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0. Introduction: Wounded in Babel 
 
The first sentences spoken in Alejandro González Iñárritu’s 2006 film, Babel, are unlikely to 
be understood by a major part of its intended audience – they are spoken in Berber. As if to 
relish the situation of non-understanding, the filmmaker has the viewer do without subtitles 
until finally displaying them from about the fifth sentence onward. The feeling of alienation 
aroused in the viewer in such an immediate way dominates this third part of the unofficial 
trilogy after Amores Perros (2000) and 21 Grams (2003). The film consists of four narrative 
strands set on three different continents that are woven into a pattern marked by 
communication barriers, isolation and desperation. A US-American married couple, Richard 
and Susan, travel to Morocco trying to save their marriage after the death of their infant third 
child, to Sudden Infant Death Syndrome. The couple export the emotional encapsulation they 
experience abroad and seem not only isolated from each other and the rest of the tour group – 
the tour bus appears like a tiny protective capsule in the midst of a hostile and foreign desert 
landscape. Communication with locals is not part of the tour, until a storyline, followed by the 
viewer with a sense of foreboding, violently and incomprehensibly bursts into the emotionally 
void, but still protective sphere. A Moroccan shepherd’s son, thoughtlessly testing the range 
of a rifle he and his brother have been given to shoot jackals, fires a bullet at the tour bus and 
critically wounds Susan, startling her from her sleep as well as from her state of depressive 
apathy.  
The gun, uncannily presented as the only means of making contact between the local 
and the tourists, triggers a narrative leading into two directions: on the one hand, to the nurse 
of the couple’s other two children, whose forced decision to take the children along to her 
son’s wedding in Tijuana ends in a nightmarish episode of border-crossing with a catastrophic 
outcome. On the other hand, the trace of the rifle leads to a Japanese businessman, who, after 
a trip through Morocco, had given the rifle as a present to his Berber guide. The businessman 
has difficulty in communicating with his deaf-mute teenage daughter, who is not only longing 
for love and appreciation, but is also traumatized by her mother’s suicide.  
As indicated by the film poster, in which the five letters of the word “Babel” draw a 
vertical separation line through its center, language also draw dividing lines between human 
beings in a globalized world. As in the myth of the tower of Babel (The Bible, Genesis 11. 1-
9), in which God punishes mankind for their hubris by confusing their tongues and scattering 
them all over the world, the characters of Iñárritu’s film find themselves divided and 
distanced from each other – an insurmountable distance, which soon seems to justify physical 
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and psychological violence against the other. Picking up on this Babelian sense of alienation, 
one review opens with the words:  
Shut your mouth. Communication is impossible. There are too many languages. There are too 
many tongues. And there is far too much cultural white noise to ever decipher the emotions and 
intent above the clatter and ricochet issuing from the globalized maw. The sheer volume of 
linguistic and societal back-spatter promises discontinuity that only ends in one of two ways: 
silence or babble. (Savlov 2006, online) 
 
While silence, in fact, pervades critical moments in all of the narrative strands, the assertion 
that there are “too many languages” is debatable, since it evokes the image of a world, in 
which language boundaries prevent human beings from communicating. Even though the 
language repertoire of the film encompasses five different languages – English, Arabic, 
Spanish, Japanese and sign language – the greater communication barriers persist between 
speakers of the same languages: husbands and wives as well as parents and children. As 
another reviewer writes, “language is far from the principal barrier” (Chocano 2006, online). 
This view is also confirmed by the director, who says that “Babel is about how our everyday 
lives are affected by walls, miscommunications and barriers” (Iñárritu in Michael 2009, 
online). Thus, the film only takes its cue from the idea of language difference to bring home 
the message: Babel is a human condition. 
 In contrast to the stories ridden by communication barriers, the film aspires to talk 
about universal sensitivities. Thus, Iñárritu stresses in a different interview that “despite all 
obvious differences, we humans have extremely much in common. And this is how I had the 
idea to make a film about borders that, eventually, are utterly redundant” (Iñárritu in Sturm 
2006, online, translation mine)
 1. In a review, titled “Emotion Needs No Translation”, A.O. 
Scott argues that Iñárritu conveys human feelings through a film language easily accessible to 
everyone: 
We may not be able to read minds or decipher words, he suggests, but we can surely decode faces, 
especially when we see them at close range and in distress. Loss, fear, pain, anguish – none of 
these emotions, it seems, are likely to be lost in translation. (Scott 2006, online) 
 
While the dominant close-ups and landscape shots certainly have a wide appeal, the words of 
the reviewer make multilingualism appear like an obstacle that Iñárritu could not keep out of 
the film. This seems misleading since the director has stated in several interviews that he, in 
fact, had to overcome severe obstacles in order to bring multilingualism into the film, for 
                                                 
1
 In the original: “Trotz aller offenkundigen Unterschiede haben wir Menschen extrem viel miteinander 
gemeinsam. Und so hatte ich die Idee, einen Film über Grenzen zu machen, die im Endeffekt völlig überflüssig 
sind.” 
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instance, having to employ translators for effectively communicating with the amateur 
Moroccan actors (cf. Chang 2007, online).   
Contrary to the statement that emotion needs no translation, I would argue that Iñárritu 
very consciously takes his characters to language boundaries since they entail a tremendous 
metaphorical potential. The boundaries of languages are linked here to limits of articulation, 
beyond which lies the unspeakable. One does not need to look very long for what the film 
presents as unspeakable: the trauma of the incomprehensible loss of loved ones, inscribed as 
the backstory wound both of the American couple and the Japanese family. What is 
considered traumatic in the field of Trauma Studies are experiences that cannot be processed 
because they resist their integration, into narrative memory, and therefore also their 
translation into symbolic language (cf. Caruth 1995, 153-54). Such a translation does not 
seem to have taken place in the two narrative strands in Babel, causing unprocessed 
sensations and languages – no matter whether English or sign – to exist parallelly in an 
emotional Babel. The figure of the language boundary makes visible the limits of what the 
characters are able to verbalize. The violent transgression of the border to the other – even if it 
occurs through a rifle bullet – surprisingly also shows a wholesome effect: the spouses reach 
out for each other again. She articulates her feelings of guilt, while he admits to having run 
away from the painful realization of their child’s death.  
 However, Iñárritu takes not only the characters, but also the viewers to language 
boundaries. By staging dialogues in a language the viewers are not likely to understand, the 
filmmaker tropes what it means to reach limits of understanding. Thus, multilingualism as 
used in the film effectively implants a sense of alienation and helplessness in the viewer. This 
narrative strategy, in turn, exerts the effect of what critics have described as “traumatic 
realism” (Foster 1996, Rothberg 2000, LaCapra 2001). In Writing History, Writing Trauma, 
Dominick LaCapra uses the expression to describe fiction that “somehow attempts to come to 
terms, affectively and cognitively, with limiting experiences involving trauma and its 
aftereffects” (2001, 26). By confronting the viewers with limits of understanding, the film can 
be said to use “multilingual realism”, which recreates a symptom of trauma and seeks to 
convey an emotional understanding of it. 
 This short analysis demonstrates three aspects: first, the film tropes the transgression 
of language boundaries as a dangerous and almost impossible endeavor, since in its Babelian 
world, communication does not proceed by means of words, but of bullets. Second, the film 
metaphorically uses the figure of the language boundary as a communication barrier between 
characters. In the context of traumatic experience, the figure can represent the limits of 
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understanding that prevent the traumatized from ‘translating’ unconscious sensations into 
narrative memory. Finally, the use of multilingual passages serves as an aesthetic strategy for 
intensifying the sense of alienation and isolation for the viewer and, thus, affectively 
approaching the intricacies of trauma.  
 Babel is not an isolated example of a work of fiction in which characters are sent to 
linguistic borderlands. A large number of works present a similar concern and engagement 
with linguistic border-crossings. Sofia Coppola’s film Lost in Translation (2003) tells the 
story of an encounter between two Americans, who feel lost in their linguistic environment as 
well as in life, and briefly find a safe haven in each other during their stay in Japan. The 
disconcerting experience of the immersion into a foreign language is used to trope a more 
general feeling of disorientation. In Jim Jarmusch’s Ghost Dog (1999), the protagonist finds 
his best friend in an ice-cream vendor with whom he does not share a common language. 
Understanding is achieved across and despite the language boundary between them. In 
Beeban Kidron’s Swept from the Sea (1997), a film based on Joseph Conrad’s 1901 novella 
Amy Foster, two characters even fall in love while being unable to communicate across 
language boundaries. In a critical moment, however, their non-understanding of the other’s 
language has disastrous consequences. 
 A differently troped, but equally strong interest in linguistic border-crossings persists 
in literary fiction. In the grandmaster of multilingual fiction, Vladimir Nabokov’s, Pnin 
(1957), the émigré protagonist’s struggle to make himself at home in the English language is a 
metaphor of his trying to lead a meaningful life that has been shaped by a constant experience 
of loss. Julia Alvarez, in her How the Garcia Girls Lost Their Accents (1991), tells stories of 
four sisters who migrate to the US from the Dominican Republic and experience their 
initiation into English as part of a wider coming-of-age process. And in Anne Michaels’ 
novel, Fugitive Pieces (1996), translation is used as a central metaphor of coming to terms 
with Holocaust trauma. 
 The figure of the language boundary and its transgression forms the main focus of my 
investigation of multilingual fiction. As shown through the example of Iñárritu’s Babel, the 
thesis pursues the following questions: on the one hand, it is interested in the negotiation of 
linguistic border-crossings: How are such transgressions achieved and what emotions are they 
invested with? Do the border-crossings present a danger to one’s life and mental integrity or a 
chance of liberation that cannot be found otherwise? These issues take into account the 
sociopolitical backgrounds in which the transgressions occur and are closely related to 
psychological and psychoanalytic theories on multilingualism and the acquisition of a second 
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language. On the other hand, the thesis explores the ways in which transgressions of language 
boundaries are used in metaphorical and aesthetic terms to trope psychological phenomena 
and their evolvement in linguistic borderlands. This investigation will mainly draw on 
translation theories concerned with the ethics and aesthetics of language boundaries and their 
transgression. Finally, the thesis shall closely examine the multilingual aesthetics involved in 
the troping of linguistic border-crossings and develop an understanding of the uses of 
‘multilingual realism’. 
This thesis deals with a number of linguistic border-crossings in fiction, all of which 
have far-reaching consequences for the protagonists. The scenarios of these transgressions 
feature characters of most various linguistic, cultural and political backgrounds. Some of them 
are monolingual travellers in exophonic territories who cannot do without translators and take 
more or less secure steps with the help of the latter. Others have grown up in linguistic 
borderlands or bilingual territories and are deeply familiar with linguistic border-crossings. 
Still others are translators or interpreters of different levels of linguistic competence, whose 
main activity consists in the transgression of language boundaries. Finally, language migrants, 
whose trajectories include the crossing of language boundaries, can be seen forming different 
relationships with their first or also their second languages – from denying their mother 
tongue to demonizing their second language. Whether the characters become dependent on 
the linguistic services of translators or turn translation or self-translation into the central 
projects of their lives – Babel never leaves the soul unmarked. Of course, the sociopolitical 
context in which the border-crossings occur as well as the political status of these subjects is 
crucial and must receive adequate attention in the analysis of multilingual fiction. However, 
as I agree with Dirk Delabastita and Rainier Grutman, contemporary fictional representations 
of multilingualism and translation have developed an increased interest in the troping of 
subjective experience in linguistic borderlands (2005, 22-24) – a circumstance which shall be 
centrally addressed in this thesis. 
 
 
From the trauma of translation to the translation of trauma 
 
Fiction that sends its protagonists across language borders is typically concerned with the 
chances and hazards of these border-crossings. Their negotiation can be conceptualized on an 
imaginary scale reaching from scenarios that end in calamity to those leading to salvation. 
What unites the works analyzed in this thesis is a common engagement with interconnections 
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between the transgression of language boundaries and psychological conditions. These 
interconnections specify the scale in the way that different mental conditions and 
developments appear at its opposite poles. At the pessimistic end, one can find representations 
of pathologies originating in acts of linguistic border-crossings, at times troped at traumas of 
‘self-translation’. Among these are anxiety, neuroses, the fragmentation of one’s self, and, at 
worst, even schizophrenia – afflictions surfacing through symptoms such as nightmares or 
obsessive-compulsive behavior. At the other end of the scale, one can position the 
representations of the linguistic border-crossing as a chance of relief of pre-existing mental 
conditions or limitations, culminating in a possible working-through of traumas from the past. 
 Fictions of linguistic border-crossings are mutually connected with political, cultural, 
linguistic, psychological and psychoanalytic discourses on multilingualism and translation, 
which, in turn, have mutually conditioned each other. In some of these fictions the points of 
reference are clearly visible, in others they are less apparent. Both ways, they are never 
isolated figurations, but resonate with tenets from different disciplines. This thesis seeks to 
examine the existing connections and to put the works of fiction in a productive dialogue with 
other theoretical positions which are sometimes consistent with the fictional tropings of 
linguistic border-crossings and sometimes put their internal gaps or contradictions into 
question in a deconstructive manner. While this dialogue shall take place in the following 
chapters, I would like to cast a brief glance at some discursive positions that make up the 
cornerstones of the configuration of linguistic border-crossings. 
 As late as in 1982, François Grosjean published a study, Life with Two Languages, in 
which one chapter is titled “The Bilingual as a Person”. In this chapter, the author strives in 
all seriousness to present some advantages of being bilingual, to defend the mental sanity of 
bilinguals and to prove that bilingualism does not necessarily have to produce split minds and 
schizophrenic psychoses. To illustrate his point, he even puts together a list of “Well-known 
Persons Who Were or Are Bilingual”, in which he includes as disparate examples as Martin 
Luther, Indira Gandhi, Marshall Tito, Henry Kissinger, Jesus Christ (“who may even have 
been trilingual”), Marie Curie, Frédéric Chopin, Pablo Picasso, and finally also Samuel 
Beckett and Vladimir Nabokov, who “are the proof that one person can write literature in two 
different languages” (1982, 284-288). Why does Grosjean strive to make such a strong case 
for bilingualism and what discourses does he respond to? 
 As Aneta Pavlenko explains in her study, Emotions and Multilingualism (2005), since 
the 19
th
 and throughout most of the 20
th
 century, discourses on bilingualism were dominated 
by the academic consensus that the phenomenon presented a pathological condition. Until the 
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late 1970s, one could observe the trend in the disciplines of linguistics, psychology, education 
and sociology to point out “adverse effects of bilingualism on children’s cognitive, linguistic, 
and emotional development” (2005, 25). Thus, researchers diagnosed and prophesied 
“alienation, apathy, cognitive dissonance, and emotional vulnerability” as well as “anomie”, a 
term connoting “the feelings of anxiety, social isolation, personal disorientation, and 
rootlessness experienced by people who are in transition from one social group to another” 
(ibid.).  
 Different approaches were taken in psychology and psychoanalysis to explain this 
variety of pathological conditions. One line of research, pursued particularly until the 1940s, 
claimed that a life in two languages necessarily led to the development of multiple identities 
in one person (see Pavlenko 2005, 26). However, even in the late 1970s, the view was still 
present that bilingualism could lead to a split identity (see Clarke 1976, Adler 1977). Thus, 
writing about foreign students in the USA, Mark Clarke associated second language and 
second culture acquisition with schizophrenia, where “social encounters become inherently 
threatening, and defense mechanisms are employed to reduce the trauma” (1976, 380). 
Drawing on Gregory Bateson’s ideas (1972), Clarke framed the process of second language 
learning as an experience involving double-bind phenomena, since the learner needs to have 
contact with speakers of the language in order to learn, while being at high risk of being 
misunderstood or even rejected due to his or her limited communicative competence. In 
Clarke’s view, the culture shock that comes with the immersion into a new language and 
culture is likely to trigger schizophrenic defense mechanisms, as described by Gregory 
Bateson: first, the subject might “assume that behind every statement there is a concealed 
meaning which is detrimental to his welfare”; second, he might “tend to accept literally 
everything people say to him”; and third, he might choose to ignore metacommunicative 
messages, in which case “he would find it necessary to see and hear less and less of what went 
on around him, and do his utmost to avoid provoking a response in his environment” (Bateson 
1972, 211). It hardly needs to be said that the analogy established between language learners 
and schizophrenic patients relegates the former into a passive victim position. 
 The possibility of being traumatized in the process of second-language learning is also 
pointed out by Alexander Guiora and associates, who base their notion of the “language ego” 
on the Freudian notion: 
In a manner similar to the concept of the body ego, language ego too is conceived as a maturation 
concept and refers to a self-presentation with physical outlines and firm boundaries. […] The 
permeability of the language ego boundaries […] is developmentally and genetically (in the 
psychoanalytic sense) determined. […] Thus a child can assimilate native-like speech in any 
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language. Once ego development is concluded, flexibility will be sharply restricted forever. (1972, 
112) 
 
If flexibility of the “language ego” is restricted, it may become threatened by the second 
language, which, as Aneta Pavlenko notes, makes second language learning “a traumatic 
experience” (2005, 30). 
 Claiming that the experience of second language learning was traumatic in its nature, 
these studies tend to ignore the fact that, as migrants, the second language learners were 
exposed to much harsher confrontations than that with the new language. As Pavlenko writes, 
a number of studies dating back to the 1940s and 1960s had already made the point that “the 
emotional maladjustment of the bilingual student is environmentally determined and is not the 
result of mental conflict” (Spoerl 1943, quoted in Pavlenko 2005, 26). What this means is that 
mental suffering resulted not so much from the exposure to the second language, but rather 
from the social stigmatization and degradation that language learners commonly experienced 
in their monolingual host communities. The role of the language learner’s social status is best 
demonstrated through the double standard involved in the responses to bilingualism and 
second language learning from the 1920s. “‘Elite bilingualism’ – that is, bilingualism of the 
upper and middle classes”, Pavlenko explains, “was typically presented as a positive 
phenomenon”, while the “bilingualism of immigrant and linguistic minority children was 
commonly associated with mental retardation, moral inferiority, split identity, and linguistic 
shortcomings” (ibid., 24). One could go so far as to claim that is was this bias that first invited 
the pathologization of bilingualism and second language learning.  
 These pathologizing discourses are relevant for this thesis, since they resurface in 
autobiographic writing on second language learning and bilingualism, as vividly demonstrated 
by Tzvetan Todorov’s essay, “Bilinguisme, dialogisme, et schizophrénie” (1985), or, more 
famously, by Eva Hoffman’s language memoir, tellingly titled Lost in Translation (1989) and 
in fictional tropings of linguistic border-crossings, as, for instance, in Michel Gondry’s The 
Science of Sleep. Tracing these discourses in the works analyzed in the thesis shall bring us 
closer to understanding the troping of self-translation as traumatic. 
At the celebratory end of the scale, on the other hand, one can find works of fiction that 
overtly draw on psychoanalytic and translation theories and make use of the metaphorical 
potential of multilingualism and translation. In this case, the intersection between trauma and 
translation is reversed. What is at stake here is not the question of trauma stemming from a 
process of translation, but that of the ‘translatability’ of traumas that existed before the act of 
translation. How can trauma become subject to a linguistic operation like translation? The 
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idea is derived from the ‘translational metaphor’ that has been used in psychoanalysis since 
Freud. As Patrick Mahony outlines, the notion of translation has been used by Freud in many 
contexts. Thus,  
neuroses and symptoms are translations of unconscious material; and the manifest or pictorial 
dream is nothing but a kind of internalized intersemiotic translation or transformation of the 
previous verbal latent dream. The analyst’s interpretations are also translations, and even more 
than this, the very movement of material in the psychic apparatus as such is understood as 
translation whereas repression is a failure of translation. (Mahony 1982, 64) 
Since Freud’s times, the metaphor has been in use in psychoanalysis and has, more recently, 
been  appropriated in Trauma Studies, where the process of processing traumatic experience 
has been described as the translation of trauma (Caruth 1995, 154; van der Kolk and van der 
Hart 1995, 173; Pestre and Benslama 2011). “When people are exposed to trauma, that is, a 
frightening event outside of ordinary human experience”, psychiatrists Bessel A. van der Kolk 
and Onno van der Hart write,  
they experience “speechless terror” […]. The experience cannot be organized on a linguistic level, 
and this failure to arrange the memory in words and symbols leaves it to be organized on a 
somatosensory or iconic level: as somatic sensations, behavioral reenactments, nightmares, and 
flashbacks” (1995, 172). 
Drawing on the translational metaphor, we could conclude from van der Hart’s and van der 
Kolk’s description that traumatic experience needs to be translated into symbolic language, 
since in its untranslated form, it tortures the traumatized subject by resurfacing through a 
number of symptoms. But can such a metaphorical phrasing do justice to the mental suffering 
of trauma victims? 
As shall be demonstrated in the thesis, the translational metaphor proves highly 
productive in the troping of traumatic experience, and can be therefore found in fictional 
representations of trauma, or serve as a heuristic tool for analyzing the latter. To explain my 
point, I will draw on the notion of trauma as understood by Cathy Caruth and the contributors 
to her edited volume, Trauma: Explorations in Memory (1995). Among the multiple 
characteristics of trauma, two aspects stand out that seem to reach out for the translational 
metaphor: the incomprehensibility of the traumatic event and its literal repetition in the mind 
of the traumatized. 
As Caruth argues in the context of Holocaust Studies, trauma victims are precluded 
from accessing their own memories of the traumatic event, since the latter “escapes full 
consciousness as it occurs”, is never “fully experienced”, and, therefore, not integrated into 
narrative memory (1995, 153, emphasis in the original). For this reason, the victims are faced 
with the impossibility of understanding what precisely they have witnessed and survived: 
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“For the survivor of trauma, then, the truth of the event may reside not only in its brutal facts, 
but also in the way that their occurrence defies simple comprehension” (ibid.). In its 
incomprehensibility, trauma can be likened to an unintelligible text in the foreign language of 
the unconscious, asking to be translated and, at the same time, resisting its translation. The 
translational metaphor appears valid in this context, since incomprehension can be seen as 
tertium comparationis between the problems posed by trauma and the lack of knowledge of a 
foreign language. 
Further, Caruth draws on the pioneering mind in the field of trauma, Pierre Janet, who 
“proposed that traumatic recall remains insistent and unchanged to the precise extent that it 
has never, from the beginning, been fully integrated into understanding” (Caruth 1995, 153). 
Modern analysts, as Caruth continues, have commented on the “surprising literality and 
nonsymbolic nature of traumatic dreams and flashbacks, which resist cure to the extent that 
they remain, precisely, literal” (1995, 5). The insistence, or repetition, is an aspect that 
traumatic memories share with repressed memories, as described by Freud, whose theories 
Caruth strongly relies on. In the essay “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through” 
(1958), Freud explains that “the patient does not remember anything of what he has forgotten 
and repressed, but acts it out” and, during the hypnotic treatment, “repeats [it] under the 
conditions of  resistance”. As to the indicated therapy, the analyst’s task lies in uncovering 
this resistance, acquainting the patient with it and allowing him or her time to “to work 
through it” in order to overcome the traumatic neurosis (1958, 150-155, emphases in the 
original).  
As psychoanalysts Élise Pestre and Fethi Benslama argue in their article on 
“Translation and Trauma”, to break out of the literal repetition of the traumatic memory, the 
traumatized subject must escape his or her own trauma-ridden inner language:  
The symbolic agency which produces meaning can be represented by the subject’s entrance into a 
language other than his own, […] or by an encounter with an analyst – simply put, by a third 
agency, an Other who triangulates what has remained undifferentiated, in this way helping the 
resumption of the process of symbolization. (2007, 21, emphasis mine) 
Thus, it appears that the traumatic memory needs to be carried across a language boundary 
and pass through the language of an other in order to emerge in a non-literal, symbolic 
quality. Unless this happens, not only the trauma victim, but also his or her children can be 
burdened by the silenced trauma throughout their lives. As Pestre and Benslama write: 
In the context of survival, the unsaid often accumulates and is transmitted “en bloc” to the heirs. It 
then forms a dense and opaque mass, composed of enigmatic contents and buried memory traces, 
which nonetheless remain alive in the heir’s psyche. These silenced events have disastrous 
consequences and remain psychically active throughout the person’s entire life. (2007, 19) 
13 
 
These thoughts are closely related to Nadine Fresco’s concept of “remembering the unknown” 
(1984), Nicolas Abraham’s and Nicholas Rand’s notion of “phantomized” memories (1988, 
4), Henri Raczymow’s idea of “memory shot through with holes” (1994), and Marianne 
Hirsch’s term of “postmemory” (1997), which all describe the after-effects of trauma on the 
descendants of the traumatized, and which we shall deal with in greater detail in the fourth 
chapter of this thesis. What stands out in Pestre’s and Benslama’s argument, is their reliance 
on the translational metaphor in the context of trauma. Thus, they point out that 
[a] true work of translation (from the Latin traducere), in the sense of moving from one place to 
another, must therefore take place if the subject, a child of the suffering exiled parents, wants to 
grow without falling prey to another’s captivating and often destructive memory. (2007, 20) 
If working through trauma depends on a “true work of translation”, what can, and must, such 
translation look like? And if the translational metaphor is incorporated in works of fiction in 
order to speak about trauma, what are its aesthetic and ethical implications? Finally, if we 
encounter tropings of trauma in multilingual fiction, how can we meaningfully put it in 
dialogue with the notion of translation? As I want to argue and as shall be demonstrated 
throughout the thesis, the translational metaphor in the field of trauma demands an ethical 
basis and invites a particular body of theory. In outlining a few characteristics implied by this 
metaphor, I shall map some of the main theoretical positions that inform my exploration of 
the translation of trauma. 
 First, if trauma can never be fully accessed, its possible translation must be freed from 
its traditional image of functioning as a copy of an assumed original. This aspects clearly 
relates it to deconstructive positions, such as that by Jacques Derrida and Paul de Man, who, 
in their writing on translation, dismiss and undermine the notion of any original (Derrida 
1985, de Man 1985). In the context of trauma, there can be no fully restorable original, nor 
could one truly wish to produce a copy of a traumatic memory that is frozen in its literality. 
Second, if the traumatized subject is to be released from the grip of literal repetition, the 
notion of a translation of trauma must be based on a “refusal of mimesis” (cf. Benjamin 1989, 
130), so as to renounce the expectation of equivalence between original and translation.  
Further, since the processing of traumatic memories depends on the patient’s breaking-
out of a traumatic inner discourse and, as Pestre and Benslama inform us, on “the subject’s 
entrance into a language other than his own” (2007, 21), the translation of trauma is best 
described by Derrida in terms of transformation: 
In the limits to which it is possible, or at least appears possible, translation practices the difference 
between signified and signifier. But if this difference is never pure, no more is translation and for 
the notion of translation we would have to substitute a notion of transformation: a regulated 
transformation of one language by another, of one text by another. We will never have, and in fact 
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never have had, to do with some ‘transport’ of pure signifieds from one language to another, or 
within one and the same language, that the signifying instrument – or ‘vehicle’ – would leave 
virgin and untouched. (Derrida 1981, 26, emphasis mine) 
In the context of trauma, the restoration of the “difference between signified and signifier” is 
crucial, if the patient is to overcome his or her “speechless terror” (van der Kolk and van der 
Hart 1995, 172), and the ensuing impossibility of articulating the traumatic experience 
through the symbolic means of language. 
 Derrida’s idea of the “regulated transformation of one language by another, of one text 
by another” (1981, 26) can be seen as an answer to the concern in Trauma Studies, as to how 
traumatic memories can be integrated into narrative memory without, however, reaching 
narrative closure. “The danger of speech, of integration into the narration of memory,” Cathy 
Caruth writes, “may lie not in what it cannot understand, but in that it understands too much” 
(1995, 154). In the deconstructive view, translation, as governed by the principle of 
différance, always remains on the way without ever fully reaching its destination, which is 
why closure can never be attained. 
 Derrida’s mentioning of the “signifying instrument” that would necessarily also 
transform a traumatic text, brings up the role of the analyst’s discourse, and, in consequence, 
touches upon the involvement of the analyst himself. Significantly, in Trauma Studies, it is 
highly debated to what extent a therapist should try to mitigate the force of trauma by helping 
a patient imagine alternative scenarios to the traumatic scenes witnessed by him or her. Thus, 
van der Kolk and van der Hart recall the example of a “therapist of a Holocaust survivor 
[who] had the patient imagine a flower growing in the assignment place in Auschwitz – an 
image that gave him tremendous comfort” (1995, 178). With regard to such alternative 
scenarios, the psychiatrists wonder “whether it is not a sacrilege of the traumatic experience to 
play with the reality of the past” (ibid., 179). These considerations coincide with Alan Bass’ 
deconstructive comment on the translator’s complex involvement in the process of translation, 
which, in his view, marks any translation as a mistranslation (cf. Bass 1985, 138-39). This 
idea, at the same time, draws attention to what Lawrence Venuti has criticized as “the 
translator’s invisibility” (1995) – a topic that shall be addressed in regard to the fictional 
translator figures present in the corpus of this thesis. The translational metaphor may be a 
matter of controversy, as demonstrated by Lewis A. Kirshner’s criticism of its use in clinical 
practice (2010), however, in fictional representations of trauma, it finds its validity and 
suggestive power, as shall be demonstrated in the thesis. 
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From language politics to psychological experience at language borders 
 
Particularly in the English-language context it is worthwhile to explore multilingual fiction, 
since English is both the lingua franca in the world and the language of both the US-American 
‘melting pot’ and the Canadian ‘cultural mosaic’. Until the 1990s, as Maria Lauret points out, 
the USA have been the site of a continuous struggle around the question whether the country 
should be regarded as monolingual or multilingual (cf. 2014, 20-24). As a result of the 
pressure of militant monolingualism, the field of literature has seen a strong emergence of 
literary studies seeking to make the multilingual heritage and contemporary cultural potential 
more visible.  
One of the early publications pursuing this objective is Alfred Arteaga’s collection of 
essays, An Other Tongue (1994), that brings together distinguished scholars, including 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Tsvetan Todorov, and Gerald Vizenor. In 1998, Werner Sollors 
publishes another volume of essays, Multilingual America, followed by The Multilingual 
Anthology of American Literature, co-edited with Marc Shell (2000). Shell’s own edited 
volume, American Babel (2002), appears only two years later. Another fierce attack against 
the dictate of monolingualism in the United States is launched by Doris Sommer, who 
demonstrates, first in her edited volume, Bilingual Games (2003) and then in her monograph, 
Bilingual Aesthetics (2004), the subversive political potential of literary and everyday 
multilingualism. Finally, Lawrence Rosenwald, in his monograph, Multilingual America 
(2008), examines the history and the linguistic representation of encounters between 
communities speaking different languages, and considers how multilingual fiction can be 
translated and incorporated into US-American literary history. The ground for these broad 
explorations is prepared by studies focused on different ethnic literatures. Among those, the 
monographs by Alan Rosen (2005) and Hana Wirth-Nesher (2006) offer important 
contributions in the field of Jewish-American, and Gustavo Pérez Firmat (2003) and Isabel 
Alvarez Borland and Lynette Bosch (2009) in the field of Hispanic-American literary studies. 
Since neither the drawing of linguistic borders nor the negotiation of mono- or 
multilingualism of individuals and states take place in a politically neutral territory, it is vital 
to the explore the sociopolitical and historical contexts of language boundaries. Nevertheless, 
this thesis shifts the attention to psychological processes of individuals moving in these 
contexts. The background of this focus is a simple and complex one at the same time: first, the 
significance of the sociopolitical context results from the fact that individuals are affected 
directly in their inner life by language politics. Colonial endeavors of imposing a new 
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language would not matter much if they did not do violence to colonial subjects by repressing 
their own languages and submitting them to a hegemonic discourse in a foreign language. 
Migration would be much less of a strain if the immersion into a new language did not have 
strong psychological effects on migrants. Finally, debates over possible multilingualism in a 
country would have less weight if it did not matter to its citizens whether they daily move 
within one or several languages. It seems difficult to ignore these connections, which makes 
explorations of the human psyche in linguistic borderlands and its fictional representations a 
worthy subject. 
At the same time – and this is the complex issue at stake here – the question arises about 
the effects that the transgression of language borders can have on the emotional and psychic 
constitution of individuals. What exactly happens in the mind of migrants, who feel forced to 
abandon their mother tongues in favor of a new language? And what does it mean if the inner 
life of individuals is coded in two languages from the very beginning? In this context, 
psychoanalytic and psychological explorations become relevant, and will play an important 
part in this thesis.  
Such studies range from Sigmund Freud’s and Josef Breuer’s writings on multilingual 
patients such as Anna O. in their Studies on Hysteria (1955d) or Freud’s thoughts on the 
multilingual encoding of dreams in The Interpretation of Dreams (1953b). Another important 
study for my work is Nicolas Abraham’s and Maria Torok’s The Wolf Man’s Magic Word: A 
Cryptonymy (1986), a rereading of the case history of Freud’s long-term patient, in which the 
authors develop the idea of a mechanism for encrypting unspeakable experiences by means of 
crossing language boundaries.  
While Abraham and Torok approach the Wolf Man, whom they never meet in person, as 
an encrypted text requiring a particular reading practice, other studies rely on the clinical 
work with ‘language migrants’, that is patients whose migration included the crossing of 
language boundaries. Thus, my thesis is informed by the work of Leon and Rebeca Grinberg 
(1989), of Salman Akhtar (1995, 1999, 2011) and of Sophie Walsh and Shmuel Shulman 
(2007), who have researched the phenomenon of immigration from a psychoanalytic 
perspective. Further, I draw on linguistic explorations of multilingualism pursuing 
psychoanalytic perspectives. These include François Grosjean’s work on bilingualism (1982, 
2010), the contributions to the edited volume, Multilingualism, Second Language Learning, 
and Gender, by Aneta Pavlenko et al. (2001) as well as her study on Emotions and 
Multilingualism (2005) and Claire Kramsch’s study of The Multilingual Subject (2009). 
Finally, I take my cue from Jacqueline Amati-Mehler’s, Simona Argentieri’s and Jorge 
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Canestri’s The Babel of the Unconscious (1993), which offers enlightening insights into their 
psychoanalytic work with multilingual patients and presents, up to date, the most 
comprehensive study of the psycho-emotional effects of multilingualism. 
 
 
From translingual authors to multilingual scenarios and aesthetics 
 
To come back to studies of multilingual fiction, nearly all of them highlight the fact that 
literary multilingualism raises psychological questions, which, however, have not yet been 
examined systematically. There is a considerable body of work on multilingual writing that 
pursues psychological perspectives such as by Elizabeth K. Beaujour (1989), Steven Kellman 
(2000, 2003), Isabelle de Courtivron (2003), Georg Kremnitz (2004) and Axel Englund and 
Anders Olsson (2013). However, the focus of these studies lies not so much on multilingual 
fiction as on “literary translingualism, the phenomenon of authors who write in more than one 
language or at least in a language other than their primary one” (Kellman 2003, ix). In the 
politically and socioculturally highly charged field of multilingual writing, these studies 
choose to keep the authors ‘alive’, strongly emphasizing their biographies and relying on their 
reflections on their own writing, rather than putting the emphasis on the aesthetic strategies 
and narrative strategies employed in their fiction.  
While these critical studies give productive impulses for this thesis, my main interest 
lies not so much in the multilingual lives of fiction writers, but rather in works experimenting 
with multiple languages. As I want to suggest, in our globalized times, the focus on 
translingual biographies sets a rather narrow frame to the study of multilingual works. This is 
not only due to Roland Barthes’ proclamation of the death of the author (1967), but also to the 
fact that such biographies do not appear entirely exceptional in our times. The migration of 
millions of people for political and economic reasons has been, as Delabastita and Grutman 
note, an ongoing phenomenon since the early 19
th
 century (2005, 14). Additionally, due to 
globalized politics, economy and education as well as the promotion of mobility, we 
nowadays witness increasing numbers of language migrants, who choose to leave their 
linguistic homeland for professional or personal reasons. Therefore, it is safe to say, with 
Manfred Schmeling, that Babel is our reality (cf. 2004, 222). 
This Babelian reality, in my view, also suggests a different approach to multilingual 
fiction. Rather than analyzing the psychology behind the act of its creation, it seems 
interesting to focus on its highly imaginative configurations of the transgression of language 
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boundaries as well on the ways in which these configurations are presented by means of 
multilingual aesthetics. As the thesis shall show, the corpus of fiction dealing with linguistic 
border-crossings is by far not limited to works of those who have undergone language 
migration themselves, as is clearly proved by the case of Jonathan Safran Foer, Michel 
Gondry or Lars von Trier. Like their translingual colleagues, their almost fantastic 
psychological scenarios at language borders and their aesthetic experiments with 
multilingualism and translation definitely deserve critical attention. 
My interest in depictions of psychological experience in the transgression of language 
borders is most closely related to approaches centrally focused on the aesthetics of 
multilingual fiction. Thus, my thesis is informed by contributions to the edited volumes by 
Johann Strutz and Peter Zima (1996), Manfred Schmeling and Monika Schmitz-Emans 
(2002), Monika Schmitz-Emans (2004), Dirk Delabastita and Rainier Grutman (2005), and 
Susan Arndt, Dirk Naguschewski, and Robert Stockhammer (2007). Also, my readings are 
influenced by Leonard Forster’s pioneering study of multilingualism in literature (1970) and 
K. Alfons Knauth monograph, in which he defines translation and multilingual literature as a 
new field of research in Comparative Literature (2011).  
With regard to my focus on linguistic encounter between English and other languages, 
my work is related, to a certain degree, to Evelyn Nien-Ming Ch’ien’s study, Weird English, 
in which she promotes the “sometimes unrecognizable English created through the blending 
of one or more languages with English”, claiming that it “constitutes the new language of 
literature” (2004, 3-4). Also, I take my cue from Maria Lauret’s remarkable study, 
Wanderwords, in which she develops a poetics of otherness inscribed into English by authors 
whose work is influenced by language migration. She argues for a multilingual reading 
practice that focuses on the function and aesthetic effect of “wanderwords” or “words and 
passages in other languages that deliberately appear to obstruct the transparency of English” 
(2014, 1). A study of equal importance to my framework is Martha Cutter’s  Lost and Found 
in Translation (2005), in which the critic assigns the trope of translation a central role in 
American ethnic writing, demonstrating that “there is a trope of cultural and linguistic 
translation specific to this body of writing and distinguishable from the treatment of this topic 
in Anglo-American literature” (1). Exploring literary multilingualism within the field of 
German Literature, Yasemin Yildiz’ book, Beyond the Mother Tongue, that studies “the 
working of the monolingual paradigm and multilingual attempts to overcome it” (2012, 4), 
offers valuable impulses. 
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After this introductory presentation, it may come as a surprise that I have chosen to 
open the discussion of multilingual fiction with the only non-fictional exception to the corpus: 
Eva Hoffman’s memoir, Lost in Translation (1989). The work is assigned this prominent 
place since it has been singled out as a milestone by critics dealing with the topics of language 
migration, multilingualism, translation and, most importantly in this context, with 
psychological experience at language borders. Since the memoir is vastly familiar in academic 
circles, I consider it a good departure point for discussing a corpus of fictional works, related 
to the same issues and, as in the case of the most experimental ones among them, still fairly 
unknown in academia. The memoir’s quality as non-fiction does not alter the approach that I 
have described above and shall take to analyze it. As with the works of fiction, my main 
interest lies in the troping of the figure of linguistic border-crossing, the social and academic 
discourses on psychology and translation it is based on, and the aesthetics employed to 
emphasize the evaluation of multilingualism and translation. Finally, rather than merely 
celebrating the memoir as a sincere and touching account of language migration, I set out to 
investigate the gaps and silences that I regard as constitutive for this work. 
 
 
From cushioned to radical multilingualism 
 
In my understanding of literary multilingualism, I rely on an open and flexible concept of 
languages, as suggested by Delabastita and Grutman,  
which acknowledges not only the ‘official’ taxonomy of languages but also the incredible range 
of subtypes and varieties existing within various officially recognised languages, and indeed 
sometimes cutting across and challenging out neat linguistic typologies (2005, 15, emphases in 
the original). 
This concept allows me to embrace not only works that draw on English and at least one other 
clearly identifiable language, but also texts that employ hybrid languages such as Haitian 
Kreyòl, as in Edwidge Danticat’s The Farming of Bones, and Dominican Spanglish as in 
Junot Diaz’ The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao, and even artificial varieties of English as 
the one composed by Jonathan Safran Foer for his translator figure in Everything Is 
Illuminated. This decision is motivated by the fact that, as I agree with Delabastita and 
Grutman, what matters in the critical interpretation of multilingual texts is not so much the 
official status of the languages used, but their textual interplay (cf. 2005, 16). 
 The question of the textual interplay, in turn, goes beyond a technical evaluation of the 
quantity of foreign-language insertions or their degree of prominence in the text. Rather, it is 
relevant to examine multilingual aesthetics in their functional context, both in regard to the 
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fictional worlds they configure and their accessibility to monolingual, bilingual and 
multilingual readers. As to the former, it is interesting to investigate how the works of fiction 
“linguistically orchestrate the various character and narrative voices” (Delabastita and 
Grutman 2005, 16), which means to analyze the characters’ linguistic origins and trajectories; 
their linguistic competence and emotional relations to the languages used by them and around 
them; and finally, the personal and political statements implied in the characters’ use of their 
mother tongues or foreign languages. 
 The extent to which authors choose to mimetically render the languages that their 
characters are supposed to be using of course depends on their choices to address a certain 
audience – an audience that is naturally smaller, if the knowledge of two or more languages is 
necessary for the understanding of the text. To describe the multilingual aesthetics used in the 
works I examine, I shall draw on the systematization of code-switching strategies as 
developed by Lourdes Torres in her essay on Latino/a writers publishing in the United States 
(2007). The critic distinguishes between three main strategies of including languages other 
than English, which challenge the monolingual reader to different extents.  
First, a writer can decide to cater to a monolingual audience by drawing on an “easily 
accessed, transparent, or cushioned” multilingualism (2007, 79). In this case, the foreign 
language would be used with the prime objective to create a “more ethnic text” (ibid., 78) that 
would be merely flavored with a scent of exotic linguistic otherness. Strategies of this kind 
include using only foreign-language words that the monolingual reader would understand or 
marking them as foreign bodies by italicizing them and giving the English translation. Thus, 
the reader “does not have to leave the comfortable realm of his/her own complacent 
monolingualism” (ibid.). Second, authors can choose to gratify the bilingual reader, for 
instance by making use of unmarked and untranslated phrases or entire sentences or drawing 
on informal expressions in the foreign language (cf. ibid., 83). As Torres argues, “[t]he 
bilingual, bicultural reader will derive most pleasure from this text, while the monolingual 
reader will find parts of it inaccessible” (ibid., 85). Third, writers can resort to “radical 
bilingualism”, in which both languages are used so extensively that the texts can be only 
understood by bilingual readers (ibid., 86). This significantly reduces their publishing 
opportunities, which is why texts like Giannina Braschi’s Yo-Yo Boing! (1998) and Susana 
Chavez- Silverman’s Killer Crónicas (2004) are published by academic presses, rather than 
mainstream ones (cf. ibid.).  
Torres’ systematization of multilingual strategies displays a clear political perspective 
and shall prove useful in my readings. However, rather than ‘applying’ this taxonomy on the 
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texts and categorizing them as more or less politically engaged, I favor a more integrative 
approach that considers writers’ choices of aesthetic strategies both in the context of their 
intended reception by the readers and in that of the fictional scenarios they develop. As shall 
become clear, the political agendas involved in the choice of multilingual strategies and the 
configuration of the story may be at odds with each other, which forces us to take a closer 
look at the ethics involved in their multilingual aesthetics. 
 
 
Why multilingual films? 
 
As implied by the introductory example, my analysis of trauma and translation in multilingual 
fiction is not limited to written texts, also includes fiction films. To be sure, whereas literature 
consists solely of language, language in films figures mainly at the level of dialogue, which 
makes up but a part of the filmic code. However, what justifies the decision to combine the 
two media in this framework is the fact that, like literary fiction, film is a narrative genre as 
confirmed by influential film studies such as Seymour Chatman’s Story and Discourse: 
Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film (1978) or David Bordwell’s Narration in the Fiction 
Film (1985) and Poetics of Cinema (2007). The categories used by Bordwell for analyzing 
narrative cinema, that is “story world”, “plot structure” and “narration” do not stray far from 
those for analyzing novels, which enables the common treatment of the two media.  
 What is more, the extent to which multilingualism is exerted in fictional discourse of 
novels and films can be analyzed within the same framework. Thus, Lukas Bleichenbacher, in 
a study of multilingualism in Hollywood productions (2008), draws on a taxonomy 
established by Petr Mareš representing the treatment of multilingual discourse in fictional 
texts. The taxonomy distinguishes four strategies that, according to Bleichenbacher can be 
equally found in fiction film: “elimination”, in which “any speech that would have been in 
another language is completely replaced with an unmarked standard variety of the base 
language”; “signalization, where the replaced language is explicitly named in a metalinguistic 
comment”; “evocation”, in which “characters speak a variety of the base language that is 
characterized by interference (transfer) from the language they would really be speaking”; and 
finally, “presence”, in which “the other language is not replaced at all” (Bleichenbacher 2008, 
23-25).  
While originally detected in written texts, the strategy of evocation, in particular, can 
be practiced in film even more easily than in novels. “While literature”, as film scholar 
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Verena Berger reminds us, “uses language in its written form, cinema and theatre have the 
advantage of allowing their audiences to experience language at an acoustic level.” (2010, 8). 
This enables the playing with accents in film dialogue – an experiment that, in literary texts, 
can be realized only by means of violations of orthography and, therefore, brings about a 
much more alienating effect on the audience. To this I would add that the presence of 
different languages in film entails a lesser experimental risk than that in novels because 
dialogue constitutes only a small part of film language. Thus, verbal non-understanding can 
be easily compensated though the visual channel, for instance, by means of acting techniques, 
the action in a scene or the mise-on-scène, which can provide the necessary context for 
divining the content of a foreign-language dialogue. 
What makes the consideration of film particularly attractive in this analysis is the fact 
that, from its moment of birth, cinema has been a multilingual genre commonly relying on 
translation. In relation to the processes of film production and distribution, Tessa Dwyer 
points out that the era of silent film featured a vast array of translation practices: “Intertitles 
were swapped, films were accompanied by live commentators/interpreters, and whole 
storylines were transformed.” (2005, 301) Along similar lines, Tijana Mamula and Lisa Patti 
recall  
cinema’s popularization through urban immigrant communities at the turn of the twentieth 
century; the fact that Hollywood itself was built in good parts by immigrants, and classical 
Hollywood narrative and style consolidated through the work of countless displaced practitioners” 
(2016, 1) 
Therefore, even linguistically homogenous films are not free from hidden “undercurrents of 
polyglottism”, which is why recent research has focused on uncovering “multilingualism’s 
traces beyond the soundtrack” (Mamula and Patti 2016, 5-6).  
 As to its traces in the very soundtrack, Ella Shochat and Robert Stam discuss in a 
pioneering essay of 1985 the way Hollywood has strengthened US-American monolingual 
politics by making language difference in its story worlds invisible:  
Hollywood both profited from and itself promoted the universalisation of the English  language as 
the idiom of speaking subjects, thus contributing indirectly to the subtle erosion of the linguistic 
autonomy of other cultures. By virtue of its global diffusion, Hollywood became an agent in the 
dissemination of Anglo-American cultural hegemony. (36) 
While silencing language difference in some cases, Hollywood productions have, on the hand, 
exposed it, as Bleichenbacher argues, for the sake of characterizing and stereotyping certain 
characters. In contrast to this Hollywood practice, particularly European cinema, in the last 
two decades, has created ‘polyglot films’ which take into account the conditions of migrant 
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and diasporic existence. In a much-quoted essay, Wahl defines polyglot film as a genre 
acknowledging multilingualism in the world: 
[In] polyglot film […] languages are used in the way they would be used in reality, They define 
geographical or political borders, ‘visualise the different social, personal or cultural levels of the 
characters and enrich their aura in conjunction with the voice. (Wahl 2005, online) 
In a more emphatic way, Hamid Naficy defines the entire corpus of cinema made by exilic, 
diasporic, and postcolonial ethnic and identity filmmakers who live and work in countries 
other than their country of origin as inherently “accented” (Naficy 2001, 11ff). Since the main 
emphasis in this thesis lies not so much on the translingual biographies of the artist, but on the 
fictional negotiation of linguistic border-crossings, my own approach is more closely related 
to Wahl’s understanding of “polyglot film”. Thus, while the notion of “accented cinema” will 
surface rather briefly in my discussion of Atom Egoyan’s film Calendar, I regard the former 
as a constitutive part of what I shall describe as ‘multilingual realism’. 
 
 
Chapter Outline 
 
The first chapter starts out at the pessimistic end of possible negotiations of linguistic border-
crossings and analyzes constructions of trauma and other pathological conditions suffered at 
this threshold. For this purpose, it zooms in on two works dealing with the process of 
language migration: Eva Hoffman’s ‘language memoir’ Lost in Translation (1989) and Atom 
Egoyan’s feature film Calendar (1993). The chapter explores how the works trope and 
negotiate the process of ‘self-translation’, in which language migrants settle down in the new 
language, and how they are characterized in their role as “translated men”, to speak with 
Salman Rushdie (1991, 16). 
Since both works link the transgression of language boundaries to psychopathological 
conditions, it will prove relevant to examine the psychoanalytic patterns they draw on to 
configure their narratives at language borders. How do they configure the course of the 
illness? To what exactly do they ascribe a traumatizing effect? How do they stage the later 
return of the memories of traumatic linguistic border-crossings? What earlier experiences of 
the characters do they reference to explain the traumatic quality of the encounter with the 
foreign language? And finally: How do the works enact symptoms of the pathological 
conditions and how do they trope possible ways of therapy? 
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In this context, it will be important to understand what stance the works take in general 
towards multilingualism and translation. The chapter asks, therefore, what political and 
academic discourses on the two topics the works rely on. What is at stake here are traditional 
images of multilingual individuals in “postmonolingual” societies (Yildiz 2012), as well as 
approaches to the politics of translation. In the context of the latter, the chapter explores the 
hierarchical structures the process of translation is governed by: How do the works configure 
the relation between the ‘original’ and its translated version? What position is assigned to 
translator figures? And what is the political potential ascribed to the act of translation? 
Moreover, the chapter focuses on the aesthetics and narrative strategies employed in 
the two works for troping the figure of linguistic border-crossing. It sets out to demonstrate 
that, on the one hand, they draw on multilingual aesthetics in various ways in order to 
transmit the characters’ psychological experience at language borders to the reader or viewer. 
On the other hand, I shall argue that in opting for one type of multilingual strategies or 
another, the works always implicitly position themselves in regard to the topics of 
multilingualism and translation. 
The second chapter explores how the figure and the aesthetics of linguistic border-
crossings are productively used to map a different field, relevant in the psychoanalytic 
context: the social and individual construction of gender and sexual identities. Focusing on 
Yann Martel’s novel Self (1996) and Junot Diaz’ The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao 
(2007), the chapter analyzes fictions, in which the development of this part of identity is 
closely linked to the language identity of the protagonists. As shall be argued, these narratives 
emphasize a correlation between the monolingualism of a society and its dictate of gender 
roles and sexual orientation. Therefore, it shall prove useful to examine how the figure of the 
language border is associated with gender difference and heteronormativity so as to 
understand how the novels negotiate the chances in the transgressions of boundaries in all 
three fields. 
In order to investigate this metaphorically structured negotiation, I shall put the works 
of fiction in dialogue with theories on the role of the mother tongue in the psychological 
constitution of the individual, as developed by Jacqueline Amati-Mehler et al. (1993). The 
question at the base of such negotiations is, as shall be shown, whether a renunciation of the 
mother tongue is possible, and if so, whether such a move is configured as an act of liberation 
or the trigger of a traumatic inner split. Furthermore, the chapter traces the references that the 
two novels establish to psychoanalytic theories on the development of gender identity and 
sexuality, as formulated by Jacques Lacan (2006) and Jacqueline Rose (1985). As shall be 
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illustrated, these theories map the ground for the metaphorical connection with 
multilingualism and translation. 
It shall be argued in the chapter that multilingual aesthetics play a central part in the 
negotiation of language and gender identity. The two novels offer fertile ground for the 
exploration of different forms of literary multilingualism and its functions. Martel’s Self 
depicts the split of the narrative voice into two languages, and inserts long untranslated 
passages in languages which the target audience is unlikely to understand. In regard to The 
Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao, my analysis focuses on the lexically, syntactically and 
phonetically hybrid linguistic discourse that is often also referred to as Spanglish. The chapter 
discusses in what ways these different multilingual strategies are used to subvert or enforce 
dominant discourses on gender identity and sexuality. 
The third chapter investigates the staging of multilingual dreams in two transnational 
films, Lars von Trier’s Europa (1991) and Michel Gondry’s The Science of Sleep (2006). My 
investigation is guided by the hypothesis that the multilingual dream texts are used in the 
films as projection screen for collective and individual repressed memories and anxieties, 
respectively. The chapter analyzes how the dreams enacted in the films strongly deviate from 
the “pleasure principle” initially assumed by Freud (1953a), and how the viewers are led into 
a realm of darkness and impotence. As shall be argued, the multilingualism of the staged 
dreams is troped as subverting multiple human faculties: the ability to understand, to 
communicate, to process experience, and to determine one’s own actions. It is the central aim 
of this chapter to demonstrate how the films design a ‘Babel of terror’ in order to release the 
repressed and to expose the protagonists to voices in languages they had, literally or 
metaphorically, tried to silence in themselves. 
As enactments of the “via regia to the unconscious”, the two films reveal an intense 
dialogue with Freud’s writings on The Interpretation of Dreams (1953a,b). As shall be 
demonstrated in this chapter, both filmic narratives subject their protagonists particularly to 
one aspect dealt with extensively in psychoanalytic thinking: regression, or the condition of 
being thrown back into childhood. Additionally, in the context of Lars von Trier’s Europa, I 
take my cue from Arnold van Gennep’s (1960) und Victor Turner’s (1964, 1969, 1974) 
theories of rites of passage so as to trace the process and the implications of the English-
speaking protagonist’s linguistic initiation into his German-speaking surroundings. In regard 
to Michel Gondry‘s The Science of Sleep, Freud’s study on “Delusions and Dreams in 
Jensen’s Gradiva” (1957a) and his writings “On Narcissism” (1957b) shall prove useful in 
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order to understand the protagonist’s struggle for control over the languages lodged in his 
unconscious. 
My analysis is also focused on the multilingual aesthetics of the two films, which have 
been largely ignored by critics up to date. First, I shall examine how subtitles are used to 
provide the viewers with an information advantage in comparison to the protagonists, and 
how, at the same time, they are led to face limits of understanding. Second, I pursue the 
question of fictional characterization in a multilingual context and wonder to what extent and 
with what effect psychological realism plays a role in the linguistic set-up of the characters. 
Finally, the chapter discusses the interrelation between multilingualism and the technically 
complex and experimental visual world as employed in the two films. This will help clarify 
the central question: whether and to what end the visual aesthetics also attract the viewer’s 
attention to the films’ multilingual set-up, or rather serve to distract from the latter. 
The fourth chapter is devoted to the figure of linguistic border-crossing in the context 
of historical trauma and its literary representation in Jonathan Safran Foer’s Holocaust novel 
Everything Is Illuminated (2002) and Edwidge Danticat’s novel The Farming of Bones 
(1998), which narrates the 1937 genocide of the Haitian population in the Dominican 
Republic. As shall be shown, the figure of linguistic border-crossing is of particular relevance 
in the context of traumatic experience, situated, as psychoanalysis and trauma theory teach us, 
at the limits of language. The chapter, therefore, explores the interconnections between the 
limits of languages and language as such. It suggests that the novels trope the possibility of 
working through historical traumas by means of negotiating possible transgressions of 
language boundaries. 
To explore the troping of the limits of language(s), the novels are analyzed, on the one 
hand, with regard to their depictions of symptoms of trauma, potential ways of healing from 
it, and the psychological after-effects on the descendants of the traumatized. This exploration 
mainly draws on the writings of trauma theorists such as Cathy Caruth (1995, 1996), 
Shoshana Felman (1992), Dori Laub (1995) and Ernst van Alphen (1999), as well as on ideas 
regarding the transmission of trauma as formulated by Nadine Fresco (1984), Henri 
Raczymow (1994) and Marianne Hirsch (1997). On the other hand, the two novels are 
brought into productive dialogue with Walter Benjamin’s (2000), Jacques Derrida’s (1985) 
und Paul de Man’s (1985) theories on translatability. I shall devote particular attention to 
questions arising at the intersections of psychoanalysis and deconstructive translation 
theories: How can trauma be inscribed as a multilingual legacy in one’s family narrative? 
What are the traces left in the psyche by an individual’s expulsion from their own language? 
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Can traumatic memories be translated? And what exactly would be the task of the translator 
of trauma? Finally, the chapter raises the question of the ethics involved in the translation of 
trauma, both in the context of psychoanalysis and the politics of translation. In this 
exploration, the Bakhtinian ideas of dialogism and heteroglossia shall provide a valuable basis 
(1981). 
Since trauma presents, among other things, a phenomenon of language, the linguistic 
texture of its literary representations is a crucial issue. As the chapter proposes, the limits of 
language(s) can not only be written about, but inscribed into the very texture of literary works, 
thus becoming an ingenious narrative strategy for representing traumatic experience. Two 
further forms of literary multilingualism can be observed here: in Danticat’s novel, the 
insertion of translated and explained words in Spanish and Kreyól into an otherwise English 
text, and in Foer’s text, the opposition between correct and broken or unidiomatic English 
constituting what could be called pseudo-multilingualism. Both the aesthetics of multilingual 
transparence and that of the pseudo-multilingual intransparence are discussed as strategies for 
representing trauma and its after-effects on the descendants of the traumatized. 
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1. Losses in Translation and the Translation of Loss: Eva Hoffman’s Lost in Translation 
(1989) and Atom Egoyan’s Calendar (1993) 
 
In works of fiction and non-fiction, one often encounters the fantasy of a world without 
language borders and the need for translation. This can be observed in the introductory 
example of Alejandro González Iñárritu’s Babel as well as in Sidney Pollack’s film The 
Interpreter (2005), the film poster of which presented the telling slogan: “the truth needs no 
translation”. However, there is hardly a title that epitomizes this longing for a pre-Babelian 
world more famously than Lost in Translation. Drawing on the title of a poem by James 
Merrill, Eva Hoffman first prominently used it to render the hardships of her language 
migration. The fact that Hoffman struck a nerve of the time with the re-use of this title can be 
clearly deduced from the large number of works, most prominently Sofia Coppola’s 2003 
film, that subsequently adopted the title for their own purposes. 
 The question of potential losses in translation is also raised, in Atom Egoyan’s 1993 
film, Calendar, in which the protagonist takes his wife along on a journey as his interpreter 
and literally loses her in the process of translation. In the two works by Hoffman and Egoyan, 
the transgression of language boundaries in the shape of language migration appears as the 
pivotal figure. Both works explore the relation that language migrants develop towards their 
first and their second languages. Also, they negotiate the implications of traces of the first 
within the second language, which figure on the semantic, syntactic, or also phonetic level in 
the form of an accent.  
Curiously, Lost in Translation and Calendar both narrate stories of linguistic border-
crossings through psychological case studies, which encompasses the naming or staging of 
symptoms, the exploration of their origins, and the suggested therapies, in turn, closely linked 
with multilingualism and translation. This chapter examines how these multilingual narratives 
are constructed and what elements they comprise. The representation and negotiation of 
language learning processes is central in this context: What are the emotions that accompany 
such processes? What goals do language migrants seek to achieve in their new language and 
what compensation mechanisms are triggered for the sake of succeeding? Since language 
learning always implies an encounter with what is perceived as different or foreign, it is 
interesting to analyze how the protagonists react when faced with linguistic difference. The 
narratives’ construction as case histories suggests to examine where and how these reactions 
were acquired. 
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Set within particular socio-political and historical contexts, the two narratives also 
invite a reading for their internal gaps and contradictions as well as the ideological constructs 
they draw on to approach the issue of difference. For examining the two works, it shall prove 
instructive to scrutinize the translation theories and politics underlying the negotiation of 
linguistic border-crossings. Thus, it will be relevant to question hierarchical relationships set 
up between perceived originals and their translations, the relationship between the source and 
the target language and the role of the translator. Finally, we will deal with the multilingual 
aesthetics and narrative strategies and their role in the works’ staging of their case histories. In 
examining these questions, we will develop an understanding of narratives that associate 
linguistic border-crossing with the experience of loss. 
 
 
The (Un)Translatability of One’s Self: Eva Hoffman’s Lost in Translation 
 
Hardly any other work appears more appropriate for opening the following thesis than Eva 
Hoffman’s Lost in Translation. Written by one of the countless language migrants to North 
America, the book was published at the onset of a historical period marked by waves of mass 
migration from East to West in the aftermath of the Cold War and the Fall of the Iron Curtain. 
It owes its popularity not least to the fact that thousands of migrants of the 1990s could 
identify with Hoffman’s autobiographic narrative about her cultural and linguistic transition 
from her native post-war Poland to Canada and later the United States of the 1960s. However, 
it is more than just a convenient chronological point of departure. With the two suggestive 
notions of a ‘loss’ and of ‘translation’, Eva Hoffman maps out a significant part of the terrain 
that this thesis sets out to cover. However, rather than marking two distinct points on a route, 
the memoir, which Alice Yaeger Kaplan would classify as a ‘language memoir’ (1994), puts 
up signposts to numerous destinations.  
 First, the notion of ‘loss’ at the borders between languages: is it transitory or 
permanent and who or what exactly does not seem to survive the passage? Second, and more 
complexly, translation: where there is translation, there must also be a translator. The curious 
aspect in Hoffman’s text is that she engages in self-translation, in which she emerges 
simultaneously as a text to be translated and the translator of her own self. Also, Hoffman’s 
text presents a curious deviation from the common practice in literary translation: Instead of 
translating a text from a foreign into her mother tongue, she veers in the opposite direction, 
seeking to translate her Polish text of self into her new language, English. What is more, in 
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her metaphorical use of the notion, Hoffman refuses to restrict herself to the type of 
translation termed “interlingual” by Roman Jakobson in his 1959 essay (2001, 114). Instead, 
her translation operates simultaneously in a cultural, linguistic and psychological sphere and 
suggests different tracks of interpretation. Depending on the choice of the track, cultural, 
linguistic or psychological, one can observe different phenomena – on the one hand, losses 
that occur in the field of translation, on the other, translation operating in the field of loss. Let 
us begin with the first one. 
 The first loss she suffers that of a sense of unity, which she anticipates through a 
spatial metaphor even before arriving to Vancouver, the destination of her “exile”: 
The train cuts through endless expanses of terrain, most of it flat and monotonous, and it seems to 
me that the relentless rhythm of the wheels is like scissors cutting a three-thousand-mile rip 
through my life. From now on, my life will be divided into two parts, with the line drawn by this 
train. (100) 
The train can be said to function as the vehicle of her ‘translation’. Hoffman leaves no doubt 
about the fact that this process of translation is violent, unstoppable and forced upon her. The 
“rip” through her life is lifted out of the metaphorical domain, when she recalls a ceremony of 
“careless baptism”, which she and her younger sister undergo against their will upon entering 
school. In this ceremony, their names are assimilated to sound more English, with “Ewa” 
turning in “Eva” and “Alina” into “Elaine” (105). Hoffman’s portrayal of the scene remains 
closely connected to the imagery of the train ride, since it sets a mechanism in motion that 
relentlessly makes the distance to themselves grow, or as she puts it, that “make[s] us 
strangers to ourselves” (ibid.).  
 While Hoffman recites this ceremony as an example of a split afflicted to her by her 
surroundings, it is mostly herself who, in the following, carefully preserves the divide 
between what she perceives to be her Polish and her English self. Thus, the alienation that 
Eva feels toward her ‘translated’ name becomes generalized, when she enters the process of 
second-language learning: “The words I learn now don’t stand for things in the same 
unquestioned way they did in my native tongue” (106), she complains, and gives an example:  
“River” in Polish was a vital sound, energized with the essence of riverhood, of my rivers, of my 
being immersed in rivers. “River” in English is cold – a word without an aura. It has no 
accumulated associations for me, and it does not give off the radiating haze of connotation. It does 
not evoke. (106) 
It is curious to observe how the adult narrator hurries to rationalize her feeling of alienation 
by associating it with “structuralist wisdom” (107). In fact, her analysis of the word ‘river’ 
expresses much more than what she will address as “the problem […] that the signifier has 
become severed from the signified” (106). While the use of Saussurean vocabulary attests to 
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her later familiarity with academic thought popular in the United States during the time of her 
studies, her thoughts on her linguistic transition attest to a radical feeling of foreignness.  
 Most importantly, however, her comparison between her first and second languages 
displays a clear tendency to idealize and romanticize her mother tongue against the 
background of the new language. The division of her self proceeds along the lines of the 
dichotomy of ‘original and copy’. Reflecting on the word “river”, Hoffman makes clear that 
whereas the Polish ‘original’ encompasses vitality, essence and an aura, the process of 
translation into English “drain[s] the world not only of significance but of its colors, 
striations, nuances – is very existence” and therefore causes “the loss of a living connection” 
(107). In line with this polarizing view on linguistic translation, she observes the negative 
traces translation has left on her own body, writing that “after the passage across the Atlantic, 
[she has] emerged as less attractive, less graceful, less desirable” (109).  
 This evaluation of the relationship between the original and the translation as well as 
that between the source and the target language can be associated what Paul Ricoeur’s theory, 
in which, drawing on psychoanalytic vocabulary, he describes “the work of remembering” 
and “the work of mourning” in translation (Ricoeur 2004, 3). The central challenge in the 
former is posed by a “resistance” to translation that can be found both on the side of the native 
and the foreign language, with the psychoanalytic term denoting an unconscious, but 
“deceitful refusal” (ibid., 5). Relying indeed on a quasi-neurotic mechanism, the language of 
reception, in Ricoeur’s account, may refuse hospitality to the threatening ‘foreignness’ of the 
source language, which can put it to the test. On the other hand, the source language may 
express the tendency to preserve an original text in its own realm and to resist against its 
duplication by another original in the language of reception. As Ricoeur suggests, the 
resistance from both sides perforce leads to a sense of loss, which necessitates some “work of 
mourning” in order to “give up the ideal of the perfect translation” (ibid., 8). 
 Since in Hoffman’s text, as noted above, the common direction in translation is 
reversed into the source language being the mother tongue and the language of reception 
being the foreign language, both kinds of resistance seem to apply at the same time. Thus, in 
the passage from Lost in Translation quoted above, one can identify the resistance on the side 
of Hoffman’s mother tongue, since the mere idea of a (self-)translation “attacks the view that 
the mother tongue is sacred, the mother tongue’s nervousness around its identity” (Ricoeur 
2004, 4). The anxiety on the side of the mother tongue is expressed again when, invited in by 
her new neighbors, the narrator finds difficulty in tagging their manners as “kindly” and 
“pleasant”, as implied by her English Canadian surroundings, or as “silly” and “dull”, as her 
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Polish consciousness seems to suggest (108). Compelled to opt for the positive terms, she 
formulates that she feels threatened by a “cultural unconscious [that] is beginning to exercise 
its subliminal influence” (108).  
 In addition, this passage voices the fear of tampering with or losing one’s original self 
altogether, like an original text, both on a linguistic and a cultural level. Thus, Hoffman soon 
begins to debate in inner dialogues, which of her two selves is “more real” (120). Initially 
giving a clear preference to her ‘original’, Polish self, the fear seems to come true when 
eventually when she finds her English self capable of attacking her Polish self with the words: 
“I don’t have to listen to you any longer. I am as real as you now. I am the real one.” (231) 
Likewise, when suspiciously examining other immigrants’ stories of success, she comments 
that “these successful immigrants have lost some of their meaning. In their separateness and 
silence, their wisdom – what they used to know in an intimate way, on their skin – is stifled 
and it dries up a little” (143). The nervousness surrounding the mother tongue and the fear of 
losing the original “wisdom” or “meaning” leads Hoffman to the assumption of both her own 
untranslatability and her inability as translator. Therefore, she keeps repeating, in  different 
contexts, that “the translation doesn’t work” (107, 108, 144, 175),  
 As to the deeper roots of the resistance to translation, Ricoeur detects them in 
“linguistic ethnocentrisms, and more seriously, numerous pretensions to […] cultural 
hegemony” (Ricoeur 2004, 4). Indeed, this explanation finds correspondence in Hoffman’s 
autobiography when she mourns her lost sense of a center: “I have been dislocated from my 
own center of the world, and that world has been shifted away from my center.” (132) 
Exaggerating her own sense of displacement, Hoffman decries the shift of the world and thus 
the ‘translation’ – the process of being carried over – of her original self as an act of violence. 
After having claimed already on the first pages of the memoir that Cracow to her is “both 
home and the universe” (5), she realizes that her worldview cannot reasonably be defended 
against other, equally ethnocentric perspectives: “I will not convince these teenagers in this 
Vancouver classroom that Poland is the center of the universe rather than a gray patch of land 
inhabited by ghosts” (132). From the moment of arrival to what she calls the “New World”, 
the narrator is aware of the politics of ethnocentrism. In describing herself as a “marginal, off-
centered person who wants both to be taken in and to fend off the threatening others” (110), 
she formulates precisely what it means to be in the center: to be included and entitled to 
exclude others. Despite her realization of the hegemonic claims of ethnocentrism, she does 
not quite renounce such claims on her own part. This becomes palpable, as Eva Karpinski 
points out (2012, 145), in her invocation of the traditional frontier motif, when Hoffman calls 
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herself “a naturalist trying to orient myself in an uncharted landscape, and eyeing the flora 
and fauna around me with a combination of curiosity and detachment” (173-74). What is 
more, in my view, she even crosses the bridge to Darwinist rhetorics, describing people 
around her as a “puzzling species” (174). 
 
 
The invisibility of self-translation 
 
Hoffman links her sense of displacement and disempowerment with a feeling of being 
decentered within herself, which she attributes to her split of self or her “bifocal vision” (213). 
Tortured by her polarizing vision of Polish and American sets of values, she finds herself 
longing for a perception of reality beyond culturally specific norms, a perception she 
describes as “normal” (211). However, when she tries to formulate messages that would 
release her from her ongoing polarization and “triangulations”, her internalized sense of 
power relations in translation becomes visible, since these messages suddenly emerge in 
French as “C’est normale” and “N’exagères pas” (211). It is ironic that this sudden switch to 
French, which both in Poland and in the United States carries connotations of high culture, 
seems like an appeal to a higher authority that could stop the fight between her own two 
languages. 
 How is this fight enacted on the textual level? After all, a text that capitalizes the 
linguistic phenomenon of translation in its title arouses the expectation that an encounter 
between two languages will be inscribed into its texture. In Hoffman’s Lost in Translation, 
this is hardly the case, which leads to the assumption that the author practices not only a 
discourse, but also an aesthetics of loss. It appears almost paradoxical that a narrative that 
pivots around the notion of untranslatability is presented as an almost entirely monolingual 
text in English. While on the level of the histoire, Hoffman traces a process of translation 
from its beginning to its end, she scarcely makes use of the possibility to stage this process on 
the textual level. In other words, on the level of the discours, the translation process seems to 
be completed by the very onset of the narrative.  
The result of the process bears only few traces of Hoffman’s mother tongue, Polish. 
These traces are all introduced in the first chapter, “Paradise” to mark Poland as the author’s 
place of origin and departure. The Polish words Hoffman acquaints us with can be grouped 
into several categories: forms of address and proper names, artifacts associated with Poland, 
and abstract terms that are presented as epitomes of Polish culture. The first one encompasses 
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the words “Pan”, “Pani” and “Ciocia”, which Hoffman translates for us as “Mr.” (12), 
“Madame” (17) and “Auntie” (20), as well as place names such as the untranslated “Biały 
Dunajec” (18) and the “Planty” (40), of which she gives detailed descriptions, and semi-
translated names such “Urzędnicza Street” (6), “Tatry Mountains” (17) and “Florianska Gate” 
(49). The second category contains material entities presented as essentially Polish, such as 
“kogelmogel”, described as “a creamy, thick, sweet mixture of egg yolk, sugar, butter, and 
cocoa” or “banieczki”, translated as “cuppings” (50). The third one, finally, is made up of 
precisely two words, which Eva Karpinski rightly describes as concepts that are “crucial to 
Hoffman’s construction of cultural difference” (2012, 134): “tęsknota”, which the author 
defines as “a word that adds to nostalgia the tonalities of sadness and longing” and invokes 
many times throughout the book (4, 20, 28, 91, 115, 116), and “polot”, depicted by Hoffman 
as “a word that combines the meanings of dash, inspiration, and flying” (71).  
What is striking about this set of Polish vocabulary is that while it is preserved in its 
original sound, Hoffman never leaves any doubt about its meaning and translates or carefully 
explains every single lexical item in English. This narrative strategy calls up Friedrich 
Schleiermacher’s distinction between two approaches in translation, presented in Lawrence 
Venuti’s The Translator’s Invisibility as  
a domesticating method, an ethnocentric reduction of the foreign text to target-language cultural 
values, bringing the author back home, and a foreignizing method, an ethnodeviant pressure on 
those values to register the linguistic and cultural difference of the foreign text, sending the reader 
abroad. (1995, 20) 
Of the two tendencies, Hoffman’s text clearly represents the former. Rather than positioning 
the Polish words as stumbling blocks in her text, which would recreate an estranging effect or 
even the feeling of being lost in translation for the reader, Hoffman uses them as if to teach 
short Polish language lessons to an English-speaking classroom. Especially when introducing 
‘polot’ as one of “the true Polish values”, she falls prey to an essentializing tendency, which 
turns the Polish word into an easily absorbed and consumable entity. As Venuti cautions: 
The “foreign” in foreignizing translation is not a transparent representation of an essence that 
resides in the foreign text and is valuable in itself, but a strategic construction whose value is 
contingent on the current target-language situation. Foreignizing translation signifies the difference 
of the foreign text, yet only by disrupting the cultural codes that prevail in the target language. 
(1995, 20) 
Far from disrupting any American English codes, Hoffman defuses the subversive force of 
her Polish vocabulary, which could otherwise challenge the centrality of English in the 
narrative. 
After presenting the reader with this tamed ‘foreign’ vocabulary, Hoffman silences her 
mother tongue altogether, declaring early in the second chapter, “Exile”, that “Polish, in a 
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short time, has atrophied, shriveled from sheer uselessness. Its words don’t apply to my new 
experiences” (107). Instead of articulating her new experiences in her mother tongue, 
Hoffman bans Polish into ancient times, writing that using it would be “like resorting to Latin 
or ancient Greek” (120), and waits to be proficient enough to voice them in English. Naming 
“speechlessness” as one of her symptoms and lamenting the “lack [of] a voice of [her] own” 
(219-20), Hoffman, as I agree with Karpinski, falls into “re-enact[ing] a literacy narrative 
about finding a voice in English” (2012, 147). As Hoffman stresses, she yearns “to give up the 
condition of being a foreigner” (202), and “to live within a language and to be held within the 
frame of culture” (194). It is this yearning that keeps her from making the border area 
between her languages productive, and instead pushes her to cross the border as quickly and 
inconspicuously as possible so as to evade any border patrol. 
The exclusive belonging to the dominant linguistic group is even more essential in her 
career as a writer and critic, since what is at stake for Hoffman is not only her private 
experience of self-translation, but also the successful publication of her account of the latter. 
As Karpinski points out, a “complicity with the dominant culture ensures that immigrant 
autobiographies can gain access to the printed world” (2012, 147). Hoffman seems highly 
aware of this interconnection, when she recalls a Polish friend complaining about the 
difficulty of getting his book published. In response to his complaint, she repeats his editor’s 
demand that the book “needs more references for an American audience” (256), thus clearly 
taking sides with the dominant culture. Realizing that this lifts her out of her position of 
marginality, Hoffman readily accepts the hegemonic claims of her new language and writes: 
“Of course, it has helped in nurturing this confidence that I live in an imperial center whose 
currency is the international standard and whose language is the Esperanto of the modern 
world.” (251) It is curious to observe how the sense of a ‘center’, the loss of which she 
initially mourns, suddenly makes its entry back into her language. In this sense, I also agree 
with Karpinski, who “cannot but suspect that [Hoffman] has travelled from centre to centre, 
substituting the centrality of New York for that of Cracow in her childhood” (2012, 146). 
 It is this substitution of one center for another, as I would argue, that also seems to 
resolve the problem of her split. Curiously, Hoffman herself gives a different explanation, 
maintaining that her identity, like everyone else’s in her surroundings, is affected by 
postmodern fragmentation. Falling into poststructuralist rhetorics, she argues: “[I]nstead of a 
central ethos, I have been given the blessings and the terrors of multiplicity. […] I step into a 
culture that splinters, fragments, and re-forms itself as if it were a jigsaw puzzle dancing in a 
quantum space” (164). Ignoring the power relations involved in the perceived fragmentation 
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of her migrant identity, she declares in an uncritically celebratory tone: “Perhaps a successful 
migrant is an exaggerated version of the native” (164). It is tempting to characterize 
Hoffman’s autobiography, as Jennifer Browdy de Hernandez does, as “a version of the classic 
American immigrant success story, but with a postmodern ambivalence that prevents her from 
falling into traditional assimilationist melting pot rhetoric” (1997, 31). As I would argue, 
however, she constantly oscillates between a postmodern and an assimilationist stance, at 
times embracing the former and then once again longing “to break out of my difference and 
reclaim a state of ordinariness in which, after all, we want to live” (179). Her submission to 
the dominant culture becomes most obvious when she asks: “In a splintered society, what 
does one assimilate to?” and answers it herself with: “Perhaps the very splintering itself.” 
(197) Close as she is to acknowledging the potential of beating the dominant culture at its 
own game and unmasking both the parallels and differences between her own and a 
postmodern sense of fragmentation, she instead finds consolation in the fact that American 
culture around her is not as monolithic as it initially presented itself to the immigrant. 
Therefore, rather than striking a subversive stance, she chooses the mode of assimilation, of 
playing according to the same rules and absorbing the same sense of fragmentation she 
perceives around herself. The losses she suffers through her self-translation are thus absorbed 
in the process of assimilation. 
 
 
From self-translation to self-analysis 
 
Hoffman’s negotiation of her self-translation is complicated by the fact that it is not only 
“interlingual” in Roman Jakobson’s terms (2001, 114). Partly, it represents what Richard 
Kearney, in his introduction to Ricoeur’s On Translation, has called ‘ontological’ paradigm in 
translation, which “refers to how translation occurs between one human self and another” 
(2004, xii). In Lost in Translation, Hoffman uses the term ‘translation’ synonymously with 
‘understanding’. Thus, “the translation doesn’t work” when she does not understand how her 
friend feels (107); when she cannot make sense of people’s gestures, she “can’t translate them 
into [her] mind’s eye” (108); friends “pose[…] problems of translation”, which can be 
encountered by “set[ting] out to understand each other at will” (175, emphasis mine) and 
“hoping that [they] can translate [them]selves for each other” (189). 
 More prominently, however, Hoffman draws on a translation paradigm that can be 
called the ‘psychoanalytic’. As shall soon become clear, Hoffman’s understanding of 
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translation approaches the one implied in many of Freud’s writings. As mentioned in the 
introduction, Patrick Mahony observes in an article on the understanding of translation in 
psychoanalysis that, in Freudian vocabulary,  
neuroses and symptoms are translations of unconscious material; and the manifest or pictorial 
dream is nothing but a kind of internalized intersemiotic translation or transformation of the 
previous verbal latent dream. The analyst’s interpretations are also translations, and even more 
than this, the very movement of material in the psychic apparatus as such is understood as 
translation whereas repression is a failure of translation. (1982, 64) 
As I would like to show in the following, Hoffman develops a very similar view on 
translation. As in the figure of linguistic self-translation, in which she occupies both the role 
of the translator and the translated text, here, she appears as both patient and analyst. 
 “This is the twentieth century, you can’t be a modern person and pretend to be 
innocent of psychoanalytic knowledge”, Hoffman quotes an American friend of hers towards 
the end of her narrative (262). In fact, her entire project of self-translation is anything but 
innocent of it. Psychoanalysis makes its first appearance already in her childhood narrative in 
the first chapter, when Hoffman is too young to have any knowledge of it. Thus, she recalls 
her early encounter with Freudian thinking, in which her friend Basia brings her “an arcane 
bit of revelation” by confronting her with the idea of the Oedipus complex. Basia’s laconic 
account that “girls of our age are in love with our fathers and therefore want to kill our 
mothers” startles and appalls young Eva so much that she runs to her mother to make sure she 
has no intent to kill her. Comical as this encounter and Eva’s feeling of shock may seem, they 
turn out to be telling in regard to what she later presents as her compatriots’ perspective on 
psychology in general:  
When my parents, or their Polish friends, use the word ‘psychological,’ it’s to suggest something 
weird, verging on crazy. […] Normal human beings are assumed to have understandable feelings 
and motivations. […] Outside of those normal paths and knots of the human heart lies the murky 
pit of the psychological. (261-62) 
More than just the perspective of her parents and friends, this is a view which, had she stayed 
longer in Poland, in all likelihood, she would have adopted. Significantly, she concludes the 
childhood episode with the words: “I might never think about Freud again – at least not until I 
find myself in a country where I’m forced to think of him all the time” (77). Polemically as 
the adult narrator may react to the words of her American friend and call psychoanalysis “just 
one version of modernity” (262), a few pages later, she admits: “In the project of gaining 
control, I’ve been aided by the vocabulary of self-analysis” (270), by which she refers to the 
vocabulary of psychoanalysis. 
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 Psychoanalytic vocabulary finds itself as the most prominent marker of Hoffman’s 
retrospective narration. To begin with, the narrative of her migration and entry into the 
English language is framed by two dreams, which she reports in detail and for which she 
offers interpretations. The first of the two is a nightmare, in which she sees herself “drowning 
in the ocean while [her] mother and father swim farther and farther away from [her]” (104). 
The nightmare is followed directly by its interpretation, which betrays her narrative voice as 
that of an adult: “I know, in this dream”, she explains, “what it is to be cast adrift in 
incomprehensible space; I know what is it to lose one’s mooring” (104). The second dream 
presents quite the opposite picture. The scenery is replaced by the idyllic ‘comprehensible 
space’ of a warm cottage, which is even praised in two rhyming sentences: “The Cottage is 
the Heart of Desire; it’s the Sun itself that stokes the Fire.” (243) As Hoffman solemnly 
informs us, she “can see its Jungian implications, and the Freudian ones, its sexual symbolism 
and its archetypal allusions” (ibid.). The greatest cause of exultation for her, however, is the 
fact that the dream is in English, that the language “flows in [her] bloodstream” (ibid.) 
 The linguistic journey that leads her from an “incomprehensible” into the eventually 
comprehensible space of English language and North American culture is largely figured in a 
psychoanalytic manner. To begin with, her acquisition of the new language is invested with 
the feelings of desire and guilt. As Hoffman reports, the recognition of her marginality makes 
her initially “become immune to desire [and] snip the danger of wanting in the bud” (136). 
Also, along with the split between her two linguistic selves, “the unity, the seeming organic 
growth of [her] desires is becoming fragmented” (158). At the same time, she acknowledges 
that her “desires, when freed from their protective covering, are forceful, and they are 
unchanneled as an infant’s id” (160). After these phases of denial and fragmentation, her 
desire resurfaces through a libidinal investment of language: “When I fall in love”, she writes, 
“I am seduced by language. When I get married, I am seduced by language” (219).  
 Directing her desire at being taken in by American language and culture, however, 
Hoffman is also haunted by feelings of guilt towards her parents, which may be seen as a 
reason for her polarization between her native and her second language. The tendency of 
idealizing the mother tongue is thermalized by psychoanalysts Leon and Rebeca Grinberg, 
when they remark that some individuals 
put up strong resistance rooted in dissociative defenses to learning a new language: they maintain 
that their mother tongue is the only authentic one and the best suited to expressing life experiences, 
and they scorn the second language as poor and unequal to the task. This reaction may arise from a 
feeling of guilt at being disloyal to one’s parents’ language. (1989, 110) 
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The “feeling of guilt at being disloyal” to the parents and their linguistic and cultural 
background indeed figures as a recurring topic in Lost in Translation. Thus, after a prolonged 
process of acculturation in Canada, Hoffman ponders over what she perceives to be a 
reproach on her mother’s part: “My mother says I’m becoming ‘English.’ This hurts me, 
because I know she means I’m becoming cold” (146). The connection between language and 
family bonds becomes even clearer when the adult narrator finds herself ‘seduced’ into falling 
in love with and marry an American-born man. While the choice of a partner, who speaks a 
different language from that of the parents, seems to bespeak Hoffman’s successful 
individuation, the feeling of guilt comes to haunt her in her adult life. When she joins her 
husband in a lively intellectual exchange, at a party after her doctoral ceremony, she cannot 
escape highly ambivalent feelings: “I feel my parents’ eyes looking at me with pride: look 
how far she’s come, look how well she’s learned to behave – and I want to stop, pained at 
their approval” (227). This provokes her to question her relationship with her husband and 
remark that “every one of [her] complicities is a small betrayal” (227). 
 
 
The pathology of self-translation 
 
Drawing on vocabulary that could be taken from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM), Hoffman also ventures further into the domain of the pathological. 
Although she never applies it directly to her persona, she repeatedly uses the strategy of 
describing her own psychological symptoms in order to then draw a connection to a mental 
illness. Thus, when arguing in regard to her own situation that speechlessness can result in 
“impotent, murderous rage” , she deducts in a careful and distanced way: “If all therapy is 
speaking therapy – a talking cure – then perhaps all neurosis is a speech dis-ease” (124, italics 
mine). In a similarly cautious manner, she approaches another pathological term when 
recalling her first attempts to write a diary in English and being unable to do so in the first 
person: “I do not go as far as the schizophrenic ‘she’ – but I am driven, as by compulsion, to 
the double, the Siamese-twin ‘you’” (121, italics mine). Later, Hoffman mentions the risk of a 
“mild cultural schizophrenia” when speaking about her alienation from many of her American 
friends’ common beliefs and assumptions; her fear of not finding the right words is associated 
with “hysteria […] brought on by tongue-tied speechlessness” (219). When invoking a fourth 
psychiatric notion, that of ‘trauma’, she tries to convince a psychologist that she is directly 
affected by it: “You don’t believe that culture shock can be a real shock”, she attacks him and 
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continues mockingly: “You don’t believe that its trauma can be as real as seeing your father 
naked when you’re three months old.” (268) 
 Even though Hoffman approaches all of the psychiatric notions in of neurosis, 
schizophrenia, hysteria and trauma in a rather tentative manner, her choice of words remains 
striking and raises the question of why she is drawn so much into the domain of the 
pathological. Of course, one option would be to confirm Hoffman in her pathological 
terminology. Such a project is undertaken by literary critic Susan Ingram, who consults the 
DSM-IV to establish that Hoffman’s narrative displays schizoid tendencies and is therefore a 
“schizophrenic autobiography” (1996, 259-260). In my view, however, the case of Lost in 
Translation is more complex and subtle. To address the question of the symptoms described 
by Hoffman, two approaches seem instructive: the first is to have a look at discourses that 
could have motivated the negative evaluation of her self-translation; the second one to closer 
examine the intrapsychic reasons Hoffman offers us in her narrative.  
 To begin with the former, it is curious to note that throughout the book, the author who 
portrays her process of absorbing a second language does not describe herself as ‘bilingual’ 
even a single time. This may be attributed to the fact that Hoffman immigrated at a time when 
bilingualism was not exactly presented as an advantage in popular and academic discourses in 
North America. One need only consider that although Canada has been populated both by 
English- and French-speaking settlers from the 17
th
 century on, it was only in 1969 that the 
federal government passed the Official Languages Act, declaring English and French both 
official languages and giving them equal status in all aspects of the federal administration. 
What is more, the legal act has not had the desired impact, since it was met with resistance on 
both the Anglophone and the Francophone sides. While outside Quebec, education and public 
services were still not sufficiently provided in French, the Quebecois were and are highly 
concerned that the equal status of English and French in Quebec would eventually lead to an 
extinction of French. In 1977, the fear of losing the Francophone identity even led the 
government of Quebec to the monolingual policy of passing the Chartre de la Langue 
Française, which declared French the sole official language of the province (cf. Grosjean 
1982, 16-18). The debates on official bilingualism in Canada, which, significantly, did not 
involve any mention of languages other than English and French, give an impression of the 
status of bilinguals, who, like Hoffman, immigrated to the country in the late 1950s. 
 In a similar vein, linguistic academic discourses assumed monolingualism to be the 
norm, from which bilingualism seemed to be an aberration. As Aneta Pavlenko and James 
Lantolf observe, “[l]inguistic theories, including those prevalent in SLA [second-language 
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acquisition] research, have traditionally assumed monolingualism to be the unmarked case” 
(2000, 157). The authors also highlight an ironical remark from a study by Sridhar and 
Sridhar (1986), according to whom “SLA researchers seem to have neglected the fact that the 
goal of SLA is bilingualism” (quoted in Pavlenko and Lantolf 2000, 157).  
 Apart from this traditionally dominant view in linguistics, the assumption existed until 
the 1980s that bilingual subjects presented pathological cases. Such a view was championed, 
for instance, by Max Adler, who wrote that a bilingual child’s “standards are split, he 
becomes more inarticulate than one would expect of one who can express himself in two 
languages, his emotions are more instinctive, in short, bilingualism can lead to a split 
personality and, at worst, to schizophrenia” (1977, 40). As mentioned in the introduction to 
this thesis, one only needs to cast a glance at François Grosjean’s 1982 study, Life with Two 
Languages, to get a sense of the influence of the monolingual paradigm. Were it not for 
militant defenses of monolingualism, the author would not need to take up the cudgels for 
bilingualism as a non-pathological and sometimes even advantageous condition. 
 
 
Early encounters with the incomprehensible 
 
While it is illuminating to view Lost in Translation in its discursive context, it is also possible 
to look for explanations of the self-pathologization within the text itself. As I would like to 
show, the first chapter, “Paradise”, in which Hoffman depicts her childhood in Poland, offers 
a key to the solution. Curiously enough, except for the humorous account of her first 
encounter with Freudian thinking, this chapter remains entirely void of psychoanalytic 
vocabulary. Hoffman’s self-analysis thus begins only with the account of her emigration and 
not with her childhood, which, as we learn, is tragically marked by her parents’ stories of 
Holocaust survival. This may be explained by the author’s stylistic decision to adapt the 
discourse to the linguistic and intellectual capabilities of the child that she is in the narrative 
of the first chapter and not to introduce too much vocabulary that she could not have been 
acquainted with. Another reason may be her – questionable – belief that as a child she was 
“not yet divided” (74), which would explain her choice not to endow her childhood persona 
with the critical distance which will later dominate her life and is implied in the use of 
psychoanalytic vocabulary. 
However, unless she wanted to “pretend to be innocent of psychoanalytic knowledge” 
(262), she can hardly imply that her childhood is irrelevant to her self-analysis. After all, it is 
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one of the major premises of psychoanalysis that patterns of emotion and behavior are 
acquired mostly in early childhood and only brought to the core in adolescence. In my view, 
while Hoffman does not apply psychoanalytic vocabulary to her childhood, she is at the same 
time far from denying the influence that the presence of her parents’ Holocaust memory had 
on her post-war childhood. The topic of the Holocaust figures in all three parts of her memoir 
and its psychological after-effects, though not explicitly diagnosed as symptoms, are inscribed 
into her narrative in a more subtle form.  
Thus, we learn about her parents’ attitudes to remembering their own survival and the 
deaths of all other relatives. Her father hardly mentions the topic, since “dignity for him is 
silence, sometimes too much silence” (23). The mother, Hoffman informs us, in contrast, 
“wants me to know what happened, and I keep every detail of what she tells me in my 
memory like black beads” (24). Much in line with Nadine Fresco’s article, “Remembering the 
Unknown” (1984), on the transmission of psychological symptoms from Holocaust survivors 
to their children, Hoffman points out that, as a child, she does not “understand what [she] 
remember[s]” and is pushed into a double-bind situation: “To atone for what happened, I 
should relive it all with her, and I try. No, not really. I can’t go as near this pain as I should. 
But I can’t draw away from it either.” (24-25) Confronted with the stories about killed 
relatives, she oscillates between repressing them with the fantasy that “[m]aybe it didn’t 
happen after all, maybe it’s only a story, and a story can be told differently, it can be changed” 
(7) and accepting the horrible heritage just like her name, Ewa Alfreda, which she has 
acquired from both her killed grandmothers. All in all, while she seeks to avoid the notion of 
the Holocaust by referring to it as “the war” (16) and even the “Thing” (25), she nevertheless 
inscribes it into the origins of her family. She refers to the Holocaust as her parents’ “second 
birthplace” (16), and what is more, claims these origins for herself with the statement of 
having ‘come from the war’, which she compulsively repeats almost literally throughout the 
book (23, 25, 129, 230). 
Unsettling as these comments are, they do not take up much space in Hoffman’s 
narrative and remain rather vague in terms of the psychological effects on the narrator. 
However, as I would like to argue, they can be seen as preparing the stage for Hoffman’s 
multiple ‘losses in translation’ and her choice of diagnostic vocabulary in the second and third 
part of her autobiography. This reading relies on Freud’s observation that “in every case the 
later neurotic illness links up with the prelude of childhood” (1964b, 184), and on the 
temporal structure he observes in the development of a neurosis: “early trauma – latency – 
outbreak of neurotic illness – partial return of the repressed” (Freud 1964a, 80). Drawing on 
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this Freudian insight, trauma theorist Cathy Caruth argues that since “the impact of the 
traumatic event lies precisely in its belatedness, in its refusal to be simply located”, it becomes 
“fully evident only in connection with another place, and in another time” (Caruth 1995, 8-9).  
Both Freud’s and Caruth’s arguments shed light on the narrative presented by Eva 
Hoffman. Thus, it seems striking that when the author for the first time draws on 
psychoanalytic imagery it is to speak about the “primal scream of [her] birth into the New 
World” (104), as if introducing another childhood narrative. Significantly, while the scream is 
the result of a nightmare related to her migration experience, both her choice of words and her 
description of the scene in which it occurs calls up uncanny associations with what she had 
previously referred to as her parents’ “second birthplace” (16): the Holocaust. For when she 
wakes up “in the middle of a prolonged scream” (104), her penniless family has just found 
refuge in the house of a well-established, but rather unsympathetic couple in Vancouver, 
where they are “relegated to the basement” (102). At the latest when the narrator recounts that 
instead of comforting her, “her parents wake up and hush [her] up quickly; they don’t want 
the Rosenbergs to hear this disturbing sound” (104), the reader is uncannily reminded of a 
hiding place, which her parents would not have sought for the first time in their lives.  
 This incident is only the prelude to the migration experience and its psychological 
effects that Hoffman will present in the following and that seem to be marked by the 
experience of growing up as a child of Holocaust survivors. Thus, her perceived 
speechlessness in the New World finds its antecedent in the lack of words for accounting for 
her family heritage, as demonstrated in her expression of ‘coming from the war’. The feeling 
of guilt of being disloyal to her parents’ language is easily associated with the burden of 
memory she has inherited from them already in her childhood. Finally, her sense of 
dispossession and of being divided between different worlds reflects the loss and 
irrecoverable memory of family members, whose deaths preceded her birth. These uncanny 
connections between the two periods of her life may lead to a view taken by Marianne Hirsch, 
who, in the early 1990s, coined the term ‘postmemory’ and whose biography displays striking 
parallels to that of the author. Alienated by the latter’s “obsession with the canyon, with a 
disjunction that defines her life and her book” and her “pervasive nostalgia that clings to 
everything Polish”, emphatically appeals to Hoffman: “I want her to see that in Poland, as a 
child, she was already divided” (1994, 76-77).  
 In defense of Hoffman’s narrative, one could offer a psychological and a textual 
explanation. First, it has been argued by Salman Akhtar that “[r]esulting from a retrospective 
idealization of lost objects, nostalgia helps the immigrant defend against the aggression 
44 
 
resulting from current frustration” (1999, 123). It can be therefore seen as a value of 
Hoffman’s writing that she does not delete these sentiments, which seem overcome by the end 
of her narrative, from her book, but exposes her “nostalgic defense” (ibid.) as part of her 
integration process in the New World. Second, I would argue that she does not seem 
completely unaware of this seeming ‘return of the repressed’. For instance, when she learns 
about the suicide of her childhood love, Marek, the explanation she offers is that both of them 
are “children who came from the war, and who couldn’t make sufficient sense of the several 
worlds they grew up in, and didn’t know by what lights to act” (230). Also, when wondering 
how it has “come about that from the age of thirteen on [she has] not known what peace of 
mind feels like” and why ‘peace of mind’ “strikes [her] as a phrase from another world”, she 
immediately voices her sense that these symptoms stem from an earlier time: “Is it that I come 
from the war, while my parents were born before it? Is it that I have only struggled with 
specters – their specters among others – while they have battered themselves against hard 
realities?” (129)  
 When Hoffman informs us of her visits to a psychotherapist towards the end of the 
narrative, she zooms in on her parents as the characters that connect the different thematic 
strands of what she calls her “psychodrama” (267). In doing so, she weaves in the story about 
the death of her father’s relatives in the Holocaust that had been silenced in the family 
narrative for many years. Facing the pain of what “is no longer a frightening fairy tale, as it 
would have been in childhood”, she admits her narratological dilemma: “There’s no way to 
get this part of the story in proportion. It could overshadow everything else, put the light of 
the world right out. I need seven-league boots to travel from this to where I live. And yet, this 
is what I must do.” (252-53) In my view, this passage reveals most clearly that Hoffman has 
constructed her story as a psychoanalytic case history, since her account of her migration 
symptoms cannot be fully understood without the background of her childhood. And at the 
same time, her post-Holocaust childhood narrative would remain untold if it were not 
reactivated in the course of her migration. 
 
 
Translation as therapy 
 
It is in this context that I interpret Hoffman’s project of self-translation. Thus, when she 
introduces the notion of “translation therapy” (271), it refers less to a therapy against the 
losses inflicted on her in the process of self-translation than to translation as a therapeutic 
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means for uncovering and coming to terms with earlier losses from a time when she was not 
yet ‘translated’. To be sure, the challenge of growing into a new language and culture is not 
neutralized or denied, when Hoffman stresses that her “going to a shrink is, among other 
things, a rite of initiation […] into the language of the subculture within which [she] 
happen[s] to live” (274). However, it more than that: for in the medium of psychoanalytic 
translation, the “talking cure” begins to emerge as “a second-language cure” (271), which 
means that the second language ceases to make the narrator speechless, and allows her to 
develop a sense of self. As she points out, psychotherapy  
becomes a project of translating backward: The way to jump over my Great Divide is to crawl 
backward over it in English. It’s only when I retell my whole story, back to the beginning, and 
from beginning onward, in one language, that I can reconcile the voices within me with each other 
(271-72). 
At this point, the psychoanalytic reading, albeit invited by Hoffman’s vocabulary, cannot 
remain entirely consistent. First, her emphasis on being able to retell her whole story “in one 
language” is not entirely innocent of some promotion of monolingual discourse, be it in Polish 
or English, as a natural condition for a united sense of self. As such, it misses a central point 
forwarded by psychoanalysts working in the field of multilingualism. Thus, Jacqueline Amati-
Mehler argues in The Babel of the Unconscious that the acquisition of a second language has 
the advantage of allowing individuals to re-experience and re-articulate painful episodes from 
their pasts from the safe vantage point of a language different from their mother tongue. The 
effect, in the psychoanalyst’s view, lies in the possibility of being lifted out of the discursive 
framework of one’s parents and place of origin as well as out of the emotional patterns 
associated with it. In hurrying to “jump over the Great Divide”, however, Hoffman does not 
succeed in making the gap between her two languages productive in a psychological sense 
due to her persisting fear of staying “[b]etwixt and between” (116): “The gap cannot fully be 
closed, but I begin to trust English to speak my childhood self as well, to say what has so long 
been hidden, to touch the tenderest spots. Perhaps any language, if pursued far enough, leads 
to exactly the same place.” (274) From her perspective, this gap can never be closed enough 
and she seems to forgive English for its foreignness only because it allegedly leads her back 
to precisely the feelings she had in her Polish childhood. 
 In consequence, while hinting many times at the parallels between her post-Holocaust 
childhood and her migration experience, she fails to map them out consistently. “[W]hile 
therapy offers me instruments and the vocabulary of self-control”, she writes, 
it also becomes, in the long run, a route back to that loss which for me is the model of all loss, and 
to that proper sadness of which children are never afraid; in English, I wind my way back to my 
old Polish melancholy. When I meet it, I reenter myself, fold myself again in my own skin. (274) 
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It seems that she almost arrives at the full realization of how her later sense of loss and 
deprivation was shaped already in her childhood, but stops short of it, generalizing her 
‘postmemory’ into her “old Polish melancholy” and a “proper sadness of which children are 
never afraid”. In this sense, it is difficult to defend Lost in Translation from Marianne 
Hirsch’s critique that Hoffman idealizes her Polish childhood while lamenting her later split 
of self.  
 What remains even more disquieting is another aspect. While claiming that translation 
is possible since “any language, if pursued far enough, leads to exactly the same place”, she 
continues her search for a more universal language. Thus, she formulates that she wants “a 
calm and simple language that will subsume the clangor of specialized jargons and of partial 
visions, a language old enough to plow under the superficial differences between signs, to the 
deeper strata of significance” (212). Throughout most of the narrative, Hoffman remains 
vague about what language, or rather, what kind of language that could be. It is only on the 
last pages that she specifies that it could be the “language of psychology”, which gives her 
troping of translation a rather unexpected turn: 
Perhaps the homogenizing language of psychology is a way of coping with a bewilderment of 
heterogeneity. It’s a language that provides universalizing explanations for strangers whose 
circumstances are unknown to us, a language of familiarity and of ripened habit from which the 
speech of colloquial intimacy and of common observation grows. (267) 
Especially in the context of translation, the attributes “homogenizing” and “universalizing” 
appear highly questionable, since Hoffman seems to dream of a pre-Babelian linguistic state, 
in which translation would turn superfluous. At this point, her two figures of self-translation, 
the linguistic and the psychological one, coincide in the same contradiction. Thus, when 
searching for a “true voice” for her memoir, she acknowledges that “there’s no returning to 
the point of origin” (273), but still longs to calm down all foreign voices inside herself and 
immerse herself into silence, a “white plenitude” (275). In the context of her ‘postmemory’, 
one may wonder whether this silence can be a pre-Babelian or still a post-Holocaust 
phenomenon. Concluding her narrative, however, Hoffman opts for a version of silence as a 
“white blank center, the level ground that was there before Babel was built, that is always 
there before the Babel of our multiple selves is constructed.” (275). This phantasy stands in 
stark contrast with Ricoeur’s philosophy of translation, according to which the translator, as 
which Hoffman also presents herself, must acknowledge that “[t]ranslation is always after 
Babel [and] renounce the dream of a return to some adamantine logos of pure 
correspondences. The attempt to retrieve a prelapsarian paradise of timeless signs is futile.” 
(Kearney in Ricoeur 2004, xvii) Be it that the self-translation brings about a loss, which can 
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be compensated by completing the translation process and leaving the mother tongue in the 
periphery, or that it helps to uncover and work through earlier losses – Hoffman’s narrative is 
held together by the various figures of translation, while she cannot quite give up the hope for 
a loophole of universality that would liberate her from the necessity to translate. Whether one 
interprets Hoffman’s project of self-translation in a linguistic or a psychoanalytic sense, the 
blind spots and contradictions in her narrative remain present and symptomatic of her 
ambivalence towards translation. 
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Trauma and Desire in the Language of the Other: Atom Egoyan’s Calendar 
 
Atom Egoyan’s feature film Calendar presents us with another loss in translation. An 
Armenian-Canadian photographer, disconnected from his Armenian language and culture, 
travels to his ancestral country in order to shoot pictures of ancient churches for a calendar. 
He is accompanied by his wife Arsinée, who takes on the role of a translator between him and 
their Armenian driver and guide Ashot. The diasporic couple’s encounter with their historical 
country of origin triggers a chain of events set in linguistic borderlands. While the 
photographer re-experiences a trauma from his childhood and falls into deeply neurotic 
behavior, Arsinée falls in love both with the Armenian rural scenery and the native guide.  As 
a result, the protagonist is not only lost, but also loses his wife in translation. The journey, 
configured as a return to and of the repressed for the protagonist, is narrated retrospectively 
through his scraps of memory and his footage shot in Armenia. In the cinematic present, he 
engages in dating women with a foreign background, turning the pages of the finished 
calendar and composing an account of the journey addressed to his wife.  
 As the present chapter sets out to explore, Egoyan stages a case history of linguistic 
trauma and sets up a scenario in which the photographer, a central protagonist and the 
filmmaker’s intradiegetic double, himself consistently tries to set up a scenario for staging 
traumatic memories. The film displays the structure of an analytical – and psychoanalytic – 
drama and prompts the question, what circumstances have led to the photographer’s 
repression of his mother tongue, his neurotic behavior and eventually his loss in translation.  
In a first step, I will focus on this question and will analyze the protagonist’s case history 
according to the Freudian categories his behavior calls up. For this, I will examine the visual 
symptoms of the linguistic trauma in Calendar and consider causes, symptoms, and remedies 
against this trauma as presented on the plot level. Also, I will open my analysis to a Lacanian 
discussion of the protagonist’s encounter with a foreign language so as to present an 
understanding of the film which integrates the film’s intertwined themes of language, desire, 
neurosis and the Other. In a second step, I will shift my focus from the protagonist’s 
perspective to that of his wife and translator, Arsinée, and analyze her way of encountering a 
foreign language, which Egoyan presents as an alternative to linguistic trauma. Lastly, I will 
debate the political agenda behind her role as translator and compare them to the ideological 
project of the photographer. In doing so, I will examine the ways in which Egoyan’s film 
negotiates the traumatic and liberating effects of the transgression of linguistic boundaries as 
well as their ethico-political implications. 
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Linguistic trauma and the game of fort/da 
 
Considering Calendar as a case history about linguistic trauma first of all raises the question 
of the representation of trauma in the cinematic narrative. According to Anne Whitehead, 
author of Trauma Fiction,  
[n]ovelists have often found that the impact of trauma can only adequately be represented by 
mimicking its forms and symptoms, so that temporality and chronology collapse, and narratives 
are characterised by repetition and indirection (2004, 3). 
What the author identifies in literary fiction is also precisely at work in the cinematic narrative 
of Calendar, since, on a formal level, it incorporates many qualities commonly ascribed to 
traumatic neurosis. As Whitehead explains,  
[o]ne of the key literary strategies in trauma fiction is the device of repetition, which can act at the 
levels of language, imagery or plot. Repetition mimics the effect of trauma, for it suggests the 
insistent return of the event and the disruption of narrative chronology or progression (2004, 86). 
On the level of the plot in Calendar, the device of repetition indeed figures most prominently, 
and thus mimics the protagonist’s state of mind. In the extradiegetic narrative we encounter 
the photographer as a withdrawn, emotionless character displaying many kinds of obsessive 
behavior. Once a month, through a dating agency, he arranges for a date in his Toronto 
apartment, throughout which, however, he remains utterly distant, impassive and 
unexpressive. While the looks and the dresses of his escorts, as well as the dinner music and 
the dishes for dinner change every month, each date follows exactly the same scenario. As 
soon as the dinner is finished and the last of the wine poured, each of the escorts asks to use 
the photographer’s telephone and proceeds to seemingly make a phone call to a lover, with 
whom each of them flirts in a different foreign language. By portraying the protagonist as 
abandoned and excluded from the escort’s foreign language affairs, these scenes effectively 
restage his alienation and separation from his wife, who had grown attracted to a speaker of 
Armenian in the process of translation. 
Interestingly enough, the repetitive dinner scenes quickly turn out to be orchestrated 
not by an extradiegetic narrator, but scripted and staged on an intradiegetic level, namely by 
the photographer himself. This is first of all betrayed by his lack of interest in the 
conversations with his dates, and the lack of emotion and surprise, when all of them 
systematically leave the dinner table as soon as he pours the last of the wine. The 
consternation visible on the face of one of the escorts, who, significantly enough, tells him 
about her experience as an actress, betrays his action as a cue for her to break off the 
conversation and ask for the telephone. A recorded phone message from the dating agency 
concerning the choice of foreign languages to be spoken by the escorts as well as their 
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English accent, unidiomatic speech and grotesque way of flirting on the phone clearly reveals 
them not as real dates, but as amateur actresses enacting his scenario. While the women 
perform their poorly acted and strongly accented foreign language telephone flirts, the feigned 
character of the dates culminates in the protagonist reaching out for his notepad, which, 
absurdly enough, turns out to be positioned on the dinner table just outside the frame, and 
starting to write to his wife Arsinée. 
How can his repeated enactments be read? In psychoanalytic terms, the photographer’s 
behavior can be a reenactment of the fort/da game, which Freud discusses in “Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle” (1955c). Observing his 18-months old grandson playing with a wooden 
reel by throwing it over the side of his draped cot so that it disappears from view, and hauling 
it in again, Freud comes to the conclusion that the child symbolically represents the absence 
of his mother and learns to accept it “by himself staging the disappearance and return of the 
objects within his reach” (1955c, 15). Likewise, in Calendar, the photographer creates a 
playful space in order to come to terms with his traumatic loss of Arsinée, or, in Freud’s 
words, “to play ‘gone’” (ibid.). By directing the dinner scenes, the photographer seeks to 
regain control of the situation, much in the way Freud describes his grandson’s game: “At the 
outset he was in a passive situation – he was overpowered by the experience; but, by repeating 
it, unpleasurable though it was, as a game, he took on an active part” (ibid., 16, emphases in 
the original). Indeed, the photographer takes on such an ‘active’ part that he robs the escorts 
of any agency of their own and treats them like mere “objects he ha[s] at hand” for 
dramatizing the loss of his wife. This accounts for the performance of the dinner dates 
appearing bleak, emotionless, and badly rehearsed, since the photographer interrupts some of 
the escorts in mid-sentence by pouring the last of the wine and thus giving the cue for them to 
ask for the telephone. Just like children who “repeat everything that has made a great 
impression on them in real life, […] abreact the strength of the impression and, as one might 
put it, make themselves master of the situation” (ibid., 17), the protagonist restages his 
traumatic separation to master his present situation.  
The protagonist’s attempt to direct his own situation finds itself literally translated into 
cinematic vocabulary. As the photographer, an intradiegetic figure, snatches the direction of 
the film from the director’s hands, he seems to avoid being at the mercy of the narrative. 
Unlike most traumatized fictional characters, whose subjectivity in the extreme case is 
annihilated and whose agency is undermined, the protagonist in Calendar seemingly remains 
in charge of the situation. Instead of employing the stream-of-consciousness technique, one of 
the most common narrative strategies in trauma fiction allowing the reader or spectator to 
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gain a direct insight into the wounded psyche of the traumatized character, Egoyan seems to 
make a concession to his neurotic protagonist, who, as shall be explained later, loves to watch, 
but not to be seen. The photographer fervently protects his inner life from the gaze of others, 
and, in staging the dinner dates, externalizes his mental state on the plot level.  
However, the illusion of the protagonist’s control over the dinner scenes soon 
collapses, since all other cinematic elements apart from the script escape his command and 
infringe upon his well-controlled form of repetition. First of all, the image composition 
restricts his and the escort’s actions to a very confined space. The dinner scenes consist solely 
of close-ups and medium shots, which narrow down the gaze and do not allow the viewer to 
get a proper sense of space in the apartment. The feeling of confinement deepens, when the 
photographer remains at the dinner table while the escorts walk away to use the phone. While 
the protagonist, sitting at the table, occupies the foreground, his dates – instead of moving out 
of the frame – walk into the background of the same image, where they can be seen 
performing their telephone flirts. In the reverse shot, it is the photographer himself who can be 
seen in the background while the escort appears in the foreground. The fact that the only real 
movement during the dates precisely follows one single line strongly contributes to a 
claustrophobic sense of space.  
With only one exception, when the photographer is seen sitting naked on a couch and 
masturbating to the video images of Arsinée (0:20:17), the characters are filmed from only 
three camera positions, which are repeatedly used for all interior shots. In addition to the 
afore-mentioned shot directed at the protagonist at the dinner table and the reverse shot with 
the escort speaking on the phone, the camera also switches to a third shot aiming frontally at 
the wall with the telephone and the calendar next to it. The repetitive use of the same camera 
perspectives adds a new dimension to the repetition on the plot level. Here the protagonist 
cannot control the image, but is controlled by it and confined to the narrow space granted to 
him by the frame of the image. Seen from Anne Whitehead’s perspective, this stylistic 
repetition compulsion clearly functions as a hint at his traumatic condition. The fact that all 
interior shots are static constitutes an entirely indifferent camera gaze. Indeed, the camera 
itself seems to be bored by the scenes in which the possibility of any development or 
movement that transgresses the image frame is precluded from the outset. The monotony and 
bleakness of the apartment scenes is further underlined by the color filters and the image and 
sound editing employed in the film. All interior shots are deprived of brightness by means of a 
bleak and disharmonious color composition. If brownish and yellowish tones dominate the 
image, the bright red lipstick worn by several of the escorts stands out in sharp and irritating 
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contrast to the surroundings, thus highlighting the absurdity and inauthenticity of the staged 
dinner scenes.  
Furthermore, as Anahid Kassabian and David Kazanjian observe, the film, and these 
scenes in particular, is “structured in an obsessive form” (2005, 133). Apart from the 
photographer’s absurd dating practice, every month in the narrative is marked by a recurring 
cycle of images and sounds: the ringing of the phone, the protagonist’s recorded voice saying 
that he is busy in the darkroom, the turning of the calendar page. The slight deviations from 
and intrusions into this scenario, such as Arsinée’s voicemail messages or the different 
appearances of and conversations with the escorts, do not notably alter the cyclical course of 
events. Since the protagonist continues carrying out his own unchanging script throughout 
most of the film, they hardly seem to enter his reality. Thus, the protagonist’s repetitive 
staging is embedded in a larger time loop. Repetition as a device deployed throughout the film 
evades the protagonist’s control and closes in on him, betraying his traumatic condition. As 
psychoanalysts Bessel A. van der Kolk and Onno van der Hart explain in an article on 
memory and trauma, “the traumatic experience/memory is, in a sense, timeless. It is not 
transformed into a story, placed in time, with a beginning, a middle and an end” (1995, 177). 
A beginning, a middle and an end are precisely what the episodic narrative strand set in the 
Toronto apartment lacks. The breaking with the expectation of a progression of narrative time 
creates a highly irritating effect, thereby allowing a glimpse into the protagonist’s mental state 
of traumatic neurosis. 
The traumatic organization of time is paralleled by a fragmentation of cinematic 
reality. This comes about when the protagonist’s memories, triggered by each escort’s 
withdrawal into a foreign language, appear on screen in the shape of video images. The co-
presence of the two media, film and video, establish a fictional world that fails to cohere. The 
very opening of the film presents the viewer with images from Armenia only later to reveal 
them as part of the video footage shot by the protagonist and thus as part of a metadiegetic 
narrative. As the viewer is initially deceived about the diegetic status of these images, 
cinematic reality appears not only fragmented, but ontologically destabilized. Just like in 
Michael Haneke’s psycho-thriller Caché (2005), which sets out with a scene recorded on a 
video camera and watched on a TV set within the cinematic diegesis, the viewer is left to 
wonder about the reality status of the images presented on screen. Although in Calendar, 
unlike in Caché, the two types of images are clearly set apart from each other through their 
quality – the unsaturated colors and the static shots of the interior scenes are contrasted by the 
grainy, bluish-tinted and shaky video images shot with a hand-held camera – the viewer 
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initially falls prey to the illusion of the video images as ‘actual reality’ and has to figure out in 
the course of the film how the two types of images relate to each other. What then appears as 
an ingenious trick for incorporating scenes from the past into the present and to radically set 
apart the mythic Armenian scenery from the dull setting in the Toronto apartment at the same 
time functions as a marker of trauma. As trauma theorist Cathy Caruth argues, traumatic 
memories are marked by a “surprising literality and nonsymbolic nature […], which resist 
cure to the extent that they remain, precisely, literal” (1995, 5). As the protagonist’s memories 
are represented through video images, which he never seems to edit, they indeed remain 
literal and “unassimilable to associative chains of meaning” (ibid.). When at the end of each 
date, the photographer sets out to verbally articulate his experience of loss in Armenia, his 
memories still intrude upon him in their visuality. The switch to the visual medium again 
exposes him to traumatic memories, which are replayed without any modification. 
Finally, the film title betrays the centrality of the calendar as an epitome of trauma. 
Appearing in the image at the beginning of each of the twelve sequences of the film, it serves 
as a structuring device of cinematic time, which in Calendar can be said to pass in a traumatic 
way. For although the turning of the calendar pages announces the progression of time, every 
new month only brings a series of recurring irritating actions, namely the photographer’s 
staged dinner dates, his wife’s unanswered phone calls and his musing about the journey 
through Armenia, which led to Arsinée’s departure. Locked in repetition, the protagonist’s life 
stands in sharp contrast to the passing of the calendar months. In addition, the calendar 
represents the initial trigger of the journey to Armenia and the photographer’s alienation and 
separation from his wife. It therefore functions both as cause and later symptom of the 
protagonist’s suffering. 
Not surprisingly, the printed pages of the calendar in their characteristics resonate with 
traumatic memories. Much in line with trauma theory’s assumptions, the photographs in the 
calendar appear as frozen, static images, foreclosing any possibility of development. Their 
motifs, Armenia’s historical churches, not only cater to a nostalgic diasporic memory, but also 
underline the standstill of time. The absence of human life from these pictures adds a sterile 
touch to them and symbolically disallows any agency, since potential agents are kept outside 
of the frame. Lastly, as van der Kolk and van der Hart put it, traumatic memories are 
“unassimilated scraps of overwhelming experiences, which need to be integrated with existing 
mental schemes, and be transformed into narrative language” (1995, 176). Their 
transformation into language, however, is precisely what does not occur, which marks both 
the protagonist and his photographic creations as utterly speechless. What is more, the silence 
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of the calendar photographs expresses his refusal to communicate, which is pointed out by 
Arsinée: 
I finally received the calendar. It turned out really great. But I’m very upset though, you just sent it 
without a letter or anything. I really want to know what’s going on in your mind. We’ve known 
each other too long to play these games. We’ve loved each other for too long. It’s very mean to 
send me something that – I don’t know – something that meant so much to both of us without 
letting me know how you feel about it. […] Just share with me whatever there is to share. Please, 
please write to me. I do miss you. (0:09:16-0:10:20) 
Significantly, the photographer does not even answer his phone, which is why Arsinée’s 
complaint can be only heard as a message recorded on his voicemail. All of the protagonist’s 
trauma symptoms, but most of all his speechlessness, mark his loss of control as a narrative 
authority. It becomes clear that he does not manage to work through the loss of his wife or to 
contain the experience within the script of the dinner dates, which instead appear as a form of 
acting out. According to his script, the presence of the escorts is followed each time by their 
spatial and linguistic departure so that his fort/da game turns into a more traumatic game of 
da/fort. Unlike the game of Freud’s grandson, the photographer’s scripted scenes do not 
include a jubilatory moment of a return. This is not surprising, since unlike Freud’s grandson, 
Egoyan’s protagonist is not trying to come to terms with the absence, but with the loss of a 
loved person. Therefore, rather than alleviating his suffering, the date scenes merely trigger 
his painful memories, which he then begins to narrativize by writing letters to Arsinée.  
Re-viewing his video recordings and mental images and virtually adding to them a 
new voice-over, the photographer can be said to undergo a ‘talking cure’. As highly ritualized, 
continuously repeated and, most importantly, purely verbal encounters, the dinner scenes 
most palpably mimic psychoanalytic sessions, which gradually bring about an improvement 
of the protagonist’s condition. Significantly, there is no intradiegetic figure of a psychoanalyst 
to whom his narrative is addressed. Neither the escorts – with one exception which will be 
discussed later – nor Arsinée take on this role, since he does not establish any real contact 
with the women and never sends the letters he is composing to his wife. Instead, his ‘talking 
cure’ relies utterly on the address to the reader, who, in Jonathan Romney’s words, “should 
ideally have the perceptions of a psychoanalytic sniffer dog” (2003, 1). After all, the 
verbalization of his traumatic memories does not only help the protagonist to work through 
his past, but also establishes a frame for his scraps of video footage, thus granting the viewer 
access to the cinematic narrative. 
Representing a series of psychoanalytic sessions, the dinner dates can be identified as 
the last phase of a longer case history. When the film sets in, the origins of the protagonist’s 
suffering already lie in the past, while the cinematic present is entirely devoted to an 
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unfolding case analysis. This makes obvious that the film is structured as an psycho-analytic 
drama. Like in the analytic drama of Ibsen, Calendar does not present any evolving conflict, 
turning point or climax with a resolution of the conflict or a catastrophe. Instead, all of the 
film’s stagnating action is devoted to the reactivation and gradual reconstruction of the 
protagonist’s memories so as to explain what factors have led to his neurotic condition in the 
present. Here the analytic and the psychoanalytic structures of the film coincide, which of 
course does not surprise, considering that Freud modeled his own method upon the technique 
of analytic dramatists such as Sophocles. Freud acknowledges in his Interpretation of Dreams 
that the dramatic technique in Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex “can be likened to the work of a 
psycho-analysis”, since “[t]he action of the play consists in nothing other than the process of 
revealing, with cunning delays and ever-mounting excitement” (1953a, 261-62). Likewise, 
Calendar, puts its viewers into the role of psychoanalysts and urges them to solve the riddle 
of the protagonist’s neurotic condition. 
 
 
The ‘original trauma’ in language migration 
 
If on the formal as well as on the plot level Calendar presents itself as a trauma narrative, this 
raises an obvious question: What trauma does it deal with and what are its origins? While the 
first answer may be that the film depicts the protagonist’s trauma of separation from his wife, 
it only provokes more questions: Why is the separation staged on their journey through their 
ancestral homeland Armenia? Why do husband and wife relate to the country and its language 
in such different ways? Why does the photographer behave in an obsessive and authoritarian, 
and at the same time careless way towards his wife? And why, finally does he have to literally 
lose her in translation? As I would like to show, this loss cannot be understood without an 
earlier one that functions as the back-story wound. More precisely, the protagonist’s case 
history corresponds to the structure of a traumatic neurosis as outlined by Freud in his last 
work, Moses and Monotheism (1964a). Egoyan’s use of the formational elements of the 
neurosis – “early trauma – latency – outbreak of neurotic illness – partial return of the 
repressed” (Freud 1964a, 80) – will be analyzed in the following. 
As the discovery of an “early trauma” presents the goal and end of every trauma 
analysis, it has to be sought in the last of the ‘psychoanalytic sessions’ enacted in the film. 
And indeed, the last of the staged dinner dates diagnoses the back-story wound and opens up 
the view onto the origins of the protagonist’s traumatic neurosis. Talking about identity and 
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belonging with the last escort, who, significantly enough, shares the protagonist’s Armenian 
roots and his migration history from Egypt to Canada, the photographer recalls a scene from 
his early days in Canada: 
No, it was really difficult, I mean, at the beginning, because I actually didn’t speak any English at 
all, and ah, like I can remember this one time where I was on the beach and there were all these 
kids and they were all singing like “Yellow Submarine,” and I didn’t know the words and all I 
could hear was like “yalla submarine,” like “yalla submarine.” So I started singing with them and I 
was going like “yalla submarine, yalla submarine”. It was completely ridiculous. [Pours last of 
wine.] I mean you’re so vulnerable to that, right, when you’re a kid, I mean you just sort of like, 
you just sort of imitate like what you think other people would wanna hear but it doesn’t really 
have anything to do with what you are feeling or, you know, what’s going through your mind or 
anything like that. (01:02:31-01:03:05) 
However, Egoyan’s complex exploration of his protagonist’s mental constitution invites the 
viewer not only to spot the early trauma, but to ask what kind of trauma it is and how it could 
come about. For the discussion of the origins of the trauma presented in Calendar, I will first 
revisit two explanations given by Kassabian and Kazanjian (2005) and by Monique Tschofen 
(2005/06) to then develop my own line of argument. 
 In their analysis of diasporic nationalism in Armenian cinema, Kassabian and 
Kazanjian work “against what [they] see as a central obstacle in the contemporary 
configuration of postcolonial studies – the rush to celebrate diasporas” (2005, 144). They 
rightly point out that the protagonist’s recapitulation of the story is interrupted by his well-
rehearsed pouring of the wine as the last of his “rigorous and systematic efforts to fend off the 
memory of his childhood cultural dislocation”. In a more questionable move, however, they 
proceed by describing this memory as “figured by the sign for traumatic, diasporic hybridity 
that he uttered as a child: ‘yalla submarine’”. As they conclude, “[d]iasporic assimilation 
emerges from this scene not as a triumphant ideal, but rather as foundationally traumatic, 
constitutively impossible and, indeed, psychically disruptive” (2005, 135, emphases mine). 
While I agree that Egoyan has his protagonist struggle against this unsettling memory, I feel 
troubled by the fact that the term “traumatic” is so easily integrated into their discourse 
without ever being clearly defined. In the following, they do offer an insightful account of the 
protagonist’s neurosis, which I will discussed later. However, they skip the explanation of 
why diasporic hybridity in Calendar should be seen as traumatic and merely pathologize it by 
terming it “constitutively impossible” and “psychically disruptive”. 
 In her article on modalities of translation in Atom Egoyan’s work, Monique Tschofen 
cites Kassabian’s and Kazanjian’s argument on the “originary and foundational trauma of 
diasporic assimilation” (2005/06, 34), but does not evaluate it further. Instead, she suggests 
that the photographer’s condition can be understood as “a kind of trauma (not yet translated 
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into language) from having experienced the limits of speech and meaningfulness, and the 
threatened dissolution of his self this experience brought” (Tschofen 2005/06, 34). Without 
mentioning it explicitly, Tschofen here approaches the tenets of psychoanalytic trauma theory, 
which understands as a trauma “an event or experience which overwhelms the individual and 
resists language or representation” (Whitehead 2004, 3). From the perspective of trauma 
theory, experience and language represent different ontological orders, which have to remain 
firmly connected, since the subject has to process one through the other. Trauma emerges 
when the two orders are out of joint and (real-world) experience cannot be transformed into 
narrative language. What happens, however, if as in the case of Egoyan’s protagonist, the 
experience is not extralinguistic, but comes about through an encounter with language, or 
more precisely, with a foreign language? The childhood incident presented in Calendar does 
not consist in a traumatic episode that the protagonist cannot articulate, but in the mere 
inability to articulate his thoughts during the period of second-language acquisition. But what 
is traumatic about a phrase from a Beatles song that a child funnily distorts when imitating 
other children? Does this childhood incident, as Tschofen argues, really expose “the limits of 
speech and meaningfulness”, let alone a “threatened dissolution of [the] self”? Shall the 
protagonist be trusted in his evaluation that his misinterpretation of “Yellow Submarine” was 
indeed so ridiculous that it could leave traces of trauma? And finally, if the inability to 
express oneself or the tendency to imitate were to be categorized as ‘traumatic’, would the 
acquisition of any language, the mother tongue included, not have to bear the same label? 
 
 
 
The struggle to go native 
 
Both Kassabian’s and Kazanjian’s and Tschofen’s lines of argument appear undermined by 
the fact that Egoyan also presents a figure which stands in stark contrast to the obsessive 
neurotic protagonist: the non-traumatized figure of the translator. Monique Tschofen does 
devote some attention to the role of the translator, but eventually fails to establish an 
integrative perspective on the contrast and relation between these two central figures. While 
the role of Arsinée will be discussed later in this chapter, one obvious difference between her 
and the photographer is worth pointing out right away. Unlike her, the photographer has 
completely forgotten his mother tongue and obliterated the traces of his assimilation. It is 
important to point out that such phenomena do not only exist in fiction, but have been 
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observed in psychoanalytic studies. Thus, Leon and Rebeca Grinberg write in their 
Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Migration and Exile (1989), originally published in Spanish 
in 1984, that some immigrants “react with manic overadjustment, rapidly identifying 
themselves with the habits and manner of functioning natural to inhabitants of the new 
country, trying to forget their own” (1989, 89). This forgetting forms the basis of what I 
would like to describe as the protagonist’s ‘linguistic trauma’. I suggest that this type of 
trauma occurs in and through language, and befalls language migrants, who sacrifice their 
mother tongue in the process of adopting a foreign language. In my view, linguistic trauma 
consists neither in the shock of the encounter with the foreign language, nor in diasporic 
hybridity, but in the young migrant’s loss of the mother tongue, in which his self had been 
previously encoded. 
Like any other loss, the loss of the familiar language and culture environment needs to 
be mourned in order to be worked through. “Immigrants who deny the loss and do not 
gradually mourn the abandoned culture of origin” psychologist Olga Marlin argues, “become 
blocked in adjusting to a new life” (1997, 254). A decade later, psychologists Sophie D. 
Walsh and Shmuel Shulman conduct a study, in which they research the immigration 
experience of Former Soviet Union residents in Israel. Like Marlin, they come to the 
conclusion that  
[t]he absence of conscious grieving cannot serve as a basis for future organization. A deeper 
analysis of those immigrants who appeared to have reached higher levels of integration […] 
showed that the so-called ‘integration’ or ‘resolution’ that they showed was not, in fact real, stable 
integration but rather a form of superficial resolution that covered inverted splits” (Walsh and 
Shulman 2007, 369, emphasis in the original). 
The denial of loss and the absence of grieving are themes echoed in Calendar. It is striking 
enough that the protagonist, who upon his arrival in Canada “didn’t speak any English at all”, 
undergoes a developmental process after which he neither speaks nor even understands his 
mother tongue. What is more, however, is the fact that the protagonist’s mother tongue is 
never mentioned throughout the film. The cinematic text displays a significant gap, for 
without drawing biographic parallels to Atom Egoyan, we do not even learn what language it 
is – is it Armenian? or, inferring from his understanding of the word ‘yalla’, is it Arabic? 
Indeed, the film models the protagonist’s perception in such a way that he imagines himself to 
have been in an almost pre-linguistic state before his acquisition of English. It becomes clear 
that he has not only forgotten his mother tongue, but has also repressed the memory of this 
forgetting.  
What keeps him from mourning the loss, from a Freudian point of view, is not a 
complete deletion of this memory as in amnesia, but precisely the mechanism of repression: 
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“The trauma, instead of being forgotten, is deprived of its affective cathexis; so that what 
remains in consciousness is nothing but its ideational content, which is perfectly colorless and 
is judged to be unimportant” (Freud 1955a, 196). As Freud further develops in this study of 
the Rat Man (1955a), traumatized subjects resort to obsessive behavior as an additional 
defense against the resurfacing of their traumatic memories. These two defense mechanisms 
are also effectively staged in Calendar. If the protagonist’s misinterpretation of the song line, 
“yalla submarine”, exhibits his migration history from Arabic-speaking Egypt to Canada and 
thus, in his eyes, makes him “vulnerable”, in his adult life we see him, as the passage quoted 
above demonstrates, armed with colloquialisms such as “I mean”, “like”, “sort of” and “you 
know”, which speak to his chronic attempt to pass for a native. His linguistic origins are thus 
extinguished as if they never existed and his excessively colloquial language, along with his 
ritualized dating practice, appears as a manifestation of obsessional neurosis. 
 
 
Desire and the language of the Other 
 
Taking the analysis one step further, one may wonder what makes him abandon his mother 
tongue in the first place. With psychoanalyst Josiane Paccaud-Huguet, we can see this act as 
part of a larger symptomatics, which migrants may develop in foreign language surroundings. 
Thus, she  writes: “The subject in exile [and, likewise, the language migrant] is condemned to 
imagine what the Other wants, and is tempted to respond by a logic of sacrifice which is the 
neurotic way of giving the Other imaginary consistency” (2006, 285). If in Paccaud-Huguet’s 
view the migrant is lured into neurosis, her use of the Lacanian notion of the ‘Other’ also 
presupposes a host community which is monolingual, culturally homogenous and therefore 
seen as radically different by the immigrant. While this seems to be an overly monolithic 
conception, it nevertheless finds itself confirmed in the filmmaker’s own experience. In a 
BBC interview, Egoyan stresses that at the time when he and his parents moved to Victoria on 
the Canadian West coast, it was “a very isolated community” and they were “the only 
Armenian family there”. Furthermore, he states: 
English is not my mother tongue and I remember very clearly not being able to communicate. 
Going to school and having to, and wanting nothing more than to be like everyone else. That was a 
very important part of my upbringing, this idea of shedding an identity and embracing another one 
(Egoyan and Tusa 2010, online). 
In Calendar, the filmmaker, who himself began relearning his mother tongue at the age of 
eighteen when he first got in touch with the Armenian community in Toronto (Egoyan and 
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Tusa 2010, online), develops the fantasy of a character who does not acknowledge the 
forgetting of his mother tongue as a loss. His first neurotic act of sacrificing one language 
identity in favor of another remains constitutive in the formation of his adult personality.  
While the linguistic sacrifice occupies the position of the back-story wound, it is 
prominently mirrored on a different level, which is briefly mentioned in Kassabian’s and 
Kazanjian’s article (2005). Drawing on the protagonist’s account of the childhood incident 
cited above, they write that for the young language migrant 
[s]peech was severed from ‘what you were feeling’ and ‘what’s going through your mind’, 
becoming instead an impoverished response to ‘what you think other people would want to hear’. 
In effect, signs became attached to an unstable fantasy of the desire of the other, producing both 
imitations of the other that seem ‘ridiculous’ because of that instability and a subjectivity 
constantly ‘vulnerable’ to the return of that instability (2005, 135, emphasis mine).  
As the authors observe, the protagonist is not only plagued by the anxiety of being unable to 
understand English or express his thoughts, but is first and foremost deeply affected by his 
constant attempts to adapt to the desire of others. To understand the significance of this 
observation, one only need to notice how the themes of trauma and neurosis are constantly 
intertwined with the theme of desire. Thus, the narrative of the Armenian journey, which 
restages scenes of the protagonist’s linguistic alienation, is clearly focused on attraction and 
desire. The photographer’s neurotic behavior within the context of translation results in the 
loss of his love to a native speaker of his lost mother tongue. Second, the protagonist’s 
obsessive restagings of his linguistic alienation from Arsinée are also deliberately set within 
the context of desire. For even though the dinner scenes, as already mentioned, show purely 
linguistic encounters, the photographer unceasingly arranges for dates with attractive women 
through an escort agency. Finally, the protagonist overcomes his neurotic condition by 
stumbling upon his own desire, which however shall be explained later.  
 As I would like to show, Calendar invites a reading based on Lacan’s statement 
formulated in Écrits: “[M]an’s desire is the Other’s desire” (2006, 525). In order to develop 
this argument, I will first recall some of Lacan’s ideas on language and identity relevant for 
the film. To begin with, the protagonist’s absurd entry into the English-speaking world, as 
depicted in the quotation above, seems to reenact Lacan’s ideas about the child’s entry into 
the sphere of the Symbolic. Lacan’s ideas are reflected in the protagonist’s view that as a 
child you imitate, and thus adapt your desire to speak to “what you think other people would 
want to hear”. If there is space for his own desire in this constellation at all, it is in Lacanian 
terms, “‘desire of the Other’s desire’, which means both desire to be the object of another’s 
desire, and desire for recognition by another” (Evans 1996, 37-38). The reason why the 
protagonist feels so “vulnerable” in his desire for recognition can also be accounted for by 
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Lacan’s thinking. For while Freud ascribes “primary narcissism” and “phantasmatic 
omnipotence” to the little child (van Haute 2002, 116), Lacan takes the opposite view that 
“the capricious, real Other appears omnipotent to the child” (ibid., 116-17). 
If Lacan releases the child from the power of the first Other through the entry into the 
Symbolic, he does not set the subject free from a different Other – the language and laws of 
human society. Thus, the child abandons imaginary identification with the object of lack of 
the mother only to enter the realm of the Symbolic, governed by “the law of the Other, which 
makes possible the development of one’s own desire” (ibid., 191). However, this desire is also 
not completely one’s own – and here we come to the second interpretation of the thesis that 
“man’s desire is the Other’s desire” – since in the realm of the Symbolic the subject cannot 
but construct itself through language, which for Lacan “is like an alien body that grafts itself 
onto the order of the body and of nature” (ibid., 25). This means that human desire is not 
generated by the subject in a self-contained system, but is predetermined and formed by 
discourses exterior to the subject, from which there is no escape. Or as Lacan puts it, “there is 
no Other of the Other” (2006, 688). 
Seen from a Lacanian perspective, the encounter of Egoyan’s protagonist with the 
children on the beach restages an encounter with the Other in Canada. Badly wanting to be 
accepted in their circles, he tries to approach their (musical) discourse at least phonologically. 
However, he remains painfully aware of his vulnerable position, since the Others seem to 
possess the key to group belonging, while he can only mimic it in a ridiculous way. 
Confronted with the language of the Other, the protagonist begins to wonder what “other 
people would want to hear”, thus reviewing and reshaping his self through the desire of the 
Other. Indeed, already in his rendering of “Yellow Submarine” as “yalla submarine” he 
sacrifices meaning for sound, thus showing first signs of neurotic behavior. Just like in the 
Lacanian model, he tries to overcome his dependence on these real Others by subjecting 
himself to the higher law of the Other in the Symbolic order, that is, by learning to speak 
English. However, the process of second-language learning does not bring about the desired 
effect of liberation, since, as Claire Kramsch and Linda von Hoene argue, it implies a sense of 
inequality and even mental colonization. “From the perspective of second language learning”, 
they write, “the native speaker functions as a desired site of mimesis or identification”. 
Therefore, “the goal of foreign language study, i.e. to acquire native speaker fluency, takes as 
its implied goal identification with the native speaker ideal and the erasure of anything that 
would make the learner deviate from the native speaker ideal” (Kramsch and von Hoene 
2001, 285).  
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In Calendar, the “identification with the native speaker ideal” and the erasure of 
difference are taken to the extreme. The protagonist’s process of second-language learning 
seems to be literally modeled after Lacan’s idea of a child’s entry into the Symbolic. Here, 
however, the previously mentioned textual gap comes into play. As his adaptation to the 
foreign-language surroundings takes place after the acquisition of his mother tongue, neither 
his submission to the real nor to the symbolic Other comes without a price. Trying to replicate 
a process that can only originate in a pre-linguistic state, the protagonist denies the existence 
of his mother tongue and thus abandons the sphere of the symbolic Other, in which his desire 
was already developed. As expressed in his statement that the imitation of others “doesn’t 
really have anything to do with what you are feeling” or “what’s going through your mind”, 
the protagonist loses touch with his own desire. 
 
 
Being a translation neurotic 
 
In his adult life, his alienation from his own desire becomes palpable in relation to his wife 
and their driver Ashot on the journey through Armenia, which eventually brings about a 
return of the repressed. When he reencounters the country of his ancestors as a foreign-
language environment, the photographer follows the logic of submission to the native speaker, 
this time however, not of English but Armenian. He 
seems to have generalized this logic, since upon his 
encounter with Ashot, the protagonist begins to 
desire him as a figure of identification and, in 
consequence, to take on his desire. This is conveyed 
through the photographer’s gaze directed at Ashot 
through the camera. In many of the recorded video 
sequences, the protagonist’s attention and his 
camera are entirely focused on the Armenian driver, 
who appears in the forefront as if introducing the 
image to the camera (image 1). While Ashot 
effortlessly enters the frame, he literally has to help 
Arsinée into the image by stretching an arm out to 
her and dragging her inside (image 2).  
 
Image 1 
Image 2 
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Arsinée’s entry into her husband’s reality is mediated by the driver not only in this 
physical way, but also through his gaze. This becomes visible in a long take in which Arsinée 
is exposed to the voyeuristic gaze of the camera that slowly glides down her body (0:12:58). 
While the camera gaze seems to fall prey to the magnetic attraction of her body, the 
protagonist first directs it at Ashot (0:12:46), follows his gaze, and only then almost 
undeliberately lingers on Arsinée’s body. Although the camera, through which the viewer 
eventually witnesses this scene, is operated by the photographer, the gaze at Arsinée does not 
seem to be his own, but the driver’s. Eventually, it is not Arsinée’s body, but Ashot’s gaze at 
her that seems to be the subject of this scene. Commenting on the photographer’s focus on the 
driver, Kassabian and Kazanjian go as far as to detect homosexual desire, writing that in her 
role of the translator, Arsinée “is positioned between the Photographer and the driver, 
mediating their desire for each other, redirecting that desire into a more comfortable and 
familiar regime of heterosexual rivalry” (2005, 139). Countering this view, I would instead 
argue that by following Ashot’s gaze, the photographer fully identifies with this Other’s 
desire, ironically enough directed at his own wife. Being obviously detached from his own 
desire, the protagonist corresponds to van Haute’s description of obsessional neurotics, who 
“exhaust themselves trying to adapt to the desire of the Other” (van Haute 2002, 262). “The 
obsessional neurotic”, van Haute continues, 
is thus a follower, a slavish adept. As soon as he is in a situation where he must choose for himself 
– where he must speak in his own name without the support of his master – he is blocked. […] In 
obsessional neurosis desire is reduced thus to the demand of the Other; the obsessional neurotic 
subject never desires “in his own name”. […] In fact, he almost finds it annoying that he has his 
own name, because it reminds him that he is summoned to his own desire, which does not dissolve 
into the desire of his master (van Haute 2002, 263). 
The repression of his own name and desire is most vividly expressed in the scene, in which 
Ashot is asked to enact a KGB agent checking Arsinée’s passport. While the photographer 
wants to capture the Other’s gaze by making him perform directly to the camera, he is startled 
from his hiding place behind the camera, when Ashot, in his role of the agent, addresses him 
instead of Arsinée. Having to reveal his own identity, the photographer forgets about his plan 
to film the KGB performance and escapes the situation by stopping the running camera and 
thus editing his exposure from his reality. 
On the one hand, the gaze of an Other can also be said to help the photographer hide 
his own desire, which would otherwise exhibit his helplessness and lack. By following the 
driver’s gaze, he not only channels, but also rationalizes his own desire, trying to free himself 
from any subconscious stirrings. “The obsessional neurotic subject”, van Haute writes, 
“reduces his existence to his conscious existence, so that he is completely independent from 
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the Other and neutralizes it. He wants to banish every reminder of limitation and lack from his 
life” (van Haute 2002, 261). In Calendar, the protagonist’s lack is doubled since it not only 
speaks to his dependence on Arsinée as his lover, but also as the translator of the language he 
has banned from his life. The protagonist refuses to acknowledge his dependence on neither 
of her roles, which prompts her to briefly step out of her role as translator: 
Translator: What does it mean when you hear me tell you his stories?  
Photographer: What does it mean? 
Translator: Yeah, it’s practical, right? 
Photographer: What’s practical? 
Translator: My services as a translator.  
Photographer: I guess. (0:16:35-0:16:50) 
Just like the photographer avoids getting interested in Ashot’s explanations about the history 
of the churches they visit – “Does this mean anything to you?”, Arsinée wonders (0:16:18) – 
in order to play down his dependence on her as a translator, he also does not pay much 
attention to her as a partner. In fact, he treats her in such an authoritarian and ignorant way 
that it is difficult for the viewer to empathize with him when she eventually leaves him for the 
driver. As an obsessional neurotic, he “organizes his sexual life in such a manner that any loss 
of control is excluded – for him […], depending upon and yielding to the Other as the cause 
of his desire would equal his very destruction as a subject” (van Haute 2002, 271).  
 The obsession with control, on the one hand, and with hiding his own desire, on the 
other, culminate in the protagonist’s obsessive filming and taking of pictures. This leitmotif is 
introduced early in the film, when a dispute between him and his wife over whether she may 
film with the video camera makes clear that he wants to seize control over the visual field 
instead of being exposed to the gaze of the camera. While not realizing that he thus edits 
himself out of the others’ lives, he appreciates that with the visual medium he can assert his 
independence from them. For the calendar pictures, he makes use of his professional authority 
as a photographer and asks Arsinée and Ashot to move out of the frame of his image 
(0:14:38), thus reducing their presence in his reality. Likewise, when shooting with the video 
camera, he prefers recording their departure rather than their uncontrollable presence. Thus, 
when Arsinée asks him to join her and Ashot for a walk he uses the already positioned camera 
as an excuse for staying behind. In the voice-over he adds to his recordings later in Toronto, 
however, he admits: “It’s not a question of wanting to go or not. It’s much stranger than that. 
What I really feel like doing is standing here and watching. Watching while the two of you 
leave me and disappear into a landscape that I’m about to photograph” (0:52:14-0:52:37).  
 The protagonist’s obsessive watching of Arsinée and the driver can also be identified 
as ‘scopophilia’. Drawing on Freud’s “Three Essays on Sexuality” (1953c), Laura Mulvey, in 
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her essay “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema”, associates “scopophilia with taking other 
people as objects, subjecting them to a controlling and curious gaze” (1975, 9). In assuming 
the role of the “bearer of the look” (Mulvey 1975, 12), the photographer then can be said to 
seize control and make himself master over the subjects in his visual field. However, in line 
with Freud, who describes scopophilia as a possible symptom of obsessional neurosis in the 
case study of the Rat Man (1955a, 160ff), this act can at the same time be seen as 
compensatory behavior. This interpretation is at work in Calendar, since the visual medium 
offers the protagonist an escape from language, the medium in and from which his neurosis 
originated. Both aspects of scopophilia help him evade the repressed memory of his traumatic 
entry into English. 
 
 
The return of the repressed 
 
However, the protagonist’s reviewing of the scene of Arsinée’s and Ashot’s departure marks a 
turning point in his case analysis. His wife’s behavior indicates the irreversible course of 
events, since she introduces a linguistic boundary between him and herself. While she can be 
seen engaging in a lively conversation with the driver in Armenian, for her husband she 
reserves only the English word “Bye!” (0:52:48) Moreover, when he later recollects the 
situation, the photographer surprises both himself and the viewer by noticing more of the 
scenery of Arsinée’s and Ashot’s departure. The two disappear between a church and a 
fortress ruin, which symbolically represent the different directions Arsinée and the protagonist 
take at that moment. While her way leads her towards Armenian spiritual history and very 
likely towards a traditional marriage, he is left behind with the ruins of the fortress he set up 
around himself.  
It is not a coincidence that the image of the fortress recalls Freud’s neuropsychological 
concept of the human psyche. In “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, Freud describes “as 
‘traumatic’ any excitations from outside which are powerful enough to break through the 
protective shield” of the psyche, functioning as an “efficacious barrier against stimuli” 
(1955c, 29). Seeing traumatic neurosis, as Freud does, “as a consequence of an extensive 
breach being made in the protective shield against stimuli” (ibid., 31), explains why 
traumatized subjects unconsciously try to set up barriers so as to protect themselves from 
other violent stimuli. It becomes obvious that a “barrier against stimuli” has materialized from 
the very outset in the shape of the camera lens, which protects, but also isolates the 
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photographer from his surroundings. The fortress in ruins then stands out as a symbol of his 
wounded psyche, which he has ‘fortified’ through obsessive behavior. Reviewing the scenery 
of Ashot’s and Arsinée’s departure before his inner eye, he zooms in on this symbol and 
contemplates: “A church and a fortress. A fortress in ruins. All that’s meant to protect us is 
bound to fall apart, bound to become contrived, useless and absurd. All that’s meant to protect 
is bound to isolate. And all that’s meant to isolate is bound to hurt” (0:53:57-0:54:26). 
A few takes later, remarkably, an elderly Armenian man appears on screen, whom the 
photographer interviews about the fortress in Arsinée’s absence without understanding a 
single word (0:56:05-0:58:45). During the long monologue of the man, the breach between 
speaking und understanding seems absolute; the scene condenses the distress of linguistic 
alienation both for the protagonist and the viewer. Seen from a psychoanalytic perspective, 
the monologue presents itself as an ingenious comment on the protagonist’s trauma. He 
cannot understand the content of the man’s words, which symbolically speaks to his non-
understanding of his trauma. Yet, the code used in the monologue, that is the Armenian 
language, points to the source of his trauma, which the loss of his mother tongue. It is most 
striking that when Arsinée – together with Ashot – arrives at the scene of non-translation and 
makes a first attempt at explaining, the photographer zooms in on the old man, thus leaving 
her outside the frame and editing her and the translation from his reality. While this maneuver 
previously seemed like a rude imposition of his worldview, this time it appears in a different 
light. He refrains from relying any longer on her translation, which he has used to deny the 
loss of his mother tongue, and begins to expose himself to his trauma. 
His giving up of resistance is interpreted on the visual level through the collapse of 
barriers between the images and their smooth connection by music, without which they 
previously, just like the protagonist himself, appeared isolated and stirred little emotion in the 
viewer. Whereas before, the photographer, as Katrin Kegel observes, could interrupt Ashot in 
his explanations, Arsinée in her translations, the escorts in their conversations and even 
confuse the viewer by his fast-forwarding or rewinding of the video material (cf. 2007, 85), 
from this moment on, he seems to lose control, and the images enter into an uncontrollable 
flow, a cinematic stream of consciousness. The editing style, based mostly on abrupt and 
laconic jump cuts between the takes, turns ‘emotional’ and unleashes images that had 
previously been under strict control. Just after Arsinée’s “Bye!”, which signals a final 
goodbye, a song sets in from an initially off-screen source and begins to smoothly link the 
images (0:52:52). The following take for the first time shows a desolate urban landscape, 
which violently breaks into the protagonist’s idealized pastoral vision of Armenia and clearly 
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places him outside the context of his work, where he could still exert professional authority as 
a photographer.  
When he moves inside from the balcony, from which he was shooting the view of the 
city, it becomes clear that he is but a guest in Ashot’s apartment. The guide is seen singing the 
song previously heard, a popular Armenian song that, significantly, tells the story of two 
lovers in the mountains.
2
 As Arsinée joins in singing, she abandons her job as translator and 
excludes her husband from their company. The long suspense-creating take that shows the 
photographer’s slow and shaky movement from the balcony to the interior of the apartment 
anticipates this scene like an epiphany. Not only does it bring home the realization that he has 
irretrievably lost Arsinée, the scene also triggers a most literal return of the repressed from his 
childhood. Of all things, it is once again a song sung in a foreign language, which most likely 
used to be his own, that appears as an epitome of untranslatability and the ultimate boundary 
of understanding. Arsinée’s question: “Do you know the song?”, returns him to the very 
origins of his neurosis, when he as a child was marked as an outsider in a foreign-language 
community and could not join other children in their singing. If the course of his dinner dates 
does not explain why he eventually comes up with the memory of trying to sing along to 
“Yellow Submarine”, the memory of the apartment scene in Armenia does.  
In the unstoppable flow of images, this scene returns him to his own apartment, where 
we see the second last of the dinner dates with different eyes. After a neighbor of the 
protagonist, as we learn, has mistaken the escort for Arsinée, the mechanism of substitution, 
which was at work throughout the dating scenes, is exposed and ceases to work. The setting 
remains the same, but instead of talking over dinner, the photographer and the escort are 
shown sitting at the table in silence, as if mourning together the loss of his mother tongue, his 
translator and his wife. In correspondence with this act, the film here takes on an aesthetics of 
mourning, since the apartment settings in Armenia and Toronto are connected through what 
approaches a match cut, with the escort’s beautiful hair graphically matching that of Arsinée. 
The visual comparison highlights the non-identity of the two women and the irreplaceability 
of Arsinée, whom the photographer then remembers in the voice-over. Finally, Egoyan 
exposes the illusion of the escort’s enacted phone conversation by making a recorded message 
– and not a lover’s voice – audible on the other end of the line (0:55:48). 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 I thank Tatevik Zürker for the translation of the song. 
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Returning to “full speech” 
 
At the end of Calendar, however, something unusual for Egoyan’s films occurs – the 
protagonist’s dating ritual actually brings about a therapeutic effect and the series of 
obsessively repeated scenes closes, as Katrin Kegel puts it, in a “conciliatory gesture elegantly 
swaying between release and surrender” (2007, 86). The last of the dinner dates most palpably 
formulates what function the ritualized encounters eventually fulfill. Apart from serving as a 
game of da/fort and exemplifying the photographer’s neurotic behavior, as outlined before, 
they serve the recovery both of his past and his desire, which combines the aims of analysis in 
the Freudian and in the Lacanian perspectives. Viewing Calendar with Freud, healing occurs 
when the revelatory lines about his traumatic encounter with a foreign language are spoken 
during the last of his dinner dates. They signal the protagonist’s eventual remembrance of one 
of probably many similar traumatizing instances from his childhood and release him from the 
burden of the past.  
From a Lacanian perspective, his “release and surrender” can be observed not only in 
his recollection of and re-exposure to his forgotten past, but first and foremost in a recovery of 
desire expressed through speech. In Lacanian terms, the protagonist in the course of his ten 
psychoanalytic sessions, disguised as dinner dates, undergoes a development from ‘empty’ to 
‘full’ speech. Whereas in ‘empty’ speech “the subject seems to speak in vain about someone 
who – even if he were such a dead ringer for him that you might confuse them – will never 
join him in the assumption of his desire” (2006, 211), ‘full’ speech comes “closer to the 
enigmatic truth of the subject‘s desire” (Evans 1996, 194). A linguistic misunderstanding 
between the photographer and the last of the escorts offers the key to the unexpected 
resolution: 
Escort: I mean, I consider myself to be Egyptian and I grew up in Canada. I was born in Canada 
and I still trace myself, you know – 
Photographer: Yeah, but you act Egyptian in like the way you walked in here and stuff and you 
know –  
[…] 
Escort: I see. [laughs] 
Photographer: But you wouldn’t probably get that in me, or anything, like. 
Escort: Well, I can I can see it in you. I mean I wouldn’t think that you’re Canadian – 
Photographer: You you you conceive in me? 
Escort: I can see it in you – 
Photographer: Oh, you can see it – 
Escort: I wouldn’t think that you were Canadian. Just from the way that you look. (01:07:35-
01:08:26) 
Although the mishearing of “can see it in you” as “conceive in you” seems rather absurd, the 
sexual touch of the interpretation as well as the context in which these words are spoken are 
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momentous in the protagonist’s recovery. The mishearing takes on the same role as the slip of 
the tongue in Lacanian theory. As Lacan argues, the psychoanalyst faces the tremendous task 
to read and interpret symptoms in the patient’s speech, since it is in the very nature of 
repressed subconscious memories that they will not be simply linguistically articulated. The 
psychoanalyst therefore has to listen to “what the subject is not saying” (Lacan 2006, 206). A 
slip of the tongue on the part of the patient, however, can allow the analyst a sudden glimpse 
of what the conscious subject represses, for in a slip of the tongue 
the subject is overtaken by her own statement, as it were, or more precisely, overtaken by a 
signifier that intrudes autonomously upon her statement independent [sic] of her conscious 
intentions. In other words, the self-conscious subject disappears for a moment, and in the place it 
just occupied, a signifier appears (van Haute 2002, 44). 
This very signifier also intrudes upon the neurotic photographer, since in the context of the 
conversation it suddenly highlights the connection of the two themes that lie at the heart of the 
film: identity and desire. While the initial unvoiced neurotic conflict has its origins in the 
repression of the protagonist’s desire in the course of his adaptation to Canadian identity, 
desire now resurfaces in the conversation on belonging and national identity. The escort’s 
remark that she would not have taken him for a Canadian unmasks his history of inauthentic 
adaptation and surprises him so much that he finds himself voicing a signifier of repressed 
desire.  
Through this misinterpretation the protagonist can be said to turn from ‘empty’ to 
‘full’ speech as “speech which aims at, which forms, the truth such as it becomes established 
in the recognition of one person by another” (Evans 1996, 194). Indeed, an act of recognition 
underlies the mishearing, since only during the last date the protagonist seems to notice the 
woman at his table, and not only “a prop within his inner drama of restitution” (Wilson 2009, 
69). He is even surprised when she asks for the telephone upon his pouring of the last of the 
wine. In turning to ‘full’ speech, the protagonist recovers his position as a desiring subject and 
thus overcomes his initial neurotic tendency to submit himself to the desire of the Other. With 
the linguistic misunderstanding that replicates the ‘Yellow Submarine’ episode, but reverses 
its effect, the narrative – or case history – comes full circle. The protagonist’s memory and his 
desire are finally recovered, which, from both a Freudian and a Lacanian point of view, marks 
the end of a successful case analysis.   
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The multilingual subject 
 
So far, my analysis has only dealt with the protagonist’s perspective, presenting second-
language learning as a precarious process, which the film interprets in terms of trauma and 
desire. To discuss a counter-perspective presented in Calendar, I would like to return to an 
already mentioned argument by Josiane Paccaud-Huguet, in whose words the migrant subject 
“is condemned to imagine what the Other wants, and is tempted to respond by a logic of 
sacrifice which is the neurotic way of giving the Other imaginary consistency” (2006, 285, 
emphasis mine). Significantly, the subject is “tempted”, but not bound to respond in a neurotic 
way. As I would like to show, Calendar resists the idea of a necessary neurotic response to 
foreignness by contrasting the figure of the obsessive protagonist with the figure of his wife. 
Why is she, a diasporic Armenian like him, not affected by the same neurosis? A question 
posed in Claire Kramsch’s study on second-language learning offers an important hint:  
[The] self is not just learning another system of signs, but the language of a foreign Other. How 
can it learn to speak like the Other without losing itself in the process, that is, how does it construct 
itself as a multilingual subject? (2009, 78)  
The beginning of the quotation refers to what has been discussed above: the attempt to merge 
with the Other as a migrant’s potential neurotic response to his or her foreign-language 
surroundings. In the last part of her question, however, Kramsch not only asks how to remain 
oneself while learning a second language, but simultaneously provides the answer: precisely 
by constructing oneself as a multilingual subject. The last two sections of the chapter examine 
Arsinée’s construction as a multilingual subject in Calendar and discuss how she relates to 
her task of the translator.  
 What obviously sets Arsinée apart from her husband is the fact that she has retained 
her mother tongue, Armenian. However, despite being fluent both in English and Armenian, 
she does not show native speaker proficiency in her second language. Her English is often 
non-idiomatic and marked by a heavy accent and a peculiar intonation. How can this 
imperfection in her linguistic appearance can be accounted for? As Rosina Lippi-Green 
argues in her book, English with an Accent (1997), a foreign accent, has been and is still often 
conceived of as a marker of social inferiority, lower intelligence and rebellious attitude 
particularly in the United States. While the photographer seems to believe in this stereotype 
and therefore desperately tries to avoid having a foreign accent, Arsinée’s case is well 
described by Hamid Naficy, who sees accent as “one of the most intimate and powerful 
markers of group identity and solidarity, as well as of individual difference and personality” 
(2001, 23). In contrast to her husband, Arsinée resists going linguistically native, as if 
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agreeing with Claire Kramsch and Linda von Hoene in that “the very term ‘“native” speaker’ 
connotes the colonialist image of a stereotyped, monolithic, foreign other” (2001, 285). Her 
accent can be seen as a strategy of resistance against simplistic categorization, since it upsets 
binary oppositions of ‘native’ and ‘foreign’ and marks her as a multilingual and multicultural 
subject.  
In her refusal to be cut off from her Armenian roots, Arsinée’s linguistic situation also 
seems comparable to that of a famous real-life language migrant, Hannah Arendt. Having fled 
to the United States from Nazi-occupied Europe, Arendt, despite her profound mastery of 
English, continued writing in her mother tongue, German. In a conversation with Günter 
Gaus, she explains this attachment stating that 
there is no substitution for the mother tongue. People can forget their mother tongue. That’s true – 
I have seen it. There are people who speak the new language better than I do. I still speak with a 
very heavy accent, and I often speak unidiomatically. They can do all these things correctly. But 
they do them in a language in which one cliché chases another because the productivity that one 
has in one’s own language is cut off when one forgets that language (2003, 13). 
This passage effectively illustrates the contrast Egoyan’s film sets up between Arsinée and the 
photographer. While the translator exudes a sense of freedom and authenticity despite her 
accented English, her husband, desperate to pass for a native English speaker, seems caught 
up precisely in clichés, such as the excessive use of colloquialisms, speculations about the last 
escort’s ‘Egyptian behavior’ (01:07:42), or, more generally, the arrangement of dates through 
an escort service. 
Furthermore, his eradication of traces of his mother tongue from his English can be 
seen as symbolic of his disconnection from the diasporic history of his family. According to 
literary scholar Alan Rosen, foreign “[a]ccents […] serve as a shorthand memory, identifying 
the community to whom one belongs and embodying the memory of privation. […] 
accordingly, the eradication of an accent signals the eradication of memory” (2005, 81). 
Written in the context of Holocaust Studies, these lines equally address the Armenian 
“memory of privation”, which lies at the heart of diasporic consciousness. While Arsinée’s 
accented English bears witness to her cultural origins, the photographer’s linguistic 
assimilation can be likened to that of Edward Wallant’s protagonist in The Pawnbroker, 
Nazerman, whom Alan Rosen describes in the following terms: “His English is a tongue 
without memory; it locates him neither in place nor culture nor community” (Rosen 2005, 
81). In the light of the photographer’s disconnection from place, culture and community, it 
does not seem surprising that he can only be seen inside his apartment, but in no public spaces 
which might speak to his cultural belonging. The apartment is furnished in an utterly 
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inexpressive, culturally unmarked fashion and could be theoretically located anywhere in the 
Western world.  
Significantly, the only cultural symbol that briefly enters the image is an ‘evil eye’ 
wall pendant, a both Armenian and Turkish talisman. Provoked by an unpleasant dinner 
conversation about the photographer’s intrusive behavior at a belly-dance performance and 
possibly driven by an antipathy towards Armenians, the Turkish escort turns over the talisman 
during her enacted telephone flirt (0:33:28). This act of defiance marks the only tangible 
cultural encounter before the last date with an Egypt-born Armenian woman, with whom the 
protagonist eventually discusses the topic of national identity. Apart from these two 
occasions, the theme of cultural belonging does not come up during the dates at all despite the 
protagonist’s explicit choice of women with a foreign-language background. This fact lends 
itself to two interpretations: first, these indifferent encounters appear as a critique of Canadian 
multiculturalism, the idea of which the protagonist seems to have assimilated and can be seen 
performing in Calendar. While the film, as Kassabian and Kazanjian rightly point out, “does 
not allow us to see or hear of disjunctures between the guests’ ethnicities and their position 
within predominantly white, English-speaking Canada” (2005, 139), the protagonist, in 
staging a series of multicultural dates, seems to celebrate the Canadian society model of the 
‘cultural mosaic’, in which different languages, cultures and ethnicities peacefully co-exist. 
However, he undermines his own celebratory gesture both by displaying an obsession with 
linguistic assimilation and by revealing that the encounters between different cultures in the 
Canadian mosaic are first and foremost constituted by economic relationships – such as his 
own use of the escort service – and linguistic and cultural non-understanding. 
Second, it seems remarkable that although the protagonist, being monolingual, is 
doomed to be cut off from any foreign-language conversation, his choice of languages spoken 
by the escorts is not arbitrary. As Atom Egoyan points out himself, “the languages of the 
‘guests’ the photographer has invited represent countries that have ‘hosted’ Armenian 
communities” (2008, 97). Thus, the multicultural dates not only illustrate Canadian diversity 
he is surrounded by in the present, but also function as a picture-book of countries with an 
Armenian diasporic population, with whom he shares his origins. On the one hand, the 
director’s words imply that his protagonist is rehearsing the role of a host, having left behind 
his past as a guest in Canada, which can be seen as an expression of successful assimilation. 
On the other hand, however, the link to the Armenian diaspora signals his utterly abstract 
relationship to Armenia, which the director admits to having had himself (cf. 2008, 93). A 
confrontation with his origins seems to come about during the last date rather coincidentally, 
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as the escort turns out to share his Armenian origins. Regarding the other dates, however, his 
choice of women with a foreign-language background serves him merely for rehearsing 
scenes of estrangement. 
Precisely the opposite can be said about Arsinée, for her command of two languages 
connotes familiarity with her surroundings. It could be objected that in turning away from her 
husband, Arsinée seeks to abandon her bilingualism in favor of her mother tongue, Armenian. 
However, Calendar is not so much about the linguistic environment, in which the characters 
eventually settle down, but about the psychological freedom to define oneself and to choose 
where to belong. As Monique Tschofen argues in her essay on Calendar, Arsinée’s 
bilingualism implies a powerful position: 
The translator’s voice resonates in both distinct linguistic spheres and brings to each articulation 
traces of the other. Accented speech for her is not linked to estrangement as it is for the 
photographer, but rather constitutes her as a powerfully liminal figure able to access multiple 
realms of knowledge and experience (2005/06, 36). 
Moreover, Arsinée’s intimate connection to her surroundings is reflected on the visual level of 
the film. In order to expand on this, I would like to draw on a line of argument developed by 
literary critic Anne Malena. She suggests that “[m]igrants are translated beings” (2003, 9) and 
can be distinguished by their degree of translatability:  
[T]he new versions of their selves may be “perfect” translations, creating the illusion that they are 
native to the target culture, or retain traces of the foreign, proclaiming their difference and forcing 
transformation on the target culture. While some migrants achieve a high degree of translatability 
– hence of invisibility – most remain visible because they carry along many untranslatable 
components, ranging from visual appearance to cultural practices and beliefs (2003, 9).  
“[T]ranslation” here is closely associated with ‘transition’, implying that migrants who leave 
behind one culture and language to enter another possess a higher degree of translatability 
than others who “retain traces of the foreign”, that is their own culture and language. Though 
terminologically rather problematic, since ‘“perfect” self-translation’ is understood as the 
erasure of an old identity in favor of a new one, this passage establishes an interesting 
connection between visibility and language, which is also at work in Calendar. If the 
photographer, in Malena’s terms, seeks to excel in his “degree of translatability” by trying to 
pass for a native, he at the same time becomes invisible and unlocatable in a cultural, 
linguistic and most literal sense. His profession is highly symbolic of this development: as a 
photographer he not only manages to escape the medium of language, in which “traces of the 
foreign” may still show, but also, at least during the journey through Armenia, remains 
outside the cinematic frame, hiding behind the camera. As I argued earlier in this chapter, his 
attempts at editing himself out of reality and his practice of scopophilia function as symptoms 
of his obsessional neurosis. In that sense, the film presents a severe evaluation of what Malena 
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calls “‘perfect’ translations” – to rid oneself of all traces of the native culture and language 
means to fall into neurosis.  
 In contrast, Arsinée is presented as an untranslated or not entirely assimilated subject, 
engaging in an ongoing process of translation from and into English and Armenian.  Her 
indispensability in her role as an interpreter and her integration of traces from both languages 
and cultures relate to her strong presence on screen. Although in the photographer’s footage 
she can also be seen filming with a video camera, we never get to see her footage. While on 
the one hand, this can be linked to the photographer’s patriarchal gesture of denying her a 
perspective of her own, on the other hand, this speaks to her visibility, which functions as a 
sign of her non-traumatizing self-translation and her construction as a multilingual subject. 
Not only is Arsinée visually much more present than her husband, she is also filmed in an 
entirely different way. The photographer, when he does appear on screen in a frozen posture 
during the dating scenes, is exposed to an utterly indifferent camera gaze. In contrast, the 
camera seems to be in love with Arsinée and mostly captures her in motion. Unlike the 
photographer, who always looks absent-minded and never meets the gaze of the camera, his 
wife fills the video frame with her radiant presence, at 
times fearlessly looking straight into the camera, as if 
she were looking into her husband’s face (0:55:44, 
image 3). Running with a flock of sheep (0:18:38), 
walking through the landscape and merging with it or 
even balancing on ruins while translating for her 
husband (0:16:07), she combines untamed beauty and 
playfulness. Apart from appearing closely connected 
both to the photographer and the driver, she first and 
foremost seems in touch with herself. This is visually 
represented through her physicality. Thus, in two video 
scenes, for which the photographer interrupts the fast-
forwarding mode and switches into real time or even 
pauses the image, Arsinée can be seen stroking the bare skin of her legs (0:13:55) and 
hugging her own upper body (0:19:57, image 4) – both of these acts which Monique Tschofen 
interprets as auto-erotic (2005/06, 37). The bluish-tinted, grainy images of the photographer’s 
footage present her both as already lost and highly desirable, but most of all, unlike the 
protagonist, in possession of her own uncompromised desire. 
 
Image 3 
Image 4 
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The politics and ethics of translation 
 
While Egoyan devotes much attention to the psychosocial portraits of his mono- and bilingual 
characters, to interpret Calendar only in terms of language migrant psychology would be to 
ignore the film’s negotiation of power structures at work in linguistic border regions. In order 
to explore the power relations between the photographer as a monolingual English speaker, 
Arsinée as an English-Armenian bilingual, and Ashot as a monolingual speaker of Armenian, 
Egoyan gathers the characters in a field of cross-cultural and cross-linguistic communication: 
the field of translation. 
 On the journey through Armenia, the photographer clearly finds himself as the 
linguistically most helpless character, since he does not understand the language of his own 
ancestors and is entirely dependent on his wife’s translation. If Egoyan does not equip him 
with at least a basic level of Armenian, he provides him with a different instrument of self-
assertion before the eyes of the viewer: the camera. Whereas in the context of the 
photographer’s neurosis, the camera functions as the symbol of his scopophilia and obsession 
with imaginary control, in the linguistic battlefield, the camera plays a crucial role for the 
simple reason that it records not only images, but also sound. Since the protagonist is assigned 
both the role of a cameraman and a sound engineer, he not only imposes his visual perspective 
on the viewer, but also manipulates the audio track during and after the recording. With the 
microphone obviously attached to the camera, the one in closest proximity to the camera can 
also be heard best. This fact enables the cameraman to establish a hierarchy of linguistic 
discourses on the audio track of the footage. 
Considering how the three characters are positioned in regard to the camera helps us 
understand how the recording device is employed an as instrument of power. Being closest to 
the microphone, the photographer is privileged, as his comments in English, though scarce, 
easily drown out everything that is spoken further away. Significantly enough, Arsinée, who 
switches between English and Armenian, and Ashot, who speaks Armenian only, are left to 
compete for the second and third rank in this hierarchy, interchanging their positions several 
times throughout the film. As I would like to argue, two ideological paradigms struggling in 
the protagonist’s mind underlie this competition. The first paradigm privileges the driver, who 
is monolingual like the protagonist and whose national identity is undisputed. With these 
characteristics, Ashot reaffirms the stereotype adopted by the protagonist that a subject can be 
rooted in one culture only and, as a native local, appeals to the photographer as a figure of 
identification. A second paradigm, however, relegates Ashot to the weakest position and lets 
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Arsinée rank second, since despite her liminal and ambiguous role, she translates into the 
lingua franca of English. Freeing the protagonist from the necessity of learning another 
language, Arsinée confirms the hegemony of his own position. What in any case remains 
undisputed on the audio track is the dominance of the English monolingualism of the 
protagonist, who in his identity crisis sometimes favors the discourse of the bilingual and 
sometimes that of the monolingual foreign-language speaker. 
In his militant monolingualism, the photographer resembles a colonial explorer, who 
not only does not understand the language of the natives, but also tacitly postulates the 
superiority of his own language. Imposing his comments in English on the scenes he captures, 
he silences the foreign-language voices of the local and the translator and thus presents an 
easily consumable display of Armenian foreignness to a presumably English-speaking 
audience. Moreover, his meeting with Ashot echoes encounters between oral and written 
cultures, since the photographer uses a technical recording device, while the Armenian 
driver’s discourse calls up oral story-telling traditions. Disrupting the driver’s explanations on 
the churches they visit through his own comments as well as requests to move out of his 
image frame, the photographer claims superiority to the native both in language and 
technology. However, it is only through the technical device that the protagonist can reassure 
himself of the dominance of his English monolingualism. Moreover, he can do so only in the 
eyes of the viewer, who has no other way of knowing about the journey through Armenia, but 
through the photographer’s footage. It is not Arsinée or Ashot, but the viewer alone who is 
presented with the result of the protagonist’s filming and eventually listens to an audio track 
dominated by English. And even so, while the protagonist’s account of the journey reaches its 
audience, his display of imperialist power fails, since through the evolving events in Armenia, 
the film tells a different story.  
Far from subjecting Arsinée and Ashot to the dominance of the photographer, 
Calendar empowers both the foreign-language speaker and the bilingual. Thus, Ashot does 
not carry out his job as the silent native driver, which the photographer had expected him to 
be. Instead he offers detailed explanations on almost every church they visit and succeeds in 
exposing the photographer’s ignorance about Armenia. For instance, he remarks that one of 
his photographic motifs – supposedly only churches – is not a church at all, but a pagan 
temple (0:28:58). When, in response to this, the protagonist points out that he hired Ashot as a 
driver and not as a guide (0:29:20), we witness not only his explicitly stated concern about the 
payment for the job, but also his fear that the native as a speaking subject may assume a role 
much more important than the one assigned to him. The protagonist’s fear of course comes 
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true when the native, whom the photographer had employed for a silent job, much like 
Shakespeare’s Othello, manages to impress Arsinée with his stories and to win her for 
himself. 
 Not only does Ashot transgress his role as a driver, his discourse also reaches far 
beyond that of a guide. In his conversations with Arsinée, he raises many unresolved personal 
issues of the diasporic couple. For example, he discusses with the translator why she and her 
husband do not have children and whether it is not advisable to raise them in the land of one’s 
ancestors. Later on in their journey, he unsettles the photographer’s sense of identity when he 
jokingly enacts a KGB officer doing a passport check. What starts out as a little entertaining 
performance between him and Arsinée, suddenly collapses into seriousness, when the 
photographer wishes to capture this scene as a touristic souvenir and asks Ashot to “do it to 
the camera” (01:04:24). For instead of simply performing for the camera, the guide asks the 
protagonist for his – significantly, Canadian – passport, thereby symbolically raising the 
question of national identity, a highly problematic question for the photographer. What is 
more, the guide’s enactment of a communist figure unsettles the protagonist’s commodified 
image of Armenia, which otherwise largely consists of archaic churches and pastoral 
landscape. It thus becomes clear that Ashot’s foreign-language discourse is by far not naïve or 
subservient, but unfolds the power of subverting the protagonist’s ideological views. 
If the driver’s discourse, linguistically and culturally alienating both for the protagonist 
and viewer, succeeds in unfolding this power, this is due to Arsinée’s mediation as translator. 
The film reviews her task as a translator much in line with ethically and politically minded 
theorists such as Carolyn Shread, who argues that  
the task lying before translators is to engage not with situations of equivalence but to become 
involved with the asymmetries of difference. […] The recognition of power differentials and their 
extensive effects requires different strategies, but shares a general ethical mistrust of hegemonies. 
The task of the translator then becomes an ethico-political intervention motivated by a desire to 
rectify inequalities and deconstruct abusive power systems via a flexible range of strategies suited 
to the particular situation (2007, 217). 
Arsinée’s “ethico-political intervention” begins with her rendering of her translation as 
somewhat dysfunctional to her husband. Whether due to a limited proficiency in English, a 
fully conscious resistance, or, most likely, a combination of both, Arsinée’s translations 
mostly come out as neither very fluent, nor fully graspable in their content. This can be 
observed, for example, in the following passage, in which she translates Ashot’s remarks on 
the particular locations of the churches: 
He says it’s a wonderful idea that you’re making pictures of the churches… [Ashot gives 
explanations in Armenian] … oh, because apparently, the churches are supposed to be completely 
in relation with their, uh… [speaks to the driver in Armenian] Oh, actually the spot is – has 
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something to do with the actual, uh, importance of that, of that place, so it had to be in a particular 
landscape, but regardless of, uh, if it’s beautiful or not, it was more based on where the actual 
energy of that place is. (0:11:39-0:12:40) 
The long and tedious translation borders on the incomprehensible and almost seems to excuse 
the fact that the photographer’s attention fades and, in his later mental reviewing of the scene, 
shifts to Arsinée’s body (0:13:05). This shift of attention from the translator’s words to her 
body, or from the challenge of interpretation to voyeurism, is symptomatic of the 
protagonist’s attempt to master a linguistic situation that evades his control. At the same time, 
however, we can hear him struggling to make sense of Ashot’s explanation and inquiring 
further about the locations of the churches as well as about Ashot’s thoughts on his own 
positioning of the camera for photographing them. Particularly his eagerness to hear Ashot 
confirm that the position of his camera is not accidental – which of course seems obvious to 
him from an aesthetic point of view – demonstrates that he desperately seeks a connection 
between the guide’s remarks and himself. This is precisely what Arsinée refuses to establish 
in her translation, for instead of taming and accommodating Ashot’s words within her 
husband’s worldview, she passes them on in an impersonal and obscure fashion. In doing so, 
she  responds to Lawrence Venuti’s call for “foreignizing” translation, which originates in his 
critique of  
the prevalence of fluent strategies that make for easy readability and produce the illusion of 
transparency […]. Fluency masks a domestication of the foreign text that is appropriative and 
potentially imperialistic, putting the foreign to domestic uses which, in British and American 
cultures, extend the global hegemony of English. It can be countered by “foreignizing” translation 
that registers the irreducible differences of the foreign text […] by deviating from the values, 
beliefs, and representations that currently hold sway in the target language (Venuti 2000a, 341). 
Venuti’s critique applies well to the two opposing forces in Calendar, namely the 
photographer as an imperialistically minded traveller and defender of the global hegemony of 
English and the translator as a rebel against the commodification of the foreign. The 
photographer likes pointing at the artifacts he films and demanding prompt explanations from 
the native guide. Instead of engaging on a real dialogue, he interrupts both Arsinée and Ashot 
and makes them repeat comments and translations so as to leave no detail in his images 
unexplained. His pointing finger, which enters the video image (0:23:09), not coincidentally 
reminds of the patriarchal symbol of the phallus. In order to counter her husband’s 
appropriative attitude, Arsinée confronts him with the foreignness of Ashot’s discourse. She 
does not gloss over, but exposes the photographer to the traces of the foreign, seeking “to 
restrain the ethnocentric violence of translation” (Venuti 1995, 20). Drawing on Venuti’s 
ideas, her foreignizing translation can be seen as “a strategic cultural intervention in the 
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current state of world affairs, pitched against the hegemonic English-language nations and the 
unequal cultural exchanges in which they engage their global others” (1995, 20). 
 Fluency and transparency are not the only sacrifices made in foreignizing translation. 
As Carolyn Shread argues, Venuti’s call, and consequently also Arsinée’s translation practice, 
present “a direct challenge to an ethics of fidelity” (2007, 216). This remark gains particular 
weight in Calendar, since fidelity is not only undermined in Arsinée’s translations, but also in 
her relationship with the protagonist. As Monique Tschofen observes, this linkage calls up the 
Italian dictum “traduttore traditore”, which marks the translator as a traitor (2005/2006, 36). 
Egoyan parallelizes the two kinds of infidelity most palpably in a scene, in which the 
photographer, in apparent desperation, confronts Ashot with the question of how he feels 
about having a love affair with his wife. Even in this emotionally charged context, Arsinée 
does not stray from the technique of foreignization and translates to the protagonist: 
Translator: He feels that you are a two adventurous.  
Photographer: That I’m too adventurous?  
Translator: No, that the two of you are adventurous men. […] He says because we know that 
we’re talking about something and within it you can find many other things such as evil and the 
divine. 
If the formulation “two adventurous” seems to be a literal translation that after some 
clarification can still be understood, the mentioning of the “evil and the divine” doubtless 
leads into obscurity. The non-Armenian viewer does not learn how much of this effect is 
owed to Ashot’s own linguistic manoeuver, through which he seeks to evade the 
confrontational question. What is obvious, however, is that Arsinée does not undertake any 
efforts to domesticate his words and make them easily understood by her husband.  
While the last passage demonstrates that in her foreignizing translation, Arsinée 
ruthlessly follows the agenda of an ethically and politically motivated translator, Egoyan 
makes her acknowledge another argument brought forth by Lawrence Venuti: 
The ethically and politically motivated translator cannot fail to see the lack of an equal footing in 
the translation process, stimulated by an interest in the foreign, but inescapably leaning towards 
the receptor. This translator knows that translations never simply communicate foreign texts 
because they make possible only a domesticated understanding, however much defamiliarized, 
however much subversive or supportive of the domestic (Venuti 2000b, 469). 
Indeed, Egoyan makes Arsinée go beyond mere foreignization by having her translate from 
and into both English and Armenian, thus subverting the boundary between the source and the 
target language. This has to do with the figure of the driver, who himself demands equal 
footing in the translation process in rejecting the silent role intended for him. By raising 
questions which the photographer has to respond to, he prompts Arsinée to translate long 
stretches of dialogue not only from Armenian into English, but also in the reverse direction. 
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While her initial task is to translate only for her husband, she fully accepts Ashot as an equal 
partner in communication and quickly begins to lean towards him as a receptor. It can even be 
said that the translator, finding more interest on the side of the native guide, opts for 
Armenian as the domestic language and soon seems more engaged in explaining the Canadian 
context she lives in as something foreign to Ashot than in communicating Ashot’s comments 
to her husband. 
 Clearly, Arsinée’s translation strategies do not only help to empower Ashot, but also 
promote her own emancipation. First, she has good reason to present her husband with a 
foreignizing translation, since his attempts to domesticate the foreign reveal a monolithic 
conception of English. As Venuti notes, a “translator may find that the very concept of the 
domestic merits interrogation for its concealment of heterogeneity and hybridity” (Venuti 
2000b, 469). As a bilingual character, the translator in Calendar then seems bound to resist 
the domestication of the foreign, even if simply for the reason that this implies the application 
of a certain linguistic standard or norm, which she, as her accented speech makes clear, never 
adopted. However, there is more at stake than a defense of hybridity. As one of the first 
scenes of the film, in which the photographer tries to forbid her to use the video camera 
(0:08:20), reveals, the protagonist exerts patriarchal power over his wife. He largely draws 
this power from his mastery of English, and from the hegemonic position of the language in 
the world. Seeing the camera, as outlined above, as his weapon for defending a hierarchical 
order of languages, one can easily understand the implications of his attempt to monopolize 
the recording device. The patriarchal act we see him perform relates directly to his fears of 
being dethroned in and by another language and, therefore, to his endeavors to secure the 
hegemonic – or simply, the loudest – position of English.  
While to the photographer, Armenian presents itself as foreign and dangerous territory, 
for Arsinée, the language functions as a liberating force: it reconnects her with her native 
culture and establishes a communicational and ideological tabula rasa between her and her 
husband. Armenian enters the stage as a foreign language that does not bear any traces of their 
common discourse, the clichés, to quote Hannah Arendt, they may have fallen prey to by 
communicating in English – a language originally foreign to both of them – and the power 
relations that have evolved between them. The words of the Armenian driver, which Arsinée 
carries across into English, disrupt the discourse of the diasporic couple by exposing the 
silences between them and opening up a new, though not neutral, linguistic space for 
renegotiating their relationship. For instance, Ashot voices the unresolved question about their 
ties to the country of their ancestors: 
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Translator: He [Ashot] says, so if you didn’t have the calendar project proposed to you, you 
would have never come to Armenia? 
Photographer: Does that bother him or is that an issue? 
Translator: I don’t know. 
Photographer: Well, I don’t… No, I wouldn’t have probably. 
Translator: You wouldn’t have come to Armenia? 
Photographer: Well, no, I mean, not if I didn’t have a specific reason to come here, no. (0:36:21-
0:36:42) 
What is remarkable in this exchange is the way in which Arsinée maneuvers between her own 
voice and her voice as a translator. Significantly, Ashot’s question is part of a longer dialogue, 
the rest of which Arsinée does not translate. Her selection of what to translate as well as her 
insistence on the question betray her personal interest in raising the subject of her husband’s 
relationship to Armenia. At the same time, she hides her own attitude when she refuses to 
comment on the provocative undertones of Ashot’s question and pretends to merely repeat it 
in English. Her ‘task of the translator’ becomes a ‘mask of the translator’, for it allows her to 
raise questions without assuming authorship for them. Her transgression of the role as a 
translator does not go unnoticed by the photographer and provokes his later comment in a 
voice-over: 
Photographer (voice-over): How can you be so passive? How can you ask me to respond to these 
questions when you know all the answers? How can you pretend that my responses are a surprise 
to you? Why can’t you refer to our history of each other? Why can’t you tell him what you know I 
would think? (0:36:44-0:37:06) 
Although Arsinée can be said to abuse her role as a translator by hiding behind Ashot’s 
provoking questions and rejecting her husband’s answers as not satisfactory, the film does not 
judge her for this behavior. The photographer reproaches her for subverting the asymmetrical 
relationship that has developed between them by accusing her of passivity. Surely, Arsinée’s 
role is marked not by passivity, but by active agency, with which she disrupts her husband’s 
hegemonic discourse. In fact, his accusation is revelatory since it points to his secret wish to 
make her remain passive and loyal, abandon her liminal role as translator and calmly settle 
down in his own discourse. His words express his desire to appropriate her discourse, to have 
her function as his mouthpiece and to defend his position from the discourse of the Other. 
This very attempt to secure his hegemonic position justifies Arsinée’s use of her task as a 
mask of the translator. 
  Mostly, however, Arsinée does not use her role as a translator in order to hide, but on 
the contrary, to highlight her own position. This goal is mostly achieved through Arsinée’s 
strategy of interrupting her translation or leaving large stretches of Armenian dialogue 
untranslated, which keeps both the photographer and non-Armenian viewers out of her 
conversations with the driver and thus, by means of multilingual realism, mimics the 
protagonist’s sense of alienation. Early on their journey, her withholding of the translation has 
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less to do with a wish to keep her conversations with Ashot secret, than with the attempt to 
make her role as a translator visible. For as pointed out earlier in this chapter, the protagonist, 
who has repressed the knowledge of his mother tongue, denies his lack by playing down the 
importance of his wife’s translation. By withholding it and explicitly commenting on her 
“services as a translator” (0:16:48), she reminds him of his lack and his dependence on her 
translation as a substitute for his own knowledge of Armenian. 
Again, Arsinée’s translation strategy does not only expose a psychological issue, since 
the photographer’s denial relies on the marginalization of translation, which Venuti sharply 
criticizes in The Scandals of Translation (1998). Using English as an instrument of power, the 
protagonist tells Arsinée when and what to translate, interrupts her and corrects petty mistakes 
such as her use of the word “catalyzer” instead of “catalyst” (0:38:33). In treating her like a 
mere imperfect translation device, he seeks to conceal his dependence on her. Eliminating the 
translator as an active agent becomes part of his patriarchal enterprise, since, as Calendar 
demonstrates, a translator can pursue an “ethics of difference” and “choose to redirect the 
ethnocentric movement of translation so as to decenter the domestic terms that a translation 
project must inescapably utilize” (Venuti 1998, 82). If the photographer at times seems 
successful in silencing Arsinée’s foreignizing discourse, the translator’s complete silence – 
the withholding of the translation – turns radically against him and decenters the domestic 
even more. As Monique Tschofen points out, the untranslated passages make clear that 
Calendar “refus[es] to subordinate other languages to the increasingly global hegemony of 
English” (Tschofen 2005/2006, 31). Thus, by making the foreign language heard, Arsinée 
advocates equality for all languages and simultaneously exposes her husband’s need and 
devaluation of translation. 
Finally, Arsinée’s role as a translator between the two monolingual men commands a 
linguistic space that Michael Cronin, in his book Translation and Identity (2006), describes as 
the “triangular space of negotiation” (135). The figure of the triangle connotes both the 
process of translation as communication between three parties and Egoyan’s portrayal of the 
translator as a woman torn between two men. Cronin links the two connotations by ascribing 
to translation  
a form of ethics, which is predicated on complexity, distance and desire. The desire to know means 
the necessary triangulation of relationships (source text – translator – target text) which is more 
complex and less readily assimilated than the polar simplicities of binary opposites and involves 
an inevitable distancing effect but one which brings closeness, not familiarity (2006, 135). 
In regard to the characteristics of complexity and distance, Egoyan’s characters mirror 
Cronin’s view in several ways. First, Arsinée’s discourse as a translator is in fact not easily 
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assimilated, for its distancing effect upsets her husband’s assumption of familiarity. Instead, it 
offers closeness, which the native guide, however, knows to use better than the photographer. 
While Ashot sees the distancing effect as a challenge – in this sense, he really is an 
“adventurous” man – the protagonist seeks to eliminate or at least marginalize translation. 
Such attempts are addressed by Cronin, when he writes: 
To remove the space of mediation, the intermediary zone of time and difficulty which is the 
attempt to get to know another culture and another language, is to move from the triangular space 
of negotiation to the binary space of opposition (2006, 135). 
Precisely this movement underlies the protagonist’s worldview, since it is the assumption of a 
binary opposition between self and Other which makes him abandon one language for another 
in his childhood and marginalize foreign languages and their speakers for their very 
foreignness in his adult life. Translation subverts this logic and does more than this. The 
“triangulation of relationships” opens up not only a space of negotiation, but also a space of 
desire. Cronin argues that 
[t]ranslation and interpreting, rather than being treated as an unfortunate impediment to the 
progress of understanding and true love between peoples [sic], are arguably what ensures that 
people remain interested in each other. Both activities involve the obligation to know, to 
understand better, to open up the space of mediation in the absence of which individuals and 
communities remain marooned in the discrete islands of their own prejudice. Collapsing the space 
brings not proximity, but alienation (Cronin 2006, 135). 
In Calendar, translation indeed becomes the trigger of Arsinée’s and Ashot’s interest for each 
other. It could be argued again that, in leaving her husband, Arsinée seeks to leave the field of 
translation. However, in my view, Egoyan does not first and foremost stage her changing of 
sides, but highlights her ability to connect her own, diasporic experience with that of a 
foreign, native Armenian Other. Predicated on the attraction to difference, the act of 
translation becomes an act of desire, one of reaching out towards the unknown and connecting 
through language. The translator’s and the guide’s intimate ties, tragic as they are for the 
photographer, call up celebratory lines from translation theory. In her essay, “The Politics of 
Translation”, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak writes: “Translation is the most intimate act of 
reading. I surrender to the text when I translate. […] The translator earns permission to 
transgress from the trace of the other […] in the closest places of the self” (1992, 178). She 
concludes that “[t]he task of the translator is to facilitate this love between the original and its 
shadow” (Spivak 1992, 178). Laying the foundation for both Spivak’s argument and Venuti’s 
ideas on foreignizing translation, Walter Benjamin writes in “The Task of the Translator” that 
“a translation, instead of resembling the meaning of the original, must lovingly and in detail 
incorporate the original’s mode of signification, thus making both the original and the 
translation recognizable as fragments of a greater language” (2000, 21). He proclaims that 
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“the kinship of languages is to be demonstrated by translations” (2000, 17). Egoyan shifts this 
statement from a metaphysical to a sociopolitical context: in Calendar, the kinship of 
languages is demonstrated through intimate encounters at their borders. The border zone is 
configured as a force field, in which translators and their audience, if they enter unarmed, are 
likely to experience love and desire. 
 To come to a conclusion, the film contrasts two opposing perspectives on language 
migration and translation. The first part of the chapter presented the view that the encounter 
with a foreign language is potentially traumatizing, since in their need to be accepted in the 
host community, language migrants repress their own identity. In the film, linguistic trauma 
resurfaces as an obsessional neurosis, in which the protagonist, for lack of his own desire, 
continuously subjects himself to the desire of others. His case history only reaches its 
conclusion when the loss of both his mother tongue and his wife are mourned and his desire 
recovered.  
In contrast, the character of the translator, who initially comes into play as oppressed 
by a patriarchal regime, undergoes a process of self-empowerment through translation. Apart 
from serving a political enterprise, translation is also configured as an act of desire, since it 
relies on the wish to connect with the Other. The positions are thus contrasted through the 
absence or presence of one’s desire as well as through opposing political attitudes, which the 
neurotic and the bilingual tend to assume. 
 Although Egoyan endows the character of the translator with more happiness and 
fulfillment than his protagonist, he consciously refuses to idealize one position or the other. 
He sympathizes with the photographer by employing elements of a trauma aesthetics, such as 
fragmentation and repetition. At the same time though, he highlights the dangers of 
traumacentrism. He problematizes the protagonist’s status as a traumatized victim by 
exposing his complicity in patriarchal structures both in the scenes set in Armenia and those 
in Toronto. Arsinée’s authenticity, radiance and openness, in turn, attract the viewer’s 
sympathy, but are also overshadowed, since she abandons her husband in a linguistic and 
emotional situation which he cannot master. 
  
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have analyzed different perspectives on multilingualism and translation, 
which are at play in Eva Hoffman’s Lost in Translation and Atom Egoyan’s Calendar. The 
two works present us with stories of loss in translation, which are narrated as case histories. 
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As such, they retrace the protagonists’ first encounters with their second languages. They 
outline that language migrants find themselves in a marginalized position, which tempts them 
into choosing radical ways of dealing with their first languages. In Lost in Translation, the 
defense from the foreign language triggers an idealization and romanticization of the first 
language, in which life in the homeland is preserved like a lost paradise. The reverse tendency 
is enacted in Calendar, where the helplessness of the young language migrant leads to the 
wish of passing for a native speaker of the second language at all costs, even if it means 
forgetting one’s first language. 
 While both narratives stage the encounter with the foreign language as traumatizing, 
they also allow for a different reading. In this chapter, I have shown that, in Calendar, trauma 
can be rather traced back to the repression of the first language, which, after a period of 
latency, resurfaces in the shape of ‘translation neurosis’: the desire to keep translation 
processes invisible and forgotten. In Lost in Translation, the extreme feelings of 
disintegration and melancholia that Hoffman associates with her language migration can, in 
fact, be retraced to the unprocessed postmemory of her parents’ survival in the Holocaust. 
Thus, in both narratives, the perceived trauma of self-translation is a result of a projection, 
which both of them reveal by eventually staging translation and multilingualism as a means of 
working through their initial traumas. 
 As to the politics of translation underlying the narratives, the two works take different 
paths. Thus, in Lost in Translation, the process of self-translation is evaluated as one of 
marginalization, which can be explained through Hoffman’s notion of translation as governed 
by the principle of invisibility and domestication – or, as in the case of the language migrant, 
absolute assimilation. Even though, after a long struggle, Hoffman seems to accept that her 
life is defined by both of her languages, she eventually seeks refuge in what she perceives as 
the ‘universal’ language of psychology. Therefore, her narrative is marked by a longing for a 
pre-Babelian condition, which could guard her from the feeling of fragmentation and 
disempowerment. 
 Calendar, in contrast, presents us with two different perspectives on multilingualism 
and translation. On the one hand, the protagonist, a ‘translation neurotic’ and militant 
monolingual, seeks to repress the presence of translation and, even more, his dependence on 
it, by means of authoritarian behavior, until he loses his wife in translation. What stands out in 
the process of translation, in his view, is the issue of fidelity, which after all, is reflected in the 
undermined fidelity of his wife and translator. Seen from Arsinée’s perspective, translation 
appears in a radically different light: as an instrument of emancipation as well as an act of 
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desire, since it relies on the attraction to otherness. This also highlights a different politics of 
translation and self-translation. Rather than extinguishing all traces of the first or source 
language, her translation practice favors the tendency of foreignization, which allows for the 
inscription of traces of the source into the target language and allows for a more integrated 
image of the multilingual subject. 
 The negotiation of multilingualism and translation is also carried out in both works on 
the level of aesthetics. Thus, the traces of Hoffman’s first language, Polish, appear only 
scarcely and in a highly domesticated form. Rather than exposing the monolingual English-
speaking reader to the foreignness of her first language, she carefully translates and explains 
each of the Polish words she uses. In contrast, Calendar presents the viewer with much 
dialogue in Armenian, parts of which are left untranslated. By employing a translator figure at 
the center of the narrative, the process of translation is rendered highly visible. Like the 
protagonist, much of the target audience depends on Arsinée’s translation, but, due to her 
foreignizing translation technique, is not granted an easily consumable and transparent 
rendering of the dialogue. Considering this multilingual aesthetics, it is safe to say that 
Calendar propagates a more empowering vision of translation than Lost in Translation, 
which, eventually, remains more strongly dominated by the hegemonic dictate of 
monolingualism. 
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2. Gender and Sexuality in Linguistic Borderlands: Yann Martel’s Self (1996) and Junot 
Diaz’ The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao (2007) 
 
In Eva Hoffman’s memoir, Lost in Translation, and Atom Egoyan’s film, Calendar, we have 
encountered multilingualism and translation as dominant topics in the lives of their real and 
fictional protagonists. The stories of their second language acquisition turned out to be central 
in their mental case histories constructed by means of self-diagnoses, as in the case of Lost in 
Translation, or the enactment of symptoms and the therapeutic process, as in the case of 
Calendar. As we have seen in the introductory example of Alejandro González Iñárritu’s film, 
Babel, the figure of the linguistic border-crossing is not only used in fiction in order to 
negotiate the cultural and linguistic identities of characters, but, even more interestingly so, in 
its metaphorical quality. 
 It is in this quality that the transgression of language boundaries is evoked in the 
novels that will be dealt with in the present chapter: Yann Martel’s Self (1996) and Junot 
Díaz’ The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao (2007). In both narratives, the protagonists are 
born into bilingual settings and, consequently, grow up bilingual. In Self, this setting is the 
capital of Canada, Ottawa, situated right at the border of the country’s Anglophone and 
Francophone territories. In Díaz’ novel, the main character grows up in a Dominican diasporic 
community in New Jersey, which is why he is familiar from the onset with both English and 
Spanish. As readers, we accompany both protagonists from their childhood on and into early 
adulthood and quickly learn that their lives are mostly defined by their search for love. 
 This search is cast in a particular light in both cases, since the protagonists do not 
conform to the stereotypes of gender and sexuality set by their surroundings. For both of 
them, these dominant stereotypes are closely associated with the languages of their families. 
Thus, Martel’s protagonist encounters the dictate of gender difference and heteronormativity 
in French, while Díaz’ character, Oscar, becomes acquainted with Dominican machista 
discourses in Spanish and Spanglish. What is at stake, then, in both narratives, is the question 
whether can liberate themselves from the dominant discourses on gender and sexuality 
encoded in their mother tongues. The present chapter sets out to examine in what ways the 
two novels negotiate the possibility of breaking out of one’s native language, and along with 
it, of prescribed gender identities. In the course of this examination, we will also approach the 
question of how the aesthetics of literary multilingualism influence such a negotiation.  
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Language and Metamorphosis: Yann Martel’s Self 
 
As we have seen, both in Atom Egoyan’s Calendar and in Eva Hoffman’s Lost in 
Translation, mono- and multilingualism tend to be associated with mental conditions. Thus, 
monolingualism is linked to the hardship of adaptation, the danger of isolation and weakened 
empathy, neurotic tendencies, self-centeredness and finally loss and its denial. 
Multilingualism, in contrast, stands for rootedness, the attempt to understand others and 
resistance against patriarchal structures. In narrating the process of second language 
acquisition, these two works show that, for subjects originally rooted in one language, 
migration can mean a challenge and a crisis, from which they can emerge either broken or 
strengthened in their personality (Grinberg and Grinberg 1984, 14-15). 
 Can multilingualism also be imagined without the taste of crisis? In his 1996 novel 
Self, Yann Martel undertakes precisely this enterprise. Having his nameless protagonist grow 
up with French at home and English at school, Martel tropes bilingualism as the norm, as a 
natural human condition. The protagonist’s numerous voyages along language boundaries – in 
chronological order, those to Spanish, Czech, German, Turkish and Hungarian – do not carry 
any connotations with fear. On the contrary, the character constantly feels attracted by 
speakers of foreign languages, even though in the majority of cases he is not able to 
understand them. To be more precise, it is not despite but because of his verbal non-
understanding that strangers and their languages have a magnetic effect on him. 
 Admittedly, the protagonist’s affinity to everything ‘foreign’ also has to do with the 
fact that he grows up as the son of diplomats. In socio-political terms, he finds himself on the 
other side of the embassy counter, and thus of the hegemonic divide that separates him from 
political or economic refugees such as Eva Hoffman in her language memoir or the 
photographer in Atom Egoyan’s Calendar. The continuous migration of the protagonist in 
Self is not involuntary, but part of his well-respected parents’ métier. Rather than being drawn 
into an uncontrollable whirlwind of events, they stand, as it were, above the turmoil of 
migration and are masters of their situation. What makes the novel interesting, however, is not 
the fact that Martel situates his protagonist in a socially advantaged milieu and derives from 
this that the transgression of language boundaries can also be effortless, depending on from 
whose vantage point it is experienced. Instead, the particularity of this novel consists in the 
fact that multilingualism is not only – though also – used as a metonymy of multiculturalism, 
migration and travelling, but enters into a metaphorical relationship with the topic of gender 
identity. In the present chapter, I will analyze the cross-mapping between the domains of 
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‘language’ and ‘gender’ and their mutual structuring. Thereby, I shall closely look at the 
following points of intersection: firstly, the formation or acquisition process that underlies 
both linguistic and gender identity and is, in both cases, envisioned in a psychoanalytic 
context; secondly, the troping of borders between languages and genders and the possibility 
and consequences of their transgression, or, in other words, the extinction of binary 
oppositions such as mother tongue and foreign language, masculinity and femininity and 
homo- and heterosexuality and their translation into a sphere of multiplicity; and thirdly, 
trauma and translation. 
 Such an enumeration of points of intersection suggests that the novel offers a 
systematic negotiation of language and gender identity. In fact, this is not the case. What 
stands out instead, is a certain indecisiveness and fragmentation both in terms of structure and 
ideological content. As critic Gerry Turcotte pointedly notes, it is not only Self’s protagonist, 
but the novel itself that “suffer[s] from a serious identity crisis” in moving “between 
bildungsroman, travelogue, philosophical treatise and soft porn” (Turcotte 2003). To this I 
would add that the socio-political comments formulated in the novel do not form a consistent 
line of thought, but rather appear as experimental statements. Martel even admits to a critic: 
“In Self I had the impression I was getting over my head […]. I was getting into an area of 
gender conflict, sexual relationships and so on, that’s really complicated. I can’t say it’s an 
area I really feel comfortable in” (quoted in Marchand 2001). This discomfort on the one hand 
and the somewhat overambitious attempt to encompass too many weighty subjects on the 
other, have provoked rather unsympathetic reviews. The novel was described as “simply dull” 
and with “its focus blurred by trivia” (Ferraro 1996), as “a bad case of over achievement [sic] 
[…] haunted by an off-putting tone of smug precociousness” (Waters 2001), as a “puppyish, 
baggy blend of fiction and autobiography” (Adams 2003), and as “stumbl[ing] into excess, as 
though the voice he is seeking has eluded him until the end” (Turcotte 2003). However, 
though Self does suffer from several not unusual flaws of a first novel and betrays that Martel, 
above all, sought the experiment both in aesthetic and philosophical terms, I would like to 
demonstrate that there are interesting insights to be gained from precisely this experimental 
arrangement. 
The inconsistence and fragmented character of the novel are at the same time quite 
likely the reason why literary scholars have largely remained silent about the novel, even 
though the exploding sales figures and numbers of essays on Martel’s second novel, Life of Pi 
(2001), have made it almost impossible not to take notice of his debut novel. Up to date, to 
my knowledge, only three published articles have addressed Self. The first one, published by 
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Anglo-Canadian critic Smaro Kamboureli nine years after the publication of Self, does not 
focus on the novel at all, but solely on an interview, in which Martel had bluntly declared that 
the aim behind Self was to overcome his own sexism (Sielke 2003, 16-17). Leaving aside the 
literary qualities of the work and the text in general, the critic brings the author, pronounced 
dead by Roland Barthes (1967), back to life and sets out to critically examine “how the novel 
performs Martel’s turn to ethics” (Kamboureli 2007, 944). Pirouetting around this and several 
other indeed unfortunate interview statements on 18 pages, the critic mentions only two 
passages from the novel, presumes to discover a racialized discourse, and concludes that 
Martel has not succeeded in overcoming his sexism after all. With these comments on the 
author’s persona, Kamboureli’s essay hardly contributes to a discussion of the literary 
qualities of the novel. 
The topic of gender is picked up again in the latest article published on Self in 2011, 
albeit in a very different fashion. In his short but illuminating paper, Mirko Casagranda zooms 
in on the construction of gender through grammatical categories and exemplifies his point 
through the comparative analysis of passages from the novel in the original English version 
and its Italian translation. In analyzing the transformation not of Martel’s central character, 
but of the novel itself, when it is translated from a largely gender-neutral language such as 
English to one with a grammatical gender system such as Italian, the critic convincingly 
argues that novels like Self “are like sleeping hermaphrodites that are waiting to be unveiled 
in order to show their complexity and their polycentric nature” (Casagranda 2011, 214).  
The only essay that offers an interpretation of the novel in its entirety was published in 
2009 by Franco-Canadian critic Rainier Grutman, who has extensively contributed to the field 
of literary multilingualism and translation. In his essay, he carefully examines the novel’s 
multilingual setup and devotes close attention to the languages employed in Self – to all 
except for one. For when he sets out to explore the “frequency of the use of the languages” 
and the “modalities of their insertion”3 (Grutman 2009, 61, translation mine), he focuses on 
the use of French, Spanish, Czech and Hungarian, however, leaving out the most important 
question of why most of the narrative is composed in English. This may be due to the fact that 
in his analysis he heavily relies not only on the original, but on Hélène Rioux’s French 
translation of the novel (1998). In fact, the dominance of English may tempt even the reader 
of the original version to consider only the inserted languages other than English. However, as 
I shall argue, it is crucial that the narrative is conveyed retrospectively by an originally 
Francophone adult narrator, whom we encounter in his own present only on the last page of 
                                                 
3
 In the original: “fréquence d’emploi des languages” and “modalités de leur insertion”. 
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the novel. If in the narrative present, the narrator addresses us in English, then the choice of 
language must have been made in the course of the narrated time, and the narrative has to 
contain certain key moments explaining this choice. These key moments will play a central 
role in my own analysis.  
Another difference between Grutman’s and my analysis lies in the interpretation of the 
relation between the novel’s two main languages: English and French. This aspect cannot be 
considered separately from the division of numerous passages in Self into columns, which 
serves as a graphic representation of the novel’s multilingual narration. Grutman observes that 
the aesthetics produced by this division present a challenge to common reading habits (2009, 
61-62). For a moment, indeed, the division produces the illusion of a narrative simultaneity, 
as the columns run from top to bottom completely parallel to each other. Nonetheless, this 
aesthetics does not break with all reading habits, since the arrangement of one column on the 
left-hand side and the other on the right-hand side of the page also implies their chronological 
succession. In that sense, Martel does not force us to abandon our reading habits, for such a 
column aesthetics already exists for instance in newspapers. Rather than to newspapers, 
Grutman compares the narrative to legal and official Canadian texts, which are likewise 
bilingual and printed in two neighboring columns (2009, 61). Thus, with his columns in 
French and English, Martel seems to be graphically imitating an ‘essentially’ Canadian voice. 
While Grutman suggests that the two-column aesthetics creates true multicultural equality 
(2009, 57), it is my contention that Martel’s narrative also absorbs the problematic aspects of 
the column aesthetics in official Canadian bilingual texts. As the columns never touch or 
reach out towards each other, they invoke what Hugh MacLennan has called the ‘Two 
Solitudes’ (1945) – the coexistence of Anglo- and Franco-Canadians without much 
communication or interaction.  
Moreover, the two columns run parallel to each other, as if this layout could entirely 
exclude a privileging of one of the two languages. The relation between the two languages is 
then not so much one of equality, but of competition – an implication that even an academic 
text such as Grutman’s seems to half-consciously act out. Thus, the critic on the one hand 
notes that “Martel’s narrator refuses to choose between languages”4 (Grutman 2009, 57) – an 
observation which, as I argue in this chapter, can be easily contested. Despite his assertion of 
a neutral and equal relationship between the two languages, Grutman formulates an odd 
comment on the protagonist’s relation to English and French. He points out that the columns 
are arranged in a way – with French on the left and English on the right – that leads us to read 
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 In the original: “Le narrateur de Martel refuse de choisir entre les langues”. 
92 
 
the French column first and pay attention to the chronology in the protagonist’s acquisition of 
languages. However, Grutman also claims that Martel decides to “place the French text, 
which will be read first and have a more immediate effect, on the left-hand side, followed by a 
translation on the right-hand side”5 (2009, 61). At this point, it can be objected that French 
only has a more immediate effect on a reader who understands French in the first place. 
Unless this is the case, an English-speaking reader will be much more inclined to read first 
and perceive as more immediate the column written in English. More importantly, however, 
the phrase “more immediate” puts the two languages in the hierarchical relation of an original 
and a translation, and thus betrays an ideologically charged perspective. 
With the ideological tug of war between the two official Canadian languages set in 
motion, even the sober statement: “I speak English and French” (331), uttered in the closing 
lines of the novel, lends itself to ideological interpretation. Why do French and English 
suddenly change place despite the chronological and hierarchical relation that Grutman 
assumes? Does the narrator speak primarily English just because the language is mentioned 
first in his concluding sentence? Or did the sequence “English and French” simply sound 
better to the author than “French and English”? This confusion demonstrates, on the one hand, 
on what slippery ground we tread when trying to pursue the ideology behind Martel’s use of 
English and French. On the other hand, it also demarcates the boundaries of a constructive 
argument, for, in my view, the novel resists its appropriation as a projection screen for 
speculations on the power relations between Anglophone and Francophone Canada. 
While displaying a clear socio-political dimension, Self and its protagonist are not 
much concerned with the relation of the two official Canadian languages, but instead focus on 
the phenomenon of bilingualism. In this context, both Anglophone and Francophone Canada 
are criticized for hypocritically holding up the idea of multiculturalism, laid down in the 
Multiculturalism Act of 1988, instead of putting it into practice. The critique is directly voiced 
by the protagonist, when he arrives in Ottawa at the age of twelve and encounters 
the Anglophone intolerance that reigned in the capital of [his] country during the years [he] lived 
there, where those who spoke two languages were despised by those who spoke only one (and 
poorly at that). (72) 
The experience of intolerance repeats itself on the other side of the divide. When, after her 
studies, the now female protagonist settles in Montreal in the Plateau Mont-Royal, she quickly 
finds herself disillusioned about the multicultural and multilingual atmosphere of her 
neighborhood: 
                                                 
5
 In the original: “placer le texte français à gauche, où il sera lu d’abord et aura un effet plus immédiat, puis en y 
joignant une traduction, à droite”. 
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Around us, the Plateau: that is, a neighbourhood where the store signs were in French but where 
inside one might hear Greek, Portuguese, Yiddish, Spanish, Arabic and others, in addition to 
French, and where the Volapük was often a functional, beaten-up English flavoured with myriad 
accents. The mix seemed easy between the variously integrated ethnic groups, the Anglophone 
university students, the hipsters, cool people and wannabees, and the Francophone Quebeckers. Or 
so it seemed to me. I could identify with up to three of those groups, which made me not so much a 
hybrid as a chameleon. Depending on the speaker I could change my persona, though 
unfortunately my Quebec accent has never been very good for having lived in France as a child, so 
sometimes, far from fitting in, I stood out all the more. On occasion, when I made the faux pas of 
addressing a nationalist Québécois in English and was replied to in French, which would bring out 
my French French, I went from being une maudite anglaise to being une maudite française. (238, 
my emphasis) 
As both passages show, the protagonist experiences a Canada, which does not allow him/her 
to freely live out his/her bilingualism. Exposed to discriminatory treatment on both sides, the 
character is forced to suppress what he/she considers her ‘hybridity’ and instead to adapt to 
the different ‘solitudes’ around her like a “chameleon”. Far from representing 
multilingualism, Martel’s Canada can be described with Yasemin Yildiz’ term 
“postmonolingual”, which refers to “the period since the emergence of monolingualism as 
dominant paradigm, which first occurred in late eighteenth-century Europe” and captures the 
“ongoing dominance of the monolingual and well as the incipient moves to overcome it” 
(2012, 4). According to Yildiz, 
monolingualism is much more than a simple quantitative term designating the presence of just one 
language. Instead, it constitutes a key structuring principle that organizes the entire range of 
modern social life, from the construction of individuals and their proper subjectivities to the 
formation of disciplines and institutions, as well as of imagined collectives such as cultures and 
nations. (2012, 2) 
Martel’s depiction of Canada in the 1970s strongly reverberates with this description. Not 
only is the protagonist confronted with militant monolingualism; as a “key structuring 
principle” of social life around him, it is accompanied by other forms of ideological violence, 
such as his being bullied for wearing long hair as a boy and thus seemingly blurring the 
boundaries between the genders (60).  
 The recognition that gender and language politics are driven by similar homogenizing 
attitudes is crucial for the novel since it offers a key to understanding the language and gender 
transformations of the protagonist. While Rainier Grutman contends that the change of 
languages does not correspond with that of gender, since as a man and as a woman the 
protagonist speaks the same languages (2009, 56), I do detect deep structural parallels 
between the linguistic and the gender transformations. A perspective which does not consider 
these parallels cannot account for central passages devoted to the narration of the 
protagonist’s mental and emotional life or for his development and metamorphosis of gender 
and sexual identity and thus falls short in offering a consistent interpretation. After all 
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Martel’s negotiation of multilingualism is interesting for the very reason that it takes place 
both on a socio-political and a psychological level and reminds us that language and, along 
with it, bilingualism are not only a matter of language politics. Therefore, without detaching 
the protagonist’s sexual and linguistic development from the socio-political context, I would 
like to propose a reading that stresses the psychic dimension of multilingualism in the novel 
and integrates the topics of gender and multilingualism.  
Ironically enough, if one believes Martel’s statements in the interview that Smaro 
Kamboureli takes as the basis for her discussion of the novel, then the author is “not really 
interested in psychological novels” (Martel quoted in Sielke 2003, 15). However, the novel 
itself tells a different story. In fact, it brims over with hints to psychoanalysis, two of which 
shall be highlight right away. I agree with Julian Ferraro when he notes that the opening 
passage of the narrative that reads like “a textbook example of Freudian theories of infant 
sexuality” (1996). In fact, the protagonist proudly produces “a magnificent log of excrement” 
as a present for his mother and takes her smile as a return of pleasure: “Pleasure given, 
pleasure had”, he expounds (2). Seemingly regretful about having given the psychoanalytic 
reference such a prominent place, Martel soon has his narrator contest another psychoanalytic 
lesson, this time by means of a direct reference to Lacan’s “The Mirror Stage” (2006, 75 ff). 
Thus, the narrator ponders:  
Do children look into mirrors? (...) I didn’t. Of what interest was a mirror to me? It reflected me, a 
child - so what? (...) Childhood, like wisdom, is an emotion. Feelings are what register deeply of 
one’s early years. What the eye catches, the visual aspects of these feelings, is secondary. So it is 
that I have no memories of mirrors, no memories of clothes, of skin, of limbs, of body, of my own 
physical self as a child. As if, paradoxically, I were then nothing but a huge eager eye, an 
emotional eye, looking out, always looking out, unaware of itself. (11) 
Rather than positioning the narrative outside of a psychoanalytic framework, this passage 
achieves the opposite effect. Firstly, the objections on emotionality and visuality do not carry 
against Lacan’s thoughts in “The Mirror Stage”, which does not seek to reduce the child’s 
experience to a purely visual one or deny emotions involved in the encounter with one’s own 
mirror image. Secondly, and more importantly, the reference and vague objections to Lacan 
only grant the psychoanalytic text a greater presence in the novel and have a similar effect as 
the joke in which one is told not to think of a pink elephant. This suggests that despite its 
ambiguous relationship to psychoanalysis, the novel asks the reader to keep the theory in 
mind and thus implicitly invites a psychoanalytic reading. As the further analysis of language, 
gender and trauma in Self shall demonstrate, the novel can hardly be reasonably considered 
without the psychoanalytic references inscribed in it.  
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Language and gender acquisition 
 
The first instance in which this becomes apparent is Martel’s troping of language and gender 
development as learning processes. From the onset, Martel establishes a parallel between his 
narrator’s development of language and of gender. It is not an accident that the narrative sets 
in with the protagonist still being in a prelinguistic and, in Freudian terms, pre-Oedipal, anal 
stage. Both language and the triad of sexuality, gender and desire are presented as yet 
undiscovered territories, to which the protagonist’s view will open up only gradually. What is 
more, neither language nor gender development are accepted by the narrator as natural 
phenomena; they are instead encountered with incomprehension and a sense of shock. Thus, 
the narrator puts his discovery of the verbal nature of thought into the following words: 
I became aware of a voice inside my head. What is this, I wondered. Who are you, voice? When 
will you shut up? I remember a feeling of fright. It was only later that I realized that this voice was 
my own thinking, that this moment of anguish was my first inkling that I was a ceaseless 
monologue trapped within myself. (2) 
A similarly significant experience as his entry into language is his first confrontation with the 
issue of sexuality. He first encounters it, as he says, in an “epiphanous moment of television”, 
when he sees an image that he takes for “a simple anatomical drawing of the cross-section of 
an eye. Next came the fluid images of hundreds of silvery fish swimming as a school” (15-
16). Remaining true to his childhood experience, the grown-up homodiegetic narrator never 
explains what it was in fact that he had seen on TV at the age of five. From his depiction of 
the images, the reader may infer that what the child sees is an explanatory drawing of the 
process of insemination. This is also implied by the ironic comment of the adult narrator, who 
explicitly tropes this experience as a primal scene: “I walked into the garden and sat under a 
tree, my senses bloated, my head racing with the thoughts that come from a sudden 
understanding of things” (15, my emphasis). While the reader may smile at this overstated 
“sudden understanding”, the young protagonist intuitively chooses an appropriate frame of 
interpretation for his experience. Thus, he reaches the conclusion that “love is the food of eye 
fish and only love will bring them out” (15). Significantly, this primal scene occurs when the 
narrator is watching TV in Costa Rica, where his family has just recently moved. Therefore he 
encounters the topic of sexuality in Spanish, “a language [he] had not as yet absorbed” (14). 
The development of sexuality seems to work along similar lines as his second language 
acquisition. Both language and sexuality are new arenas for the protagonist so that he arrives 
at absorbing the new language and understanding sexuality by undergoing parallelly staged 
learning processes. 
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While the discovery of sexuality causes exultation in the young protagonist, learning the 
vocabulary and grammar rules of sexual difference presents him with a greater challenge. It is 
not before his mother disapproves of him wanting to marry his kindergarten friend Noah that 
we are implicitly informed that the protagonist is male (20). The idea of sexual difference thus 
violently breaks into a narrative in which the narrator had hitherto remained unaware of his 
own sex and gender. Linking the issues of sex and gender, the adult narrator reflects upon his 
parents’ roles: “I cannot recall noticing, as a small child, any difference between my parents 
that I could ascribe to sex. Though I knew they weren’t the same thing twice over, the 
distinctions did not express themselves in fixed roles” (5). The protagonist’s distress upon 
being enlightened about his sex and the idea of sexual and gender difference by his mother 
echoes the psychoanalytic observation that young children have difficulty in grasping this 
idea. Such an argument can be found for instance in Polly Young-Eisendrath’s monograph 
Gender and Desire: Uncursing Pandora (1997), in which the author revisits Jung’s idea of 
contrasexuality, “the notion that each of us has an unconscious (or less conscious) personality 
of the opposite sex” (1997, 32), and calls for a non-essentialist approach to gender. Thus, she 
describes gender as an “identity club into which we are assigned at birth, when our bodies are 
read by the elders who say whether we are female or male” (1997, 27), and explains: 
Although children begin to think in gender categories almost as soon as they can identify a 
separate embodied self, around eighteen months of age, they do not understand the permanence 
and exclusivity of this concept until much later. Very young children easily may say, for instance, 
that boys have penises and girls do not, or that boys run faster than girls; but they do not grasp the 
power of this difference – that it permanently may constrain who they themselves can become. 
Nor do they understand that sex cannot be changed through changing one’s appearance or name, 
or that some of these exclusive differences will last a lifetime. (1997, 38) 
Questioning the imposition of gender roles based on sexual difference, Young-Eisendrath 
nevertheless stresses the “power of this difference” and seems to take such an imposition for 
almost unavoidable. “The sex we are born as and the gender we become are not the same 
thing”, she writes, “although one flows from the other” (1997, 27). In Self, Martel invokes 
these ideas by placing his protagonist in a society that insists on clear gender differences and 
punishes everyone who seeks to blur the boundaries between them. While the protagonist in 
fact cannot change his sex by simply changing his looks, for his social environment, gender 
difference is coded precisely through a particular appearance. Thus, upon his return from 
Paris to Canada at the age of twelve, he suffers both physical and verbal harassment from his 
classmates for wearing long hair: 
I didn’t think anything of my long hair […]. But in North America, I discovered quickly and 
brutally, girls could have their hair short or long, though most had it long, but boys, boys I say, 
could only have it short. The first day of school, within the first minutes, just as I sat down, the 
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class clown came up to me and asked me if I was a boy or a girl. I said flatly that I was a boy, but 
my response didn’t register, or even matter, since he was not really asking a question so much as 
making a comment which elicited the desired chuckles and snickers from the class. (60)  
However, rather than merely exposing his protagonist to separate instances of gender 
violence, which in Saussurean terms, can be likened to the ‘parole’ of gender discourse, 
Martel addresses its very ‘langue’ – the set of rules it is governed by (de Saussure 1983). 
What is more, he regards this set of rules as being rooted in language. Thus, the narrator 
pronounces ideas that seem more radical than the psychoanalytic stance of Young-Eisendrath 
and betray their origin in Lacanian psychoanalysis, which centers on the connection between 
language and the unconscious: 
Once at the McDonald’s near the school, at an unhappy moment of tension, I stood in front of the 
washrooms with Sonya, sweet Sonya. MEN said one door, WOMEN said the other. I thought, ‘No, 
no, this isn’t right. It shouldn’t be this way, not MEN, not WOMEN. It should be FRIENDS and 
ENEMIES. That should be the natural division of things, one that would better reflect reality. That 
way Sonya and I could go together through one door, and the others through the other.’ (64) 
The protagonist’s thoughts are highly reminiscent of a famous passage from Lacan’s Écrits, in 
which he replaces Saussure’s model of the linguistic sign by a drawing of two bathroom 
doors, which we recognize due to the signs “GENTLEMEN” and “LADIES” (Lacan 2006, 416). 
On the basis of this drawing, Lacan demonstrates in a poststructuralist fashion that the notion 
of sexual difference does not represent factual reality, and not even, as in Saussure’s view, 
mental images, but creates this reality and the related mental images in the first place. As 
Lacan puts it, “the signifier in fact enters the signified – namely, in a form which, since it is 
not immaterial, raises the question of its place in reality” (2006, 417). Thus, the door labels, 
linguistic signs in their essence, impose particular patterns of thought and behavior. “Any 
speaking being whatever”, Lacanian critic Jacqueline Rose comments, “must line up on one 
or other side of the divide” (1985, 42).  
Martel’s protagonist resists this very pattern of thought from early childhood on. As a 
toddler, he is already preoccupied with the matter of dichotomies, which finds expression in 
the narrator’s very use of the word “dichotomy” to describe his parents’ gender roles (6). In 
what afterwards reads like a prophecy and is described by the narrator as a “cataclysm in the 
garden” (2), the boy discovers that the sun and the moon, which the reader easily decodes as 
symbols of masculinity and femininity, can appear in the sky at the same time. Their 
simultaneous apparition shatters his belief in dichotomies: “At the time I thought the sun and 
the moon were opposite elements, negations of each other. The moon was the sun turned off, 
like a light-bulb, the moon was the sun sleeping […] – whatever the case, one excluded the 
other” (2). When the protagonist utters: “I glanced a last time at the moon. My God, it was a 
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free orb. It moved at random in the universe, like the sun. Surely one day they would clash!” 
(3), the subversion of the symbolically highly charged opposition foreshadows the later 
gender transformations. 
Before these can occur, however, the protagonist finds himself exposed to his mother’s 
lessons on sexual difference. What unsettles him most is the fact that there are but two sexes 
between which he is not even free to choose: “Things were far more limited than my open 
mind had imagined”, he comments, “[t]here were in fact only two sexes, not infinite numbers” 
(21, emphasis in the original). In this passage, Self almost literally echoes Jacqueline Rose’s 
explanation of the Lacanian view on sexual difference: 
Sexual difference is then assigned according to whether individual subjects do or do not possess 
the phallus, which means not that anatomical difference is sexual difference (the one as strictly 
deducible from the other), but that anatomical difference comes to figure sexual difference, that is, 
it becomes the sole representative of what that difference is allowed to be. It thus covers over the 
complexity of the child’s early sexual life with a crude opposition in which that very complexity is 
refused or repressed. The phallus thus indicates the reduction of difference to an instance of visible 
perception, a seeming value. (1985, 42) 
As in Lacan’s theory, for Martel’s protagonist, sexual difference emerges as a kind of violent 
and inacceptable opposition relying on a game of signifiers out of touch with any signified. 
Both in Self and in Lacan’s account, as Rose writes, “sexual identity operates as a law – it is 
something enjoined on the subject. For him, the fact that individuals must line up according to 
an opposition (having or not having the phallus) makes that clear” (1985, 29).  
By presenting the relationship between the sexes as one of complementarity, the 
protagonist’s mother introduces him to what Adrienne Rich has termed “compulsory 
heterosexuality” (1980, 631), or, in Michael Warner’s words, to “heteronormativity” (1991, 
3). Initially, the idea of sexual complementarity sets off a romantic fantasy in the mind of the 
young protagonist. As if practicing a new set of vocabulary, he exclaims: “Imagine: 
somewhere out there, totally separate, of independent origin, was a sexual organ tailored to 
suit me. I set out to find my complementary sexual organ, my true love.” (20)  However, 
when his mother insists that his kindergarten friend Noah – despite his androgynous name – 
does not have the “sexual organ tailored to suit [him]”, he is confronted with the restrictive 
power of the heteronormative system. Echoing Rose’s comment on sexual difference quoted 
above, the young protagonist exclaims: 
I was amazed. This question of complementarity referred merely to a vulgar point of biology, an 
anatomical whim? The menu for ocular fish had only two items on it? And it was decided in 
advance which they could select, either little bum or little finger, steak or chicken? What kind of 
restaurant is that, Mother? (21-22, emphasis in the original) 
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Much in line with Lacan, Martel seeks to unmask both sexual difference and 
heteronormativity as fictions. He opposes these two orders and the narratives they produce by 
presenting us with a different fiction, in which the foundational principles of the former are 
turned upside down. In his version, the protagonist finds himself released from the 
inalterability of sex and is allowed to experience relationships both with men and women. 
 At the same time, Martel’s decision to transform his protagonist’s body cannot entirely 
resolve the ideological issues raised in the previous paragraphs. On the contrary, the gender 
metamorphoses introduce a break in the ideological framework of the novel. In exposing 
sexual difference and complementarity as an “anatomical whim”, the narrator seems to be one 
step ahead of the author. For despite equipping his narrator with a critical Lacanian attitude, 
Martel figures the metamorphoses as transformations of the body and not of the mind. In this 
fashion, Martel’s text itself becomes a silent affirmation of the equivalence between anatomy 
and sexual identity. Thus, while the protagonist unmasks sexual difference as based on 
anatomy as an artificial construct, Martel creates a fiction that is no less arbitrary. The reader 
is left with the impression that Martel could not avoid the pitfall he so clearly outlines through 
the voice of his narrator.  
Likewise, the critique of heteronormativity is not consistently thought through, for 
eventually the protagonist’s personality seems to be so strongly molded by the dominant 
opinions in his/her society that, except for a few short homosexual affairs, he/she finds 
greatest fulfillment in heterosexual relationships, first with Marisa and later with Tito. Having 
seemingly been converted to heterosexuality through the episode with Marisa, the character, 
curiously enough, exports his interest in women into his/her life after the gender 
transformation. After the first metamorphosis, the now-female protagonist, whose mindset has 
not changed in the least, is initially interested in women only. It then comes as a surprise both 
for her and for the reader that her sexual orientation suddenly changes: “I’m not sure why, as 
a woman, I began to desire men. After a moment of surprise it became a matter of feeling – 
and I acted upon that feeling, without reflection. It’s an odd thing to question desire” (184). 
What seems even odder at this point is that the idea of heteronormativity, which the 
protagonist has so far been protesting against, suddenly returns and is accepted in the guise of 
desire. The lessons taught by the homophobic society around her seem absorbed when she, for 
the first time, starts an affair with a man. Thus, she comments: “He’s a man. This is 
homosexuality. I’m a homosexual. Which is crazy, I know. We were doing the perfectly 
heterosexually normal, the banal even, but it came, over and over, he’s a man, this is 
homosexuality, I’m a homosexual, though this sense of committing the forbidden forbade 
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nothing” (201, emphasis in the original). While these circles of thought are understandable 
given the ever-present homophobia in her society, the narrative and the protagonist 
nevertheless seem to take different paths: the text attacks heteronormativity while the 
protagonist silently accepts it.  
 What nevertheless justifies the figure of the gender metamorphosis in Self is the fact 
that is occurs as part of a larger experimental arrangement that could be called the ‘languages 
of the self’. Thus, what matters is not so much the ideological outcome of the metamorphosis, 
but rather its genesis. As I shall argue in the following section, this supernatural element can 
be read as a materialized vision of a psychological development that Martel carefully traces in 
his novel. If gender identity is so firmly rooted in language and is not just developed, but 
acquired along with the mother tongue, then how, he seems to ask, can the gender identity of 
a multilingual character be configured? What role can a character’s ability to transgress 
boundaries play in his or her formation of the self? In tracing the protagonist’s way through 
different languages, we shall come closer to understanding the nature of the metamorphosis as 
it is troped in the novel. 
 
 
Desire across languages 
 
It is interesting to note that although the protagonist’s mother regards her son’s 
multilingualism as a “[v]ery Canadian” trait (18), he does not grow up with several languages 
from his birth on. Throughout the first years of his life, he views his surroundings through the 
lens of a single language, which is French, the language of his parents. This fact allows Martel 
to narrativize his hero’s acquisition of languages as a chronological process and to link it with 
his psychological development. Furthermore, the linguistic origins form the prerequisite for 
the figure of linguistic transgression, which would look very different if several languages 
were present in the protagonist’s family. The transgression of language boundaries is based on 
the fact that the languages in question are not situated in the same psychological terrain. The 
movement from one language to another is thus clearly traceable. 
What is more, however, is that Martel takes the notion of the mother tongue literally 
and equates it with the actual discourse of the protagonist’s mother. Through the maternal 
discourse, as stated before, the young boy is introduced to the restrictive orders of sexual 
difference and heteronormativity. It is his mother who explains to him the impossibility of 
marrying Noah. It is also her who tries to answer the young protagonist’s persisting questions 
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about the sex of things and beings like cars, trees, the wind and finally a cow and an 
earthworm (24-28). The boy’s animistic worldview, which makes him assume that all objects 
and natural phenomena have a life of their own, does not allow him to easily absorb her 
explanations. While the mother triumphs when she can finally answer his question about the 
sex of the cow – “[s]he’d got it right, she thought” (25) – for the protagonist, the lesson on 
sexual difference remains frustrating and incomprehensible. 
Later, in his teenage years, the protagonist draws on the same connection between the 
mother tongue and the maternal discourse and turns toward the mother tongue to examine and 
validate his lessons about sexual and gender difference. As his struggles with his gender 
identity reveal, the French language remains one of his few points of orientation: 
I sought guidance where I could. At one point I turned to the French language, which gave me the 
gender of all things. I would readily agree that trucks and murders were masculine while bicycles 
and life were feminine. But how odd that a breast was masculine. And it made little sense that 
garbage was feminine while perfume was masculine – and no sense at all that television, which I 
would have deemed repellently masculine, was in fact feminine. When I walked the corridors of 
Parliament Hill […] I would say to myself, ‘C’est le parlement, masculine. Power, it’s le pouvoir.’ 
I would return home to la maison, feminine where, as likely as not, I would go to my room, la 
chambre, where I would settle to read un livre masculine, until supper. During the masculine meal, 
feminine food would be eaten. […] At one time, for a few days, I even took an affected aversion to 
being in the kitchen, la cuisine. As I entered it I would put on a disdainful expression and say to 
myself, 
‘Les femmes font la cuisine ici, mais pour 
moi, une cuisine, c’est un endroit où 
Robert Kennedy se fait tuer. 
‘Women cook here, but a kitchen, to me, is a 
place where Robert Kennedy gets killed.’ 
(61-62) 
Conceptualizing gender through grammatical gender of course does not help the protagonist 
in his search for meaning. Instead, it projects Saussure’s descriptions of linguistic signs as 
arbitrary and convention-based onto gender categories and underlines Lacan’s point that 
sexual difference is defined by a mere phantasmatic relationship between signifiers. Thus, 
after practicing the grammatical gender gymnastics quoted above, the narrator admits that he 
never had an emotional connection to the grammatical order of gender: 
But this is nonsense. I write it to be truthful to the moment, but it is nonsense. Not far from my 
house in Ottawa there was a large field, a vast, rolling expense of grass. Often I would go there 
alone and lie down, angel-like. I would look up at the male yellow sun and the male blue sky. I 
would turn and smell and feel the female green grass. Then I would roll over and over and over 
down the incline till I was dizzy, mixing up the colours and the genders. I felt neither masculinity 
nor femininity, I felt only desire, I only felt humid with life. (62) 
Considering his disappointing encounters with the concept of gender in his mother tongue and 
through his mother’s discourse, it is very telling that none of his numerous upcoming 
relationships evolves in the realm of the French language. Indeed, love and sexuality unfold in 
Self in all languages but French. Thus, the maternal francophone lessons on gender and 
sexuality are contrasted by the protagonist’s personal theory of love and sexuality, which he 
102 
 
develops while watching TV in Spanish. The new language he “had not as yet absorbed” (14) 
immediately becomes a loophole for escaping the conservative discourse on sexuality in his 
mother tongue. Whereas the teachings of his mother rely on binary oppositions, in the ‘new’ 
language, the protagonist creates a space for himself that allows for multiplicity – a 
multiplicity of gender enabled through and corresponding with the multiplicity of his 
languages. 
When he falls in love for a second time, albeit this time with a girl, it is, significantly, 
a love across languages. As he informs us, Marisa, who in 1971 fled with her parents from the 
political unrests in former Czechoslovakia, “was my age, eight, and spoke, as far as I could 
tell, no language known to humanity beyond the Esperanto of our first names. We looked at 
each other, mutually surprised at the gibberish the other was speaking. But she smiled again” 
(34). The protagonist feels attracted to the girl despite the impossibility of verbal 
communication – or is it rather because of it? 
We began – in spite of not sharing a common tongue – to communicate, although I’m not sure 
what. She whispered to me in her sweet East European Chinese and I whispered back in French 
that I thought painfully clear and boring, but she seemed happy enough, for she replied right away 
each time, hardly letting me finish. The only word she spoke that I understood, the most powerful 
word in her language, was my name, which she said four or five times, each time dazing me for a 
few seconds. (34-35) 
As this passage implies, the absence of a common language creates a brightly illuminated 
space of encounter. The protagonist’s daze upon hearing his own name recalls Martin Buber’s 
ideas on the encounter with oneself in the face of the other (1923). The narrator literally 
seems to become ‘I’ through his relation with a ‘Thou’, since he views his own name as a 
word in Marisa’s language and thus creates the impression that he receives his name from the 
Czech-speaking girl. 
Apart from these philosophical implications, two fantasies are at play in the encounter 
of the two children. Firstly, there is the imaginary scenario of communicating without a 
common language. The only means of signification are paralinguistic and consist in the 
lowering of the voice – the whispering, and the quick turn-taking in the conversation, signaled 
by the fact that Marisa hardly lets the protagonist finish his sentences. The passage quoted 
above therefore reminds of the controversial study by Albert Mehrabian and Susan S. Ferris 
(1967), according to which, in human communication, the tone of voice accounts for 38 per 
cent, body language for 55 per cent and the verbal content for only 7 per cent of a verbal 
message. Here, however, the verbal content is reduced to even less, that is to a single first 
name. In this Babelian conversation, which almost leaps from the romantic into the absurd, 
the prename plays a central part, since it serves as a firm proof of the protagonist’s existence 
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and his role in this scene. It brings to the fore a kind of poststructural poetics, in which despite 
the protagonist’s changing and shifting self, his name – albeit unknown to the reader – 
appears as an anchor point in a sea of free-floating signifiers. 
At the same time, the protagonist’s attraction to Marisa lies in the overwhelming 
fantasy of the other’s difference. While Marisa’s Czech is exoticized as “sweet East European 
Chinese” and the protagonist’s own language, French, is utterly deromanticized as “painfully 
clear and boring”, the space in between, in which the utterance of a first name can be 
“dazing”, appears as a magical border area between Marisa’s and the protagonist’s languages. 
In contrast, when Marisa begins “reconciling herself with fate, thinking of Australia, already 
speaking her first words of English – ‘boat’, ‘bed’, ‘dictionary’” (41, my emphasis), the 
foreign-language charm loses its power. The magical space between their languages is 
extinguished in the moment, when Marisa enters the territory of English, a language known to 
the protagonist. The “boat” as the means of transport that will bring her to Australia already 
precedes the “bed”, in which the children have previously ended their Babelian conversation 
with a kiss, while the “dictionary” demystifies the charms of foreign languages. Although it is 
not Marisa, but her parents who take the decision to move to Australia, the reader is left with 
the impression that the actual crossing of language boundaries signifies departure and 
separation. 
Interestingly enough, Martel does not relate to us any of their words in Czech or French. 
These languages are only used by their parents (36), whom the protagonist wants to keep out 
of the romance. One of the few sentences spoken in French – “Ne dérange pas Marisa” (36) – 
immediately provokes the protagonist’s inner rebellion as a response: “What did that mean, ne 
dérange pas Marisa, don’t bother Marisa? I narrowed my eyes. If my parents had died that 
second I would have been delighted” (37, emphasis in the original). As these words imply, the 
fantasy about the parents’ death, which, in a twist of fate, will come to a catastrophic 
realization, is mostly a fantasy about silencing the mother tongue, for it obtrusively enters the 
stage as the language of nonsensical imperatives. This is also the reason why, upon being put 
into the same bed by their parents, both children switch into languages that are not their 
respective mother tongues. While Marisa begins to speak German, the protagonist draws on 
Spanish, the language in which he has previously developed his own theory of love. In this 
fashion, they continue exchanging completely disconnected phrases: 
‘Ich bin nicht müde. Und du?’ […] 
‘Ocho años. Casi ocho y medio.’    
‘Hier gefällt es mir überhaupt nicht.’  
 ‘Tengo calor. Pero estoy bien. Estoy 
 contento.’    
‘I’m not sleepy. Are you?’ […] 
‘Eight years old. Nearly eight and a half.’ 
‘I don’t like it here at all.’ 
‘I’m a little hot. But I’m fine. I’m 
happy.’ 
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‘Ich will zurück nach Prag. Die Leute 
hier sind schrecklich.’   
‘¿Te gustan los helados?’  
‘I want to go back to Prague. The people 
here are nasty.’ 
‘Do you like ice-cream?’ 
(37-38) 
 
As to the reason of switching languages, the protagonist gives us a curious explanation: “I 
replied in the language which by virtue of being my third and last, was the most foreign to me 
and therefore, surely, the closest to Czech” (38). While this way of childish reasoning serves 
the comical tone of the narrator’s account of his childhood, it seems crucial that both children 
break out of the realms of their mother tongues in order to articulate their love for each other. 
The affection is also highlighted by the layout of the columns: for the first time in the novel, 
two different languages – German and Spanish – appear together, intimately intertwined, in 
the left column, taking the space that had been previously reserved for utterances in French. 
The childhood escapes from one’s mother tongue are thus used to trope the romantic aura and 
the liberating force of linguistic transgressions. 
 The romantic aura of multilingual encounters is re-invoked later in the protagonist’s 
life, when, after the gender metamorphosis, the female protagonist gets to know Tito, an 
immigrant from Hungary. Although Tito, unlike Marisa, does speak English, she obviously 
feels attracted to him because of the traces of foreignness in his speech: 
I liked his voice. He had an accent, an unusual timbre derived from I don’t know what native 
tongue, though his English was flawless, and he spoke in a measured way. His words didn’t come 
out in a hurried, jumbled pile the way mine did, but one at a time, each with its own dignity and 
heraldic right, a sort of aural pageant. I registered every word he said, even the vassal words, the 
thes and the ands. Listening to him, I was aware not only of what he said, but of the language we 
spoke, as if I were on the outside, hearing English for the first time. (249) 
No longer does the protagonist dream of a communication without a common language. 
However, Tito’s non-native English enables a conscious and fresh encounter with her 
language and thus with herself. Just like in the exchange with Marisa, the narrator conjures 
the magic of proper names in foreign languages: “I kept saying his name; already it was my 
favourite Hungarian word, the jewel of my tongue. A few times he said my name I acted like 
a dog: I nearly dropped whatever I was handling and looked up, as if I had been called” (250). 
And once again the narrator admits that she does not have a clue of the language of her 
beloved: “It occurred to me that I didn’t know boo about Hungary. A few newspaper facts, 
Bartók, Kodály, Liszt – that was about it; and that Hungarian was a weird language, related to 
no other in the area, only to Finnish” (253). Finally, the narrator himself draws a direct 
connection to Marisa. When she says: “It has only happened to me twice in my life: I could 
hardly see him [Tito] for the fish in my eyes” (258), she literally repeats her own words 
previously uttered in regard to Marisa (40).  
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Liberated or split? 
 
Apart from recounting the protagonist’s early encounters with foreign languages, the 
childhood escapes from one’s mother tongue anticipate one of the novel’s most central events: 
the first gender transformation, accompanied or even enabled, and metaphorically structured 
by a linguistic metamorphosis, in psychological and aesthetic terms, respectively. The turning 
point that motivates this metamorphosis is marked by the death of the protagonist’s parents in 
an airplane crash. Through the depiction of the tragic event and the metamorphosis in its 
consequence, the literary multilingualism employed in the novel and the narrator’s 
transgression from French to English emerge as multi-faceted strategies for representing 
liberation and emancipation, on the one hand, and trauma and split personality, on the other. 
While the death of the parents, as soon shall become clear, is presented as one of the 
lynchpins of the narrative, the narrator plays down the significance of this event: “My parents’ 
sudden, foreign deaths”, the narrator recounts, “struck me not as the tolling of a bell, but as 
another stage in my ever-expanding metamorphic life” (93-94). Indeed, long before his 
parents’ death, the narrator weaves an elaborate discourse around the idea of metamorphosis, 
which for him remains the discursive framework for the sudden and tragic event. The 
transformation is anticipated from the very first pages on, when the protagonist “spen[ds] 
entire afternoons watching carrots boil in water” (8). The childhood fascination with the 
process around the not coincidentally phallic symbol is expressed as follows: “It was the 
transformation from hard to soft that fascinated me, my mother said later. Indeed, from my 
earliest years the idea of transformation has been central to my life” (8). The reference to 
hardness and softness lifts the scene out of its naïve obscenity and forms a direct allusion to 
what Susan Jeffords, in her study on Hollywood masculinity in the Reagan era, has called 
“soft bodies” and “hard bodies” (1994). Drawing on ideological constructions of gender and 
race, Jeffords describes the “hard body” as “the normative body that enveloped strength, 
labor, determination, loyalty, and courage” (1994, 24), while the “soft body” forms its precise 
Other. “In this system of thought marked by race and gender”, Jeffords writes, “the soft body 
invariably belonged to a female and/or a person of color, whereas the hard body was, like 
Reagan’s own, male and white” (1994, 25). In this picture, the connection between the boiling 
of carrots and the idea of transformation becomes obvious. For what the protagonist in fact 
observes in all respects reads like a prophecy of his own later transformation – encompassing 
both the fantastic transgression from masculinity to femininity and the ideology-breathing 
social context, in which it occurs. Curiously enough, the protagonist’s transformation from 
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“hard body” to “soft body” will even occur precisely in 1981, the year of Ronald Reagan’s 
inauguration as the President of the United States. 
While Martel thus inscribes traces of the established gender ideology into the 
protagonist’s childhood, the hero himself sees transformation as a most natural, ubiquitous 
process, not much charged with ideology. This is demonstrated by his naïve and comical 
over-generalizations of the idea of metamorphosis: 
When I started losing my baby teeth and was told that larger, more durable teeth would grow in 
their stead, I took this as my first tangible proof of human metamorphosis. I had already gathered 
evidence on the metamorphosis of day and night, of weather, of the seasons, of food and 
excrement, even of life and death, to name but a few, but these teeth were something closer to 
home, something clear and incontrovertible. I envisioned life as a series of metamorphic changes, 
one after another, to no end. (9) 
Apart from these physical processes, which the young protagonist takes for metamorphoses, 
the narrator depicts another instance of a pseudo-metamorphosis: his “nightly transformation” 
into a rabbit (17). While the adult narrator humorously admits that his “time as a rabbit was 
closely related to that strange condition called sleep” (16), the vividness of the description of 
his bodily transformation into a rabbit in his dream hardly differs from that of his experience 
of the gender metamorphosis. What he remembers “with absolute lucidity”, as he says, is  
[n]ot the process – the shrinking in size or the stretching of my ears and legs, although, if I close 
my eyes and concentrate, I can nearly feel the growing of my soft, thick fur – not the process, but 
the result: a medium-sized rabbit, brown and white except for the tips of my ears, which were 
black. (17) 
Furthermore, he situates his transformations in the context of identity formation: “I changed 
schools, languages, countries and continents a number of times during my childhood. At each 
change I had the opportunity to re-create myself, to present a new façade, to bury past errors 
and misrepresentations” (9). Finally, he presents us with his physical development around the 
age of twelve, which he registers as “a new hairiness, an awkward physical growth, a skin 
disease, the discovery of a secret pleasure” (50). In this instance, too, he does not content 
himself with the common term “puberty”. In line with his vision, he presents his account as 
“the metamorphosis that begins at puberty” (50). All five examples to some extent approach 
the phenomenon of the metamorphosis as “a change of the form or nature of a thing or person 
into a completely different one” (Oxford Dictionary 2013, online) from symbolic, childish-
naïve, imaginary, identitary and physical points of view. Most of all, however, they prepare 
the ground for the actual metamorphosis, which, due to the anticipating transformations, is 
envisioned as a natural and positive one: “I envisioned life as a series of metamorphic 
changes, one after another, to no end” (9), this is how the adult narrator puts his childish 
worldview into words. Given this pseudo-metamorphic pre-history, it does not surprise at first 
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glance that the protagonist also comes to see his parents’ deaths as “another stage in [his] 
ever-expanding metamorphic life” (93-94). However, this statement neither accounts for his 
description of their deaths as “foreign” nor for the trauma aesthetics involved in the 
representation of the accident. As I shall argue, the ‘foreignness’ appears both as a marker of 
trauma and of the linguistic metamorphosis which the protagonist is about to undergo.  
 With the parents’, and particularly the mother’s death, the narrator’s mother tongue 
fades from the narrative. Even the news of the catastrophe does not reach the protagonist in 
his mother tongue, but in a second language, Spanish, which makes the parents’ deaths appear 
as “foreign deaths” (93): 
Ante todo, el viento y el ruido. Aquel día el 
mar estaba como un espejo sin nada de 
viento. Yo estaba remando. Oí algo como un 
grito, un grito de niña, no más,  y al darme la 
vuelta ví un inmenso chorro de llamas 
viniendo hacia mí. Cayó del cielo azul como 
un volcán. 
First there was the wind and the noise. That 
day the sea was as flat as a mirror and without 
a whisper of wind. I was rowing. I heard what I 
thought was a scream, a little girl’s scream, no 
more, and I turned to see an enormous flaming 
streak of colour coming towards me. It fell 
down from the blue sky like a volcano. 
(88) 
 
This passage is only the beginning of a two-page long testimony, which breaks into the 
narrative without any warning, even though the narrator has mentioned the fatal accident on 
the first pages of the novel (7-8). The narrative frame of the testimony itself, however, does 
little to announce or round off the report on the parents’ death. In the passage preceding the 
testimony, the narrator reflects upon his love-hate relationship towards his boarding school, 
and the passage that follows the testimony leads us back to his everyday school life. As the 
narrator laconically notes, his “parents’ death was witnessed only by an old man and the sea” 
(89). With this immediate reference to Hemingway’s The Old Man and the Sea (1952), the 
narrator refuses to take notice of the horrible event and presents it as but a topic of an English 
lesson by informing us that it “so happened that [they] were studying The Old Man and the 
Sea that very moment” (90). What is more, by shifting his attention to the novel, he 
effectively assigns the tragedy a place in fiction rather than in reality. He hardly allocates any 
space for this event in his memory, which makes the adult narrator admit upon rereading 
Hemingway’s classic: 
My reaction was a blend of blankness and upheaval, for my memory had mixed the work of art 
with my parents’ death. I can’t see a plane crashing into the sea. The noise, the colours, the 
burning, the scattering of bodies and luggage – it’s beyond my imagination. But I can see a large 
fish tethered to the side of a skiff. I can see it being attacked by sharks and other fish until nothing 
is left. […] Sometimes I have to scold my memory and remind it that my parents did not drown, 
their bodies found by a fisherman, but died in a plane crash, their bodies found by no one. (90) 
The near amnesia and the fictionalization of the catastrophe expose the trauma inflicted upon 
him through the loss of his parents. Also, in line with the trauma theory introduced in the first 
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chapter, the lack of a narrative frame expresses precisely that the testimony does not lend 
itself to any meaningful framing, that the experience of the loss resists its narrativization and 
is therefore only conveyed by the figure of an old man, who is a stranger to the narrative.  
This is also where the use of Spanish becomes significant. As noted earlier, Spanish is 
the language in which he first formulated his understanding of love and which he drew on in 
his exchange with Marisa. However, these undertones of desire seem radically extinguished, 
since his previous wish to silence the French family discourse has come true in a gruesome 
fashion. With French being replaced by Spanish in the left column, the testimony unfolds its 
uncanny effect, as the message comes to the protagonist in a familiar and intimate shape, but 
brings along a horrifying content. At the same time, the attribute “foreign” testifies to a 
distancing effect not unlike the one achieved by the fictionalization, which seems to foster if 
not the amnesia, then the repression of the painful memory. The event seems to bypass his 
emotions and does not insert itself in his memory precisely because it is encoded in a foreign 
language. Thus, the adult narrator relates to us that “[i]n many ways [he] denied [his] parents’ 
death” (93) and “[a]s for emotion, [he] was a spectator at its theatre” (92).  
The insertion of the testimony in a language that is not the main language of the novel 
reproduces an alienating effect also for the reader, since in its English-language surroundings, 
the text appears like a foreign body. By dividing this section into two columns, Martel on the 
one hand preserves the initial shock and the coping strategy inscribed through the Spanish 
text; the leap into Spanish emerges as a uncanny marker of trauma and the ensuing attempts to 
overcome it. On the other hand, the narrator leaves space for an English translation. This 
translation is not simply addressed to readers who do not understand Spanish, but signals that 
the adult narrator has eventually worked through the memory, for he has integrated it into his 
own discourse. Thus, the translation brings home the painful message – especially so for 
readers who do not know any Spanish – but also mitigates the traumatic effect, since it signals 
that the event has found its place in the narrator’s English discourse, and thus in the 
protagonist’s conscious memory. 
However, the intrusion of the tragic message in Spanish also fulfills an entirely 
different function, for it appears as a rite of initiation in the linguistic and gender 
metamorphosis. The link to French is abruptly cut, and in fact, the language figures twice 
more in the entire novel: once, in a later passage, in which the protagonist resorts to her 
bilingualism in order to stress her Canadian identity. “Je ne veux pas être comme toi / I don’t 
want to be like you” (151), she repeats six times in a row in her ‘Canadian voice’ when an 
unpleasant American soldier declares “that there was no difference between Americans and 
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Canadians” (150). The second time that French still figures is in the next bilingual scene after 
the Spanish-English news of the parents’ death – the transformation scene, which shall be 
shortly discussed in more detail.  
It is because of the transformation scene that I do not agree with Grutman’s view of 
the parents’ death as a “disappearance which also signals the loss of importance of French in 
his life”6 (2009, 51). For rather than simply losing his mother tongue out of sight, the 
protagonist seems to escape it willingly and to turn to another language that will allow him to 
construct his personality anew. As argued above, the mother tongue also stands for the 
motherly discourse that governs the themes of gender and sexuality. Thus, the death of the 
mother tongue opens the way to a new freedom, for which the gender metamorphosis is 
merely a material expression. It does not seem as a coincidence that the language he turns to, 
English, hardly possesses any grammatical gender. Freed from the dominance of gender 
difference und heteronormativity, the protagonist seems to refute the doctrine that a subject 
can only belong to one or the other sex, and begins to enter relationships both with men and 
women. Thus again, the transgression of language boundaries is encoded as a liberation from 
a restrictive regime of gender and sexuality. 
The effect of this linguistic transmigration strongly recalls observations made by 
psychoanalysts working with multilingual patients. Thus, there are clear parallels to 
Jacqueline Amati-Mehler’s, Simona Argentieri’s and Jorge Canestri’s report on several 
multilingual female patients, all of whom looked back on primary relationships marked by 
deep conflicts and all of whom had abandoned their respective mother tongues such as 
Spanish and English in favor of Italian upon their migration to Italy. In their book, The Babel 
of the Unconscious (1993), they comment on the commonalities between these cases and 
reach the following conclusion: 
As far as these patients are concerned, it seems to us that by substituting the language of their 
childhood with a new language – the conveyor of new thought and affect routes – and by adopting 
a cultural and emotional context not mortgaged by the archaic conflicts, they not only rendered a 
service to resistances and defenses, but they also created new passages that provided them, albeit 
at the cost of deep and painful splittings, with valid and structured introjections on which to 
reorganize their adult feminine identity. (Amati-Mehler, Argentieri, and Canestri 1993, 71) 
Quite the same seems to be true of Martel’s protagonist. Significantly, the gender 
metamorphosis occurs precisely on the day on which the protagonist attains his majority. The 
development of a new gender identity thus signals the beginning of the protagonist’s 
adulthood. As for Amati-Mehler’s, Argentieri’s und Canestri’s patients, for Martel’s 
protagonist, “‘adopting’ a second language seems to have genuinely represented a new 
                                                 
6
 In the original: “disparition qui signale aussi la perte d’importance du français dans sa vie”. 
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opportunity for repeating the evolutive journey toward the acquisition of a more developed 
and less mutilated identity” (1993, 75), since the “new language represents a life-saving 
anchor which allows for ‘rebirth’” (ibid., 108) 
In order to better understand the relation between English and French in the narrative 
from a psychoanalytic point of view, and particularly to uncover the implications of the 
column aesthetics, let us look more deeply into the first transformation scene: 
 
Cela s’est terminé au cours d’une nuit. Je me 
suis réveillée soudainement. Je ne sais pas 
pourquoi ni à quoi je rêvais. Je me suis 
dressée. Tout était confus. Je ne me 
rappelais de rien, ni de mon nom ni de mon 
âge ni où j’était. L’amnésie totale. Je savais 
que je pensais en français, ça au 
moins,c’était sûr. Mon identité était liée à la 
langue française. Et je savais aussi que 
j’était une femme. Francophone et femme, 
c’était le coeur de mon identité. Je me suis 
souvenue du reste, les accessoires de mon 
identité, seulement après un bon moment 
d’hésitation. […] J’étais en train de me 
rendormir. Je me suis allongée sur le côté, 
j’ai tiré le drap jusqu’à ma joue, et je suis 
retournée dans les bras de Morphée, le 
sourire aux lèvres. Tout allait bien, tout allait 
bien. 
It was over the course of a night that things 
came to completion. I awoke suddenly. I 
don’t know what I was dreaming, why I 
should have awakened. I sat up. I was 
confused. I couldn’t remember anything - my 
name, my age, where I was – complete 
amnesia. I knew that I was thinking in 
English, that much I knew right away. My 
identity was tied to the English language. 
And I knew that I was a woman, that also. 
English-speaking and a woman. That was the 
core of my being. The rest, the ornaments of 
identity, came several seconds later, after 
some mental groping. […] I was falling 
asleep again. I lay on my side, brought the 
sheet up to my cheek and returned, smiling, 
into the arms of Morpheus. Everything was 
all right, everything was all right.                               
(107-108, my emphasis) 
 
Considering the arrangement of the columns, one could proceed from Grutman’s statement 
that the French text is positioned on the left “où il sera lu d’abord et aura un effet plus 
immédiat, puis en y joignant une traduction, à droite” (61). The observation on the 
arrangement seems in this case more convincing than the conclusion. As argued above, the 
effect of immediacy should not be taken for granted. In my view, the spatial arrangement does 
represent a chronology, however not so much that of the reader’s steps through the text, but 
that of two psychological aspects about the protagonist. First, it illustrates the process of 
acquisition by the protagonist, with French as the first and English as a second language. 
What is more, a reason for the English version to come ‘later’ can be that it stands for a 
greater maturity of the narrator. It can be argued that the English column stands for the 
narrator’s overcoming of the dominance of his family discourse and the liberation he has 
achieved by turning towards his second language. The fact that the English text appears like a 
translation does not devalue it as less original, but rather signals that the contents of the left 
column have been worked through and integrated into the discourse of the adult narrator. The 
moment of belatedness does not diminish the significance of the translation or the working 
through; on the contrary, without the working-through a narrativization is unthinkable. 
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 Despite the bilingual assertion of the narrator that “[t]out allait bien, tout allait bien”, 
and “[e]verything was all right, everything was all right” (108), the harmonious self-image 
raises suspicion. While the transformation scene ends with the celebratory and humorous 
synthesis: “I’m Canadian, a woman – and a voter” (108), a different truth can be detected 
behind the uniting attribute ‘Canadian’. Upon closer analysis, the two linguistic sides of the 
protagonist in the transformation scene are much less complementary than one may initially 
assume. “Tout en racontant son histoire en anglais”, Grutman writes, “la première langue 
qu’il ait appris à écrire, il clame haut et fort son attachement à la langue française, qui fait 
partie de son identité autant (mais pas plus) que la langue anglaise” (2009, 57). This comment 
demonstrates that, independently from the spatial arrangement of the columns, a reader, in 
this case Grutman himself, is tempted to rely primarily on the column the language of which 
is well known to him or her, and to sometimes ignore the other one altogether. Comparing the 
statements in the two columns, one may notice that the right one does not offer a translation 
of the left one. At this point, Martel goes further in playing with readers’ expectations and 
deliberately misleads us. For in fact, the narrator does not simply claim to have a close 
connection to French while choosing English as the main language of narration. In French, he 
states during the transformation scene: “Mon identité était liée à la langue française” (107). At 
the same time, however, he claims in the neighboring column: “My identity was tied to the 
English language” (107). As this translator’s trick shows, a complementary relation between 
English and French in the protagonist’s personality can hardly be assumed. So what kind of 
‘self’ does Martel ultimately present us with? 
What finds itself paradigmatically expressed for the whole novel in the transformation 
scene, stands in line with the column aesthetics. For a central characteristic of the columns is 
their non-connectedness. In German, the word for ‘columns’ – ‘Spalten’ – even shares its 
roots with ‘Gespaltenheit’, which in English means ‘split’ or ‘disjunction’. As implied earlier 
in this chapter, the protagonist is also split into two solitudes. The transformation scene lays 
bare that he/she does not coincide with him/herself. In Julia Kristeva’s terms (1991), he/she 
can be said to become ‘a stranger to him/herself’. This in turn corresponds with Amati-
Mehler’s, Argentieri’s and Canestri’s observations. Thus, the authors write about patients who 
abandoned their mother tongues in favor of second languages:  
It is evident that although certain fundamental aspects of the personality can be ‘saved’ through 
such an operation […], the process can be neither painless nor peaceful. In fact, the problem in 
psychoanalytic terms is to understand the internal cost of a defensive organization such as this, and 
which are the repressive and splitting mechanisms that have been set in motion. (1993, 75) 
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The splitting mechanisms are crucial, which is why I once again have to disagree with Rainier 
Grutman, who describes the identity of the protagonist as “inclusive (man AND woman; 
francophone AND anglophone) rather than exclusive (one OR the other, without any possible 
intermediate solution)”7 (2009, 58, translation mine). The narrator himself articulates the 
feeling of being split in a passage quoted above, when he comes to see his own personality 
“not so much a hybrid as a chameleon” (238). Here, Grutman seems to pay less attention to 
the novel than to the celebratory stance on fragmented subjects that has become dominant in 
Gender Studies. This stance is called into question by psychoanalyst Lynne Layton: 
[O]ften, after reading a brilliant piece of cultural criticism, my clinician self feels very 
uncomfortable. For in this work fragmentation is essentialized, universalized, and celebrated in a 
way that seems not to acknowledge what it feels like to experience fragmentation. Fragments are 
not seen as arising from specific relational interactions or specific historical circumstances but 
rather are seen as the condition of selfhood. While such texts demean any notion of a unified self, 
any wish for an integration of fragments, they paradoxically leave the reader with the sense that 
their protagonists are in total control of their fragments, that they are auteurs who pick and choose 
how they wish to represent themselves at any given moment. (1995, 109) 
In fact, Martel does not simply celebrate a fragmented self; he also problematizes such a 
celebration, and thus integrates the tenor of cultural studies with a psychoanalytic perspective. 
In line with Layton’s view that it is illusory to believe that fragmented “protagonists are in 
total control of their fragments”, the narrative derails in the transformation scene even before 
the contradiction just described. The narrator seems already to lose control over his own 
discourse when, due to the necessary grammatical gender marker in French visible in the 
verbs “réveillée” and “dressée”, the left column betrays the protagonist’s transformation into a 
woman earlier than the English one on the right. 
 In the negotiation of the first metamorphosis and its consequences, the narrative again 
displays significant intersections between the topic of gender and that of language. Whereas 
Grutman stresses that the changes of language do not correspond to those of sex, since the 
narrator speaks the same languages as a man and as a woman (2009, 56-57), I would argue 
that if this were true, then the already ideologically somewhat contradictory narrative would 
be led ad absurdum. It is important to note that in the transformation scene, the narrator links 
his language and gender identity by highlighting them in both French and English as the 
“coeur de mon identité” and “the core of my being” (107). I do agree with Grutman that 
Martel does not perform the rather banal trick of attributing a language to each of the two 
sexes of the protagonist and thus distinguishing a Francophone male and an Anglophone 
female identity. However, the metamorphosis only begins to make sense through the 
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 In the original: “inclusive (homme ET femme; francophone ET anglophone) plutôt qu’exclusive (l’un OU 
l’autre, sans qu’il n’y ait de solution intermédiaire possible)”. 
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connection between the mother tongue and the gender discourse that accompany the 
protagonist throughout his adolescence. The themes of language and gender intertwine in the 
troping of the metamorphosis as a moment not only of liberation, but also of splitting. While 
the figure of gender transformation finds itself celebrated in many contemporary narratives, 
Martel seems to acknowledge Lynne Layton’s criticism that 
[o]ften, the protagonists of these texts – the lesbian, the transvestite, the sadomasochist, the 
hermaphrodite [and we could add the figure of the magical transformer] – are made emblems of a 
third space, a space outside of various forms of cultural oppression. In this status, they perform an 
important cultural service – they challenge heterosexism, reified notions of gender identity, 
repressed forms of sexual expression, the hypocrisies of a puritan, yet violent, culture. At the same 
time, when these figures become postmodern heroes and heroines, the pain of fragmentation, of 
marginality, of indeterminacy is often overlooked or glossed over. (1995, 110) 
If the first metamorphosis does not yet sufficiently prove that Martel does not merely naïvely 
celebrate fragmented subjects, this is achieved through the second metamorphosis, which 
turns the protagonist back into a man. From the perspective of Gender Studies, it is interesting 
to trace the difference between the two metamorphoses through the intertextual reference to 
Ovid’s Metamorphoses inscribed into the novel. While the classical text presents linguistic 
transformations only between human and animal languages, it acquaints us with five figures 
that undergo gender transformations. In restaging the Metamorphoses, Martel seems to draw 
on two different episodes: the famous one of Tiresias and the less famous one of Caenis. 
The more obvious parallel is the one to the story of Tiresias who “had once struck with 
his staff two great serpents / As they were mating in the greenwood, / And, transformed 
amazingly from man to woman, / Spent seven autumns in that state”, after which he turned 
back into a man (Ovid 2010, 75). The killing of one of the serpents reminds of the cruel 
childhood games played by Martel’s protagonist with worms, snails, ants, turtles, lizards, 
spiders, slugs, frogs and toads (28-30). Another parallel is the curiosity about sexuality from 
the vantage point of the other sex. In the Metamorphoses, it is voiced through Zeus’ and 
Hera’s question to Tiresias as to whether it is men or women who can experience greater 
sexual pleasure. In Self, this curiosity plagues the protagonist himself. Thus, when he becomes 
close friends with Sonya, one of his prime issues of interest is her menstrual cycle: “Sonya’s 
cycle became an affair between the two of us. […] I thought that if only I could understand 
the menstrual cycle, this slow, balancing ballet of hormones, this one mystery, I would 
understand everything. My curiosity became a starvation” (66). Soon enough, however, his 
curiosity is satisfied, since, like Tiresias, he miraculously transforms into a woman and can 
experience the menstrual cycle him/herself (118). By offering the reader numerous and 
detailed passages dealing with the protagonist’s sexual encounters after the transformation, 
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Martel, in a somewhat dubious move, even seems to confirm Tiresias’ view on the greater 
intensity of sexual pleasure in women. 
 
  
Multilingualism and non-understanding 
 
While the story of Tiresias serves as the background for the first metamorphosis, this is no 
more the case with the second one. Nothing betrays the attempt to turn back into a man by 
means of the same transformation ritual – in Tiresias’ case the killing of a snake copulating 
with another. On the contrary, after the female protagonist finds happiness in a heterosexual 
relationship and becomes pregnant, a transformation back into a man is the last thing she 
could wish for. Instead, the second metamorphosis is triggered by an utterly traumatic 
episode, in which the protagonist is brutally raped by a neighbor. Here, the narrative conjures 
another episode from the Metamorphoses – the story of beautiful Caenis, who is raped by 
Neptune and afterwards transformed into a man. After “the god of the sea / Had her by force” 
and “had enjoyed / The pleasure of this new love” (Ovid 2010, 331), Caenis is granted a wish, 
which she formulates in the following way: 
‘The wrong you’ve done me demands the great prayer 
That I never be able to suffer this again. Make me 
 A woman no longer and you will have given me all.’ 
 
She spoke the last words in a huskier voice 
That seemed like a man’s. And so it was, 
For the sea god had already answered her prayer 
And granted her besides that she could not be wounded 
Or fall to any weapon. Caeneus now 
Went away happy and spent all his time 
Pursuing manly arts in Thessaly’s fields. (Ovid 2010, 332) 
Caenis’ wish to “never be able to suffer this again” is almost literally cited in Self when the 
protagonist utters after the rape: “Never again to be so open to attack. Never” (310). At this 
point, however, the differences to Ovid’s narrative also become palpable, since Martel’s 
protagonist cannot rejoice about her transformation or the possibility to pursue “manly arts”. 
This difference does not surprise since being a woman generally is a disadvantage in the 
Metamorphoses: “Girls are a much greater burden,” Ovid tells us in the story of the 
providential transformation of Iphis into a man, “[a]nd it is their misfortune to be weak” 
(Ovid 2010, 259). As critic Carla Meyer points out, in the Metamorphoses, all transformations 
into men are troped as acts of liberation, propelled by the gods’ pity (1995, 45), so that their 
prehistory is rendered almost irrelevant. Not coincidentally, the only character appalled by his 
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own gender transformation is Hermaphroditus, who has the fortune to be born as a boy, but 
whose good luck abandons him, when the nymph Salmacis tricks him into merging with her, 
and he turns into a creature both male and female, or, as Ovid has it, into “half a man” (2010, 
103). 
 In Self, this ancient and misogynous discourse is opposed by a psychological one, for 
the protagonist’s wish “[n]ever again to be so open to attack” stands at the end of a traumatic 
stream of consciousness, significantly split again into two columns, which echo the splitting 
of the protagonist’s consciousness. Thus, the novel corresponds with Lynne Layton’s 
discussion of cases in which female rape victims begin to develop a split personality and 
partly take on a masculine identity, for “when the experienced trauma is sexual abuse or rape, 
splitting and fragmentation operate on gender identity” (Layton 1995, 113). Female victims 
can afterwards imagine, as the psychoanalyst explains, to possess both a female and a male – 
better protected – identity. In this self-image, “[e]ach identity is split between highly negative 
and highly positive traits; identifying with either is fraught with anxiety and pain because 
each has complex associations to the abuse and the gender of the abuser” (Layton 1995, 113). 
Indeed, in the novel, it seems both an act of self-defense and of punishment that the 
protagonist in the end shares the gender of her abuser. In a gruesome scene, the gender-split 
re-masculinized protagonist even falls into the role of a perpetrator, when he makes out a 
seemingly inferior Other in a heavily drunk Native American, whom he attacks and beats up. 
A laconic confession articulated as if by the feminine voice in him betrays the background of 
the deed: “The simple truth is, I am afraid of men” (322). 
 Addressing the question of why Martel puts his protagonist through such an ordeal, 
two answers seem plausible: one stands in relation with the author’s negotiation of gender, the 
other one with that of multilingualism. Within the framework of the gender discussion, the 
rape appears to prove the point that there are no clear boundaries between the genders, except 
for the difference in their position and power in society. Polly Young-Eisendrath comments in 
a similar fashion that “a major component of gender difference worldwide is power 
difference, with female people having less power” (1997, 29). In such a context, it makes 
sense that Martel’s young male protagonist dreams of becoming Prime Minister of Canada 
(56), while the adult female ends up as a waitress at a “posh greasy spoon” (242). By taking 
her through the excruciating experience of rape, the author seems to imply that being a 
woman includes being exposed to male power even in its most extreme expression. This 
power materializes not only in the shape of sexual violence, but also in the status of rape as a 
taboo topic in society.  
116 
 
 The unspeakability of the crime marks the second reason for which Martel may have 
chosen to have his narrative culminate in a rape scene. In a novel that negotiates 
multilingualism in all its facets, the silence that surrounds such an experience of extreme 
violence presents the other end of the linguistic spectrum – the sheer negation of language, 
which makes the pages turn blank. Arranged in two columns, the traumatic rape scene, the 
account of which is squeezed into the left column, most palpably cries out for a translation. 
While calling up the expectation of a translation once again through the graphical 
arrangement, the narration of gruesome facts on the left only finds itself echoed through the 
fragments “pain”, “fear” and “baby” and endless dots as a sign of speechlessness on the right 
(286-308). The missing translation and the fading out of the narrative on blank pages (308-
312) imply that an understanding of the events remains impossible and the trauma of rape 
remains unprocessed throughout the narrative, unintegrated into the protagonist’s narrative 
memory. 
 The presence or absence of a translation, and thus the possibility of understanding, is a 
central criterion in Self’s negotiation of multilingual lives and encounters. Significantly, the 
effect of non-understanding is practiced both on the protagonist and the reader shortly before 
the rape scene, when a longer passage is inserted in Tito’s mother tongue, Hungarian (261-
265). At a first glance, the reader feels reminded of the same technique in the narration of the 
protagonist’s encounter with Marisa. This time, however, the maneuver occurs with a 
different twist: in contrast to the conversation with Marisa, which the narrator finds himself 
miraculously able to recount in the Czech original with an English translation – or, more 
probably, to reinvent in a plausible fashion – the Hungarian text is not translated in the right 
column. Does Martel want his reader to understand the passage at all? In answer to this 
question, Grutman argues that it is difficult to conceive of an author who would count on his 
reader’s inability or reluctance to decipher his text, for in his view, this would contradict the 
basic rules of the hermeneutic exercise (2009, 77). In my view, however, the passage is 
multiply addressed: both to readers who understand Hungarian or will make the effort to find 
a translation of this passage, and to those who will neither understand nor try to translate it.  
Those who understand the meaning of the Hungarian passage or make the effort to do 
so, encounter, as Grutman elaborately uncovers in his essay (2009, 66-75), passages from 
Béla Balázs’ libretto for the opera Bluebeard’s Castle by Béla Bartók (1918). More precisely, 
they witness young Judith follow her husband, Bluebeard, to his gloomy castle with the 
locked rooms, in the last of which, as the opera connoisseur knows, she will eventually perish. 
The fact that these passages are arranged in the column on the left, while on the right, the 
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narrator tells us in English how comfortable she felt in the Hungarian community (260-265), 
creates a most uncanny effect. The tremendous discrepancy between the two columns 
introduces a fatal split between the seeming and the real and foreshadows the gruesome rape 
scene, in which many elements, such as the absence of windows in the protagonist’s office, 
her search for her keys and even the moustache of the rapist, are strongly reminiscent of 
motifs from Bluebeard’s Castle (cf. Grutman 2009, 76). This relatedness in motifs recalls the 
already quoted passage dealing with the death of the protagonist’s parents, which the narrator 
integrates into the fictional framework of Hemingway’s The Old Man and The Sea. Having 
previously encountered such a connection as a narrative strategy for conveying trauma, the 
reader can only feel alarmed at the intrusion of a seemingly unrelated fictional text into the 
narrative. Likewise, the rape scene acquires its ghastly effectiveness by unexpectedly 
intruding into the narrative and bringing the course of the action to a sudden and dreadful halt. 
Shortly before the end of the novel, the narrator will mention Bluebeard’s Castle also in 
English and reveal another metaphorical connection betraying the traumatic quality of his 
memories: “My soul is like Bluebeard’s castle: it has a few locked rooms in it” (329). 
On the other hand, the passage in Hungarian has a similarly powerful effect on readers 
who do not understand it – even more since they share this non-understanding with the 
protagonist. The arrangement of the passage in columns calls up the expectation of a 
translation, which this time – for the first time in the narrative – is not fulfilled. Even without 
any knowledge of Hungarian, the attentive reader will notice that the text in English 
graphically sets in before the Hungarian one and hardly contains dialogue, whereas the 
column in Hungarian consists of dialogue only. Bearing in mind the many parallels between 
the two love stories with Tito and with Marisa, the reader may be tricked into believing that 
the protagonist is so much at ease in the Hungarian community that she does not feel the need 
to understand the language spoken around her. The name ‘Judit’ facilitates the deception, 
since it is both the name of Bluebeard’s bride and Tito’s mother. Both the reader and the 
protagonist believe to find themselves in a new Babel, in which a peaceful and fulfilled 
existence is possible without the permanent need for translation. However, the reader who 
joins the protagonist – and narrator – in her feigned non-understanding, is even more shocked 
about the rape scene that defies understanding in a different sense. For only then does this 
reader realize that the absence of a linguistic translation of the Hungarian passage anticipates 
the impossibility of a mental translation of the rape scene. 
 
 
118 
 
Killed in Translation: Junot Díaz’ The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao 
 
Like Yann Martel, Junot Díaz in The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao
8
 links the topics of 
language and nation with gender and sexual identity. Whereas Martel, however, particularly 
explores the motif of gender difference and transformation, which was previously troped in a 
multilingual context by Virginia Woolf in Orlando (1928), Christine Brooke-Rose in Between 
(1968) and Brigid Brophy in In Transit (1969), Junot Díaz finds himself in a much longer 
tradition of Hispano-American writing set on performing borderland experiences and 
identities by engaging with multilingual experimentation. Such a border identity is ascribed to 
the central character named in the title of the novel, Oscar. Growing up in the Dominican 
diaspora in New Jersey as the son of a first-generation migrant mother, he is only vaguely 
aware of the fact that she has fled from the dictatorship of General Trujillo in the homeland. 
Like for Martel’s protagonist, Oscar’s main objective is to find love and belonging between 
his cultures and languages – an objective, however, complicated by his marginal position both 
in the US and within his diasporic community. 
 Oscar is mainly characterized by two factors: his passion for the genres of science 
fiction and fantasy, and his deviation from Dominican gender stereotypes, which becomes 
apparent in his sentimentality and his lack of success with women. While he does not show 
any tendency towards same-sex relationships, he can be categorized as ‘queer’ in line with 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, who interprets this notion as “the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, 
overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when the constituent 
elements of anyone’s gender, of anyone’s sexuality aren’t made (or can’t be made) to signify 
monolithically” (1994, 8). Like Martel’s protagonist, Oscar grows up bilingual, with English 
and Spanish. However, in contrast to the former, Díaz’ main character is not rewarded for his 
code-switching ability, since neither of his two languages and cultures offer him a safe haven. 
While as a diasporic subject, he is doomed to remain a marginal in terms of nation, his own 
community makes him an outcast due to his non-conformity with regard to gender and 
sexuality. Thus, instead of granting his protagonist the possibility of liberating border 
transgressions, Díaz tropes bilingualism and translation as a marker of weakness and exposes 
Oscar to the violence of his surroundings. It is my objective to explore why the bilingualism 
of the protagonist does not serve him as an instrument of empowerment. In analyzing the 
ethics and aesthetics of Díaz’ novel, I will demonstrate why literary bilingualism per se does 
not always necessarily serve as a strategy of resistance against hegemonic discourses. 
                                                 
8
 In the following referred to as Oscar Wao. 
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Multilingualism in the novel: a strategy of resistance or a marker of authenticity?  
 
While Junot Díaz, in contrast to Yann Martel, mainly draws on only two languages – and a 
number of slang varieties – literary multilingualism is exercised in his novel in a still more 
radical way. The two languages, English and Spanish, are not separated in any way from each 
other, neither by grammatical nor by narrative structures. In grammatical terms, as Eugenia 
Casielles-Suárez points out (2013), Díaz does not restrict himself to intersentential code-
switching, as can be observed in a passage, in which Oscar’s mother is enraged because of his 
sentimentality: “Moms de León nearly exploded. Tú ta llorando por una muchacha? She 
hauled Oscar to his feet by his ear.” (14) Instead, intrasentential code-switching dominates 
the discourse of the narrator as well as of most of the characters. This is illustrated in the 
characterization of Oscar’s mother by one of her colleagues: “In her twenties, sunny and 
amiable, whose cuerpo was all pipa and no culo, a ‘mujer alegre’ (in the parlance of the 
period)” (112). Furthermore, the narrative discourse does not merely unite lexical items from 
both languages in common sentences. On a syntactic level, English is influenced by Spanish 
with the result that some of the English sentences absorb Hispanicized inversions: “To 
exhaustion and beyond they prayed” (145) or “To the latecomers are left the bones” (219). 
Finally, even the phonetic realization of words in English is colored by Spanish, for instance, 
when Díaz imitates a Dominican’s pronunciation of ‘New York’ as “Nueba Yol” (72). Taking 
Díaz narrative language under close linguistic scrutiny, Casielles-Suárez comes to the 
conclusion that the author practices a “radical hybridism”: 
there is a more intimate connection between the two languages, where Spanish does not so much 
alternate with English, but ‘invades’ English. […] I propose the term ‘radical hybridism’ to refer to 
the use of spontaneous loan words, and sustained insertion and congruent lexicalization à la Díaz, 
where rather than switching to Spanish for more than one phrase, what we find is massive 
borrowing of single words, and single and multiple insertions of Spanish phrases in shared 
structures. (2013, 485) 
While Casielles-Suárez, however, insists “that the term ‘radical hybridism’ does not refer to 
an established mixed language”, this assumption can be contested in the context of Díaz’ 
novel. Thus, Gloria Anzaldúa has claimed that “Chicano Spanish is a border tongue which 
developed naturally” and exists as a “language with terms that are neither español ni inglés, 
but both” (1987, 77, emphasis in the original). Similarly, theorist Ilán Stavans argues that 
“Spanglish is not only a form of code switching; it is an altogether fresh tongue” (2000, 556), 
existing in many varieties, which depend on the speakers’ countries of origins and their place 
of residence in the US. Countering the common accusation that Spanglish is spoken only by 
those who “are no longer fluent in the language of Cervantes but have also failed to master 
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that of Shakespeare” (2000, 555), Stavans compares Spanglish to Yiddish, which was also 
released from its stigma as the lingo of the uneducated Jews in Eastern Europe mainly through 
its literary use by writers such as Sholom Aleichem and Itzak Leib Peretz.  
 Considering Anzaldúa’s and Stavans’ claims, it stands to reason that even though the 
strategy of mixing two languages offers fertile soil for linguistic ad hoc creations, Díaz, in his 
novel draws on a well-established and widespread register. The mixed narrative language in 
Oscar Wao is thus not an invention made by the author, as is the case in Martel’s Self, but 
looks back to a longer history and clearly reflects a social reality. This observation raises the 
question of how the author employs the presence of two languages in a narrative context. In 
regard to his own assertion that he “sought coherence” in his use of Spanish (Céspedes 2000, 
904), I want to argue that his language strategy is not carried out in full consequence.  
On the one hand, following a logics of mimesis, he introduces the pattern of quoting 
different characters in their respective original languages. Thus, being part of the Dominican 
diasporic community, both Oscar’s family and the narrator mix English and Spanish in a 
rather believable way. On the other hand, the narrative also presents us with Dominican 
characters who are not in touch with English at all, but whose linguistic discourse seems to be 
compromised for the sake of the monolingual English-speaking reader. One of these 
characters is Oscar’s grandmother, who has never left the Dominican Republic, but who is 
nevertheless made to speak English with only few interspersed phrases in Spanish. Thus, she 
scolds her flirtatious young grandson with the words: “Muchacho del diablo! This is not a 
cabaret!” (13). At times, Díaz entirely erases the presence of Spanish, drawing on a traditional 
strategy of just naming the language of a character, but providing the reader with a clean 
English discourse. This becomes palpable when Oscar’s sister explains about her running 
training in the Dominican Republic that her friend “Karen would pass out if she could see me 
running sprints out behind my school while Coach Cortes screams at us, first in Spanish and 
then in Catalan. Breathe, breathe, breathe!” (71, emphasis in the original) 
 The fact that Díaz linguistic strategy appears as a compromise to an English-speaking 
audience raises the more general question of the text’s accessibility to monolingual and 
bilingual readers. The accessibility for intended readerships is the main criterion according to 
which Lourdes Torres has systematized strategies for the inclusion of Spanish in Latino/a 
literary texts (2007). At one end of her scale, the critic positions texts by authors such as 
Nicholasa Mohr and Judith Ortiz Cofer, who draw on “easily accessed, transparent, or 
cushioned Spanish”, which does not challenge the monolingual reader of English while at the 
same time “mak[ing] the text more exotic and allow[ing] the reader to believe the s/he is 
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interacting with and appropriating the linguistic Other” (2007, 78-79). At the other end, 
Torres situates texts such as Giannina Braschi’s Yo-Yo Boing! (1998) and Susana Chávez-
Silverman’s Killer Crónicas (2004), which, due to their “radical bilingualism” can be fully 
understood only by bilingual readers (2007, 86). Torres locates texts by authors like Sandra 
Cisneros and Junot Díaz somewhere in the middle of this spectrum. For on the one hand, they 
avoid ‘Othering’ words in Spanish by means of italics or similar markers. Also, they do not 
provide extensive comments and translations of words from languages other than English – a 
strategy we have encountered in Eva Hoffman’s Lost in Translation and will encounter in 
Edwidge Danticat’s The Farming of Bones in the last chapter. On the other hand, as described 
above, they do not leap into radical bilingualism; while gratifying the bilingual reader, they 
challenge, but do not exclude the monolingual reader. This is why, in Lourdes Torres’ view, 
Díaz’ text is not particularly radical, but nevertheless stands out in its political agency and its 
subversive potential. 
 The language-mixing strategy as used by Junot Díaz has been praised by many critics 
as a strategy of resistance. Thus, in the chapter “How to Tame a Wild Tongue” of her work 
Borderlands/La Frontera, Gloria Anzaldúa argues for the freedom “to write bilingually and to 
switch codes without having always to translate” (1987, 81) und denounces the linguistic 
dictate both of defenders of Standard Spanish and of Standard English as “linguistic 
terrorism” (1987, 80). And as poet and critic Naomi Quiñónez points out, “[t]he use of 
untranslated language functions to inscribe difference, since it makes the non-Spanish speaker 
the ‘other.’ In postcolonial writing, the use of untranslated words is a political act” (Quiñónez 
2002, 143). Also, Junot Díaz himself comments in an interview that his project in writing is a 
project of inner decolonization: 
You come to the United States and the United States begins immediately, systematically, to erase 
you in every way, to suppress those things which it considers not digestible. You spend a lot of 
time being colonized. Then, if you’ve got the opportunity and the breathing space and the 
guidance, you immediately – when you realize it – begin to decolonize yourself. (Céspedes et al. 
2000, 896) 
Later in the interview, he specifies his linguistic strategy: 
Spanish is not a minority language. Not in this hemisphere, not in the United States, not in the 
world inside my head. So why treat it like one? Why ‘other’ it? Why denormalize it? By keeping 
the Spanish as normative in a predominantly English text, I wanted to remind readers of the 
fluidity of languages, the mutability of languages. […] When I learned English in the States, this 
was a violent enterprise. And by forcing Spanish back onto English, forcing it to deal with the 
language it tried to exterminate in me, I’ve tried to represent a mirror-image of that violence on the 
page. Call it my revenge on English. (Céspedes et al. 2000, 904) 
Drawing on these statements by Díaz, some critics agree that Spanglish fulfills the function of 
challenging the centrality of English: “Such language allows for the opening of a 
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transformational space from which to interrogate unequal power relations based on race and 
class, and therefore functions as a site of resistance in relation to mainstream American norms 
of language.” (Kondali 2012, 106) Likewise, Evelyn Nien-Ming Ch’ien argues that  
Junot Díaz invests language with the power to influence political and social vision. He forcefully 
incorporates Spanish into his mainly English texts, showing concretely the linguistic violence that 
Spanish inflicts on English and vice versa. Instead of contorting English to fit Spanish, he 
demonstrates the inadequacy of English by substitution rather than metonymy or metaphor (2004, 
22). 
As I want to argue, a closer look at Díaz’ use of Spanglish betrays some implications different 
from the assumed strategy of resistance. To clarify my argument, I would like to look at the 
semantic fields invoked mainly in Spanish in the novel.  
 Like many other authors drawing on Spanglish, Díaz uses words for referring to 
persons, such as hombre, muchacha, or viejos, kinship, such as hija, tío, or abuela, food, such 
as pastelitos, pescado frito, or arroz con habichuelas, and nationalities, such as dominicano, 
chileno, or argentino in the original language. Apart from this, two semantic fields in which 
Spanish is used stand out in particular: pejorative and abusive words, and expletives and 
obscenities. The former group comprises expressions such as maldita borracha (13), 
muchacho del diablo (13), gordo asqueroso (17), puerca (17), parigüayo (19), fea (56), idiota 
(56), figurín de mierda (60), brutos (128) and cochinos (128). The latter group encompasses 
formulations such as What in carajo (22), Where in coñazo (4), coño (53), jodido (106), cuero 
(127), mona (131), culo (73), un mujerón total (91), tetúa (92), tetatorio (93), pechonalidad 
(93), toto (141, 210, 217), monita (141), hijo de la porra (113), No me jodas (138), cara de 
culo (141), hijos de puta (142), and cuerno (195).  
 The linguistically more complex expletives and sexual allusions clearly betray whether 
they are uttered by Dominicans in the homeland or in the diasporic community. Thus, 
expressions such as: “Ese muchacho está bueno!” (13); “A culo que jalaba más que una junta 
de buey” (92), and “Cómeme el culo” (141), are included in Spanish, while an abusive 
exclamation like: “Hija de gran puta, would you stop jodiéndome!” (130), displays traces of a 
linguistically mixed discourse. The number of such hybrid expletives, however, is rather 
small, since most of the named expressions are used when the action is taken to the 
Dominican Republic. Due to the high concentration of expletives and obscenities in the text 
and their prominent position within the Spanish discourse, they appear in the novel as 
essentialist markers of Dominican machismo. 
While the use of violent and abusive language stands in for the register of Dominican 
street slang, it also produces another effect: against its background, English, albeit also 
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coloured by street slang, turns bleak and seems to represent a weakened form of reality. In 
fact, Díaz’ use of the language of aggression and sexuality in Spanish raises the suspicion that 
there is an underlying attempt of creating a binary opposition between the two languages by 
means of an implied marker of authenticity.  
In his study, The Romance of Authenticity, Jeff Karem makes the point that “because 
so many of America’s minorities have suffered from white caricature and cultural 
appropriation, one of the most valued qualities of recent ethnic fiction is its ‘authenticity’” 
(2004, 1). However, as Karem shows, ‘authenticity’ in ethnic fiction is a highly unstable and 
problematic category, since whether a literary work is deemed ‘authentic’ seems to largely 
“depend on the interpreter’s own horizon of expectations regarding the culture in question” 
(2004, 7).  
Karem’s point can in fact be observed in the critical reception of Díaz’ work. Indeed, 
some critics readily assume that, in Oscar Wao, Spanish makes a greater claim to authenticity 
than English. This, for example, seeps through in Evelyn Nien-Ming Ch’ien’s study when she 
writes that: “[f]or Díaz, the presence of Spanish signifies explosive agency and lack of self-
consciousness […]. By infusing English with new rhythms, he rejuvenates it” (2004, 208-09). 
The invocation of both the terms of explosive agency and of rejuvenation in regard to the use 
of Spanish bespeak an exoticizing image of Díaz’ project. The mentioning of “new rhythms” 
can be even said to take it into the sphere of the erotic. On the contrary, English, with its need 
for infusions and rejuvenation, is implicitly characterized as decrepit and sick. The same 
combination of exoticization and eroticization is articulated in Kondali’s article, when she 
writes that Díaz “infuses English with the passion of his native Dominican Spanish idioms 
and metaphors” (2012, 107, emphasis mine). Such polarizing and essentializing visions of the 
two languages used by Díaz seem to prove Karem’s argument that, until today, critics are 
easily seduced by a sense of consumable ‘authenticity’. This, in turn, undermines the 
argument that Díaz’ use of Spanish or Spanglish presents a strategy of resistance. In line with 
Karem, we can instead observe in the criticism on Oscar Wao how “the practices of literary 
editing, publishing, and reception have been and continue to be resistant to hybridity in their 
privileging of cultural authenticity” (2004, 13). As Karem makes clear, hybridity and 
authenticity present two mutually exclusive agendas underlying the production of ethnic 
narratives. As shall become clear in the following, Díaz’s novel seeks to encompass both, thus 
producing an utterly paradoxical effect. 
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The “authenticity” of the diasporic dictate of virility 
 
What raises serious doubt about whether Díaz’ use of Spanglish can be seen as a strategy of 
resistance is his choice of characters whom he endows with a voice in this hybrid language. 
Significantly, the violence and obscenity of street language mostly characterize the discourses 
of Oscar’s mother and other characters living in the Dominican Republic. The narrator does 
not draw as strongly on expletives and obscenities; and Oscar seems far from using them. For 
as a US-born diasporic Dominican he fails to fully master Spanish; he also “lack[s] all 
aggressive and martial tendencies. […] Oscar had like zero combat rating […]. Intimidation 
and aggression out of the question.” (15) Thus, instead of providing the protagonist with a 
strategy of resistance against marginalization, the violent Dominican slang marks the 
diasporic background against which Oscar has to authenticate himself. 
The language of his diasporic origins serves as the violent basis for marginalizing 
Oscar in his sexual and gender identity. Dominican street Spanish brings along an image of 
masculinity which does not apply to Oscar in the least. Instead of displaying a stereotypical 
macho attitude by means of verbal or physical violence, as Elena Machado Sáez notes, the 
protagonist sheds countless tears throughout the narrative (2011, 536). Such unfitting 
behavior is a provocation to macho discourses on masculinity, which is why he is severely 
reprimanded by his mother: “Tú ta llorando por una muchacha? […] Dale un galletazo, […] 
then see if the little puta respects you.” (14) 
His sentimentality, also expressed through his non-aggressive language, is presented 
as the reason why Oscar has no success with women. Gender and national identity form a 
fatal alliance, since in Oscar’s case, they seem to undermine each other. As the narrator 
informs us at the onset of the narrative, the diasporic community regards it as “very un-
Dominican” that “dude never had much luck with the females” (11, emphasis in the original). 
His origin is repeatedly questioned by schoolmates observing his nerdish interest in fantasy 
and science fiction: “You’re not Dominican”, some of them comment in English (49); “Tú no 
eres nada de dominicano”, others certify in incorrect Spanish (180). Clearly, his situation does 
not improve when, instead of showing some aggressive response, Oscar “would insist 
unhappily, I am Dominican, I am” (180). 
If the absence of strong language in Spanish becomes a central marker of Oscar’s 
cultural inauthenticity, the novel seems to imply that authenticity can be found precisely in the 
obscene language of his surroundings. How can the use of a language that the author draws on 
to construct a machista discourse, however, be considered at the same time a strategy of 
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resistance and who would this resistance be directed against? These open questions raise the 
concern that instead of empowering any of his marginalized characters, Díaz’ use of Spanish 
mostly replicates Dominican hegemonic discourses on masculinity. The paradoxical character 
of Díaz’ endeavor is put in a nutshell by Jason Cortés when he writes that “Díaz […] has 
made a career of depicting, questioning, and at times, being complicit with the authoritarian 
and oppressive aspects of Dominican hypermasculinity” (2015, 98).  
By associating Spanish so strongly with the Dominican macho discourse, the novel 
seems to rob Oscar of a possibility to articulate his own concerns in his native language and 
leaves him almost no space to hide from it. The violent presence of this discourse in his life 
explains the protagonist’s affection for escapist genres such as comics, fantasy and science 
fiction. Despite being branded as “GhettoNerd” (11), Oscar submerges himself entirely in “a 
steady stream of Lovecraft, Wells, Burroughs, Howard, Alexander, Herbert, Asimov, Bova, 
and Heinlein […] – moving hungrily from book to book, author to author, age to age” (21). 
What apparently attracts him, are the languages present in these works. Thus, feeling expelled 
from Spanish, Oscar seeks to enrich his English vocabulary by using “a lot of huge-sounding 
nerd words like indefatigable and ubiquitous” (22). Even more curiously, we learn that he 
“[c]ould write in Elvish, could speak Chakobsa” (21). This fluency in fantasy languages 
confirms the assumption that he is looking for a discursive space not invaded by the degrading 
undertones he is familiar with from Spanish. 
 With Oscar left without a language in which to defend himself from his diasporic 
surroundings, street Spanish is used in the narrative to ascribe to him a number of attributes 
that deny his masculinity due to his lack of success with women. Not only is his affection for 
a friend from school described as “amor de pendejo” (36), as a coward’s love; soon enough 
his interest in the female sex is questioned in general and he is branded as queer, which turns 
him into a target of homophobic attacks. Terms from the lowest registers of Spanish are used 
to refer to his gender and sexuality. Instructing Oscar about how to get his sexual life started, 
his uncle tells him: “Listen, palomo: you have to grab a muchacha, y metéselo. That will take 
care of everything. Start with a fea. Coje that fea y méteselo!” (24) Apart from the obscene, 
derogatory and violent discourse on women, the expression palomo, literally meaning 
‘pigeon’, stands out in the uncle’s address to Oscar. According to E. Antonio de Moya, who, 
in an enlightening sociological study, deals with masculinity as a central discursive factor in 
the production of political legitimacy in the Dominican Republic, palomo is used to refer to 
“[m]en who are at the bottom of subordinate heterosexual categories of masculinity […] and 
are generally treated as outcasts, pariahs or non-persons” (2004, 86). As de Moya explains, 
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the expletives mariconcito (‘little faggot’) and pájaro (‘bird’), “are regularly used to designate 
in a pejorative way men who are homosexual by choice” (2004, 90). The assumption that 
homosexuality is a matter of choice implies, importantly in the context of Oscar Wao, the 
possibility to opt for heteronormativity instead. 
 It is implied several times that the ‘right’ decision for heterosexuality is already 
inscribed into Oscar’s last name, “de León”, and his misconduct is traced back to the fact that 
he is not mindful of the latter. Ironically enough, his last name associates him with the lion, 
symbolizing “the notion of hombría (manliness or manhood), understood here as courage, 
determination and power” (de Moya 2004, 79, emphasis in the original). As we learn later 
when he leaves for the Dominican Republic, he disregards not only his last, but also his first 
name, which is originally “Huéscar”. It almost seems as if the translation of his name into 
“Oscar” has made him susceptible to sensitivity and weakness. It is the narrator’s, Yunior’s, 
idea to associate the translated version of the name with Oscar Wilde. Being ignorant of 
English literature, a friend of Yunior’s assimilates the name of Oscar Wilde into the more 
Spanish-sounding “Oscar Wao” and thus pronounces Oscar’s future nickname (180). This 
nickname seems to turn him into a mix of a homosexual English writer and Doctor Who, a 
character from a BBC science-fiction television program – an identity reinforced by Oscar 
when on “Halloween he made the mistake of dressing up as Doctor Who, was real proud of 
his outfit too” (180). In Yunior’s view, the protagonist’s failure lies not only in acquiring such 
a name, but mostly in not fighting against it. As he informs us, “dude started answering to it”. 
Thus, the translated and distorted name that makes its way into the title of the novel seems to 
stand in for Oscar’s chosen queerness, incomprehensible to his surroundings. 
 The main reason why Oscar is robbed of the chance to emancipate himself by means 
of transgressing language boundaries lies in the fact that the account of his sexual life is not 
presented by himself in the first person, as is the case in Yann Martel’s Self, but in the third 
person. In the context of Queer Studies, the distinguishing factor between first- and third-
person narratives is lucidly elaborated on by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick in her essay “Queer and 
Now”. Commenting on the very term “queer”, the critic states that 
a part of its experimental force as a speech act is the way in which it dramatizes locutionary 
position itself. Anyone’s use of ‘queer’ about themselves means differently from their use of it 
about someone else. This is true […] because of the violently different connotative evaluations that 
seem to cluster around the category. (1994, 9) 
While the notion of queerness is not mentioned literally either in Self or in Oscar Wao, 
Kosofsky Sedgwick’s argument appears instructive on the context of the two novels, if we 
allow the term to symbolically stand in for the overall performance of gender and sexuality. In 
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its performativity, queerness defines gender and sexuality in different ways, depending on 
whether it is applied as an attribute to one’s own identity or that of another. 
 In contrast to the terms ‘lesbian’ and ‘gay’, which, according to Kosofsky Sedgwick, 
“present themselves (however delusively) as objective, empirical categories governed by 
empirical rules of evidence (however contested)”,  
‘[q]ueer’ seems to hinge much more radically and explicitly on a person’s undertaking particular, 
performative acts of experimental self-perception and filiation. A hypothesis worth making 
explicit: that there are important senses in which ‘queer’ can signify only when attached to the first 
person. One possible corollary: that what it takes – all it takes – to make the description ‘queer’ a 
true one is the impulsion to use it in the first person. (1994, 9, emphasis in the original) 
The decisive distinguishing factor between the discourses in Self and Oscar Wao is, then, that 
the definition of sexual and gender identity is performed in the first and the third person, 
respectively. While Yann Martel’s protagonist is free to perform “acts of experimental self-
perception and filiation”, Oscar is denied the performative power of defining himself in the 
first person. 
 This difference is paralleled by that in the characters’ access to their respective 
languages. While in Martel’s novel, the potential of retaining or transforming a multi-faceted 
sexual and gender identity is derived from the fact that the initially genderless narrative voice 
can easily maneuver between familiar and even unfamiliar languages, Díaz’ protagonist never 
acquires any freedom of movement between his languages. Not only does he lack language; 
his voice almost entirely disappears behind that of a different character, Yunior, who usurps 
the power of a “narrator-dictator” in the novel (Machado Sáez 2011, 551). 
 Due to his deviation from heteronormativity, Oscar occupies a de-centered social 
position as a diasporic subject. In his marginal role within the marginalized diasporic group he 
can be considered as subaltern, since he can be likened to the oppressed women in post-
colonial India described in Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s essay, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 
(1988). While critics like Ksenija Kondali consider Díaz’ language-mixing as a strategy of 
“subaltern linguistic resistance” (2012, 106), I want to argue that in Oscar Wao, the 
permeation of English through Spanish, at the same time, perpetuates the silence of the 
subaltern, embodied by Oscar. In line with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s argument, he, in 
fact, cannot speak and is instead spoken for (1988). 
Oscar’s inauthenticity points toward the figure that is being authenticated by 
implication on the basis of the binary opposition: to Yunior, the narrator. In narrative terms, 
the question arises as to why the chronology of the narrated events is anything but linear; why 
in some chapters the authority of focalization and seemingly even of narration is passed on to 
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Oscar’s sister, Lola; and finally, why Oscar, in a narrative in which he does not occupy a 
more central role than other members of his family or than Yunior himself, is appointed as 
protagonist. At this point, I agree with Elena Machado Sáez’ argument that “Yunior’s 
insecurities as narrator reveal that his investment in telling Oscar’s story is motivated by an 
inability to tell the full story about himself” (2011, 524). Oscar serves the narrator as a 
background that Yunior uses to articulate his own emotions and thoughts. 
The narrator’s difficulties in telling his own story point to areas of insecurity that he 
shares with Oscar – diasporic and gender identity. As to the latter, Yunior initially presents 
himself as a Casanova, constantly chased by women and thus affirmed in his masculinity. He 
does not seem to last in any monogamous relationship, and instead is involved in two to three 
affairs at a time. Only gradually, it becomes clear that Yunior is subject to a compulsive 
infidelity that makes him lose his great love, Lola, who is Oscar’s sister. After being left by a 
girlfriend for cheating on her, he decides not to deal with his own problem, but to focus on 
“something easy and redemptive. Out of nowhere”, he says, “and not in the least influenced 
by my own shitty state – of course not! – I decided that I was going to fix Oscar’s life” (175). 
When, at the end of the narrative, he fantasizes about being visited by Lola’s daughter, he 
voices his own feeling of failure: “Could have been my daughter if I’d been smart, if I’d been 
– ” (329). The fact that the narrator’s voice fails him confirms his perplexity. 
As to the narrator’s diasporic identity, he hurries right at the onset of the narrative to 
characterize Oscar’s lack of virility as “un-Dominican”. This move suggests that in the field 
of gender, Yunior discovers a safe terrain in which to encounter his Dominican heritage. 
However, his own extensive footnote explanations make clear that the violence that had 
become a normality under the Trujillo regime forms a part of the legacy that is more difficult 
to confront. In his incapability to analyze the dynamics of this violence, Yunior romanticizes 
it as the result of a curse called “fukú”. He hardly needs to specify its name as “fukú 
americanus”, since the origins of this thinly disguised curse obviously lie in English profanity. 
By characterizing the fukú as an American phenomenon, Yunior exculpates the Dominican 
Republic of agency in its own history of violence. 
At the same time, Yunior has internalized the idea of dictatorship so much that he 
exercises it in his narrative project in regard to Oscar. While, on the one hand, he uses Oscar 
as a negative example to implicitly authenticate himself in his own identity, on the other hand, 
he takes on the project of domesticating and silencing Oscar’s difference. At this point, Díaz’ 
novel, like Martel’s Self, engages with the motif of transformation. In the context of the 
colonizing gender discourse described above, however, it does not come as a surprise that the 
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transformation, as it is troped in Oscar Wao, is not spontaneous, self-initiated, voluntary or 
liberating. Instead, mentoring the protagonist in his sexual life, Yunior zealously and violently 
works towards one educational goal: Oscar’s integration in a pattern of testosterone-driven 
misogynous masculinity and heteronormativity. Since Oscar comes to believe his 
surroundings that “no Dominican male has ever died a virgin. […] [I]t’s against the laws of 
nature for a dominicano to die without fucking at least once” (174), his late transformational 
turn appears less as a liberating moment than as a result of a desperate attempt of national 
self-authentication. 
 
 
Death in translation 
 
The apotheosis of Oscar’s miraculous transformation, in Yunior’s view, occurs during the 
former’s stay in the Dominican Republic and consists in his romance with Ybón, who 
happens to be a prostitute and, of all, the ex-girlfriend of a jealous Dominican policeman. 
Seeing his love requited seems to change Oscar so much that he willingly and fearlessly 
accepts the danger of death. Within a homophobic discourse, the romance seems to absolve 
him of his queerness, which is proved by the reactions of his relatives: “His tío seemed 
thrilled that he no longer had a pájaro for a nephew. I can’t believe it, he said proudly. The 
palomo is finally a man.” (286-87) Proving his masculinity through his short love relation 
with Ybón seems to allow Oscar to become a legitimate part of the genealogy of the de Leóns 
and Cabrals, in which he had previously appeared as an incomprehensible accident. 
At the same time, this genealogical belonging leads Oscar directly to the trauma 
suffered by his mother and his grandfather under the Trujillo regime. The fact that Oscar’s 
violent death seems programmed, since Ybón’s boyfriend is a representative of state authority 
and violence, suggests, in my view, two different readings. On the one hand, one could argue 
that limitless violence is implied from the very beginning in the stereotyped image of 
masculinity and, therefore, presents but a logical consequence of Oscar’s transformation into 
a ‘real’ man. Following this logic, the deadly risk of fighting against a rival seems to be 
inscribed into Oscar’s love affair with Ybón. When Oscar manages to authenticate himself as 
Dominican by proving his masculinity, it is not surprising that he is initiated into the sphere of 
Dominican violence, which seems to confirm his masculinity even more. 
On the other hand, Elena Machado Sáez argues very convincingly that after the 
episode of Oscar’s final success with a woman, the narrator, Yunior, is seeking a quick 
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closure of the narrative, since this success seems to produce an inconvenient truth: instead of 
completing the process of transformation demanded by Yunior, Oscar might have found love 
precisely because of his sentimentality (Machado Sáez 2011, 549). To canalize this 
subversive element, Oscar and his voice, then, have to be eliminated from the narrative as fast 
as possible. This reading is made plausible by the narration of Oscar’s violent death. For on 
the one hand, Oscar manages to fulfill a male stereotype, which is symbolically represented 
through his heroic speech to his murderers, in which he intrepidly curses them and their 
descendants. Significantly, he does so in flawless Dominican Spanish, the language that had 
not quite seemed as his own because of his diasporic and queer identity. On the other hand, 
this image is broken when Oscar is led by his kidnappers to perform an act of translation and 
thus tricked into pronouncing the order to carry out his own murder. Naively, he falls into a 
rhetorical trap when his murderers suggest: 
Listen, we’ll let you go if you tell us what fuego means in English. 
Fire, he blurted out, unable to help himself. (322) 
In this moment, the ideal of masculinity propagated by Yunior fails in several ways. Not only 
does he get involved in a childish language game with his murderers, from which he can only 
emerge as an infantile loser. He also performs the act of translation, which, in Lori 
Chamberlain’s terms, has been coded as a reproductive and therefore traditionally feminine 
act (cf. 1992, 57), which we have already dealt with in the context of the translator figure in 
Atom Egoyan’s Calendar. In fact, rather than speaking for himself, Oscar listens to the 
instruction of his murderers and follows their discourse. The act of translation is thus 
degraded as a mere repetition of a firing order, which presents his mobility between languages 
as a weakness. In addition, Oscar’s ‘blurting out’ of the translation makes him appear as if he 
were not the master of his own voice. His body seems to succumb to translation in a feminine 
way, which renders him “unable to help himself” (322). 
 In ascribing this weakness to Oscar, the narrative presents his death as unavoidable, 
thus revealing a metanarrative, in which translation appears as a practice despised and 
persecuted in dictatorships. As we learn from Ricoeur, “[a]ll translation involves some aspect 
of dialogue between self and stranger. Dialogue means just that, dia-legein, welcoming the 
difference.” (Kearney 2006, xvii) Difference, especially from a hegemonic discourse, is 
precisely what is not welcome in dictatorships, and therefore threatened to be extinguished. 
Oscar’s queerness and bilingualism can be said to present a deviation from a monolithic 
discourse, which is why he is prevented from interpreting his diasporic identity in his own 
way. A stereotyped version of Dominicanness is enforced at his cost, which can be seen as a 
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form of dictatorship. With Oscar undermining the stereotypes of national belonging and 
gender which Yunior draws upon to authenticate himself in his own identity, the latter, as 
narrator-dictator, eliminates and silences him. 
 The lethal act of translation stands in symbolically for Díaz’ overall negotiation of 
multilingualism and translation, which is marked by a basic paradox. For on the one hand, as 
suggested by Díaz himself and many critics, the author’s strategy of denying the English-
speaking monolingual reader a translation from Spanish can be seen as way of strengthening 
and valorizing the mixed language of the Dominican diaspora. His strategy of, as Evelyn 
Nien-Ming Ch’ien calls it, “assertive nontranslation” appears as a challenge against the 
nationalist rhetorics of the melting pot, which contributes to a ‘colonization’ of speakers of 
languages other than English in the US (2004, 209). On the other hand, this challenge relies 
on a homogenization of the Dominican diasporic discourse – both in terms of language and of 
gender constructions. This point is articulated by Elena Machado Sáez, who writes that 
while Díaz’s novel aims to represent the linguistic diversity of the Dominican diaspora, it does so 
by following the nation’s logic of consolidation, specifically demarcating the borders of a 
representative diasporic subject in terms of masculinity and sexuality (2001, 523). 
Establishing such a logic, as Díaz demonstrates, silences those who cannot or do not want to 
live up to this violent pattern operating under the guise of a resistance strategy. And even 
while a certain criticism may be heard in the book, Díaz, in my opinion, fails to offer a 
corrective.  
Interestingly, Díaz seems perfectly conscious of the fact that he empowers a dictator-
narrator, who robs other diasporic subjects of their freedom of speech and interpretation. 
Thus, in an interview, he emphasizes the relation between authorship and dictatorship: 
We all dream dreams of unity, of purity; we all dream that there’s an authoritative voice out there 
that will explain things, including ourselves. If it wasn’t for our longing for these things, I doubt 
the novel or the short story would exist in its current form. I'm not going to say much more on the 
topic. Just remember: In dictatorships, only one person is really allowed to speak. And when I 
write a book or a story, I too am the only one speaking, no matter how I hide behind my 
characters. (quoted in O’Rourke 2007, online) 
As this statement shows, the author justifies narrative dictatorship through an assumed dream 
of or desire for unity and purity. In the context of multilingualism and translation, this rhetoric 
evokes a time before Babel, in which mankind was allegedly united by one original language. 
This conjured original language, usurping the place of multiplicity, forms the basis of 
dictatorship – a dictatorship that Díaz seems to accept. 
 
 
132 
 
Conclusion 
 
The contradictions in the discourse on linguistic resistance and gender violence constitute a 
curious parallel to Martel’s novel. While sharing an interest in the interrelation of gender, 
sexuality, multilingualism and translation, neither of the novels succeeds in resolving their 
inherent contradictions in their negotiation of these issues. Thus, Martel leaves it open 
whether the splitting of the narrative voice is solely a sign of the protagonist’s liberation by 
means of transgressing language boundaries or whether it is at the same time a marker of 
trauma. Likewise, Díaz writes in a hybrid code, partly established as Spanglish and partly 
made up of ad hoc creations, but uses it to perpetuate a machista Dominican discourse on 
gender and sexuality, which eventually drowns out the protagonist’s own multilingual voice. 
The author even views the fragmented character of his discourse as programmatic and 
explains: “In my mind the book was supposed to take the shape of an archipelago; it was 
supposed to be a textual Caribbean. Shattered and yet somehow holding together, somehow 
incredibly vibrant and compelling.” (quoted in O’Rourke 2007, online)  
 In their negotiation of linguistic border-crossings, the two novels can be seen as the 
positive and the negative image of a similar scenario. Both narratives acknowledge the power 
of the language in which dominant gender discourses are encoded and have their protagonist’s  
self-realization depend on whether or not they manage to transcend the limits of the language 
of their surroundings. Thus, in Self, the protagonist’s ability to switch between different 
languages sets the outline for his struggle against the constraints of a clear-cut gender identity 
and sexual orientation, which he initially absorbs through his mother’s discourse and, in 
broader terms, with his mother tongue. From early childhood on, he forms an understanding 
of love and sexuality in and through foreign languages and their speakers, and performs 
multiple escapes from the bonds of his first language, French. In my reading, the fantastic 
element of the protagonist’s gender metamorphosis, triggered by his parents’ death, serves as 
a physical expression of the linguistic transformation, in the course of which gender 
difference and heteronormativity are unmasked as fictions. Traumatic news, namely the death 
of his parents, enter the protagonist’s life as a foreign text demanding a linguistic and mental 
translation. The failure of processing the trauma of rape, in consequence, is signaled by a 
failure of translation and the fading of one of the narrator’s languages into silence. 
 The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao similarly endows its protagonist with the 
ability to switch between languages, but does so only to demonstrate the consequences of 
silencing his multilingual voice. Not only does the novel rob Oscar of the possibility to 
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articulate an own understanding of gender and sexuality by narrating his story in the third 
person; it also keeps him imprisoned within the language of his diasporic community, which 
imposes a machista view of masculinity over his own sentimental discourse on love. The 
fulfillment he finds in his brief relationship with Ybón suggests that, at least for a short time, 
Oscar manages to transgress the boundaries of the dominant discourse. Eventually, 
particularly the Oscar’s forced translation of his own death sentence shows the dictatorial 
persecution and extinction of difference implied in the freedom of stepping across language 
boundaries. 
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3. Dreams and Nightmares in Babel: Lars von Trier’s Europa (1991) and Michel 
Gondry’s The Science of Sleep (2006) 
 
Bilinguals often find themselves confronted with a question asked by monolinguals seeking to 
unmask the mysterious phenomenon of bilingualism: What language do you dream in? The 
question hides a request to show one’s colors and pledge allegiance to one of the two 
languages: the richer one, the more emotional one, the dominant one. The answer given to this 
question by a large majority of bilinguals in a survey conducted by François Grosjean comes, 
then, as a surprise: “[D]epending on the situation and the person we are dreaming about, we 
will use the one language, the other, or both.” (2010, 128)  
 In the field of fiction, this question resurfaces particularly in films, which, as Laura 
Rascaroli confirms in an essay on the “Oneiric Metaphor in Film Theory” (2002), have 
always shared an intimate relationship with dreams. Two of the films interested in 
multilingual dreaming are Lars von Trier’s Europa (1991) and Michel Gondry’s The Science 
of Sleep (2006). To pursue the question of dream languages in an experimental way, the films 
send their protagonists from the American to the European continent, where both of them 
have their family roots. Thus, von Trier’s Leo travels from the United States to post-war 
Germany and Gondry’s Stéphane arrives to France from Mexico. Despite the entirely 
different motivation behind their journeys – the former seeks to contribute to the 
reconstruction of Germany, while the latter returns to the country of his childhood trying to 
come to terms with the story of his broken family – the two travellers have a lot in common. 
First, both travel to countries, whose languages they do not master and try to keep afloat by 
means of their English. In their helplessness, they are both thrown back into the state of 
childhood and find themselves surrounded by characters who, due to their linguistic 
advantage, find it easy to influence or manipulate them. As a result, they are both forced to 
undertake different attempts to regain control over their lives.  
The central focus of the two films lies on what happens in the minds of their 
protagonists. In exploring this, they allow the viewers to accompany the characters not only in 
their waking life, but also into the unconscious world of their dreams. The latter play a crucial 
part in both cinematic narratives: While in Europa, the entire journey of the protagonist takes 
place within a hypnotic dream, in The Science of Sleep, the protagonist’s dreams invade his 
reality, also blurring the line between the two for the viewer. What unites the two films in this 
context is their common interest in the impact of linguistic border-crossings on the 
unconscious in general, and on dreaming in particular. While dealing with collective and 
135 
 
individual traumas, respectively, both films engage in a negotiation of the risks and chances in 
the transgressions of language boundaries. 
 Interestingly, they share two more aspects, one of which conditions the other. Both 
productions show an intense self-awareness of their aesthetics, thus signaling the artificiality 
of the filmic image. In this sense, both films are filled to the brim with visual effects that 
exercise an almost hypnotic effect on the viewers, thus pushing them into a blurry liminality 
where dream and reality cannot be clearly told apart. The spectacularity of the visual world 
that merges dreams and reality seems to distract the attention from the significant fact that the 
two films are concerned with linguistic border-crossings. Curiously, this fact is largely 
overlooked even by film critics, who, as well, seem to be mostly attracted to the visual 
strategies of staging dreams. This circumstance clearly raises questions around the ethics and 
aesthetics of the representation of multilingual dreaming. 
 
 
Rites of Passage in Hypnotic Babel: Lars von Trier’s Europa 
 
So far, we have encountered different ways in which multilingualism can be inscribed into 
literary and cinematic works, as well as the effects produced by multilingual narratives. Be it 
through separate foreign-language words in an otherwise monolingual text or extensive 
untranslated passages in a foreign language, through narrative voices split into parallel 
multilingual narrative strands or through staged acts of translation – multilingual narration 
always strikes the reader as a particular narrative strategy. Its aesthetics in turn entail 
implications for the negotiation of linguistic border-crossings. In pathologizing 
representations of involuntary language migration and its after-effects as in Eva Hoffman’s 
Lost in Translation, in depictions of the repression of one’s own linguistic identity and the 
ensuing neurotic structures of desire as in Atom Egoyan’s Calendar, and in narratives about 
interpersonal translingual attraction and gender and language metamorphoses as in Yann 
Martel’s Self – each time, the characters face encounters with an Other and integrate them 
more or less productively into their experience. Is it possible, however, that the characters of a 
multilingual narrative hardly take any notice of their own linguistic border-transgressions? Or 
that a multilingual work does not draw attention to its own maneuvering around language 
boundaries? That both the characters’ multilingual encounters and the multilingual aesthetics 
of a fictional work appear as an incidental detail? And if this is possible, what does it imply 
for the aesthetics and for the negotiation of multilingualism? 
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 Regarding the critical reception of Lars von Trier’s Europa, it seems that the 
bilingualism of the film in fact has gone unnoticed as a subsidiary matter. The film’s technical 
virtuosity and sociopolitical context as well as its central issues with historiography and 
hypnosis have been widely foregrounded, thus for instance by Hampton (1995), Stewart 
(2005) and Greenberg (2008). However, in most reviews and critical essays, there is no 
reference to the film’s bilingual setup. Among all reviewers, Jonathan Rosenbaum is the only 
one to highlight the bilingualism of Europa at all (1992, online). Unfortunately, even he casts 
only a cursory glance at the phenomenon and draws hasty conclusions from not quite accurate 
observations on the interrelation of English and German in the film. Other critics merely 
establish that the film is “bilingual” (Mosier Richolson 1992, online) or that it “was filmed in 
English and German” (Galt 2005, 4) – which again raises the question already posed in the 
introduction: what does it mean for a film to be shot in two languages? Strictly speaking, only 
a documentary that takes speakers of different languages as its protagonists can be “filmed” in 
two languages, whereas a fiction film has to be composed and staged in a multilingual 
fashion. Moreover, if a fiction film incorporates multilingual characters, does such a 
technique simply serve the purpose of literally depicting a historical encounter between 
speakers of different languages?  
 Two aspects concerning the production and the reception seem obvious right away: 
First, an unusual effort was involved in the shooting of Europa since the actors, as Jean-Marc 
Barr points out in the audio commentary to Europa, had to learn German for their parts in von 
Trier’s film. As for the viewers’ experience, the consequences can also hardly be overlooked: 
for unless the latter are fluent in both English and German, they have to rely on subtitles – 
provided that they do not take their non-understanding as a matter of course. However, the 
film does not suggest this option. For unlike in Egoyan’s Calendar, which, instead of giving a 
translation, presents the viewer with the highly comical remark, “speaking foreign language”, 
in the subtitle line, Europa provides subtitles in nine different languages. The viewers can 
easily select their preferred languages from a roadmap-like DVD menu. The abundance of 
language options in Europa can hardly be said to obscure the linguistic setup of the film. 
Indeed, it fulfills a similar function as the missing translation in Calendar: it draws the 
viewers’ attention to the multilingualism of Europa. 
 What is it then about von Trier’s film that keeps critics from lingering over and doing 
justice to its thoroughly bilingual setup? Why has the obvious never been adequately 
addressed? As I would like to show in this chapter, it is no coincidence that the film’s 
multilingualism has been ignored or at least never systematically analyzed in critical writing. 
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It shall become clear that both the inconspicuousness and the erratic use of multiple languages 
are intended and can be made productive for an interpretation. In order to trace the strategies 
behind this ‘inconspicuous multilingualism’, I shall first focus on its incorporation on the plot 
level and demonstrate why and in what ways it eludes a systematic approach. In a second 
step, I shall address the question of psychological realism in Europa and examine the 
structures of psychological phenomena inscribed into the film. Finally, the results of this 
examination shall be integrated with one of the aspects that has attracted most attention from 
critics: the context of the film production and von Trier’s representation of the postwar 
Germany. 
 
 
Against psychological realism 
 
Set in the aftermath of World War II, the film stages an encounter between representatives of 
defeated Germany and of the United States as the prime occupation force, and thus an 
encounter set at language borders. Indeed, most characters can be described as linguistic 
border figures, crossing the lines between English and German various times. The most 
obvious transgression is undertaken by the protagonist, Leo Kessler, a young American of 
German descent, whose arrival to Germany marks the opening of the film. His idealist 
objective is to contribute to the reconstruction of Germany as a civilian, or as he puts it “to 
show this country a little kindness” and “make the world a better place” (17:10). 
 The world from which Leo arrives is not introduced visually; as soon as he appears on 
screen, he is already in Germany. His travel route and his cultural background are presented 
verbally by an off-voice belonging to a hypnotist, whose role will be discussed in the second 
part of the chapter. Using the pronoun “you”, the voice addresses the viewer and the 
protagonist at the same time: “You’ve been travelling by train from Bremerhaven and before 
that on a ship from New York” (03:50). Apart from a country of origin, the voice also endows 
Leo with a linguistic background. For since the protagonist obeys the instructions given in 
American English, he seems to share the language of the hypnotist. As to the protagonist’s 
appearance, neither his clothing nor his behavior can be qualified in any way as American. 
The linguistic baggage Leo arrives with will remain the only signifier of his cultural and 
geographical background. 
 Accompanying him on his ways as a sleeping-car conductor, the viewer notices that 
the location of his journey is not marked by any recognizable national artifacts or architecture. 
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The only way to conceive of the location is to believe the off-voice, which informs us that the 
setting is Germany in 1945. Apart from this verbal definition, there is hardly any shot of an 
urban landscape. Instead, interior shots in apartments and train compartments make up the 
largest part of the footage. When the viewer, along with Leo, is allowed to catch a glimpse of 
the outside world, it is never by daylight, since Leo’s voyage is a voyage „through the 
German night“ (21:15). Nothing but the ruins in front of the Hartmanns’ villa and a bombed 
cathedral represent the post-war setting. It does not even surprise that the exterior shots were 
not made in Germany, but in a Polish town named Chojna, while the interior shots were 
entirely produced at Nordisk Studio in Copenhagen. The setting of the film could not only be 
located in any other country; von Trier’s film in general does not create the impression of a 
real coherent location. Only rarely, isolated interior spaces are briefly illuminated like islands 
in the dark. What labels the setting as Germany is once again language. German is present in 
almost all scenes, be it in the dialogues between characters or at the numerous ceremonies 
such as Max Hartmann’s funeral, Leo’s and Kat’s wedding and the midnight mass held by the 
German priest. Performative utterances at these ceremonies not least fulfill the function of 
constituting Germany as the setting of the film. 
 Considering the language behavior of the protagonist, a more or less comprehensible 
development can be observed. Upon his arrival in Germany, Leo has only very basic 
knowledge of German, which is why he mainly draws on English. In the course of the film, he 
gradually acquires some German and can be heard uttering complete sentences in the new 
language, though with a heavy American accent. The language skills of the Germans he 
encounters pose a greater riddle. Thus, three of them, that is, femme fatale Katharina 
Hartmann, her brother Larry and Leo’s uncle, have an impressive command of English. They 
speak without any syntactic or semantic flaws and are only recognizable as non-natives due to 
their clearly German accent. In all three cases, but most of all in the case of uncle Kessler, it 
remains a mystery where and how they could have acquired such language skills. These skills 
stand outside of the characters’ psychological and social fictional reality. Leo’s 
communication with other characters, who hardly speak English, such as Katharina’s father 
Max Hartmann, the German priest and the Werewolf manipulator, Siggi, poses further 
questions. The dialogues between them are obviously bilingual, however, it is difficult to 
make sense of their language behavior, to determine the rules of the game. How does 
understanding come about in conversations in which some characters speak English and some 
speak German? Or does it? Moreover, how is it possible that the question of a common 
language of communication is never even touched upon? Do the characters notice at all that 
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they speak different languages with each other? As the film refuses to answer all of these 
questions, any form of psychological realism is seriously undermined. 
 This fact brings us back to the question as to why multilingualism has never been 
explored systematically in Lars von Trier’s film. As I would argue, this has not happened 
precisely due to the seeming lack of psychological realism, which lies at the heart of what is 
commonly understood as language behavior. This seeming lack sets the film apart from all the 
other works analyzed in this thesis, in which the language behavior of each of the characters 
can be examined through a psychological lens. Eva Hoffman’s Lost in Translation has been 
effectively turned into a textbook on the multilingual mind, since it presents us with the real 
story of a real person, who comes to experience language migration. Likewise, all of the 
fictional works – from those grounded in realism such as Egoyan’s Calendar to those 
including supernatural elements such as Martel’s Self – are grounded in psychological realism 
in regard to the linguistic setup of the characters. The language behavior of the latter, as in 
Foer’s Everything Is Illuminated, can be exaggerated to a comical degree, however, the 
characters still play according to certain psychological rules and thus seem apt for a 
systematic examination. 
 In the case of Europa, a reading which treats the characters as independent beings with 
an autonomous inner life quickly reaches its limits. In my view, Jan Simons, who approaches 
the Europa Trilogy as “a virtual reality drifting ever closer to entropy” (2007, 103), comes 
closer to capturing the essence of von Trier’s characters: “[I]n this endless bout of shadow 
boxing”, he writes, “there is no such thing as an ‘authentic identity’ or an ‘innocent soul’; 
there are only roles that people are obliged to adopt and forced to play by circumstance” (92). 
While I agree with Simons’ view, I would stress a terminological point: more than in any 
other fictional work, in Europa, it seems problematic to speak of “people” who occupy roles 
and not simply of characters. For even though the characters come to haunt Leo with their 
orders and instructions, they seem to lack autonomy in their deeds and thoughts, which, as 
shown above, becomes obvious in regard to their language behavior. In his review of Lars von 
Trier’s Europa trilogy, Howard Hampton points out even more sharply:  
Von Trier doesn’t give us characters so much as refugees from a catastrophic Tarot deck (Fool, 
Authority, Werewolf Fatale). In turn, these walking omens serve as heralds of eternal return, 
whether of Fascism, Plague, or plain old Original Sin (1995, 41). 
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The hypnotist and the dreamer 
 
However, even in Europa, the lack of psychological realism is only a seeming one and the 
choice of languages does underlie certain rules, which I shall soon examine more closely. The 
reason of this seeming lack is rooted in the narrative framework of the film. If von Trier does 
not endow the characters with an independent emotional life, it is only because he puts one 
mind in control of them all. As Jan Simons writes: “The world in Europa is not a 
representation of an independently existent reality, but is continuously conjured up by the 
voice of the narrator, who thereby becomes the creator of a world of which he himself forms 
no part” (2007, 85). What Simons refers to as the “voice of the narrator” is, not irrelevantly 
so, the voice of a hypnotist, impressively embodied by Max von Sydow. The voice opens and 
concludes the cinematic plot and guides the viewer and the protagonist through the film like 
through a hypnotic séance. While this séance can hardly be said to have a factual hypnotic 
effect on the viewer, the voice creates a narrative frame, which does not leave any doubt 
about the status of the thus embraced action: everything about to happen is part of a hypnotic 
dream. Therefore, the film has to be read not only as a text, but as a dream text. 
 The fact that the action is presented as if in a hypnotic dream points towards the 
central mind in charge of the other characters’ behaviour and language choice. Is this central 
mind the hypnotist? As psychoanalysts assure us, the author of the dream is never the 
hypnotist, but always the dreamer him- or herself (cf. Frohne-Hagemann 1999, 166). Who 
then is the dreamer in Europa? As mentioned earlier, the hypnotist’s use of the second person 
pronoun “you” implies that Leo and the viewer are addressed at the same time. However, 
since the protagonist is never shown together with the hypnotist, the two seem to be situated 
on different ontological levels. In narratological terms, the invisible hypnotist could be termed 
an intradiegetic heterodiegetic narrator, while Leo then exists only in his intradiegetic 
narrative. It can therefore be argued that the role of the dreamer in the film is reserved not so 
much for Leo, but for the viewer. Such a reading explains why, in contrast to the setup in The 
Element of Crime, the hypnotist in Europa never appears on screen and the psychoanalytic 
session is not visualised. By appointing the viewer as the author of the dream text, von Trier 
ingeniously has his story reach beyond the diegetic frame – a move which empowers the 
viewer and holds him or her liable for the protagonist’s actions. This reading puts Leo in line 
with all other characters, who do not seem to possess an independent inner life. The 
protagonist appears as a mere puppet, in whose body the viewer can travel through the 
imagined world – a focalizer not in his own, but the viewer’s ‘hypnotic dream’. 
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 The film imitates a hypnotic séance in numerous facets, only few of which shall be 
outlined here, since they have been closely analysed by Andrea Keil in her book on the 
phenomenon of hypnosis in Lars von Trier’s Europa Trilogy (1996). The opening sequence 
clearly mimics the induction of a hypnotic dream. The monotonous and captivating linear 
forward motion along train tracks, as Achim Forst points out, replaces the swinging of a 
pendulum (1998, 87). The deep, penetrating voice, which von Sydow, as we learn from the 
audio commentary to the film, modulated by lying on his back on the floor of Nordisk film 
studio, embodies a hypnotist’s calm and assertive direction. Classical elements of hypnotic 
induction are also represented through the counting down from ten and the instructions for 
physical relaxation. As Keil further points out, the hypnotic séance in the film is characterized 
by the verbal rapport of the hypnotist towards the hypnotized, the hypnotist’s omnipresence,  
associative figures of repetition, the breaking of the time-space continuum, and missing 
logical structures in the narrative (1996, 57ff.) – a phenomenon which has been otherwise 
referred to as “trance logic” by Martin T. Orne (1959, 295). 
 
 
The interpretation of a dream 
 
As psychotherapist Philip Zindel convincingly argues in an essay on dreaming and hypnosis, 
hypnotically induced dreams differ from common night dreams only in the conditions under 
which they emerge, but not so much in their quality (cf. 1998, 236-245). It therefore does not 
surprise that the hypnotic dream in Europa is modelled like a textbook example from Freud’s 
Interpretation of Dreams (1953a,b). First, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the setting is 
outlined only vaguely and orientation seems impossible. Jan Simons links the images of 
Germany to Freud’s concept of the Tagesreste when he writes that the country appears as 
a cinematographic simulacrum, not a historical reproduction. To the extent that the trilogy refers to 
a historically and geographically factual Europa, these references are made through such a dense 
layer of cinematographic treatment and allusion that – just as in the Tagesreste in the dream – any 
direct connection with the actual, original historical and geographical context is lost (2007, 88-89). 
Also, we can observe many instances of dream condensation in the film, that is multiple 
relations between dream-content and dream-thoughts (cf. Freud 1953a, 284). Thus, in a 
Freudian manner, we could analyze the train, in cinematic terms, as a sign of the inalterable 
progression of the narrative and a symbol of the film-viewing experience itself. Critics have 
picked up on this aspect, formulating that “Europa is a film-train that dashes at high speed 
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into our viewers’ night” (Danton 1991, 34, translation mine)9 or commenting: “Trains are 
popular in movies because they’re like the moviegoing experience itself. In a sheltered, 
unchanging capsule, four or five hundred people watch moving pictures through rectangular 
screens” (Kennedy 1991, 69). Within the histoire, the train establishes a claustrophobic 
setting and Leo’s place of work and initiation into Zentropa, while in its toy shape it appears 
as a prop in the love scene between Kat and Leo and foreshadows the disaster that their 
relationship will lead him into; in historical terms, finally, the train stands in as a symbol of 
the deportation and extermination of the Jews as well as of the fatal combination of a 
subservient spirit and excessive authority in the Third Reich. 
 Just like in the Interpretation of Dreams, the “construction of collective and composite 
figures” (Freud 1953a, 293), that is, the merging of several different persons into one due to a 
connecting characteristic, figures as the central instance of dream condensation in Europa. 
One curious example of this is certainly Lars von Trier’s cameo in the role of a Jew, who 
helps release Max Hartmann of his guilt as a Nazi collaborator. Taking the director’s 
biography into account, it could be argued that the director chose to appear in this role, since 
he was convinced that he himself had Jewish origins until 1995, when his mother confessed to 
him that he was not the biological son of the Jewish man whom he had always considered his 
father (cf. Munzinger Online). In this context, it does not seem entirely accidental that the 
name of the director’s biological father was Hartmann (cf. ibid.) – the name he chose to give 
to his fictional Nazi collaborator. Whether or not von Trier with his cameo wanted to stage a 
forced reconciliation with his biological father, does not truly advance the interpretation of the 
film. However, we shall return to this cameo in a different context later in this chapter. 
 A more important instance of a composite figure can be seen in the protagonist, since 
he enters the hypnotic dream merely as a representative of the ‘hypnotized’ viewer. This is 
underlined by the fact that the viewer is addressed by the hypnotist from the very onset of the 
film, while Leo enters the stage only when the hypnotist begins to sketch out the setting of the 
dream. Moreover, The Interpretation of Dreams helps us understand how Leo is constructed 
as an identification figure within the ‘hypnotic dream’ of the viewer. “It is my experience, and 
one to which I have found no exception”, writes Freud,  
that every dream deals with the dreamer himself. Dreams are completely egoistic. Whenever my 
own ego does not appear in the content of the dream, but only some extraneous person, I may 
safely assume that my own ego lies concealed, by identification, behind this other person; I can 
insert my ego into the context (1953a, 322-23). 
                                                 
9
 In the original: “Europa est un film-train qui fonce à grande vitesse dans notre nuit de spectateur”. 
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The possibility of such an undercover appearance in one’s own dreams explains the fact that 
the viewer does not and, of course, cannot actually appear in the film. With Philip Zindel, it 
can be added that the dreamer enters the dream in a dissociated shape since the camera 
perspective mostly does not coincide with that of Leo. In fact, Zindel could be almost 
describing Europa, when he writes that in dissociated dream experience the dreamer “can see 
himself from outside, as if filming himself through a camera, as a kind of actor standing in for 
him” (1998, 237, translation mine)10. 
 
 
Back to childhood 
 
A chief characteristic that marks Leo’s appearance and behavior within the hypnotic dream 
can be described in psychoanalytic terms as regression. This term is not understood here in 
the initial, ‘topographical’ sense, with which Freud sought to describe the systems of the 
psychic apparatus that contributed to the production of dreams (cf. 1953b, 533-547), but in the 
temporal sense, on which he would expand only after his research on the infantile 
psychosexual development in 1910-12 (cf. Laplanche and Pontalis, 2006, 386). In a paragraph 
added to the chapter on regression in The Interpretation of Dreams in 1919, Freud notes that 
“dreaming is on the whole an example of regression to the dreamer’s earliest condition, a 
revival of his childhood, of the instinctual impulses which dominated it and of the methods of 
expression which were then available to him” (1953b, 548). The idea of the re-living of 
infantile scenes captures the essence of Leo’s initial appearance. When the protagonist 
appears on screen for the first time, his face expresses nothing but surprise. He looks around 
through his round innocently shaped spectacle lenses, as if he had arrived not from New York, 
but from an entirely different reality, not least since his appearance in the image seems like a 
conjuring trick performed by the off-voice. His expression does not betray any past or 
experience. Critics aptly describe Leo as a “blank slate or […] a white canvas, on which 
anything can be projected” (Müller 2000, 125, translation mine)11 or “tabula rasa” (Greenberg 
2008, 46). As Marion Müller writes, everything about his face seems or is round (cf. 2000, 
125), which makes him look like child. Moreover, he resembles a child in that he does nor 
                                                 
10
 In the original: “er kann sich selber von außen sehen, wie sich selbst durch eine Kamera filmend, als eine Art 
Schauspieler, der für ihn dasteht”. 
11
 In the original: “unbeschriebenes Blatt oder […] weiße Leinwand, auf die sich alles projizieren lässt”. 
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arrange his life in Germany on his own, but is sent to a relative, Uncle Kessler, who at the 
same time receives a letter from Leo’s father with the request to find a job for his son.  
 The adult world is represented not only by Uncle Kessler, who takes on the role of an 
educator, but also by all other Zentropa employees, such as the doctor, who examines Leo, the 
tailor, who sews his uniform, the secretary, who provides him with his conductor’s 
equipment, and finally and most curiously, the Inspector, who offers him candies. The 
protagonist does not seem to be informed about anything – not about the political situation in 
Germany, not about the company he works for, not even about relationships between men and 
women. Thus, he immediately responds to Kat’s seduction, even though her brother Larry 
draws his attention to her calculating manner (40:10). After she deliberately drops her 
cigarette case and has Leo crawl for it under a table like a toddler, she follows him to kiss him 
in a moment of childlike intimacy.  
 Regression also appears as the defining feature of Leo’s linguistic capacities. Since 
Leo hardly speaks German upon his arrival to Germany, he seems locked in an almost 
prelinguistic state. From the onset, he is spoken for by others. Thus, he silently enters the 
setting as if conjured by the hypnotist. After his character is introduced through the words of 
the hypnotist in English, Uncle Kessler takes over the task of introducing Leo and continues 
to create his identity on the intradiegetic level, this time in German. If the hypnotist at least 
addresses him with “you”, his uncle refers to him to in the third person, which strongly 
undermines his agency on the intradiegetic level. In checking his nephew’s passport at the 
gates of Zentropa and pronouncing in a nasal and clichéd staccato German: “Sein Name ist 
Leopold Kessler” (04:32), he seems to carry out a performative act of baptism. In receiving a 
German name, Leo, who has been previously culturally defined by the hypnotist as American, 
is associated with both cultures, albeit through the words of others. Moreover, he seems to be 
subjected to an authoritarian education, when he is repeatedly prohibited to speak. Every time 
he makes an attempt at speaking, he finds himself interrupted by his uncle and succeeds in 
uttering a complete sentence only 9 minutes into the film. As if to justify his ways of 
education, the uncle admonishes Leo in German: “Demut, Kessler! Nie die Demut 
vergessen!” (07:35) 
 Upon his entry into the world of Zentropa, Leo is constantly characterized in German 
by the characters around him: thus, he is called “echter Idealist” by Kat (07:20), “Schafskopf” 
by his uncle (21:05), “ein vernünftiger junger Mann” by Max Hartmann (24:02). Leo accepts 
all of these characterizations without any protest, as if he were simply happy in a childlike 
manner to learn new words that refer to him. Moreover, his vocabulary does not suffice for 
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him to formulate his own thoughts, which is why protest on his part appears even more 
unlikely. For instance, when a tyrannical passenger complains about the missing chalk mark 
on his freshly polished shoes, Leo, instead of seeing the larger absurd picture, finds himself 
lost for words and finally stutters: “Doch, ich glaube, ich habe diese Schuhe geputzt.” 
(1:35:33) Interestingly, even in his relation to Colonel Harris, with whom he does not have to 
speak German, he cannot escape his role as a child. Although he can make himself understood 
in English, the Colonel is far ahead in age, rank and authority, for which reason he receives 
instructions from him throughout the film. 
 
 
A linguistic rite of passage 
 
Apart from the elements of the Freudian interpretation of dreams, the dream metaphor calls up 
a further thematic field, which sheds light on the linguistic setup of the film. For as shall be 
explained in the following, the motif of regression only prepares the stage for the larger motif 
of initiation. The connection of psychoanalytic dream theory and rites of initiation was 
prominently elaborated upon in Joseph Campbell’s seminal structuralist study on myths, The 
Hero with a Thousand Faces (1949), which may well have served von Trier as a source of 
inspiration for Europa. Significantly, the Zentropa Inspector points out to Leo upon the 
latter’s employment as a sleeping-car conductor: “Gestatten Sie mir, diese Aufgabe 
mythologisch zu nennen” (11:25). What initially sounds like an instance of megalomaniac 
self-glorification can be decoded in a different manner with Campbell. The creation of 
Europa as a myth, reflects a Campbellian awareness of the fact that myths are closely related 
with psychological patterns. Thus, we read in The Hero with a Thousand Faces: 
According to this [psychoanalytic] view it appears that through the wonder tales – which pretend 
to describe the lives of legendary heroes, the powers of the divinities of nature, the spirits of the 
dead, and the totem ancestors of the group – symbolic expression is given to the unconscious 
desires, fears, and tensions that underlie the conscious patterns of human behavior. Mythology, in 
other words, is psychology misread as biography, history, and cosmology. The modern 
psychologist can translate it back to its proper denotations and thus rescue for the contemporary 
world a rich and eloquent document of the profoundest depths of human character.” (Campbell 
1968, 256) 
Against this background, it is more easily understood why von Trier stages the ‘mythological 
task’ of his protagonist in the frame of a dream. What is more, this mythological task is 
situated within a particular historical context, which the director, provocatively enough, 
considers to be mythological as well. In an interview, he formulates: 
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Our conceptual world and our mythological world are rooted in this time of World War II. For my 
generation, this is completely natural. We have not lived through the war, which turns it into a 
great mythological event (von Trier quoted in Steinborn 1987, 16, translation mine).
12
 
At this point, it already shines through that Europa is less concerned with the negotiation of 
the memory of World War II, but with the creation of an inner landscape shaped by this 
collective memory. Linking myth, psychology and history, von Trier lends this dream 
landscape a mythological structure and shapes his protagonist’s journey through it as a rite of 
initiation. This structuring strongly resonates with Campbell, who writes about the beginning 
of a mythical hero’s quest: “Once having traversed the threshold, the hero moves in a dream 
landscape of curiously fluid, ambiguous forms, where he must survive a succession of trials” 
(1968, 97). In fact, in Europa, the beginning of the hypnotic dream coincides with a 
transgression of a threshold, when the representative of the dreamer steps through the gates of 
Zentropa (04:40). Also, Leo can literally be said to undertake a “voyage to the underworld” 
(Campbell 1968, 98), where he “must survive a succession of trials” imposed on him by the 
conflicting forces of the American occupiers, the Werewolves, and the officials of Zentropa. 
If the film incorporates the structure of a rite of initiation, or, in more general terms, a rite of 
passage, it seems instructive to take a closer look at this originally anthropological notion 
coined by anthropologist Arnold van Gennep (1909) and developed further by Victor Turner 
in the 1960s. In analyzing the incorporation of this notion and its structure, we shall come 
closer to understanding Leo’s linguistic development within the hypnotic dream and the 
film’s multilingual setup. 
 According to van Gennep, rites of passage “may be subdivided into rites of 
separation, transition rites, and rites of incorporation” (1960, 11). Turner rephrases and 
expands on van Gennep’s findings: 
all rites of passage or ‘transition’ are marked by three phases: separation, margin (or limen, 
signifying ‘threshold’ in Latin), and aggregation. The first phase (of separation) comprises 
symbolic behavior signifying the detachment of the individual or group either from an earlier fixed 
point in the social structure, from a set of cultural conditions (a ‘state’), or from both. During the 
intervening ‘liminal’ period, the characteristics of the ritual subject (the ‘passenger’) are 
ambiguous; he passes through a cultural realm that has few or none of the attributes of the past or 
coming state. In the third phase (reaggregation or reincorporation), the passage is consummated 
(1969, 94-95). 
Comparing this account with the structure of von Trier’s cinematic narrative, it becomes 
apparent that the exposition of the film represents the first two of the three phases of a rite of 
                                                 
12
 In the original: “Unsere Begriffswelt und unsere mythologische Welt liegen in dieser Zeit des 2. Weltkrieges. 
Für meine Generation ist das eine ganz natürliche Sache. Wir haben den Krieg nicht erlebt, was ihn zum großen 
mythologischen Ereignis macht”. 
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passage: separation and liminality. It shall remain to be debated later in the chapter whether 
the third phase, reaggregation, also plays a part in the cinematic narrative. The separation 
ritual that Leo undergoes vividly corresponds to a description given by Edmund Leach: 
The initiate who is undergoing a change of status must first be separated from his (her) initial role. 
This separation may be represented in a variety of ways all of which may appear as part of the 
same ritual proceedings, e.g. […] the initiate may take off his (her) original clothing [and] surface 
‘dirt’ of the initiate may be removed by ritual washing, shaving, etc. In general these initial rites of 
separation have the effect of removing the initiate from normal existence; he (she) becomes 
temporarily an abnormal person existing in abnormal time (1976, 77) 
All of these aspects apply to Leo’s development. First, he changes his own clothes for a 
Zentropa uniform (06:00); second, he undergoes a ritual of purification, when his uncle cuts 
his hair, examines the cleanness of his hands and nails, and gives him a demonstration of how 
to rinse out his mouth (07:15). This scene calls up the notion of impurity, which Turner 
considers to stand in connection with the phase of liminality. Since the initiate has been 
detached from all secular structures, his position in society has become unclear, and “what is 
unclear and contradictory (from the perspective of social definition) tends to be regarded as 
(ritually) unclean. The unclear is the unclean”, Turner rephrases the observations of Mary 
Douglas in her book Purity and Danger (Turner 1964, 7).  
 Finally, Leo is clearly removed from normal existence is every sense of the word: not 
only does he leave behind the United States as the space that can be considered his linguistic 
and cultural home ground; he also enters an “abnormal time” in the sense that his journey will 
only lead him into what the hypnotist calls the “German night” (21:15). For Leo, there is no 
‘German day’, not only because his position a as sleeping-car conductor obliges him to work 
at night, but also because upon his entry into the world of Zentropa, he enters into a state of 
seclusion. Von Trier’s depiction of this state again matches Edmund Leach’s description: 
The general characteristic of such rites of marginality (rites de marge) is that the initiate is kept 
physically apart from ordinary people, either by being sent away from the normal home 
surroundings altogether or by being temporarily housed in an enclosed space from which ordinary 
people are excluded (1976, 77). 
The parallel between Leo’s journey and the state of seclusion is first visually introduced when 
the protagonist arrives at a paled gate and waits for his uncle to let him into a vast storage hall 
crowded by passively crouching German soldiers in uniforms. Their uniform appearance 
marks them as a community of equals, which Leo is about to enter, and can be therefore 
compared to what Turner has termed “communitas” (1969, 96). Several times throughout the 
film, the camera will perch over Leo lying in his bed in a huge underground dormitory, 
apparently surrounded by sleeping fellow initiates. Both the darkness of the dormitory and the 
silent company of his fellows are constitutive for the state of seclusion.  
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 Even when Leo performs his tasks as a sleeping car conductor and does not seem to be 
separated from the rests of society, he is encapsulated in a seclusion space. While the camera 
accompanies him on his visits to different compartments, it always returns to show Leo 
confined in his tiny conductor’s compartment. The sense of seclusion is intensified by his 
uncle’s prohibitions to raise the window blind and take a look outside. “There is nothing there 
to see!”, Uncle Kessler exclaims as if reminding Leo that as an initiate he must not seek any 
contact to the outside world. 
 Leo’s appearance and behavior also fit into the picture of an initiate. As mentioned 
above, both his general and his language behavior are marked by “submissiveness and 
silence”, two major characteristics of the liminal phase as outlined by Victor Turner (1969, 
103). His appearance also bespeaks his entry into a liminal phase, for “(t)he neophyte in 
liminality must be a tabula rasa, a blank slate, on which is inscribed the knowledge and 
wisdom of the group, in those respects that pertain to his new status” (Turner 1969, 103). 
What is more, Leo is thrown into a “limbo of statuslessness” (Turner 1969, 97), since he as an 
American, he is a representative of the occupiers, while as an employee of Zentropa, he is 
situated in the lowest ranks of a strictly hierarchical system. Finally, as Turner writes, 
“liminality is frequently likened to death, to being in the womb, to invisibility, to darkness, to 
bisexuality, to the wilderness, and to an eclipse of the sun or moon” (1969, 95). Leo’s 
condition encompasses several of these aspects: he is surrounded by permanent darkness as if 
during the eclipse of the sun, his sexual identity becomes apparent only due to his seduction 
by Kat, and the final images of his death in water strongly resemble those of an embryo in a 
mother’s womb. 
 In the world of Zentropa, in which employees have to spend a fortune on their own 
uniforms and work equipment and the restoration of a luxurious sleeping car moves his 
superiors to tears (12:40), Leo is engaged in a constant struggle for understanding. While this 
struggle is directed at the logics and social structures of Zentropa, it is prominently 
symbolized through the figure of linguistic understanding. Thus, the viewer, who is provided 
with subtitles for all passages and enjoys an information advantage, witnesses Leo’s helpless 
gaze and undetermined expression when he is addressed in German by the custodians of 
Zentropa, be it by Fräulein Schulze or the Inspector. In contrast to the viewer, Leo initially 
does not understand anything uttered in German. What is more, the representatives of the train 
company do not make any attempt at explaining or at least repeating their utterances and thus 
appear to ensure his non-understanding. It seems significant that the Inspector shares the news 
of the restoration of the first First Class car only in German, as if wanting to preserve the 
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sacrality of Zentropa. German thus acquires the status of a sacred language, reserved only for 
topics which are important in a national context. By switching into English a few minutes 
later, the Inspector demonstrates that he could as well communicate in English, but does not 
wish to hand out important information to an outsider like Leo or to desecrate an object of 
national pride by speaking about it in a ‘profane’ language. And indeed, he endows English 
with a sense of profanity by giving an utterly absurd speech about a sweet tin and instructing 
Leo on how to eat sweets in an American manner: “Take two and crush them, as is the custom 
in your country.” (13:05) 
 While Leo is constantly confronted with his non-understanding, Kat, ironically, 
establishes a connection to him by complimenting his knowledge of German. By inviting him 
into her train compartment with a French “Entrez!” (15:42), she initially creates a 
linguistically neutral ground between them, while, of course, also presenting herself a member 
of high society. Kat’s presence brings Leo out of his shell and seduces him to utter a first 
sentence in German. If a few minutes before, when Leo is trying to sell first class train tickets 
in the midst of a huge crowd, we can hear him flee from his German “Erste Klasse 
Fahrkarten” to English with “first class only”, he now justifies his clumsiness in making the 
bed with the words: “Entschuldigen Sie mich bitte. Es ist meine erste Reise” (16:30). Kat 
immediately shows interest in him by switching into English and flattering him with the 
comment: “Your German is not bad at all, Herr Kessler!” Her mixing of languages reveals her 
strategy: by using English, she enters his linguistic world and makes him feel at ease; by 
addressing him with “Herr Kessler”, she assigns to Leo a place in German society. With Kat 
in his surroundings, Leo does not have to set forth on his initiation journey on his own. She 
even seems to free him from his inferior role as an initiate in the system of Zentropa.  
 At the same time, she gradually initiates him into a different role. The fact that she 
seeks to recruit him as a supporter of the Werewolves is anticipated when the train passes two 
hanged Werewolves, whom Kat and Leo see from the compartment window. After this 
shocking sight, she asks Leo to keep her company on the pretext of being frightened in 
tunnels. At this point, the film again shares a common imagery with Victor Turner’s depiction 
of the liminal phase. For in order to capture the temporal dimension of the rite of passage as 
well as “its hidden nature, its sometimes mysterious darkness”, Turner conceptualizes the 
transitional phase precisely as “cunicular, ‘being in a tunnel’” (1974, 232). One does not 
emerged unchanged from a tunnel, Lars von Trier seems to agree, and to highlight once more 
the circles into which Kat seeks to integrate Leo, von Trier, in the tunnel shot, situates the 
Reichsadler on the front of the roaring locomotive in the very center of the image (18:55). 
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Finally, instead of dissolving the menacing motif, the film links it with the face of peacefully 
sleeping Kat through a match cut. This element of montage reveals her close association with 
Nazi circles and the particular interest she takes in Leo. The impossibility to stop the 
locomotive is literally inscribed into her face, and while Kat herself is asleep, the viewer 
senses that Leo has taken a path towards initiation not into German civil society, but into the 
Werewolf group. Putting one social group on a level with the other, Kat will again praise 
Leo’s ability of understanding, as if complimenting his German: “You’re so good in 
understanding. I find that a little provoking. Allow me to test your tolerance. Ich bin 
Werwolf” (48:15). 
 Finally, as an aspiring sleeping-car conductor, he has to undergo an initiation exam 
that strongly resembles a language test. The examination questions are utterly absurd and the 
examiner tends to answer them himself before Leo can do so. The assessor, for his part, 
rejoices in grotesque trick questions to then suddenly withdraw for a nap: “Der Herr Beisitzer 
möchte sich ein paar Stunden ausruhen, bevor wir mit der Prüfung fortfahren”, Leo is 
informed by the examiner (01:33:30).While the protagonist visibly struggles to understand the 
exam questions in German, the absurdity of the examination is emphasized when the 
examiner suddenly switches into English to utter a casual “Think it over!” (01:34:05). This 
part of the hypnotic dream not coincidentally calls up the image of the ‘examination dream’, 
which was described already by Freud in The Interpretation of Dreams as a “typical dream” 
(1953a, 273-76). Apart from the fear of failure present in such a dream, Leo’s dream features 
a displaced fear, for the bureaucratic madness of the examination overlays his dangerous 
mission of planting a bomb on his own train. When the examiner comments on Leo’s making 
the bed with the words: “Die Uhr läuft!” (01:26:40), the viewer is bound to take this as a 
reminder of the ticking time bomb.  
 After the examination, the demands of the Werewolves, the staged threat to his wife 
and the complaints of a pedantic passenger push Leo to his limits, he undergoes at least one 
consistent transformation. He abandons his role of the initiate, the language learner and the 
civilian and seizes the role of an American soldier. He arms himself with the gun of a military 
police officer, threatens the passengers, bellows orders in American English through the entire 
sleeping car, and for once makes everyone turn silent for a moment. By switching back into 
English, Leo temporarily breaks out of the inscrutable foreign-language dream. To the 
viewer’s surprise, in reaction to the pedantic complaint, he bursts out in his mother tongue: 
“Your problem is not important!” (01:34:50) In reaction to the assessor’s astonished outcry: 
“Die Notbremse! Sie haben die Notbremse gezogen!”, Leo even succeeds for the first time in 
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pronouncing the most tabooed destination of the Zentropa trains: “I don’t want this train to go 
to Munich, Bremen, Frankfurt or fucking Auschwitz. I want it to stay right here!” (01:35:07) 
 
 
 
A failed passage 
 
As we know, this breaking out does not prevent the ultimate catastrophe, so that Leo’s rite of 
passage culminates in his own death. Three reasons can be named for his failing reintegration 
after the liminal phase. First, and most obviously, his initiation turns out to be a farce staged 
according to the different scenarios of the Zentropa officials, the Werewolves and the 
American occupation forces. Operating Leo like a puppet, the three parties are guided by 
colliding objectives, which undermines the possibility of Leo’s integration into any system. 
 Second, the question of Leo’s status cannot be resolved in the narrative, since he is not 
only a liminal, but also, in Turner’s terminology, a “marginal” persona. Turner characterizes 
marginals as persons 
who are simultaneously members (by ascription, optation, self-definition, or achievement) of two 
or more groups whose social definitions and cultural norms are distinct from, and often even 
opposed to, one another […]. These would include migrant foreigners, second-generation 
Americans, persons of mixed ethnic origin (1974, 233). 
Leo appears as marginal in a double sense. First, he has grown up in the United States as the 
son of German expatriates, for which reason he is affiliated with both cultures; and second, he 
does not occupy a military or political function in Germany, so that he belongs neither to the 
occupiers nor to the occupied. Therefore, Leo’s condition fully corresponds to Turner’s 
description: “Marginals like liminars are also betwixt and between, but unlike ritual liminars 
they have no cultural assurance of a final stable resolution of their ambiguity” (1974, 233). It 
therefore does not surprise that both the occupiers and the occupied find in him a perfect 
subject for exploitation, while refusing him a real perspective of integration into one group or 
another. 
 A third reason for Leo’s failing reaggregation is finally the fact that at the time of his 
arrival, there is no functioning system in Germany, which he could be integrated into. Leo 
enters the stage at a moment, in which Germany itself is caught in a liminal phase. Although 
the war is over, instead of a new beginning, there are only the ruins of the past and an 
uncertain future. It is a time between ideologies, without any central political governance. In 
Turner’s words, Germany can be described as “at once no longer classified and not yet 
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classified” (1964, 6). With the Nazi regime overthrown, Germany does not find itself 
immediately redefined in territorial, social and political terms. There is no doubt that the 
country must undergo structural changes and that purely cognitive changes, such as an 
understanding of the extent of the Nazi crimes or re-education in the name of denazification 
do not suffice for such a purpose. What is at stake here, to quote Turner, “is not a mere 
acquisition of knowledge, but a change in being” (1964, 11). 
 Curiously enough, we see the country obsessed with ceremonies, such as Max 
Hartmann’s staged absolution of responsibility for his support of the Nazi regime or that of 
his later funeral, Leo’s and Kat’s wedding ceremony or the midnight mass. All ceremonies 
enacted in Europa heavily rely on performative language and all of them, significantly, are 
carried out in German. So while the Germans in ‘Europa’ are obsessed with performing 
ceremonies, which confirm them in their national identity, the country is endowed with 
characteristics of liminal personae. Like a transitional being, Germany as such has become 
almost invisible. Lars von Trier portrays it not only as a realm of constant night and darkness; 
it is also entirely in ruins. In this respect, Uncle Kessler’s exclamation: “Da gibt es nichts zu 
sehen!” can not only be understood as a prohibition, but also as a stating of facts. This point is 
also confirmed by the example of the town of Wöllstadt, where a Jewish family on Leo’s train 
seeks to return after the war and which is shown as reduced to a place-name sign and the 
wreck of a cab. Apart from that, there is in fact nothing else to see. 
 Also, the Germans have forfeited their rights as proprietors. Whereas in the beginning 
of the film, the Hartmann family are introduced as the proprietors of Zentropa, in the course 
of the film, this propriety is confiscated and their private compartment even becomes 
Katharina Hartmann’s prison cell, after she is arrested for her Werewolf activity. The absence 
or loss of propriety corresponds to a characteristic of transitional beings described by Turner, 
namely “that they have nothing” (1964, 9). This refers not only to material property: “They 
have no status, property, insignia, secular clothing, rank, kinship position, nothing to 
demarcate them structurally from their fellows” (Turner 1964, 9). In fact, the Germans seem 
to be reduced to their status as the occupied – their churches are bombed out, their industry is 
being destroyed and taken apart, and congregations are prohibited by the Americans. They are 
also obliged to show submission in other respects: their defeat is multiply restaged in chess 
games such as the one between Colonel Harris and the German priest and they are obliged to 
fill in questionnaires designed by the Americans to test the degree of their participation in 
Nazi crimes. In this context, it appears striking that the popular names of the questionnaires 
bear connotations with processes of ritual purification. Thus, a confirmation of one’s non-
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involvement in Nazi crimes, as it is forged for Max Hartmann, is referred to as a 
‘Persilschein’ – as a license to wash the stains of history off oneself and to emerge purified in 
the present. The questionnaires also enable the alleged perpetrators’ transition from an unclear 
to a clear status, since they allow to classify them as major offenders, offenders, lesser 
offenders, followers and exonerated persons, and to proceed with them accordingly (Control 
Council Directive 1946, 184). 
 Therefore, for Germany, just like for the American protagonist, there is no 
reaggregation in sight yet. The structure of the rite of passage breaks off in the liminal stage, 
while the film brings another structure to the forefront: the structure of the Freudian model of 
trauma. This partly accounts for the fact that a 1991 film, instead of celebrating the end of the 
Cold War, looks back to events which date back to 1945 and earlier. Lars von Trier does not 
only revisit the Holocaust as a trauma because World War II indeed created the ground for the 
ensuing collective trauma of the Cold War. This move can also be explained through the 
Freudian trauma model: “early trauma – latency – outbreak of neurotic illness – partial return 
of the repressed” (Freud 1964a, 80). Thus, the traumatic experience of the Cold War is not 
integrated into collective memory, but triggers the memory of the earlier trauma of the 
Holocaust, which has never been and cannot be entirely worked through.  
 Envisioning the traumatic events, as Cathy Caruth does in her theory (1995), as 
experience which cannot be articulated, partly explains why the protagonist of Europa is 
exiled into an almost prelinguistic state. For the lack of language is symptomatic of the 
traumatic quality of experience that a subject may wish to verbalize. This accounts for the fact 
that Lars von Trier has Leo stutter throughout most of his cinematic narrative and allows him 
to switch back into his mother tongue only towards the end, when the catastrophe cannot be 
prevented anymore. In switching back into English and raising his voice, the protagonist in a 
certain sense can be said to verbalize his experience in ‘Europa’. Therefore, as Greenberg 
argues, it appears as a cathartic moment when Leo pulls the emergency break and bursts out 
in English that he does not “want this train to go to Munich, Bremen, Frankfurt or fucking 
Auschwitz” (Greenberg, 49). 
 
 
From hypnotic dream to multilingual nightmare 
 
But is it a working-through that Lars von Trier aims at with Europa? Hardly so, for two 
reasons: the utterly untherapeutic approach of the fictional hypnotist and the quality of the 
154 
 
memory images the protagonist is eventually exposed to. Let me first expand on the first 
point. As Zindel argues in his essay, both in the conditions of sleep and hypnosis, dreams can 
only come into being when the patient lets go his or her waking functions of will (cf. 1998, 
245)
13
. In the latter condition, the presence of the hypnotist plays a decisive role. Approaching 
hypnosis with a therapeutic objective, as Zindel does, presupposes that the presence of the 
hypnotist is experienced by the patient as protective (cf. Zindel 1998, 246). To highlight the 
fact that the presence of the therapist shall not limit the inner freedom of the patient, Zindel 
speaks of “abstinent nearness” (1998, 252, translation mine)14. He goes even further by 
describing the nearness as symbiotic: “Only in a good symbiosis, the human being can 
succeed in learning to truly be him- or herself in dialectical situations” (1998, 269, translation 
mine)
15
. 
 While the presence of the hypnotist is very prominent in Europa, his relationship with 
the dreamer is entirely different from that described by Zindel. Both the exaggerated tone of 
voice and the disquieting string theme evoke violent control instead of a protective presence. 
Also, the hypnotist snatches the control over the dream from the hypnotized by choosing a 
train journey as the metaphor for the dream voyage. By putting the protagonist of the dream 
on a train, he subjects him to an imaginary train schedule, so that the dreamer cannot 
influence either the direction or the stops or the destinations. Due to his position as a sleeping-
car conductor, the representative of the dreamer is not only obliged to obey the will of other 
passengers rather than his own; as he can hardly leave the train, he is also disconnected from 
the setting the train passes through. As pointed out earlier, even the possibility of looking 
outside is reduced to a minimum, since he permanently travels through the night and the 
window curtains are regularly pulled shut in front of his eyes by his uncle and other 
characters. 
 Two rather helpless attempts of resistance to the violent hypnosis are suggested to the 
dreamer, which find themselves inscribed into the dream text as leitmotifs: sleep and the 
pulling of an emergency break. When the red emergency break in the conductor’s 
compartment is first shown on screen, Leo is optically separated from it, since he appears in 
the same image only due to a back projection, from where the break seems unreachable. 
Nevertheless, von Trier allows him to reach out from his projection screen and indeed, in the 
course of the film, Leo pulls it three times. The first time he does so not out of his own will, 
                                                 
13
 In the original: “daß das wesentliche gemeinsame Charakteristikum von Schlaf und Hypnose in Bezug auf das 
Entstehen von Träumen das möglichst vollständige Loslassen der wachen Willensfunktionen ist”. 
14
 In the original: “abstinente Nähe”. 
15
 In the original: “Nur in einer guten Symbiose kann es dem Menschen gelingen zu lernen, in dialektischen 
Situationen wirklich er selbst zu sein”. 
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but in response to Larry’s request to enable an illegal funeral for his father, Max Hartmann 
(57:55), which does not help him stop, but rather propel the cinematic action. The second time 
he pulls the emergency break, he does succeed in decelerating the course of events at least for 
a short time. Briefly, he seems to successfully rebel against the scenario set up for him by the 
hypnotist. Thus, he reacts to the German passenger’s complaint by bursting out in English: 
“Your problem is not important!” (1:35:42). Also, he interrupts the absurdity of his 
conductor’s exam by commenting in English: “You’ll have to excuse me. I need some time to 
think” (1:36:16). After he wrests a machine gun from a soldier of the military police and 
threatens the passengers on the train, the hypnotist does not tolerate any more protest on the 
protagonist’s part. He sets the train in motion again in front of Neuwied Bridge, which Leo 
was charged with blowing up by the Werewolves. When the protagonist tries to bring the train 
to a halt for a third time, his attempt fails and pulls the emergency break in vain. It remains 
unclear whether Leo eventually detonates the bomb himself or whether he simply cannot 
prevent the explosion. In either case, the explosion immediately brings the hypnotist back into 
power, who mercilessly begins a countdown to the protagonist’s death. 
 As to the second attempt of resistance against the hypnotist, we observe the 
protagonist several times as he tries to go to sleep. Twice he is shot in the dormitory by a 
camera perching over his bed and slowly spinning around its own axis. The vertiginous 
rotation is accompanied by the already familiar disquieting string motif and the verbal 
presence of the hypnotist. The off-voice evokes physical unease such as shivering in the 
protagonist: “You are in Germany just after the war. You are cold. You’re covering yourself 
up with clothes you have in your suitcase” (08:05). At other moments, the voice does not let 
him rest due to its sheer presence. Thus, the hypnotist cynically declares: “When you’re rested 
you will be on your way to your new job”, only to command one second later: “Get up. Get 
up and be on your way.” (08:27) Finally, he directs other figures like puppets to come and 
wake the protagonist as soon as we see him asleep. As soon as the hypnotist utters: “On the 
count of three there will be a message for you of great importance. One, two, three” (21:10), 
Uncle Kessler is on the spot shaking him out of his sleep and delivering an invitation from the 
Hartmann family. With the frightening action progressing, insomnia seems to become a 
natural condition for Leo, which the hypnotist does not need to reinforce anymore. Violently 
intruding into his privacy, he lays bare the reason of Leo’s sleeplessness: 
It is New Year’s morning, year one. You are on your honeymoon in the Hartmann family’s private 
compartment. You have been making love. You have enjoyed the tenderness of your wife. But 
now she is asleep and you are alone. For the first time you experience the fear of being on a train 
with no possibility of getting off and no idea of where the journey may end. (1:08:30) 
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The fact that it is the hypnotist himself who put him on this train of course remains 
unmentioned. 
 Having been refused sleep as a means of briefly escaping his nightmarish journey, the 
protagonist finds a last resort from the absurdity of his conductor’s exam in fainting. The 
hypnotist seems to cynically support him in this endeavour and declares: “The exhausting run 
has made you sick. Your clothes are soaked with sweat and you’re afraid of fainting. Your 
heart is bumping faster and faster in panic. You cannot breathe” (1:24:50). And after 
excruciating Leo with nausea, he finally sarcastically pronounces: “On the count of three you 
faint. One, two, three... One second of infinite rest” (1:26:25). Of course, this “second of 
infinite rest” does not rescue the protagonist from the hypnotist’s power. As soon as he 
collapses, the hypnotic image of passing railway tracks forces its way onto the screen as if to 
lead the protagonist back into the hypnotic dream and indeed, one second later he is already 
dragged back into the farce of the conductor’s examination. 
 To stress the importance of the motif of sleep, the hypnotist constantly has other 
characters around Leo fall asleep and, what is more, has Leo watch over their sleep by 
assigning him the bizarre position as a sleeping-car conductor. In this position, he has to fulfill 
a task formulated by the Zentropa Inspector in the exposition of the film: “Nur der 
Schlafwagenschaffner hat den direkten Kontakt zu den Reisenden: Er kann sagen: 
‘Überlassen Sie mir die Verantwortung für Ihre Reise. Ich kümmere mich um alles. Schlafen 
Sie ruhig” (11:15). From the onset of the film, he is violently initiated into this role. Thus, in a 
moment, in which Leo pulls opens the window curtains in a dormitory, he is roughly rebuked 
by his uncle: “What are you doing? Do you want to wake the sleeping? All these people work 
at night and they need their sleep” (07:55). During his very first train journey, he begins to 
take over a function which Freud in his Interpretation of Dreams ascribes to dreaming itself – 
he becomes the ‘guardian of sleep’ (cf. 1953a, 233). First, he restrains from waking up his 
uncle, who falls asleep on duty after consuming some strong drink. Left alone with the task of 
taking care of the passengers, he is summoned for the first time by Katharina Hartmann to 
make her bed and to keep her company while the train passes through a tunnel. Having 
previously witnessed the sight of two hanged Werewolves, Leo helps Kat go to sleep by 
seemingly absorbing the nightmare that could come to haunt her. Thus, after she falls asleep, 
we catch a glimpse of the protagonist’s mind being invaded by the word “Werwolf” (19:35). 
Finally, when later in the film Leo is plagued by insomnia due to the already mentioned “fear 
of being on a train with no possibility of getting off”, his image is ironically contrasted by that 
of Kat, who can be seen lying peacefully asleep next to him. 
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 Through this contrast, the title of Leo’s position at Zentropa is revealed as a pun in all 
its facets. As a sleeping-car conductor he is denied the possibility to become a sleeping car-
conductor – this, however, only on the intradiegetic level. The existence of the extradiegetic 
framework of hypnosis explains why Leo is constantly refused his sleep. For as soon as the 
dreamer’s representative falls asleep and becomes inactive, the dream action comes to a halt. 
The peculiar power of the hypnotist then lies in the fact that he censors all images of sleep 
within the dream while at the same time inducing precisely a semi-somnolent state in the 
extradiegetic dreamer to send him or her on the journey to ‘Europa’. Not only does the 
hypnotist seize the control over the contents of the dream in an utterly untherapeutic manner. 
His violent manipulation culminates in his refusal to let the dreamer wake up after the 
protagonist’s death: “You want to wake up to free yourself from the image of Europa. But it is 
not possible” (1:43:45). 
 Manipulation, in fact, can be seen as the central theme of the film, for which reason it 
does not surprise that the director performs a cameo in the scene of the falsification of Max 
Hartmann’s denazification certificate. To the viewer’s surprise, von Trier appears in the role 
of a Jew who is blackmailed into whitewashing the Nazi crimes of important figures in post-
War Germany. While the director appears in all three films of his Europa Trilogy, this cameo 
differs both from that in The Element of Crime, in which von Trier plays an insignificant role 
of a hotel receptionist, and that in Epidemic, in which he performs as a script writer. In my 
view, the choice of this role is not sufficiently explained by the circumstance that Lars von 
Trier had assumed for a long time that he himself had Jewish origins. Instead, I would argue 
that Lars von Trier steps in as the non-fictional hypnotist, who has drawn the viewer into the 
cinematic dream in the first place. With Philip Zindel, the director can be regarded as the 
introjected therapist, who enters his patient’s dream in a symbolic shape (cf. 1998, 252-258). 
According to Zindel, the technique of introjection enables three different types of 
intervention: First, the silent presence of the symbolized therapist can offer protection for the 
patient and stimulate the dream creation; second, the therapist has the chance to ask about the 
feelings, objectives and possibilities of his symbolized image; third, in particularly difficult 
phases, the therapist can intervene more directly and take certain actions (cf. Zindel 1998, 
256). What we witness in Europa is clearly the third case – a hypnotist-director who has his 
introjected image appear constantly to keep the dreamer’s representative restricted within an 
already claustrophobic scenario.  
 As to the dream images imposed on Leo and the viewer, one can hardly detect any 
therapeutic qualities about them. Following Rosalind Galt’s argument, one could give von 
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Trier credit for restraining from using redemptive images of postwar Germany. For as the 
critic points out, his film differs from postwar films such as Rossellini’s Germany Year Zero 
(1948), Billy Wilder’s A Foreign Affair (1948) and Jacques Tourneur’s Berlin Express 
(1948), which are also all set in and deal with Germany after World War II, in that in Europa, 
“there are virtually no shots of destroyed urban landscapes”, and thus, no “ruin images” 
(2005, 9). She explains the effect of this cinematic strategy by drawing on Thomas Elsaesser, 
who has argued that 
the films set in Germany took the ruin as a liberal – rather than as a radical – signifier of political 
redemption. In the conflation of liberation with ruination, images of rubble became signifiers of 
the cleansing of Germany, in which the Third Reich was physically swept away and the pain of 
destruction became cathartic for the German people. The ruin was the fresh start made material. 
Like the famous year zero, ruin images propose a fictional break that preempts any need to engage 
with the recent past (Galt 2005, 9). 
While the rejection of a redemptive stance in a certain way corresponds with a trauma 
aesthetics, the film does not betray any attempt to work though the trauma of the Holocaust. 
This is best exemplified by a scene which calls up immediate associations with the Holocaust. 
While Kat’s brother, Larry, leads the protagonist through the train to the carriage in which 
Max Hartmann’s coffin lies hidden the hypnotist announces: “You are led through carriages 
you never knew existed” (56:10). Images of emaciated prisoners that seem to be cut out from 
photographs of concentration camps contextualize the otherwise absurd utterance of the 
hypnotist. It stands to reason that the carriages with the in 1945 anachronistically placed 
prisoners metaphorically represent the repressed memory of the Holocaust. What appears 
rather bizarre is, however, the insinuation that they should be carriages “you never knew 
existed”. As Udi Greenberg underlines, 
[t]he audience of the Nineties needed no hint of the Holocaust when dealing with Germany in 
1945. The concept of Stunde Null had been a well-known legend for many years, and, after the 
flood of monuments, ceremonies, and movies dealing with the Holocaust – known as the ‘memory 
boom’ – few Western viewers would miss the connection between trains and concentration camps 
(2008, 48). 
Likewise, film critic Howard Hampton regards the Holocaust-related images in Europa 
merely as “memory-salvaging prompters, scavengers of the repressed” (1995, 41). 
Considering the technique of back projections, he points out that instead of working through a 
traumatic piece of history in a dream, the protagonist is exposed to a series of entirely de-
realized images on celluloid. As Hampton writes, “spellbound Kessler […] is taken through a 
grand maze of celluloid, a torrent of projection and conditioning that washes over him until it 
slowly dawns on the transfixed sleeper that he is not dreaming but drowning” (1995, 41). 
Thus, von Trier can be said to create at best a nightmare full of manipulated flashbacks. For 
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this reason, I agree with Elizabeth Stewart, when she observes in her Lacanian analysis of 
Europa that the hypnotist “is the analyst who repeats the trauma, who makes Leo himself 
dissolve in water, lost in identification with the real” (Stewart 2005, online, emphasis mine). 
 
 
Projecting collective repressed memories 
 
The manipulation takes place not only on the level of the image, but also on that of language. 
By putting the young American of German descent on the ‘train of history’, the hypnotist 
charges him with riding on international memory tracks and catering for German and 
American interests at the same time. However, he deprives his envoy of a linguistic ground by 
shoving him into a space between languages. In this in-between space, as von Trier 
demonstrates, intrigues prosper and repression prevails. The dreamer can be said to ride on 
ramifying railway tracks, the memory tracks in English and in German. The differences 
between these memory tracks cannot be leveled out and the points of intersection unavoidably 
form points of collision. Von Trier’s train of history, as Kat explains, “transported Jews to 
concentration camps and American officers first class afterwards” (1:10:55) is bound to 
derail, for Leo’s attempt to understand all of the passengers with their different languages and 
backgrounds turns out as utterly naïve. 
 The result of combining these international memory tracks is symbolized not only 
through the death of the protagonist, but also through the word that appears in the last shot of 
the film: EUROPA. While the spelling of the proper name is German or Danish, the 
pronunciation, as demonstrated by the hypnotist at the onset of the film, does not stem from 
any existing language. With its English pronunciation of the first syllable, but the German 
stress on the second and the “a” in the last syllable, “Europa” encompasses traces of both 
languages, but does not sound right in either of them. The bold lettering of the word in red 
and the black background in the last shot present the colors of anarchy, however, not to 
proclaim political liberation, but rather chaos and confusion.  
 When the letters crowd the final image, at the latest, it becomes clear that von Trier’s 
agenda goes far beyond negotiating and manipulating the memory of the Holocaust. The 
appearance of the proper name “Europa” at the closing of the film raises the question about 
the connection between the time in which the film was produced and the time in which it is 
set. The answer that suggests itself is that the historical, political and linguistic manipulation 
staged in the film provides a vivid metaphor for the time shortly before the signing of the 
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Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which the filmmaker’s home country, Denmark, significantly, 
refused to participate in. As film critic Harlan Kennedy comments: “The film is about the 
present thinly disguised as the past. The ‘Europe 1945’ setting vouchsafes a continent in 
chaos searching for unity, just like Europe 1991 pre-federalization” (1991, 68). Significantly, 
the film was produced at a time when the political and philosophical disorientation and 
destabilization which arose in the wake of the redrawing of the political map in 1989/1990 
created a need of self-discovery through historical narratives (cf. Csáky 2004, online). Von 
Trier, however, refuses to draw on such historical narratives and to depict the Holocaust and 
the post-war time as consolidated memories. Instead, the Third Reich and the Holocaust haunt 
the film like nightmares, which implies that the breach of civilization is not available for the 
construction of desired historical narratives. 
 Just like the historical and political chaos, von Trier uses the linguistic confusion as a 
metaphor for mapping fears and expectations around the unification of Europe. The linguistic 
confusion in the name “Europa”, its metaphorical weight, the hypnotist’s god-like position 
and, finally, the fact that Leo is punished for trying to be too understanding all draw an 
parallel to the myth of Babel. At a first glance, the linguistic circumstances in the myth of 
Babel and in that of von Trier’s Europa seem to differ, since Babel presupposes 
monolingualism as the original condition, while Europa appears multilingual from the onset. 
However, Europa can hardly be seen as a redemptive consequence of Babel, in which 
understanding is enabled by translation. For the only one who is offered a translation is the 
viewer, who as a dreamer seems to merely fantasize about multilingualism in post-apocalyptic 
Europe. In contrast, the characters communicate with each other in intransparent ways with 
the difference between their languages being silenced, denied, or at best, used as an 
instrument of intrigue. A Jewish train passenger, who seeks to return to his destroyed home 
town, Wöllstadt, and speaks German with a distinct Yiddish accent, stands out as the only 
marker of real difference. Significantly, there does not seem to be any space for difference on 
Leo’s train: believing that Wöllstadt has been spared in the war, the passenger exits the train 
with his family, whereupon the viewer witnesses how their speech fades and is reduced to the 
crying of their child (36:10). 
 Babel and Europa are not only sites of linguistic confusion; they are also both 
presented as symbols of human hubris in the attempt of creating a megalomaniac monument 
to unification and hegemony. In her study, Utopia of Understanding (2012), Donatella di 
Cesare describes the implications of the Tower of Babel: 
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A single, universal metropolis, marked by the Tower that touches the sky, where everyone speaks 
one universal language: This is the ultimate end, the extreme result of the totalizing and totalitarian 
centralism of the Babelian venture (di Cesare 2012, 39). 
Indeed, the central motif in von Trier’s oeuvre, the train with its first class sleeping car, shares 
many characteristics with the Tower of Babel. It is the work of many days and nights, as the 
Inspector points out (10:35), set on tracks with the effort of hundreds of people, especially 
women and children; a vehicle of seemingly indeterminable length containing carriages “you 
never knew existed” (56:10); finally, a symbol of the extermination of Jews in concentration 
camps, hypocritically disguised as an elitist project designed to celebrate economic recovery 
after a mythologized Zero Hour. It seems that the soaring tower has toppled into the 
horizontal to transport Europe’s totalitarian history of the 20th century on railroad tracks. Not 
coincidentally, the railway company is called Zentropa – a name derived from the historical 
company “Mitropa” and expressing precisely the centralization or concentration implied in 
the Tower of Babel. 
 “Yet Babel, the place of concentration”, as di Cesare writes, “becomes the place of 
dispersion” (di Cesare 2012, 39). This dispersion is visually translated into the violent image 
of the explosion that causes the train to fall off a bridge. Thus, the film reenacts the 
destruction of the Tower, merely inverting the direction of its fall:  
The fall of the Tower directs the human gaze, which had sought to take refuge in the closed 
verticality of the Tower, toward the open horizontality of the world. From the chimera of a single 
language, or of a single name, humanity falls from the Tower, falls with the Tower, and is 
dispersed throughout the individual diversity of languages, which are the fragments of that 
shattered Tower (di Cesare 2012, 39-40). 
Von Trier can be said to go even further than that, for after his characters fall with and from 
the train, language seems to be extinguished altogether. Significantly, he has his protagonist 
die under water, where there is no possibility of speech at all any more, no matter in what 
language. Above water, the survivors of the explosion cannot be heard uttering any 
understandable word, but instead scream in pain and fear. This reveals a certain parallel 
between von Trier’s Europa and Foer’s Everything Is Illuminated: the figure of the 
destruction of one common language of communication is equated with that of the traumatic 
destruction of language in general. 
 At this point, the film’s agenda in regard to the time of its production again becomes 
recognizable. Donatella di Cesare’s thoughts on the myth of Babel can be said to capture the 
essence of von Trier’s programmatic oeuvre: “[W]ith the confusion of languages and the 
dispersion that ensues”, she writes,  
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God prevents this totalitarian concentration in one city, around one Tower, under the banner of one 
idolatrous name, the artificial pillar of one language that allows for no differences within itself. 
Through Babel, God prevents the merciless tyranny that this totalitarianism would produce, 
because Babel is not only a proper name, but rather a divine event that repeats itself in time” (di 
Cesare 2012, 40). 
Similarly, Lars von Trier’s film seems to undermine a unification “under the banner of one 
idolatrous name” – the name “Europa”. The artificial multilingualism of the characters not 
only provides a basis for misunderstanding and intrigues. It also denounces a “utopia of 
understanding” (di Cesare 2012), resists any redemptive stance and marks the Holocaust as an 
entirely unprocessed historical event, thus also declaring an integration of Europe as 
impossible. 
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Lost in the Language of Dreams and Delusions: Michel Gondry’s The Science of Sleep 
 
The Science of Sleep revolves around a thirty-year-old creative mind, Stéphane Miroux, who 
returns to the France of his childhood after a long time in Mexico. Having grown up in 
France, the son of a French mother and a Mexican father, has witnessed his parents’ 
separation and left with his father for Mexico. Years later, when the father has died of cancer 
and his mother has talked him into returning for a creative job in Paris, he returns to the old 
family apartment and moves back into his children’s bedroom. Incapable of expressing 
himself properly in French, a language he seems to have forgotten, and overwhelmed by the 
memories and dreams of the parents’ break-up and the death of his father, Stéphane suffers a 
psychological regression through which his fantasies get increasingly mixed with his reality.  
Finding himself torn between the Spanish of his father and the French of his mother as well as 
his new Parisian surroundings, he turns to an emotionally neutral, but power-invested English, 
thus relegating his first two languages to the unconscious realm of his dreams and nightmares. 
Among the several Parisians he meets, Stéphanie, his French-and-English bilingual neighbor, 
attracts his emotional energies and becomes the objective towards which Stéphane directs not 
only his love drives, but most especially his obsessive behavior. 
 The film proves to be a witty mixture of low-tech special effects and dream sciences 
that smoothly combine to recreate the experience of confusion in Stéphane’s mind. Immersing 
the viewer into the protagonist’s dream world, the film resists a strict ontological separation 
between reality and fantasy within the fictional universe. Reviewers have taken different takes 
on this ontological confusion. Thus, Ethan Alter centers on the frustration of the young 
protagonist, who has to face the “mindnumbing drugde work” that his mother has found for 
him (2006, online). “Stuck in a dull office with aggravating co-workers,” Alter argues, “it’s 
no wonder that he allows his imagination to roam free, transporting him to magical forests 
and his own personal TV studio.” (ibid.) Sam Davies, on the other hand, finds the reason for 
Stéphane’s inability to discern between reality and delusion in the traumatic memories he 
carries within himself. As Davies puts it, The Science of Sleep is “a portrait of a reality-phobic 
designer,” Stéphane Miroux, who “has painful memories of his own – and these, together with 
the discomfort of facing up to the cold realities of everyday life, lead him to a tissue of 
distracted daydreams” (2006, online). Gondry himself gave a very short summary of the 
movie in an interview in 2007. As he said, it is “a story about this guy who gets gradually 
more and more confused by dream and reality” (in Wood 2007, online). 
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The Science of Sleep between neuroscience and psychoanalysis 
 
To better understand Michel Gondry’s engagement with the process of dreaming, it is useful 
to first cast a glance at his background as an artist. In 2005, Gondry was an Ida Ely Rubin 
Artist in Residence at the prestigious Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Since 
then, he has been collaborating with the MIT in different cultural programs and artistic 
projects. Within this program, renowned artists from all over the world have taken part, 
among them Spanish architect, Santiago Calatrava; Chinese composer and conductor, Tan 
Dun; North-American writer, Tony Morrison; or Brazilian filmmaker, Kátia Lund, the co-
director of City of God (2002). As Matt McGann, director of admissions at MIT, affirms: 
“They’re not just regular artists” (2005, online). At this center for advanced research, Gondry 
pursued his interest in the neurosciences because, as he himself acknowledged, “they 
understand the connection between science and the arts. […] It was brainstorming all the 
time” (in Hillner 2007, online). 
 Bearing in mind Gondry’s interest in the scientific world as well as his emphasis on 
the state of sleep rather than on the act of dreaming in the title of his film, one would expect 
The Science of Sleep to approach dreaming mostly from the perspective of the neurosciences. 
A popular publication in this field in Allan J. Hobson’s Dreaming: A Short Introduction 
(2005), in which the author, a neuroscientist, programmatically states that “the study of 
dreaming is inextricably linked to the science of sleep. The science of sleep is inextricably 
linked to neurobiology. Thus, the science of dreaming is inextricably linked to neurobiology” 
(2005, 142). In this view, dreams are nothing more than the psychic debris and random 
delusions of the sleep function of the brain. Thus, the process of dreaming is defined though 
its physicality and directly associated to the functions of the brain. Dreams are then part of a 
conception of the human psychic life governed by a “brain-mind isomorphism,” implying that 
“every form of mental activity has a similar form of brain activity. Therefore, if we detect a 
dream form, we can seek a corresponding brain form” (2005, 30). Brain activity dominates 
psychic activity, which is why dreams are subject, in a most direct way, to physical processes 
in the brain. It is clear that this radical imposition of the brain over the mind reduces the 
function of dreams to a state of unnecessary residues of bodily functions. 
 Such an agenda exposes Hobson as a radical critic of psychoanalytic theories of 
dreaming. In line with Hobson, Michel Gondry has expressed an overt animosity against 
Freud’s understanding and analysis of dreams. Thus, the director declares: “Well, I think it’s 
kind of a little upsetting that Freud’s theories are… you know… worked out one hundred 
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years ago when they had very little knowledge of what’s actually happening inside the brain” 
(Gondry 2004, 09:26).
16
 In a different interview, Gondry goes on to say that “with 
psychoanalysis and dream interpretation, the functional bases have been proven wrong by 
scientists who are working with neurobiology” (in Guillen 2006, online). Apart from the fact 
that Freudian dream analysis was developed over a century ago, the filmmaker mostly attacks 
the idea that dreams should have a clear and fixed meaning that is independent from the 
dreamer. He is upset by the thought that dreams should have a universal language that may be 
decoded according to a dictionary of symbols or catalogued according to their archetypal 
figures as done by Carl G. Jung. 
 However, the harsh attack on psychoanalysis, which we have encountered in a similar 
shape in the context of Yann Martel’s novel Self, appears very curious in the light of how 
Gondry’s film ultimately engages with dreams. Thus, right at the opening of the film, the 
viewer gets to see Stéphane, the protagonist, demonstrating, much like in a cooking show, the 
process behind the creation of dreams. While throwing more and more symbolic ingredients 
into a large pot, he explains: 
A very delicate combination of complex ingredients is the key. First, we put in some random 
thoughts. And then we add a little bit of reminiscences of the day, mixed with some memories 
from the past. Love, friendships, relationships, and all those ships, together with songs you heard 
during the day, things you saw, and also personal (01:27).    
What is striking in this staging of the genesis of dreams is the similarity to Freud’s ideas on 
the sources of dreams. Thus, the film seems to quote almost literally from The Interpretation 
of Dreams (1953a,b) that the day’s residues and childhood memories constitute the main 
material that dreams are made of. Moreover, the dream-work staged in the film can be 
understood in Freudian terms of condensation and displacement. Stéphane’s formulation of 
“friendships, relationships, and all those ships” demonstrates the work of displacement 
following the rule of representability. As Freud argues, 
[t]he direction taken by the displacement usually results in a colourless and abstract expression in 
the dream-thought being exchanged for a pictorial and concrete one. The advantage, and 
accordingly the purpose, of such a change jumps to the eyes. A thing that is pictorial is, from the 
point of view of a dream, a thing that is capable of being represented (1953b, 339-340, emphasis 
in the original). 
                                                 
16
 This statement is taken from a documentary about Gondry’s work, entitled I’ve Been 12 Forever, directed and 
released by Gondry himself in 2004, while still working on The Science of Sleep, which would appear only two 
years later. This documentary may be said to work as a non-fictional counterpart for The Science of Sleep, as it is 
also a work that mixes dreams and reality in the visual world with stop-motion animation and French and 
English in its soundtrack. As I mentioned briefly in the first pages of the analysis of Europa, strictly speaking, 
only a documentary that takes speakers of different languages as its protagonists can be “filmed” in two 
languages, whereas a fiction film has to be composed and staged in a multilingual fashion. Thus, I’ve Been 12 
Forever is in fact a realist multilingual production, as it features interviews in French with Gondry, his mother 
and his family, as well as in English, with Björk, or Dave Grohl, among many other artists, both native and non-
native speakers of English.   
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While the symbolic value of the image of ships as associated to friendships and relationships 
will be discussed later in the chapter, another repetitive motif can equally be said to 
demonstrate the work of displacement: the skiing trip with Stéphane’s colleagues. On his very 
first day at his work place, his colleague, Guy, tells him that he is the one “qui va t’expliquer 
ton travail dans quelques secondes” (08:18). Very meaningfully, the English subtitles translate 
the French expression as “I’ll show you the ropes”. Right after this statement, another 
colleague, Martine, who sits in front of an enormous wall picture of a snowy mountain, 
interrupts and responds that she also can “show him the ropes”. Instead of explaining the job 
to Stéphane, however, she begins to talk about the ski weekend that she organizes every year 
for the colleagues.  
As the film soon reveals, the concept of “ropes”, Martine’s picture of the mountain, 
the “ski weekend” and Stéphane’s bewilderment about the new job become interconnected in 
his mind. For this reason, every time that he dreams, the “ski weekend” motif will reappear in 
the form of this imaginary mountain covered by threads and ropes of different shapes and 
colors. For instance, in the very first dream he has right after this meeting, Martine’s wall 
already shows all these yellow, red, and green threads creating a visible mountain top (14:20). 
The walls will remain covered by these threads throughout the rest of Stéphane’s reveries that 
take place at the office (39:31). This imagery reaches its apotheosis when Stéphane dreams 
about the ski weekend itself (1:03:48). As part of his self-created imagery, the mountain is 
made of cotton and is covered by tons of ropes of the same colors that could be seen on 
Martine’s wall during his reveries. The setup of the dream as well as its interpretations as 
suggested by the film clearly expose the influence of psychoanalytic thinking on Gondry’s 
work. 
Finally, the enactment of the process of ‘dream preparation’ appears like an allegory 
of the Freudian claim that the dreamer is, even though unconsciously so, the sole author of his 
or her own dreams. In the film, this is illustrated though Stéphane’s self-presentation in his 
tellingly titled program, “Stéphane TV”, in which he occupies all necessary roles in the 
creation of his ‘dream show’. Thus, he appears in front of the camera, as the master of 
ceremony, as well as behind the camera, as the director of photography, the sound engineer 
and as a musician. As the opening scene of the film shows, despite the director’s interview 
statements, The Science of Sleep presents anything but a neurobiological exploration of 
dreams, and is instead, ironically enough, largely informed by psychoanalytic theory. 
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As I shall demonstrate in this chapter, Gondry’s film not only extensively draws on 
different psychoanalytic concepts, but can also be regarded as a cinematic rewriting of 
Freud’s study of “Delusions and Dreams in Wilhelm Jensen’s ‘Gradiva’” (1957a). Like 
Gondry’s film, Jensen’s novella, “Gradiva”, centers on a protagonist who cannot quite tell his 
dreams from reality. In both narratives, the protagonists are devoted to science which they, 
however, put “in the service of imagination” (Freud 1957a, 18). While the characters 
resemble each other in their seeming asexuality, their scientific interests are directly related to 
the study of the unconscious. Thus, Jensen’s Norbert Hanold works in the field of archeology, 
which Freud likens to psychoanalysis, since both seek to uncover traces and layers of human 
and psychic history, respectively. Gondry does not metaphorize upon the central interest of 
his protagonist and names it right away in the title: “The Science of Sleep”. 
Each of the protagonists gets to meet a young woman, whom they seem to engage with 
more in their dreams than in reality. The parallels between these encounters are striking. In 
both works of fiction, the focalizers are plagued by delusions to such an extent that the reader 
or viewer finds it impossible to discern fantasy from reality within the fictional world, and to 
understand whether the female characters have an existence of their own or are but figments 
of the protagonists’ imagination. Thus, even before meeting the young woman, Zoë, Hanold 
dreams of a graceful antique statue that comes to life in Pompei, which makes him travel there 
to search for her. When he instead encounters a young woman of flesh and blood, in whom he 
believes to recognize his statue, Gradiva, the latter shows curiosity about his delusions and 
begins to take on the role of a therapist. As the reader learns later, her interest is motivated by 
her affection for Hanold. As it turns out, she and Hanold had known and been fond of each 
other in childhood, living just across the street from one another. Zoë has good reasons to 
believe that what lies at the core of his condition is his repressed desire for her. Her struggle 
to cure Hanold from his delusions is doubly rewarded, since it results not only in his recovery 
from his symptoms, but also in their marriage. 
Most of these plot elements can be found in The Science of Sleep, albeit with a 
different resolution. In Gondry’s film, the protagonist, encounters his attractive neighbor and 
her friend, named Zoë, right upon his arrival to France. The neighbor’s name is not less telling 
than that of her friend: Seemingly made to be the protagonist’s counterpart, she is called 
Stéphanie – a circumstance leading the viewer to wonder even more whether she is but a 
product of Stéphane’s imagination. However, despite her adaptation to the protagonist’s 
language, English, this character, like in “Gradiva”, also seems to have an existence of her 
own. Like Jensen’s Zoë, she is soon confronted with the main character’s delusions and, 
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similarly, shows her interest in him by involving him in what could be described as art 
therapy.  
Despite the strong correspondence to Jensen’s “Gradiva”, The Science of Sleep does 
not end with a happy resolution, since Stéphanie does not succeed in curing the protagonist 
from his condition, and the prospect of a happy relationship is therefore thwarted. In the 
following, it shall become clear in what ways Stéphane’s delusion is different from that 
analyzed by Freud and why he cannot be helped by means of the same cure. As I shall argue, 
Gondry’s film constructs a story of childhood trauma and compulsive monolingualism 
underlying the narrative of the protagonist’s delusions. In tracing the causes and the 
development of Stéphane’s condition, we shall uncover the metanarrative behind the figure of 
linguistic border-crossing in The Science of Sleep. 
 
Regression or the return of repressed languages 
 
As already mentioned, the protagonist’s return to France is prompted by the death of his 
father in Mexico and his mother’s promise to find him a creative job in Paris, the city of his 
childhood. It is suggested that he grew up speaking French until his parents got divorced. If 
the parents’ break-up is presented as part of the backstory wound, even more so are its 
consequences – a forced decision between his parents and their languages. The possibility to 
stay only with one of them seems to imply for Stéphane that he can keep only one of their 
languages. Thus, in metaphorical terms, the separation turns him compulsively monolingual. 
Following his father to Mexico, he switches into Spanish, and thus left behind both his mother 
and his mother tongue. The fact that, by the time of his return, he has almost forgotten his first 
language suggests an analogical situation regarding his relationship with his mother. His first 
language migration is depicted as a trauma inflicted upon his infantile psyche. As in Freud’s 
trauma model in Moses and Monotheism (1964), after a period of latency, a second trauma – 
the death of his father – triggers the return of the first one that had been previously repressed.  
This time, it is Spanish that remains only as a trace of trauma in his psyche. While 
opening with a Spanish countdown to a musical number in Stéphane’s imaginary show – 
which shall be described later – the film features the language exactly only once. A traumatic 
space opens up at the beginning early in the film when Stéphane, in a dream, remembers a 
Duke Ellington concert that he attended together with his father. In this dream, accompanied 
visually only by psychedelically moving colored patterns, the protagonist can be heard 
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ventriloquizing an dialogue between himself and his father – with the father speaking Spanish 
and himself answering in English only.  
His recourse to English gives a first glimpse at his attempts to move into linguistically 
neutral territory and thus avoid, if not resolve, the conflict between his parents’ languages. 
However, the impossibility of such an easy resolution is immediately stated. Despite the 
father’s Spanish in the dream, Stéphane’s own English provokes a displacement that more 
than questions Freud’s initial assumption that dreams are governed by the pleasure principle. 
Thus, when Duke appears on stage, he has a duck’s head, which makes the father realizes that 
“this isn’t Duke Ellington. It’s Duck Ellington!” (03:18). Curiously, he expresses this 
confusion in Spanish: “Esto no es Duke Ellington. Esto es un pato, es un pato Ellington.” 
Clearly, the linguistic confusion of the father in the dream, the Duke/duck, can only work in 
English, since in Spanish there is no sound or letter relation between “duke” and “pato.” Thus, 
we witness that despite Stéphane’s switch into English, the linguistic confusion shatters the 
fantasy of happy times with his father, and the protagonist finds himself forced to remind the 
father of his lost battle to cancer. This dream also exposes Stéphane’s overwhelming pain 
over his father’s death. In the same dream, he continues: “I cried so hard. I could feel my tears 
forming two rivers under my eyes. In dreams, emotions are overwhelming” (03:40). Thus, 
rather than granting Stéphane the wish of remembering his father in happy terms, the dream 
brings forth unprocessed memories and falls into the category of dreams described by Freud 
in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1955c). The father’s Spanish becomes the marker of 
trauma that cannot be mitigated by Stéphane’s recourse to English. 
At the same time, his return to France and to the French language does not create any 
healing distance for dealing with his father’s death. Instead, it plunges him even deeper into 
the consequences of his abandonment of French in his childhood. As soon as the thirty-year-
old protagonist meets the caretaker of the house of his childhood, she announces that he has 
become “presque un homme”, only almost a man (05:00). What is more, his inability to 
communicate in French returns him to the stage of psychosexual development that he had 
reached before leaving France as a child. Upon entering the apartment in which he grew up 
and is now greeted by the toys in his children’s bedroom and his childhood photos on the 
walls, he finds himself entirely enveloped by his own childhood. Falling into the role of child, 
he tries to show some of his paintings to the janitor, who does not have time for such 
childishness.  
His father’s suit jacket, discovered in a wardrobe of his bedroom, tempts him to play 
more children’s games. On a children’s rug patterned with car tracks, Stéphane spreads the 
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jacket as if to stage a road accident. In this function, the jacket seems reminiscent of the reel 
in the fort/da game, commented on by Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, through which 
the child moves on from the pleasure to the reality principle. More precisely, it can be 
described as a “melancholy object”, a notion outlined by Margaret Gibson and based on 
Donald Winnicott’s concept of the “transitional object”: “Like the transitional objects of 
childhood, the bereaved often mourn through intimate things belonging to the now deceased. 
[…] As concrete symbolic material, objects orient in time and space the often disorientating 
and displacing experiences of grief” (Gibson 2010, 285). In line with this depiction, 
Stéphane’s spreading the jacket on the rug represents an attempt of coming to terms with his 
father’s death. At the same time, it is striking what time and space Stéphane chooses to 
provide himself with a sense of orientation. Significantly, the suit has remained in the 
wardrobe throughout all the years of the parents’ separation, and symbolizes a time not just 
before the father’s death, but before the break-up and Stéphane’s departure from France. The 
space that offers comfort is then, not surprisingly, the children’s bedroom – the space 
symbolizing the sense of security and integrity before the irreversible splitting of the family 
and their languages. 
The suit confronts Stéphane with his lack not only because it belonged to the deceased 
father. Trying on the piece of adult clothing in a childlike manner, the protagonist discovers 
an electric shaver in its pocket: an obvious symbol of maturity that he seems to lack. The 
shaver provides a link to Stéphane’s new workplace, where he is immediately reproached for, 
if at all, having “shave[d] with a toast” (12:52). What stands out upon his arrival to his new 
job at Latreille is mostly his inability to communicate in French and to have ‘adult 
conversations’ with his colleagues. While the colleagues, Guy, Martine and Serge, switch into 
his accented English, they import a topic that does not figure in Stéphane’s child universe: 
sexuality, or, as Guy formulates in a more child-oriented fashion: “dirty stuff and naughty 
stuff” (26:54). Thus, Guy presents himself right away as a “lady-killer”, openly discusses the 
sexual orientation of his colleagues, seems preoccupied with the question of sexual positions. 
Under the influence of the sexual discourse at his workplace, Stéphane soon dreams up 
awkward images of himself as a “lady-killer” and of emotion-free sex scenes with his 
colleague Martine. 
The ‘naughtiness’ of the topic of sexuality at Latreille’s can be explained through 
Freud’s ideas in, “Civilisation and Its Discontents” (1961). In this essay, he describes art as 
one of the possible channels of sublimation of the sexual drives in Western society. In the 
context of The Science of Sleep, it is significant that Stéphane’s allegedly creative job has in 
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fact nothing to do with art or creativity. Instead, as Guy explains to Stéphane upon his arrival 
to work, the company produces nude calendars, for which they do not even design the photos, 
but only the layout around pre-chosen and obscenely ridiculous pictures. While a more 
creative job might present the protagonist with a more sublimated form of sexuality, his boss 
shows no interest in Stéphane’s own creative ideas for a calendar. Thus, he is confronted with 
a world of grotesquely unsublimated sexuality – a world whose language he does not speak or 
understand neither in a literal, nor in a metaphorical sense. 
The protagonist’s encounter with his pretty neighbor, Stéphanie, can be described 
along similar lines. The prelude to their actual meeting, that is, her friend’s accidental drilling 
through the wall and into the neighboring apartment of Stéphane’s family, is presented as a 
penetration of his world, in which girls do not seem to figure as potential love objects. Soon 
enough the protagonist amuses the two girls with his absurd attempts of speaking French, 
which leads him to declare that his French is “pathétique” (20:33). In this context as well, the 
French language stands for flirtation and love – two areas that Stéphane is precluded from 
accessing. Comically, he first finds himself hiding the fact that he is Stéphanie’s neighbor and 
the son of her landlady, and tries to admit it in a letter written in a somnambulist state and in 
utterly broken French. Significantly, he slips into English and into finishing his letter with the 
question: “By the way, do you have Zoë’s phone number?” (35:03) The slip of the tongue that 
he will try to undo seems to state his initial interest in Stéphanie’s friend, but can also be read 
differently:  On the one hand, it can be understood as another rehearsal of his role as the 
“lady-killer”, in which he would try and flirt with both girls. On the other hand, and this is 
what the further course of the action suggests, his switch into English is an attempt to run 
away from romantic feelings which he will develop for Stéphanie, who is much more like-
minded, similar and close to him – in every sense of the word. 
A relationship with Stéphanie is presented as his chance to grow up and to be cured of 
his delusions. However, his insistence on English as his language is precisely what marks the 
departure of Gondry’s narrative from Jensen’s novella. Whereas in “Gradiva”, the 
protagonists turn out to share a native language, in The Science of Sleep, they approach each 
other through two different languages. The chance of healing seems to depend on the 
protagonist’s switch into his neighbor’s, or therapist’s language. But just like Stéphane will 
not manage to cross the language boundary and speak Stéphanie’s language, French, he will 
not overstep the line of a Platonic relationship. The happy resolution, in which the protagonist 
is healed by admitting his love for the woman who acts as his therapist, is not possible here 
since Stéphane never takes up French, presented as the language of emotions. 
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Shortly before leaving France, Stéphane, strangely enough, tells Stéphanie: “Your 
English is very good.” (1:31:30) While her English has never been an obstruction to their 
communication, and indeed seems somewhat more natural than his own accented English, 
Stéphane’s French has not developed during his stay. Therefore, Stéphane will be forced to 
admit to his neighbor that his language barrier coincides with an emotional barrier: “I can’t 
speak French with you. I’m too shy.” (1:31:34) His inability to speak French is portrayed 
largely as the result of his family history: “I cannot speak French”, he explains to Stéphanie 
and his mother, “because whenever I speak I feel that my moustache grows more than when I 
speak Spanish”. (1:13:00) What sounds like a childish and whimsical refusal can be 
interpreted as his inability to overcome the death of his father, who would have spoken 
Spanish to him. It appears that he is trying to freeze in time and not undergo any changes that 
he cannot share with his deceased father. This can be said to account for his unconscious 
refusal to act as a grown-up in French as well as for his urge to work on paintings of 
catastrophes for a calendar, a means of orientation in time and an obvious parallel to Atom 
Egoyan’s film discussed in the first chapter. 
Stéphane’s return to France transports him back in time, until, to use a metaphor from 
the film, he seems to fall into a black hole. Stéphanie, trying to comfort him on the phone, 
says: “You know you could never see someone fall in a black hole. Because the image of the 
traveller who passes the horizon would slow down till it would remain stuck in the same 
position. The state he was when he crossed the line” (1:11:17). Stéphane’s behavior and 
regression can be understood through this image of the individual stuck in time. His mind 
seems to have returned to the moment when he was still living in France, with his parents, and 
when they still were a family unit. The line that he has crossed back is the traumatic memory 
of the broken family and his feeling of guilt about leaving his mother. This can explain the 
ending of the film when he apologizes to his mother: “I’m sorry I went with dad when he left” 
(1:29:47).  
Stéphane’s regression to a childhood state lends itself to an analysis in psychoanalytic 
terms. According to psychoanalysis, the ego is developed following a series of phases that 
lead to the healthy and complete formation of the self in the world. The stages of 
psychosexual development – oral, anal, phallic, latency and genital – are necessary steps on 
the way towards a healthy sexuality. As the film implies, Stéphane returns to the anal phase of 
psychosexual development. As Lacan points out, “childhood sexuality goes through an anal 
stage of organization and grant erotic value to the excretory function and the excremental 
object alike” (2006, 73). Anna Freud further explains this phase, arguing that “the well-known 
173 
 
sublimatory occupations of painting, modeling, water and sand playing point back to anal and 
urethral preoccupation. The dismantling of toys because of the wish to know what is inside 
betrays sexual curiosity” (1989, 19). 
These ideas seem to describe Gondry’s Stéphane in many ways. First, he enjoys 
creating and painting, as well as being surrounded by the creative energy of Stéphanie, whom 
he does not perceive as a potential sexual partner but as an artistic playmate. Moreover, he 
keeps his grotesque collection of paintings for a calendar, his “Disasterology,” inside a big 
green folder bearing the motto: “Intestino grueso”. This name is Spanish for “large intestine,” 
the last section of the human digestive system, whose function is to store faeces before 
defecation. The connection with an anal stage of psychosexuality seems obvious, and is even 
reinforced when his colleague, Guy, pronounces his opinion on the young artist-to-be: “The 
collection is crap anyway” (10:47), a statement that Stéphane accepts without hesitation or 
protest. Further, Stéphane enjoys assembling and disassembling toys and machines, and in his 
dreams he also seems to enjoy playing with sand. For instance, when, in a dream, he destroys 
the whole world, the reconstruction is depicted through the sandbox-like image of toy 
machines digging up an apocalyptic landscape. Stéphane controls these toy machines as if he 
were the conductor of an orchestra, showing manifest expressions of pleasure and fulfillment 
(51:21).  
As to Stéphane’s dream studio, its entire design seems to be the product of handicraft, 
which, as mentioned above, points to a typical activity of children in their anal stage of 
psychosexual development. Thus, the walls are covered by egg cartons, a home remedy for 
sound isolation, and the cameras are made of old cardboard boxes. A bluebox is visible 
behind a transparent plastic curtain. Significantly, one of the walls of his studio displays two 
little windows, which can be said to represent his eyes and vision of the external world. This 
symbolic set-up deserves further attention. Positioned between the unconscious world of his 
dreams that can be accessed through the bluebox and the conscious world that lies outside the 
studio windows, the studio itself can be said to occupy the position of the preconscious. By 
manually operating the blinds of the windows as well as the rest of the studio, Stéphane seems 
to struggle for control over his entire mental apparatus, or, in Freud’s terms, to make his ego 
“the master in its own house” (1955b, 143). 
Visually, the film emphasizes the perception of Stéphane’s world as something self-
made and obsessively created by means of the use of stop-motion animation and other camera 
effects that work more like handicrafts than as special effects. The visual world of the film 
seems to celebrate the protagonist’s dreams of absolute control by leaving little space for an 
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external reality as perceived through a different point of focalization. The editing is defined 
by “transversal cuts in the film, heterogeneous assemblages, producing transformations or 
‘becomings’ that are both childlike and childish” (Shaviro 2006, online). At the moment of 
highest control, the curious gadgets and visual effects move beyond the simple childishness of 
the character, beyond his apparent “wide-eyed innocence” (Lawrenson, 2006: online), and 
point to Stéphane’s obsessive behavior. He seems to be driven by the desire to reach a certain 
power that will allow him to show himself off as a world creator deserving praise and 
admiration. In this sense, he is not so different from the neurotic film director in Atom 
Egoyan’s Calendar: not only do both prove to be obsessed with controlling their surroundings 
by dominating the visual space; significantly, they both professionalize as creators of calendar 
images, which appears to make them ‘masters of time’. However, their attempts stand out 
mostly in their traumatic quality, since they both try to freeze ‘catastrophic’ moments in time: 
the loss of one’s partner in Calendar, and natural and technical disasters in The Science of 
Sleep. 
In line with this, the utmost wish to control reality inspires Stéphane to create a 
compulsively repetitive one-second time-travel machine. Although it appears that Stéphanie is 
just playing along with Stéphane’s fantasies, the machine allegedly allows them to go back or 
forth in time for just one second. When given the machine, Stéphanie asks: “What are you 
going to do with just one second?”, to which Stéphane replies: “Well, it just adds up, and life 
is too precious” (1:01:11). However, instead of adding up, the machine actually allows him to 
repeat the same action once and again, seemingly without moving on in time. Not 
coincidentally, the machine, as can be seen in a close-up, is made of old pieces of an old 
“Simon says” game (1:01:40), in which the main task consists in quickly following pre-
recorded commands. Thus, rather than granting free movement in time, the machine is 
marked by the rule of repetition-compulsion. 
 
Narcissism and monolingual anxiety 
 
Moreover, Stéphane’s condition is dominated by narcissism. Whereas primary narcissism is 
considered by Freud as normal in children during the ‘oral phase’ of their psychosexual 
development, secondary narcissism, as in the case of Stéphane, implies that “[t]he libido […] 
has been withdrawn from the external world [and] has been directed to the ego” (1957b, 74). 
In his essay, “On Narcissism: An Introduction”, Freud defines an extreme case of narcissism 
as “paraphrenia”, a combination of paranoia and schizophrenia, which, in its morbid form, he 
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characterized by the “detachment of libido from its objects and, further, megalomania, 
hypochondria, affective disturbance and every kind of regression” (1957b, 86). This clinical 
picture seems to well describe Gondry’s protagonist. His regression and megalomania have 
been pointed out in the previous paragraphs. As to his detachment of libido from its objects, 
this materializes particularly clearly in his relationship with Stéphanie. While he may present 
her in a childish way with self-made gadgets, his narcissism gets in his way with the first 
signs of his falling in love. As Freud highlights, “the aim and the satisfaction in a narcissistic 
object-choice is to be loved” (ibid., 98). For the extreme narcissist or “paraphrenic”, then, 
“[l]oving in itself, in so far as it involves longing and deprivation, lowers self-regard; whereas 
being loved, having one’s love returned, and possessing the loved object, raises it once more” 
(ibid., 99). The fear of falling in love and not having his love returned is most palpable in the 
scene, in which Stéphane, upon reaching the café in which Stéphanie is waiting to meet him 
for a first date, turns around and runs away, being entirely convinced that she will not show 
up and his dependence on her will have disastrous consequences. 
Further, in narcissism, the state of sleep, in which the viewer repeatedly gets to watch 
the protagonist, occupies a central part. Thus, Freud writes:  
The condition of sleep, too, resembles illness in implying a narcissistic withdrawal of the positions 
of the libido on to the subject’s own self, or, more precisely, on to the single wish to sleep. The 
egoism of dreams fits very well into this context. (1957b, 83) 
In fact, in the film, Stéphane’s condition of sleep and dreaming increasingly take up all space 
until they clearly dominate over his fictional reality. What stands out in this context is his 
continuous wish to be taken to sleep by Stéphanie. Thus, Gondry shows us three scenes, in 
which his neighbor almost lulls him into sleep. These scenes demonstrate his need to feel 
loved and at the same time to escape into sleep and into egoistic dreams, before Stéphanie can 
possibly voice the demand to be loved back. 
 In Freudian terms, the emergence of secondary narcissism can be traced back to the 
development of the three parts of the psychic apparatus. As he writes in his essay on 
narcissism,  
[t]he development of the ego consists in a departure from primary narcissism and gives rise to a 
vigorous attempt to recover that state. This departure is brought about by means of the 
displacement of libido on to an ego ideal imposed from without; and satisfaction is brought about 
from fulfilling this ideal. (1957b, 100) 
Troping Stéphane’s state of narcissism, the film centers on the formation of his “ego ideal”, a 
term used synonymously with “superego”. Contrary to Gondry’s assertion that he is not 
interested in psychoanalysis, the film incorporates a structural model of the psychic apparatus 
as introduced by Freud. Thus, Stéphane’s dreams clearly represent the world of his drives, or 
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his “id”; his imaginary show, “Stéphane TV”, features his “ego ideal” or “superego”; and the 
remaining scraps of reality highlight his ego as it tries to mediate between the other two 
systems.  
As I would like to argue, the film tropes the conflict between the parts of the 
protagonist’s psychic apparatus as a conflict between his languages. As mentioned above, 
French, for him, comes to symbolize the sexual drives, while Spanish, the language of his 
deceased father, is largely associated with the death drive. At this point, it remains to discuss 
the role of his English, which, as shall be shown, is the language in which the protagonist tries 
to regain power in his internal and also external reality. The hint for such an attempt seems to 
be given by a toy action figure that can be repeatedly heard reproducing the recorded 
message: “Come in action two; can you complete the mission?” (06:33) English is thus 
summoned in the context of taking urgent action and succeeding in one’s enterprise, and the 
recording can be well understood as addressed to Stéphane. Thus, his return to France may be 
seen as “action two” and his “mission” to restore control over his own life. 
Given this context, it comes as no surprise that despite the French title of his TV 
program, “Télévision Educative”, English is the exclusive language spoken ‘on air’. While in 
the external world, the protagonist is confused and helpless with regard to the language 
spoken around him, in his ‘dream show’, he initially appears as the true master of the 
ceremony. Using English, he does not seem ‘lost in translation’; on the contrary, he presents 
himself as an eloquent speaker ready to enlighten the viewer on comically complex notions, 
such as the “Parallel Synchronized Randomness” (18:30) or, the parody of the Rapid Eye 
Movement (REM), the “Rapid Eye Monitronics” (49:56).  
In his “Stéphane TV”, the protagonist finds the stage to present an idealized image of 
himself, perfectly shaved, combed and dressed. As Sam Davies points out, “this super-
confident Stéphane, part science-lecturer, part artist, is the opposite of the troubled and 
reclusive individual we see struggling to cope with the waking world” (2006, online). Perfect 
and spotless, he is the director of his own show and the master of his world. Particularly his 
wearing of his father’s suit marks this image of himself as his own “ego ideal” or “superego”, 
the institution of self-control, obeying and perpetrating rules and morals imposed by society. 
What is more, he not only gives rational explanations on the science of sleep, he also actively 
prepares his own dreams like a chef in a cooking show. This emphasizes another function of 
the “ego ideal”. Choosing ingredients such as “random thoughts”, “reminiscences of the day” 
and “memories from the past”, he becomes the film director of his dreams, editing and 
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censoring anything that does not fit in his ideal vision of the world. This fact strongly 
resembles Freud’s contention that  
if we enter further into the structure of the ego, we may recognize in the ego ideal and in the 
dynamic utterances of conscience the dream-censor as well. If this censor is to some extent on the 
alert even during sleep, we can understand how it is that its suggested activity of self-observation 
and self-criticism […] makes a contribution to the content of the dream (1957b, 97, emphasis in 
the original). 
The act of censoring is demonstrated when, much to Stéphane’s surprise, we see his mother 
appear in the TV studio. With the words: “Are you trying to mock me on air?” (17:19), he 
takes action as a stage manager and relegates her backstage. His desire to control his dreams 
is also palpable in his waking life. When Gérard, his mother’s new partner, explains to him, in 
a comically wrong way, the significance of eye movement during deep sleep, and how it can 
be controlled, Stéphane exhorts triumphantly: “No more sleeping slavery!” (50:16) The very 
night of this discovery, he creates an ingenious device through which to guide his dreams in 
the direction he wants by means of a tape recorder that switches on during the REM phase of 
his sleep. That way, he hopes to achieve absolute mastery of the dream world. In fact, in this 
controlled dream, he becomes a god-like figure who destroys the old world and rebuilds it 
according to his wishes and imagination. This is the ultimate dream of the narcissistic 
personality: in his work colleagues, he finds an audience to whom to demonstrate his almighty 
powers, and he has absolute power over the world. It is precisely this controlled dream that 
means a turning point in the film, as Stéphane’s behavior will become more obsessive and 
controlling from this moment on. 
 In the long run, the protagonist’s attempts to edit his dreams are not crowned with 
success, since his monolingual dream studio cannot withstand the pressure of reality and his 
unconscious. Initially presented as an educational and creative space, the studio gradually 
turns into a bunker protecting Stéphane from his everyday life and his own dreams, but, most 
of all, the languages of his parents. His mother’s sudden appearance in this bunker therefore 
signals a hostile intrusion – an intrusion that cannot be warded off. After all, Stéphane’s 
attempt to make his mother disappear only demonstrates that his studio has but one door: the 
entrance door to his unconscious. Due to this design, the metaphorical attempt to repress the 
presence of his mother only leads to her entry into his dreams. Immediately, a home video 
showing old scenes from their family life appears on his dream screen and, despite his protest, 
Stéphane is left without any means to turn off the dream images. This intrusion only 
anticipates other one to come: soon enough the studio is invaded not only by his mother, but 
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also by his French-speaking colleagues, who appear like uninvited talk show guests and 
undermine the imposed monolingualism of the protagonist’s studio. 
 At the same time, it becomes obvious that the English language does not offer any 
protection from the intrusion of unconscious memories in Stéphane’s everyday life either. 
Although Stéphanie switches into English to communicate with him, a grotesque slip of the 
tongue – confirming the suspicion that she is but a figment of the protagonist’s imagination – 
marks the impossibility of escaping from the past: “How is your dad … ah… your hand?” 
(28:02), she asks the protagonist after he has had an accident while trying to help carry her 
piano and has told her about the death of his father. The fast healing process of his injury, 
which Zoë, with an expert gesture, had treated with an odor neutralizer, seems to be 
mentioned only to contrast the incurability of his father’s disease. 
 It is curious to observe that in Stéphane’s dreams, his colleagues begin to speak not 
only French, but also an unintelligible gibberish that cannot be translated. A scene at his 
workplace shows that Stéphane is trying to avoid not only the languages of his parents, but 
also any sudden transgressions of language boundaries – a pattern of behavior that can be 
understood in the context of his sudden departure with his father into a different country and 
language. When Guy spontaneously mixes, of all, the two languages of Stéphane’s parents, 
the protagonist turns hysterical and yells: “I can’t understand you guys when you talk to me in 
two different languages. It makes me feel schizometric” (57:20) This moment once again 
reveals the irresolvable conflict that young Stéphane had absorbed with the break-up of his 
parents. To hear both languages or voices at the same time, seems to trigger a panic in him as 
if he was being torn apart. The delusions caused by his own linguistic border-crossing back 
into French cannot be cured until the end of the narrative. This makes his impending 
departure back to Mexico appear as an ultimate defeat, since the psychological conflict 
between the two languages has not been defused and the viewer can only imagine Stéphane’s 
condition upon returning into his deceased father’s language, Spanish.  
Nevertheless, the farewell scene with Stéphanie, which postpones or possibly even 
cancels his departure, provides a glimmer of hope. Entering his neighbor’s apartment, the 
protagonist notices that she has completed the work both on her bunk bed and on a little fabric 
boat that, in Stéphanie’s words, “is looking for its mer/mère” (30:55). The ambiguity of 
“mer/mère”, which, as the young woman points out herself, “sounds both like ‘mother’ and 
‘sea’ in French”, opens a metaphorical space linking Stéphane’s situation to that of the boat. 
Like the boat, the protagonist is not in his element, which in his case can be mostly interpreted 
as not being in the ‘right’ language. The search for the right element and language is revealed 
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as connected to the figure of the mother. In this way, the little boat metaphorically explains 
Stéphane’s confusion about his return both to his mother and his mother tongue. Clearly, 
neither of them is simply found just because of Stéphane’s setting foot on native territory. 
At the same time, the observation that work on the little boat is completed helps him 
draw a boundary between Stéphanie and his mother, whom he had previously compared in 
their inability to finish anything. The effect of transference thus seems to be contained and 
leads to the final dream presented in the film. In this dream, he and Stéphanie are sailing on 
the very boat that is looking for its mer/mère. The symbolism of the boat had been already 
hinted at by Stéphane in the opening scene of the film, in which he subsumed friendships and 
relationships under the label of “all those ships”. Through the bilingual troping of the boat’s 
objective, Stéphanie clearly references his longing for a reconnection with his mother. The 
search for the mother figures as a missing link in his traumatic family narrative, in which he 
has left her behind, giving preference to his father. The dream images also include the rivers 
that, as we learn from the protagonist’s first dream, his tears had formed after his father’s 
death. The linguistic border-crossing implied in Stéphanie’s description of the “boat looking 
for its mer/mère” seems to break down Stéphane’s resistance and makes him take a first step 
towards healing. Thus, while the film’s ending in a dream can hardly be seen as a sign of the 
protagonist’s recovery, the dream comes to encompass all his three languages, which 
eventually raises a spark of hope for the working-through of the family conflict and his inner 
split between languages. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As the analyses of the two films show, despite their technically complex visual depictions of 
the unconscious, both Europa and The Science of Sleep are deeply engaged with the issue of 
linguistic border-crossings. While both films have their protagonists perish or get lost in 
multilingual confusion, they are far from formulating an apology for the hegemony of 
monolingualism. On the contrary, the longing for monolingualism – in The Science of Sleep 
on the part of the narcissistic protagonist and in Europa on the part of the military forces 
gathered in post-war Germany – presents the very cause of the protagonists’ breakdown and 
demise. Thus, both films present a meta-narrative that seems deeply critical of monolingual 
claims to power. 
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 The fact that both films seek to captivate the viewers by means of spectacular 
aesthetics can be said to reveal a hidden agenda. Struggling to discern between dream and 
reality within the fictional world, the viewers find themselves hypnotized by the baffling 
visual effects and lulled into a dream-like state. In the cinematic dream, they hardly become 
consciously aware of the pattern behind the linguistic code-switching in the film. While 
supporting the viewers with subtitles, the films subtly immerse them into a multilingual 
dream. This way, the audience is both engaged and influenced in formulating a response to 
the initial question of this chapter: Which language do you dream in? 
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4. Translating Trauma: Jonathan Safran Foer’s Everything Is Illuminated (2002) and 
Edwidge Danticat’s The Farming of Bones (1998) 
 
As the examples of Self and The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao point out, multilingualism 
not only plays a central role in the creation of national and gender identities. Fostering 
polyvocality, it also enters the stage as an antagonist of trauma, which can be understood as 
the annihilation of any voice. This aspect at the same time introduces the topic of the final 
chapter of this thesis: the negotiation of linguistic border-crossings as a means of working 
through trauma. The two works discussed in this chapter, Everything Is Illuminated by 
Jonathan Safran Foer and The Farming of Bones by Edwidge Danticat, present an utterly 
different connection of the themes of trauma and translation from the one established in Eva 
Hoffman’s Lost in Translation and Atom Egoyan’s Calendar. Whereas in the latter works, 
translation is depicted in its potentially traumatizing capacity, the former two envision the act 
of translation as therapeutic in dealing with historical trauma. Far from being depicted as a 
readily available remedy, translation emerges as a difficult or even impossible mission. As I 
would like to contend, the question of translatability is closely bound up in both novels with 
the possibility of healing, of working through psychical as well as physical trauma. 
 The traumas at the center of Foer’s and Danticat’s novels are linked to two genocides 
that occurred at a similar time in different parts of the world – the extermination of Jews in 
Ukraine during the Holocaust in Everything Is Illuminated and the so-called Parsley Massacre 
of 1937, in which thousands of Haitians living in the border area of the Dominican Republic 
were killed at the order of Rafael Trujillo. Published in 2002 and 1998, respectively, the two 
novels are united by the fact that they both deal with events dating back roughly 60 years – or 
two generations. The historical distance is accompanied by a geographical one. Both writing 
projects begin in New York, where the two authors currently live, and from where each of 
them, in preparation to the writing, undertook a journey to the real setting of their narratives. 
Not surprisingly, the accounts of their research journeys coincide in that neither of them found 
any traces of traumatic history in the places they visited. Thus, Foer reports on his journey to 
Ukraine: 
I found nothing but nothing, and in that nothing – a landscape of completely realized absence – 
nothing was to be found. […] I returned to Prague, where I had planned to write the story of what 
had happened. But what had happened? […] What made beginning so difficult, and the remainder 
so seemingly automatic, was imagination – the initial problem, and ultimate liberation, of 
imagining. (Foer, date unknown, online) 
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In a similar vein, Danticat recalls in an interview arriving at the Massacre River, the border 
river between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and encountering a striking “ordinariness of 
life”, which would not betray any sign of the origins of the river’s name:  
I think it was what I didn’t find there that most moved me. I had read so much about the Massacre 
River, going from the first massacre of the colonists in the nineteenth century to this present 
massacre […]. So, it was the lack of event there that inspired me, that made me want to recall the 
past and write about this historical moment (Danticat in Wachtel 2000, 107-108). 
Both writing projects are thus sparked off by the absence or invisibility of traces of the two 
genocides. This fact opens the view onto another effect of their crossing of language 
boundaries – as a means of bridging historical and geographical distance in transgenerational 
memories. The following chapter seeks to trace the ways in which the figure of linguistic 
border-crossings serves in the troping of traumatic memory and its aftereffects on the 
descendants of the traumatized. 
 
 
On the Way to the Limits of Language: Jonathan Safran Foer’s Everything Is 
Illuminated 
 
As a paradigmatic example of third-generation Holocaust fiction, Foer’s novel is concerned 
with linguistic border-crossings in various ways. The first problem that poses itself is that of 
translingual memory, that is, of memory carried across language boundaries. Along with 
works by authors such as Saul Bellow, Sylvia Plath, William Styron, or more recently, Martin 
Amis, Nathan Englander, Tova Reich, Michael Chabon, Markus Zusak or John Boyne, Foer’s 
novel belongs to a large body of Holocaust fiction in English, a language that was not a direct 
witness to the disaster. “The primary language of neither the persecutors nor the victims,” as 
critic Alan Rosen informs us, “English has generally been viewed as marginal to the events of 
the Holocaust.” (2005, x) A heritage that was handed down primarily in Yiddish, Polish, 
German, Ukrainian and Russian necessarily raises the question of translatability. This notion 
shall offer a first key to the question of why Foer engages a translator figure at the center of 
his narrative.  
The main focus of my exploration, however, shall be on Foer’s strategy of positioning 
the figure of translation in relation to the much-invoked idea in Holocaust and Trauma Studies 
that the experience of the Holocaust breaches the limits of linguistic representation. This 
invocation is immediately apparent even in book and essay titles, such as Probing the Limits 
of Representation, a 1992 prominent collection of essays edited by Saul Friedlander, which 
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among others contains an essay by Berel Lang called “The Representation of Limits”, or 
Naomi Mandel’s Against the Unspeakable (2006), a study which considers the issue of 
complicity in the Holocaust. Addressing these postulated limits of language, Foer draws on 
the metaphorical dimension of translation highlighted, as explained in the introduction, 
already in Freud’s writings. If trauma imposes perceived limits of language, his novel implies, 
then translation enters the stage as a necessary operation that can demarcate these limits and 
possibly transcend them by carrying the expression of traumatic experience over into a 
different language. The present chapter examines Foer’s troping of his fictional translator as a 
crucial element in a psychical process of working though trauma and the peculiar correlation 
established between the chances of healing and the translator’s success.  
As I would like to argue in this chapter, the figure of the interpreter and the language 
employed as his intradiegetic discourse are pivotal in Foer’s troping of the search of a 
Holocaust language. In order to analyze the theme of translation in Everything Is Illuminated, 
it shall prove instructive to draw on Yale School trauma theory, in which the notion of 
‘trauma’ has been mainly used to describe experiences which resist their integration with 
mental schemes as well as their verbal articulation (cf. Hartman 1995, Caruth 1995, van 
Alphen 1999), as well as on the psychoanalytic works of Abraham and Torok, on translation 
theories that negotiate the chances and aporias of translation and on Bakhtin’s idea of 
heteroglossia. The mapping out of connections between these theories shall open the view 
onto Foer’s negotiation of a working-through of Holocaust trauma through the transgression 
of language boundaries. 
Troping the search for a language of the Holocaust in allegorical terms, the novel 
presents us with a young Jewish American protagonist, who shares the author’s name of 
Jonathan and travels from the USA to Ukraine seeking to shed light on his grandfather’s story 
of survival during the Holocaust. Relying on the services of the dubious travel agency, 
“Heritage Touring” (3), he finds himself accompanied by Alex, a self-appointed interpreter, 
and the latter’s grandfather. While the search for Augustine, the alleged saviour of Jonathan’s 
grandfather, is not crowned with success, it becomes the frame of various comical episodes of 
intercultural exchange between the two young protagonists and eventually brings forth a 
different discovery: the traumatic story of Alex’ grandfather’s forced turn-over of his Jewish 
friend Herschel to the SS troops. The narrative is presented as an epistolary novel consisting 
of three narrative strands: Jonathan’s magic-realist account of the shtetl history until its 
destruction, the interpreter’s letters to Jonathan, and Alex’ imaginative account of their 
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common journey through Ukraine – with the last two strands boasting a highly unidiomatic, 
hilarious “language of English” (4).  
 In fact, the idea of the linguistically and otherwise turbulent journey is sparked off by 
a previous language barrier, namely the one between Jonathan and his Yiddish-speaking 
grandmother, who had fled to the United States as a Holocaust survivor before meeting his 
now deceased grandfather. Being the only person from whom Jonathan could learn about his 
grandfather’s escape, the grandmother is a problematic source of information, since she seems 
to never have carried her memories of war-time Europe over into English, but kept them 
locked away in Yiddish. The only clue the boy receives from her about Holocaust survival is a 
visual one, namely an old photograph of his grandfather with his alleged saviour, Augustine, 
which later guides his search for their traces in Ukraine. The search for Augustine becomes a 
project of translation, since the testimonies of the witnesses the protagonists manage to find 
are entirely mediated through the discourse of the interpreter, Alex. 
 To be sure, Foer’s narrative strategy that shall be treated as multilingual in this thesis 
widely differs from those employed by writers such as Yann Martel, Junot Diaz or Edwidge 
Danticat. While the latter work with one or more languages other than English, thus 
establishing a multilingual mental geography, Foer’s novel lacks any trace of a real language 
other than English and encompasses only two linguistic variations: standard English and its 
broken, unidiomatic counterpart. Also, in contrast to cinematic narratives such as in Europa 
or Calendar, Foer’s Everything Is Illuminated, just like its film adaption by Liev Schreiber, 
does not present a multilingual fictional world, in which the non-English characters would 
speak their non-English languages. Even though the entire narrative is set in north-western 
Ukraine, the novel does not contain a single word in Ukrainian. Whatever the Ukrainian 
characters say is mediated through the interpreter’s broken English. Were it not for the film 
adaptation, in which Alex faces some local workers’ animosity for coming from the in Soviet 
times Russian-speaking capital of Ukraine, the reader or viewer might not even wonder 
whether the language he is meant to interpret into English is Russian or Ukrainian.  
What is more, the unidiomatic language of the interpreter is as artificially constructed 
as the boundary between the two linguistic discourses in the novel. While the author has us 
believe that Alex speaks a “fusion of Russian and Ukrainian” (112), his discourse is not 
coloured by either of the languages. Significantly, the source of the interpreter’s verbal faux 
pas is not a bilingual dictionary, but an English thesaurus given to him by Jonathan (23). The 
brokenness of his English is largely constructed through distortions of English idioms. Thus, 
in Alex’ discourse, the idiom “to eat humble pie” mutates into “eat[ing] a slice of humble pie” 
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(23) and the expression “pins and needles” becomes “needles and nails” when Alex describes 
his tired legs (31). Other expressions are unidiomatically transformed into adjectives, which 
results in creations such as “being an upright person” (31) instead of ‘standing upright’ or “[to 
be made] a tickled-pink person” instead of being ‘tickled pink’.  Alex unskilled use of the 
thesaurus serves as the explanation of his lexical confusions such as “currency” for ‘money’ 
(53), “rigid” for ‘difficult’ (54), “amputate” for ‘remove’ (55) or “guilelessly” for ‘sincerely’ 
(55). All these examples demonstrate that Foer’s puns originate exclusively in English and not 
along the language borders to Ukrainian or Russian. Thus, in contrast to Anthony Burgess’ 
slang A Clockwork Orange, the interpreter’s discourse is neither hybrid nor even accented, but 
is best described as thesaurese. 
This absence of a real second language in the discourse of the novel implies that 
Foer’s main interest does not lie on the sociopolitical circumstances of the journey. However, 
in the context of this thesis, the exploration of Everything Is Illuminated is useful and 
necessary for two afore-mentioned reasons: first, the centrality of the figure of the translator, 
whose narrative voice in fact dominates the novel, and second, the particularity of his broken 
language. Both features stress the significance the figure of language boundaries in the novel, 
and suggest to read the novel as an allegorical text negotiating the relation between trauma 
and translation theories. 
 
 
The task of the translator 
 
While the search for Augustine is initiated by Jonathan, Foer makes the success of this 
endeavour depend on the performance of the translator figure, Alex. Hired almost by accident 
and obviously against his will, as we learn from the young man’s exchange with his father (4), 
Alex occupies centre stage in the novel, both in his role as Jonathan’s companion and as the 
focalizer and voice behind the travelogue, through which the reader learns about their journey 
through Ukraine. How exactly does the novel negotiate the role of the interpreter? How does 
Alex perform in this role? And why does Foer centralise his character to the extent of making 
him an equal narrator next to Jonathan? 
 To approach these questions, I shall take my first cue from Walter Benjamin’s “The 
Task of the Translator” (1923). The translator depicted in this essay does not operate in a 
functional context of merely transporting certain content from one language into another, or to 
help addressees who may not understand the language of the original. Instead, the translator is 
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entrusted with the metaphysical task of making the kinship between different languages 
visible through translation and, thus, to expose a greater language that is held captive in an 
alienated shape in all languages. In Benjamin’s view,  
it is the task of the translator to release in his own language that pure language which is under the 
spell of another, to liberate the language imprisoned in a work in his re-creation of that work. For 
the sake of pure language he breaks through decayed barriers of his own language. (2000, 22) 
At first glance, it seems tempting to draw a parallel between the tasks of Foer’s and 
Benjamin’s translators. At the onset of the essay, Benjamin raises the question of whether 
translation operates in the service of its addressee: “Is a translation meant for readers who do 
not understand the original?” (2000, 15) In the context of Foer’s novel, Benjamin’s question 
can be rephrased as: Does Alex’ translation really serve his American guest, who would 
otherwise be unable to follow the conversations in Russian and Ukrainian? Like in 
Benjamin’s essay, this question is clearly answered in the negative in Everything Is 
Illuminated. In fact, the translation is anything but addressee-oriented, which for example 
becomes clear in the passages, in which Jonathan is stopped by the interpreter while trying to 
ask Augustine an entire catalogue of questions: 
“Ask her to tell us everything”, the hero [Jonathan] said. “I want to hear about how she met my 
grandfather, and why she decided to save him, and what happened to her family, and if she ever 
talked to my grandfather after the war. Find out,” he said quietly, as if she might have 
comprehended, “if they were in love.” “Slowness”, I said. (148) 
Alex not only takes the lead in the conversation, he also presents the reader with certain 
utterances that are left untranslated during his journey with Jonathan. Thus, when the cruelty 
of the narrated events, such as the shooting of Augustine’s family, becomes unbearable to the 
latter, he withdraws from the conversation with the words: “‘I don’t want to hear any more,’ 
the hero said, so it was at this point that I ceased translating” (186). Despite this interruption 
by the addressee Alex continues his narrative, which is how the reader learns about 
Augustine’s survival of the Holocaust. In the moment of resisting the wish of his client, Alex 
demonstrates his twofold task: to help the traumatized witnesses speak about their experience 
and to find a language that would carry the burden of trauma.  
 As Benjamin formulates in his essay, there is a close connection between translation 
and survival: “a translation issues from the original – not so much from its life as from its 
afterlife” (2000, 16). In the narrative of Everything Is Illuminated, the success of the 
protagonists’ search of course also depends on the survival of the eye-witnesses, who have 
absorbed a traumatically charged original text. The interdependence between the traces of this 
original and the search for them that is figured as an act of translation is thematised in the 
novel when Augustine passes on a wedding ring to Jonathan which a shtetl inhabitant had 
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hidden and buried in the ground. At first, the protagonists assume that the burying of the ring 
had been meant to provide evidence, documentation and testimony for generations to come 
(192). However, Augustine proves them wrong by reversing the cause-effect relationship 
between the search and the existence of traces: “The ring does not exist for you. You exist for 
the ring.” (192) In analogy to Benjamin’s ideas, the survival of an original does not depend on 
its translation – it is the translation that comes into being because of the afterlife of original 
traces. 
At the same time, the relation between survival and testimony is put into question in the 
novel. As psychologists note, survivors of the Holocaust perceive the act of testimony as a 
very difficult task, since for the victims, the dehumanizing racial discourse of the Nazis 
extinguished any possibility of an address to an other. Invoking Martin Buber’s philosophical 
postulate of the encounter with the Other underlying the formation of subjectivity, 
psychoanalyst Dori Laub points out that the racial discourse on the inhumanity and otherness 
of the Jews 
extinguished philosophically the very possibility of address, the possibility of appealing, or of 
turning to, another. But when one cannot turn to a ‘you’ one cannot say ‘thou’ even to oneself. The 
Holocaust created in this way a world in which one could not bear witness to oneself (1995, 66). 
Laub’s philosophical argument that the annihilation of subjectivity is caused by the 
impossibility of turning to an Other is enacted in the novel in an almost literal way, when 
Augustine recalls the neighbors turning their backs on her suffering (187), after previously 
admitting: “I am so ashamed […] You had to do anything. You could not allow anyone to see 
your face after.” (155)  
As Dori Laub contends, “the event produced no witnesses” due to the intrinsical nature 
of the Holocaust. This statement does not only encompass the historical reality of physical 
extermination, for, as Laub explains, “the inherently incomprehensible and deceptive 
psychological structure of the event precluded its own witnessing, even by its very victims” 
(1995, 65). According to Laub, this structure consists in the fact that on the one hand it was 
impossible to detach oneself so as to view the cataclysmic events from outside, as in the light 
of the “contaminating power of the event” no observer could possibly maintain their integrity, 
falling either into the role of victim or perpetrator (1995, 66). As being inside the events 
meant that “one could not bear witness to oneself”, and staying in the proximity, but outside 
the events, was inconceivable, the very possibility of witnessing the Holocaust was precluded.  
 It is this impossibility that Alex seeks to work against by taking over not only the role 
of the translator, but also that of an empathetic listener. In this endeavor, Foer has him 
encounter what Shoshana Felman und Dori Laub have described as the “radical crisis of 
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witnessing” (1992, xviii). The loss of subjectivity becomes evident during the first encounter 
with Augustine. After  denying Alex’ question of whether she has “witnessed anyone in the 
photograph” brought by Jonathan on their journey over and over again, she finally responds 
with “a tear descend[ing] to her white dress” to a rephrasing of the initial question: “Has 
anyone in this photograph ever witnessed you?” (117-18) With the change that eventually 
provokes her response being a reversal of the subject and the object, the inference suggests 
itself that Augustine has become incapable of taking a subject position on account of viewing 
herself merely as an object exposed to the tortures of the German army. In this context, Alex 
is assigned the task of liberating the traumatized witness from her object position. Even if the 
survival of the testimony, in Benjamin’s terms, does not depend on its translation, the silence 
caused by trauma can only be broken by an act of empathetic listening. Thus, the interpreter 
himself enters the stage as a necessary witness to survival of the traumatized woman. 
If Foer’s translator manages to help the eye-witness, and thus an original testimonial 
text, speak, he immediately has to face the fragmented and enigmatic nature of this text. The 
task of the translator encompasses not only an act of witnessing, but also that of the 
interpretation of a traumatic discourse. The work on fragmented material reveals a further 
point of intersection with Benjamin’s translation theory. This becomes clear through a 
passage from “The Task of the Translator”, in which the philosopher draws on the metaphor 
of language as a broken vessel: 
In the same way a translation, instead of resembling the meaning of the original, must lovingly and 
in detail incorporate the original’s mode of signification, thus making both the original and the 
translation recognizable as fragments of a greater language, just as fragments are part of a vessel. 
(2000, 21) 
What Foer’s translator figure devotes himself to structurally resembles the task described by 
Benjamin: to make scraps of language recognisable as the shattered pieces of historical 
trauma. The two ‘original texts’ that put the interpreter’s abilities to the test are two 
testimonies of Holocaust witnesses, namely of the woman the protagonists take for Augustine 
and, later, Alex’ own grandfather.  
 To outline the challenge faced by the interpreter, I would like to examine more closely 
the testimony given by the woman who considers herself to impersonate or be the destroyed 
shtetl of Trachimbrod (118). Modelled on real survivor’s testimonies, her account exhibits 
traces of shatteredness which make it almost appear like a riddle. The first puzzle the 
interpreter has to confront concerns her narrative voice. It is expressed in her account of the 
shooting of her family, which she begins in the first person, but continues by splitting into a 
first and a third person, the person of her older sister, after recalling her young sister’s death. 
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This split of voice clearly violates traditional narrative principles and provokes perplexity in 
her listeners about the seeming disappearance of the first-person narrator from the scene of 
the killing: “‘What about you?’ Grandfather asked. ‘Where were you?’ ‘I was there.’ ‘Where? 
How did you escape?’” (187) The question of how she escaped is answered in a way strongly 
alluding to the narrator’s disintegration: “My sister, I told you, was not dead.” (187) The fact 
that her older sister is introduced as an alter ego in order to tell her own story, can also be 
deduced from the internal focalization in sentences such as: “She was very cold, I remember, 
even though it was the summer.” (186) As she falls into vividly describing ‘her sister’s’ 
feelings, Alex’s reasonable question: “How can you perceive this?”, yields only one possible 
answer, namely that it is not a different character, but herself shivering at the sight of the 
horrid killing scene in the summer. 
As this passage shows, the interpreter is confronted with anything but a coherent 
original text, which he could translate into English for his client, Jonathan. Instead, he finds 
himself torn between the impulse to repair it by introducing coherence and to keep his 
translation truthful to the shatteredness of the testimony. This ambiguity is what characterizes 
his role as a ‘translator of trauma’. The fragmented nature of narrative language in real 
testimonies of traumatized Holocaust survivors has been commented on by trauma and 
Holocaust scholars alike. It could be said that Alex’ response oscillates between the attempts 
to cure the survivor and to render historical truth. Thus, psychiatrists Bessel van der Kolk and 
Onno van der Hart, who have worked much with Holocaust survivors suffering from Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), describe traumatic memories as “unassimilated scraps of 
overwhelming experiences, which need to be integrated with existing mental schemes, and be 
transformed into narrative language” (1995, 176). In this vein, the task of the interpreter 
would appear to be that of a therapist seeking to initiate a process of healing precisely by 
facilitating the integration of traumatic experience into narrative memory. 
 However, the indebtedness of Foer’s interpreter to the literal truth of the testimony 
positions him closer to the role of a historian, which is pointedly described by Yosef Hayim 
Yerushalmi: “[F]or the wounds inflicted upon Jewish life by the disintegrative blows of the 
last two hundred years the historian seems at best a pathologist, hardly a physician” (1982, 
93-94). As a pathologist, Alex is precluded from mending the broken pieces of the witness’s 
account, but finds himself obliged to instead lay bare all its traces of violence. At this point as 
the latest, it becomes clear that Foer’s translator cannot live up to Benjamin’s task of 
assembling the “fragments of a vessel” into a “greater language” or “pure language” (2000, 
190 
 
21). To better grasp the role of the translator in the novel, one needs to focus on the fact that 
the translation project is mainly defined by its failure.  
 
 
The failure of the translator 
 
How does the novel negotiate the translatability of Holocaust trauma? To approach this 
question, I shall draw on two deconstructive comments on Walter Benjamin’s “The Task of 
the Translator” by Jacques Derrida (1985) und Paul de Man (1985). The departure point of 
Derrida’s argument is the Genesis myth of the Tower of Babel, known as the myth of origins 
of both multilingualism and translation. In this myth, Derrida is mostly interested in the first 
word ever split by an act of translation, which in his reading is the word “Babel” itself – a 
proper name. Drawing on Voltaire, he assumes that “Babel” was originally the name of God: 
Babel means not only confusion in the double sense of the word, also the name of the father, more 
precisely and more commonly, the name of God as name of father. The city would bear the name 
of God the father and of the father of the city that is called confusion. (1985, 167) 
By proclaiming “Bavel, Confusion”, God introduces a translation for the name of the city, 
thus marking the proper name with a split – “God deconstructing”, Derrida ironizes (1985, 
170). This performative act entails two aspects: On the one hand, mankind is shown, in the 
very moment of linguistic confusion, a way of future communication – namely through 
translation. On the other hand, however, this endeavor is led ad absurdum, since translation is 
practiced upon a word, which as a proper name is not subject to translation. “Now, a proper 
name as such remains forever untranslatable”, Derrida writes, and concludes that the myth of 
Babel recounts “the necessary and impossible task of translation, its necessity as 
impossibility” (1985, 171). 
 Jonathan Safran Foer’s novel displays strong parallels to this line of thought, since it 
explores the question of whether and how traumatic experience can be articulated or even 
overcome by means of translation processes. In connection with Derrida’s essay, it is striking 
that Everything Is Illuminated develops a downright obsession with the translation of proper 
names. In its multiple tropings of translation, we can divine a meta-narrative which betrays 
more about the central motif of the third generation’s search for traces than about the actual 
plot. At the very onset of the novel, Alex, as narrator, draws our attention to the multiple 
versions of his own name – “Sasha”, “Shapka”, “Alexi-stop-spleening-me” (4-5). As soon as 
the American guest arrives, his own name is taken to the test of translation and “Jonathan”, 
due to Alex’ pronunciation problems, is translated into “Jon-fen” (32). This moment of his 
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being translated or literally carried across a boundary reminds of Leopold Kessler’s arrival in 
Lars von Trier’s Europa and can also be read as a rite of passage, in which the young 
American enters both the Ukrainian geographical setting and the discourse of his translator. 
 In contrast to these playful and innocuous ‘translations’, the name of the alleged savior 
of Jonathan’s grandfather, Augustine, poses a greater problem. It is not accidental that this 
name appears exclusively on the back of a pre-war photograph, which Jonathan duplicates 
and tries to use as a signpost to the shtetl of Trachimbrod. According to Marianne Hirsch, 
who in turn draws on Roland Barthes (1981) and Susan Sontag (1989), the photograph 
functions as a “harbinger of death” , since the captured moment is always already lost to the 
past (1997, 19). Instead of pointing to a living subject, whom Jonathan seeks to find on his 
journey, the photograph is an indexical sign with a lost subject of reference, a “Photo 
Morgana”, as Christina von Braun pointedly expresses (1989, 119). With its indexical 
character undiminished, the photograph, taken fifty years before the search, shows a young 
“Augustine”, who eventually merely becomes the projection screen for the desire of both 
protagonists. Without the possibility of time-travelling, the search for “Augustine” appears 
desperate. 
 The same is true for the mysterious savior’s name. If a geographical translation of 
“Jonathan” is portrayed as more or less possible, the attempts to translate or carry across the 
name of “Augustine” from the past into the present remain futile. Even when the protagonists 
do find a last survivor from Trachimbrod, who can remember Jonathan’s grandfather, the 
name and the subject of reference cannot be entirely matched, since the identity of the woman 
– who in want of another name is spontaneously christened “Augustine” – remains unclear. 
Driven by the naïve desire to find a proper translation of her name, Alex eventually cannot 
suppress the question: “Who are you?” As the traumatized survivor surprisingly informs 
them, her name is “Lista” (193). However, the name does not facilitate her identification; on 
the contrary, it calls up manifold scenarios of self-denial, split personality and the extinction 
of history – a translator’s nightmare. If this untranslatability reveals the truism that proper 
names are simply not subject to translation, the wish to overcome this condition, as the novel 
shows, is undeniable. With Derrida we could say: the protagonists obtain a legacy that obliges 
them to translate, but at the same time makes translation impossible, thus dooming them to 
fail. 
 Another name without a recoverable object of reference is that of the destroyed shtetl 
of Jonathan’s grandfather. From the onset, “Trachimbrod” bears traces of trauma. First, it 
points back the name of an imaginary forefather, Trachim, whose death by accident marks the 
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point of departure in Jonathan’s magic realist account of the shtetl history. Second, 
“Trachimbrod” stands in competition to its Slavic name “Sofiowka” (51), which 
metaphorically splits the shtetl in two and anticipates the later split of the name and the object 
of reference. When the protagonists come searching for the shtetl, it is only understandable 
that it cannot be physically located, for, since its destruction, it exists only as a name on a 
monument placed by Israeli authorities, which, significantly, reminds of the genocide not only 
in Russian, Ukrainian, Polish, Yiddish and German, but also in Ivrit and English (189). Faced 
with such a multiplicity of signifiers and the absence of an actual object of reference, Alex 
can hardly express his perplexity: 
There was nothing. When I utter 'nothing' I do not mean there was nothing except for two houses, 
and some wood on the ground, and pieces of glass, and children’s toys, and photographs. When I 
utter that there was nothing, what I intend is that there was not any of these things, or any other 
things. (184) 
If the names of  “Augustine” and “Trachimbrod” reflect an irreversible split between language 
and extralinguistic reality, then a different name in the novel reveal the traumatic origins of 
translation: the name “Alexander”, which Jonathan’s translator has inherited from his father 
and his grandfather. Once again a proper name turns out to have been subject to translation, 
once again a translation of an impossible kind. Early in the narrative, Alex presents us with a 
whole genealogy of Odessa-born Alexander Perchovs, which, as if according to a natural law, 
brings forth only male firstborns:  
Grandfather’s name is also Alexander. Supplementally is Father’s. We are all primogenitory 
children in our families, which brings us tremendous honor, on the scale of the sport of football, 
which was invented in Ukraine. I will dub my first child Alexander. If you want to know what will 
occur if my first child is a girl, I will tell you. He will not be a girl. (5) 
Yet, a confession of Alex’ grandfather disrupts this picture and produces a different truth, 
after the latter has been recognized by the protagonists in an old picture from Augustine’s 
collection. Contrary to his initial statements, as he admits, he was born in a shtetl close to 
Trachimbrod, in which he used to be addressed by the Jewish name “Eli” (250). It is left open 
to debate whether the name attests to his own Jewishness – which he, however, denies (246) – 
or is meant to be a Jewish version of the name “Alexander”, particularly because the 
grandfather’s intradiegetic narrative about his past does not necessarily seem reliable. What 
comes to light, though, is the deeply traumatic fact that he had lived in a shtetl named Kolki 
until the genocide and turned in his Jewish best friend, Herschel, to Nazi troops, in order to 
save his own family. 
 Through his betrayal and its consequences he destroys the language in which his 
experience could be articulated and stays behind with a traumatic discourse that is inflexible 
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and fixed in its own literality (Caruth 1995, 5). Thus, his original first name is revealed in a 
stream of consciousness, in which both punctuation and the blanks disappear between the 
words and the thoughts of the grandfather cannot be separated from those of Herschel: 
I felt Herschel’s hand again and I know that his hand was saying pleaseplease Eli please I do not 
want to die […] I am begging you Eli youaremyfriend do not let me die I am so afraid of dying 
Iamsoafraid it will be OK I told him it will be OK do not do this he said do something do 
something dosomething dosomething it will be OK it will beOK who was I saying that to do 
something Eli dosomething I am soafraidofdying. (250f) 
The dissociation suffered by Alex’ grandfather is symbolized through his flight to a name of 
different linguistic origins, namely to the ancient Greek ‘Alexander’. Even though this self-
translation from “Eli” to “Alexander” occurs under the threat of death, it replicates the hubris 
of the sons of Noah in the Genesis, who, according to Derrida, are punished not for the 
construction of an overly tall tower, but for striving to make a name for themselves and found 
their genealogy upon it (1985, 169). Thus, Alex’ grandfather incurs additional guilt by 
repressing the memory of his betrayal that is intricately linked to his new name. Both the 
name and the guilt are passed on to his descendants.  
  
 
The blindspot of a primal scene 
 
What occurs in Trachimbrod could, with Alfred Hirsch, be termed a second “primal scene of 
linguistic indebtedness” (1997, 398, translation mine)17. For with the experience of the 
genocide, the language of the survivors splits in two; the articulation of one’s own past 
becomes impossible. What remains are names referring to still more names which cannot 
effectively refer to the extralinguistic world. In the context of Foer’s novel, the psychoanalytic 
notion of the ‘primal scene,’ which, in Freud’s terms, denotes the young child’s witnessing of 
the parents’ sexual intercourse, of which the child retains an unconscious memory (cf. 
Laplanche and Pontalis 2006, 335) is particularly illuminating. By sending his protagonists on 
a “rigid search” for the survival story of Jonathan’s grandfather, Foer can be said to stage their 
search for a primal scene, since Trachimbrod can be seen as the place of miraculous survival 
which can be compared to an act of conception of the generations to come. This is most 
vividly reflected in Alex’s address to Augustine: “By saving his grandfather, you allowed him 
to be born.” (150) Interestingly, such a connection has already been established by Nadine 
                                                 
17
 In the original: “Urszene sprachlicher Verschuldung“. 
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Fresco, who compares the post-Holocaust generation’s inaccessibility “to the life that existed 
before their birth” precisely to the “blindspot of some primal scene” (1984, 420).  
Interestingly, Foer stages his protagonists’ experience upon finding Trachimbrod very 
much like a primal scene in the Freudian sense. After finding the woman they think to be 
Augustine and listening to her memories of the violent end of Trachimbrod and the 
neighboring shtetls, they are unexpectedly excluded from a presumably intimate conversation 
between her and Alex’s grandfather (156), like children sent to play outside. Augustine’s 
request to leave them alone is preceded by the grandfather’s interruptions and insults – 
especially during her narration of Eli’s betrayal of Herschel – which attract Alex’ attention 
even more than Augustine’s stories. With the two elderly people withdrawing, the narrative 
focuses on the generation of the descendants. Both protagonists find themselves in a situation 
that they are experiencing not for the first time, namely being excluded from their families’ 
myths of origin. A familiar scene seems to be repeated here, with the difference that this time 
the exclusion is evident and forces the protagonists to reflect upon their own situations and to 
draw parallels in their family histories. This becomes clear in a scene reminiscent of Beckett’s 
Waiting for Godot in which the two characters, at a loss for words, begin to peel corn for 
Augustine: 
‘I don’t know what to do,’ the hero said. 
‘I do not know also.” 
After that there was a famine of words for a long time. We only removed the skin from corn. […] 
‘What should we converse about?’ I asked, because I knew that it was a common decency for us to 
speak. ‘I don’t know.’ ‘There must be a thing.’ ‘Do you want to know anything else about 
America?’ he asked. ‘I cannot think of anything at this moment.’ (156) 
After a brief exchange on unimportant facts about the USA, Alex gathers courage and directs 
the conversation to the topic he is truly interested in: “Tell me more about your grandmother” 
(157).  
 This prompts Jonathan to remember the presence of his grandmother’s experience of 
narrow survival in his childhood. He informs Alex and the reader about their non-verbal and 
paraverbal communication, both of which exhibit traces of the old woman’s trauma and the 
boy’s reception of it. Thus, the protagonist remembers how, during family visits, she regularly 
used to lift him into the air “with one of her wonderful terrifying hugs”, which turns out to be 
more than a sign of joy at seeing her grandson. As he learns only later, her war-time 
experience of starvation caused her obsessive habit of checking her grandson’s weight: “It 
was important to her – more important than that I had a good time – that I gained weight 
whenever I visited. I think she wanted the fattest grandchildren in the world” (158). 
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 As to the paraverbal exchanges, we learn that Jonathan’s grandmother seeks the 
alliance with her young grandson in order to break her lifelong silence, which is conveyed 
through their common game of screaming the longest words they can think of off her back 
porch at night (159). However, this revolt against silence does not facilitate communication 
about her or the grandfather’s escape from Nazi Europe. While Jonathan comes up with the 
Greek and Latin words “Phantasmagoria!” and “Antediluvian!”, thus unwittingly articulating 
his relation to his family’s past, his grandmother resorts to Yiddish words, which the boy 
cannot understand. Not only do the unspeakable contents of the family memories remain 
hidden, they also appear to be frozen in Yiddish, the language in which they have come into 
being, and resist translation into English. Thus, displaying an indexical connection to her past 
on a linguistic as well as paralinguistic level, the grandmother’s screams do not bridge her and 
Jonathan’s discursive frames of reference. This sad ‘game’ reflects insights from the 
psychoanalytic study of the transmission of trauma. As Nadine Fresco lucidly shows in her 
1984 analysis of interviews with children of camp survivors, Holocaust survivors, more often 
than not “transmitted only the wound” (1984, 419), but not its meaning, which becomes 
apparent in a rupture of the discursive order between the generations. Sensing such a rupture 
in his own family, Alex questions his companion about his grandmother: 
 “What were the words that she would scream?” “I don’t know. I never knew what they meant. I 
can still hear her.” He screamed a Yiddish word into the street. “Why didn’t you ask her what the 
words meant?” “I was afraid.” “Of what were you afraid?” “I don’t know. I was just too afraid. I 
knew I wasn’t supposed to ask, so I didn’t.” “Perhaps she desired for you to ask.” “No.” “Perhaps 
she needed you to ask, because if you didn’t ask, she couldn’t tell you.” “No.” “Perhaps she was 
shouting, Ask me! Ask me what I’m shouting!” (159) 
As this dialogue reveals, it is not only Jonathan’s non-understanding of Yiddish, but also the 
silent imperative not to inquire about the past and a lack of real address on both sides, which 
prevents them from communicating about the historical trauma. This corresponds to Ernst van 
Alphen’s statement that the condition for real understanding, that is, proper address, is often 
left unfulfilled between Holocaust survivors and their descendants, which results in the 
latter’s inability to relate to their family’s past (2006, 481). As Nadine Fresco confirms, the 
survivors handed on nothing but “compact void of the unspeakable” to their children, a 
silence the second generation has kept so as not to expose the parents’ wounds (1984, 419).  
If silence dominates the relationship of the first-hand witnesses to their children, the 
following, third generation, receives the legacy of a double gap in memory. The passing on of 
the Holocaust and war trauma to the third generation exponentiates what Henri Raczymow 
has called “mémoire trouée”, or “memory shot through with holes” (1994, 98). Such 
intergenerational silence is ingeniously inscribed in the narrative through the configuration of 
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the parents’ generation as a blank space. While Jonathan’s parents hardly emerge in any of the 
narrative strands, in Alex’ family, as Fresco might say, silence itself has been silenced 
through the boy’s father’s alcoholism and violence. Thus, the memory holes condition 
Jonathan’s keenness to embark on a “very rigid search” through the Ukraine (105), while at 
the same time, they account for Alex’ initial disinterest in guiding a “Heritage Tour”. In a 
famous study, Marianne Hirsch introduces the concept of postmemory as a form of 
consciousness shared by the descendants of Holocaust survivors (1997, 22). According to 
Hirsch, “[p]ostmemory characterizes the experience of those who grow up dominated by 
narratives that preceded their birth” and presents “a powerful and very particular form of 
memory”, whose “connection to its object or source is mediated not through recollection but 
through an imaginative investment and creation” (1997, 22). Such an imaginative investment 
can be clearly recognized on the part of Jonathan, who has grown up surrounded, if not by 
narratives, then at least by signs pointing to his grandparents’ Holocaust experience. The 
magic realist account of the history of Trachimbrod seems precisely the product of the desire 
to fill in the gaps of the family narrative.  
The character of Alex presents a different case, since his family narrative is marked 
not by memory holes but by a total erasure of memory. As explained above, the grandfather’s 
‘translation’ of his own name from “Eli” to “Alex” suggests a Derridean reading. This act of 
translation aims at the separation of his person from his name, which is supposed to make his 
guilt invisible. In consequence, the split becomes the marker of trauma and of guilt, which is 
evacuated from the family narrative only by sinking into its unconscious. Thus, Alex 
encounters this guilt as an invisible and unconscious legacy, which, in Derrida’s terms, can be 
described as “insolvent debt within a genealogical scene” (1985, 176). Without his 
knowledge, his inherited name continues to refer to the traumatic split between the signifier 
and the signified. Derrida’s troping of translation as “Wiedergabe, Sinnwiedergabe, 
restitution, restitution of meaning” (ibid.) can explain why Alex is forced by his father to 
work as a translator for “Heritage Tours”. With the family narrative forever separated from 
historical truth, its continuation in the life of the descendants also appears devoid of meaning, 
which explains the pointless existence of Alex’ father, which is reduced to alcoholism and 
violence.  
While the “task of the translator” is forced upon Alex due to the burdensome legacy of 
his grandfather’s ‘original’ creation of the false family narrative, the latter, in Derridean 
terms, cannot be considered absolved of his original guilt: “The original is the first debtor, the 
first petitioner; it begins by lacking and by pleading for translation.” (1985, 184) In 
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psychoanalytic terms, the “lacking” and “pleading” constitute an impossibility of mourning, 
which is why real and linguistic guilt remain intricately connected. Therefore, Alex can be 
described as an “indebted subject, obligated by a duty, already in the position of heir, entered 
as survivor in a genealogy, as survivor or agent of sur-vival” (ibid., 179). In a literal sense, 
Alex’ translated name bears the memory of a traumatic survival at the cost of his 
grandfather’s best friend – a guilt that cannot be redeemed neither in a real nor in a linguistic 
sense. 
Finding himself excluded from his grandfather’s and Augustine’s intimate conversation, 
Alex is freed for a moment from his duty of having to translate for others. Along with 
Jonathan, he is gradually led to discover the primal scene to which he owes his existence: the 
survival of his own grandfather. The interpreter immediately feels anger well up in him due to 
this exclusion:  
Why could he [the grandfather] say things to this woman that he had never before encountered 
when he could not say things to me? Or perhaps he was not saying anything to her. Or perhaps he 
was lying. This is what I wanted, for him to present not-truths to her. She did not deserve the truth, 
not as I deserved the truth. Or we both deserved the truth, and the hero, too. All of us. (156) 
Despite his anger, Alex seems to show restraint in the manner of a psychoanalyst – or a 
translator of the words of others – and lets Jonathan tell as much as possible about his 
childhood: “I did not utter a thing, so that he would persevere” (157). But a few lines later, he 
senses the unconscious guilt that has turned him into a translator in the first place. With 
Derrida, one can say that he “appears to himself as translator in a situation of debt” (1985, 
176), which makes him feel “ashamed” (157). Convinced that Jonathan must have noticed his 
uneasiness, he retrospectively wonders: “Did you feel sorry for me? Is that why you 
persevered?” (159) 
Interestingly, the above-mentioned passage also ends in a turn that may have been 
anticipated with Derrida’s translation theory. Describing translation as “the mission to which 
one is destined (always by the other), the commitment, the duty, the debt, the responsibility”, 
Derrida postulates that the translator “must also acquit himself, and of something that implies 
perhaps a fault, a fall, an error and perhaps a crime” (1985, 175, emphasis in the original). 
This coincides the turn at the end of the passage in Foer’s novel, when Alex peaks into 
Jonathan’s diary and finds his own future described by his companion. What the diary 
predicts and what is realized towards the end of the novel, is the expulsion of his father from 
the family, announced by the declaration: “You are not my father.” (160) 
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The workings of cryptonymy 
 
Does this renunciation help Alex to recover the truth about his family narrative and finally 
succeed at the task of the translator? According to Paul de Man, the original title of Walter 
Benjamin’s essay, “Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers”, betrays the tragic destiny of the translator, 
for “Aufgabe” in German denotes not only “task”, but also “defeat” or “giving up” (1985, 33). 
As de Man writes, “the translator, per definition, fails. […] The translator has to give up in 
relation to the task of refinding what was there in the original.” (ibid.). To demonstrate this 
failure, Foer endows his translator figure with a low level of proficiency in English, which the 
latter admits in his first letter to Jonathan: “Like you know, I am not first rate with English. In 
Russian my ideas are asserted abnormally well, but my second tongue is not so premium.” 
(23)  
 This failure of the translator is then enacted paradigmatically in Everything Is 
Illuminated through the interpreter’s constant verbal slippages. Alex’ unskilled use of the 
English-English dictionary presented to him by Jonathan accounts for countless lexical faux 
pas such as “currency” instead of ‘money’, “rigid” instead of ‘difficult’, “to amputate” instead 
of ‘to remove’, “guilelessly” instead of ‘sincerely’ or “to harmonize” instead of ‘to agree’. 
These lexical mistakes highlight the purely linguistic side of his utterances, with the signifiers 
occupying centre stage while the signified is transferred to the backstage. In its constant 
aberrations, the language of the interpreter appears as a system of signifiers endlessly 
referring to other signifiers and thus never reaching a destination.  
 The translator’s thesaurese demonstrates how the novel uses translation as a metaphor 
for the recovery of historical truth, with their possibility or impossibility being their common 
denominator. Drawing on the image of the failing translation, the novel plays with multiple 
scenarios of the extinction of history. By turning his protagonists into historiographers who, 
in word or deed, keep negotiating the rules of writing history, Foer labels his novel as 
historiographic metafiction as discussed by Linda Hutcheon (1988). Thus, the author moves 
Jonathan’s history of Trachimbrod into the genre of magic realism, which, from the first 
sentence on, produces a narrative in which “Trachim B’s double-axle wagon either did or did 
not pin him against the bottom of the Brod River” (8, emphasis mine). While this narrative is 
permeated by an obsession with memory and genealogy, the desire to recover memory is 
comically frustrated and the belief in history shattered constantly. Thus, Jonathan 
metaphorizes memory as the sixth sense of the Jews (198), and provides the Trachimbroders 
with a “Book of Antecedents” (36), absurdly updated every day in the time before the war and 
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rediscovered by the protagonists among Augustine’s collected items under the title “The Book 
of Past Occurrences” (224). However, his narrative never ascribes any content to their 
memory. “It is most important that we remember […] The what”, a Trachimbroder declares, 
“is not so important, but that we should remember. It is the act of remembering, the process of 
remembrance, the recognition of our past […] Can somebody tell me where I was?” (36) 
Bereft of any substance, memory appears as a void filled with a flow of words, which is most 
vividly illustrated through mad squire Sofiowka’s attempts to remember “something terribly 
important”. As we learn from Jonathan’s narrative, 
he was once found on the Well-Regarded Rabbi’s front lawn, bound in white string, and said he 
tied one around his index finger to remember something terribly important, and fearing he would 
forget the index finger, he tied a string around his pinky, and then one from waist to neck, and 
fearing he would forget this one, he tied a string from ear to tooth to scrotum to heal, and used his 
body to remember his body, but in the end could remember only the string (15). 
What is presented in this passage is but a metaphorized version of Jacques Derrida’s concept 
of différance, in which meaning is posed as forever deferred through an endless chain of 
signifiers. The obvious consequence is that memory along with history is largely inaccessible, 
and the idea of historical truth becomes extinguished. 
 As to the other historiographer and man narrator, Alex, Foer does not make him 
consciously create mythologies, but endows him with a lack of knowledge even of his own 
family history. Responding to Jonathan’s magic realism, Alex wonders about their 
relationship to historical truth: “We are being very nomadic with the truth, yes? The both of 
us? Do you think that this is acceptable when we are writing about things that occurred?” 
(179) From these considerations, he initially derives a particular poetic license: “[I]f we are to 
be such nomads with the truth, why do we not make the story more premium than life? […] I 
do not think that there are any limits to how excellent we could make life seem.” (179-180)  
Despite pondering the possibility of a reinvention of history, Alex never puts the idea 
into practice in his own narrative strand. This proves that it would be wrong to view the novel 
exclusively in the tradition of postmodern historiographic fiction denying any certainty about 
historical facts. To be sure, the novel is far from celebrating any definitive recovery of 
historical truth. Thus, the existence of a ‘true’ Augustine becomes a matter of belief, just as it 
is left open whether the Jewish name of Alex’s grandfather is supposed to reveal his Jewish 
identity, which would once again cast a different light on his betrayal of Herschel. Moreover, 
the grandfather’s memory returns in such a traumatically unprocessed quality that the latter is 
driven into suicide. However, the pure fact that Alex does find out about his grandfather’s 
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forced collaboration with the Nazis, makes clear that Foer does not subscribe to a view of 
history or language as pessimistic as de Man’s.  
To return to the metaphor of translation, a closer look at Alex’ language reveals that 
the novel does not entirely lend itself to a deconstructive reading and, to a certain extent, does 
put an end to the play of signifiers. Thus, on the surface, Alex struggles to understand the 
statements made by his American guest. For instance, when Jonathan shows the picture of his 
grandfather together with Augustine and explains: “This was taken during the war”, the 
translator promptly responds with the question: “From who?” (59) It is tempting to read Alex’ 
difficulty in understanding and his word-by-word translation, which results from his 
ignorance of the idiomatic expression “to take a picture”, in terms of de Man’s view of 
translation: “[F]rom the moment that a translation is really literal, wörtlich, word by word, the 
meaning completely disappears. […] The meaning of the word slips away […] and there is no 
grammatical way to control this slippage.” (1985, 41, emphasis in the original).  
 However, the way in which Foer models this slippage through his translator figure’s 
discourse is highly controlled in linguistic terms. The interpreter may well be bound to fail 
because of his linguistic competence, which he himself describes as “not first rate” (23). But 
at the same time, it becomes apparent that this failure occurs in the very moment in which 
Jonathan comments on the irredeemable loss of his grandfather’s carefree youth. One could 
say that the latter had indeed been “taken”, in the sense of “taken away” or “stolen”, for, as 
mentioned above, the photograph epitomises the impossibility of recovering the captured 
moment. Thus the translation fails on the surface, but manages to leave a trace that points to a 
hidden history of trauma.  
 At this point, it is illuminating to study the works of Nicolas Abraham and Maria 
Torok, to some of which Derrida has composed extensive prefaces and which, however, 
present “a theory of readability” (Rand 1986, li) that appears like an optimistic rewriting of 
deconstruction. The writers focus on the clinical cases of patients whose discourse seems to 
resist analysis in a radical way, since they are plagued by a suffering not of their own but of 
an other. Abraham and Rand refer to them as  
visitors to the couch who, unbeknownst to themselves, carry the concealed shame of their families. 
These people are prey to strange and incongruous words or acts, transferred from events unknown 
to them, events whose initiator was an other. (1988, 2) 
To describe the effect of this “concealed shame” on the patient, Abraham draws on the notion 
of the phantom: “The phantom is a formation of the unconscious that has never been 
conscious – for good reason. It passes – in a way yet to be determined – from the parent’s 
unconscious into the child’s.” (1987, 289) The author detects the reason of this 
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‘phantomization’ of memories in the fact that they were consciously kept secret by family 
members – which is also telling about their nature. For a memory becomes “‘phantomized’ 
because it was unspeakable in words, because it had to be wrapped in silence” (Abraham and 
Rand 1988, 4). What a descendant inherits in such a case is “a gap in the unconscious, an 
unknown, unrecognized knowledge – a nescience – subjected to a form of ‘repression’ before 
the fact. The buried speech of the parent becomes (a) dead (gap), without a burial place, in the 
child” (Abraham, Torok and Rand 1984, 17). This formulation not coincidentally reminds of 
Nadine Fresco’s and Henri Raczymow’s ideas of “remembering the unknown” and the 
“mémoire trouée”, which describe precisely the same phenomenon in the context of the 
Holocaust.  
However, Abraham’s and Rand’s exploration takes us still further. The patient’s 
“living-dead knowledge of someone else’s secret” or his or her “awareness-unawareness” 
produce two contradictory tendencies (1988, 3). Thus,  
the ‘haunted’ individual is caught between two inclinations. He must at all costs maintain his 
ignorance of a loved one’s secret, hence the semblance of unawareness (nescience) concerning it. 
At the same time, he must eliminate the state of secrecy, hence the reconstruction of the secret in 
the form of unconscious knowledge. (ibid.) 
In order to keep the secret safely hidden, such patients draw on a number of mechanisms of 
concealment, one of which Abraham and Torok refer to as cryptonymy (1986). This term 
emerges out of a re-examination of Freud’s case history of the Wolf Man, whose discourse, as 
the analysts observe, encompassed numerous enigmas and absurdities that were meant to hide 
his knowledge of his sister’s sexual abuse by their father. By “transform[ing] the Wolf Man’s 
unreadability itself into his foremost symptom” (Rand 1986, lix), Abraham and Torok subject 
case of the multilingual patient to a translingual decoding process, thus gradually laying bare 
the traces of the childhood trauma. As they establish, the Wolf Man had succeeded in barring 
the access to a traumatic memory of witnessing by encrypting it in English, the language of 
his nurse, and thus making use of the mechanism of cryptonymy. 
 This theoretical basis, which Abraham and Torok also suggest for the analysis of 
literary texts, seems apt for explaining the linguistic structure of Foer’s narrative. As I want to 
argue, the absence of the invoked Russian or Ukrainian language symbolises a hidden 
discourse that has lodged itself in the unconscious of Alex’ family. Significantly, we learn 
that both Alex’ father and grandfather that he works for a company named “Heritage 
Touring” (3), sometimes forcing Alex to take over jobs for them as well. The irony of the 
company name is obvious since it is the own heritage that is silenced in their family. The 
functioning of the company reflects the contradictory inclinations described by Abraham. For 
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on the one hand, the notion of ‘heritage’ stands out, as if to deny any sense of secrecy. On the 
other hand, it only refers to a service offered to foreign clients – “Jews, who try to unearth 
places where their families once existed” (3) – thus negating any connection to the Perchov 
family. Also, the name “Heritage Touring” betrays a mechanism of concealment of the 
“awareness-unawareness”, which finds itself already described in Breuer’s case history of 
Anna O. (1955): the translation of unspeakable contents into a foreign language. This way, the 
motif of the heritage, which is hidden behind a family romance invented by Alex’ 
grandfather, is decontextualized or encrypted.  
 With Alex’ employment as Jonathan’s guide the hidden family narrative undergoes a 
second displacement. For, due to his “not so premium” English (23), the interpreter is 
presented a thesaurus by Jonathan, which serves him an instrument of encrypting. Thus, Alex 
not only draws on English as cryptonymic code, but also distorts all of his statements through 
his seemingly unskilled use of the thesaurus. In fact, the function of the latter is of course 
designed systematically: in his constantly wrong choice of vocabulary, albeit related to the 
seemingly intended words, the displacement of a secret discourse becomes palpable along 
with the pathology of identifying with the discourse of an other. In its cryptonymic quality, 
the thesaurus can be compared to the Verbarium of the Wolf Man as elaborated by Abraham 
and Torok (1986), since it encompasses an entire system of cryptonyms enabling the hiding of 
unspeakable facts.  
The most prominent example of a cryptonym is contained in the very title of the novel: 
“illuminated”. First of all, the title “Everything Is Illuminated” appears enigmatic and poses 
the questions: What is “everything” and in what way can it be “illuminated”? Initially, the 
verb “to illuminate” and its derivatives are used in an unidiomatic, but nevertheless 
predictable sense – as ‘to cast light on something’, as in: “he was illuminated at her window” 
(133), or ‘to explain something, as in: “I do not have any additional luminous remarks, 
because I must possess more of the novel in order to lumin.” (25, emphases mine) Later in the 
narrative, the chapter titles “An Overture to Illumination” and “Illumination” (219, 243) 
anticipate that there is a deeper, hidden meaning of the word used so prominently by the 
interpreter. Finally, it is only when Alex’ grandfather is overwhelmed by his traumatic 
memories and gives a stream-of-consciousness testimony of the genocide in his shtetl and the 
death of Herschel that the reader learns what lies behind Alex’ cryptonym of ‘to illuminate’: 
[T]he guards put him [Herschel] in the synagogue with the rest of the Jews and everyone else was 
remaining outside to hear the cryingofthebabies and the cryingoftheadults and to see the black 
spark when the first match was it by a youngman who could not have been any older than I was or 
Herschel was or you are it illuminated those who were not in the synagogue those who were not 
going to die (251, emphasis mine). 
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This passage makes clear that the verb ‘to illuminate’ is most intimately connected with the 
grandfather’s witnessing of the Holocaust and the etymological origins of the latter term in 
Greek, meaning ‘entirely burnt’. With Abraham and Torok, it can be argued that it is this 
meaning that underlies Alex’ numerous repetitions of the cryptonym ‘to illuminate’. Thus, the 
use of the word points to the unspeakable scene of betrayal and death while making this 
reference unintelligible at the same time. 
Three further lexical faux pas demonstrate how Alex’ awkward discourse is used as a 
projection screen for unconscious contents: his prominent misuse of the words ‘to witness’ 
and ‘to desire’ and ‘queer’, which are recurrently used to replace the words ‘to see’, ‘to want’ 
and ‘strange’. This produces utterances such as: “First I witnessed the television”, and “It is 
almost impossible to witness her”; “He desires to write a book about his grandfather’s 
village”, and: “I desire him to feel as if he has a cool brother”; and finally: “Father said 
something queer. […] And then he said something even queerer” (6, 68, 144, 182, emphases 
mine). These unidiomatic constructions serve more than just a comical effect. Rather, they 
break up the otherwise cryptonymic discourse and allow the reader to catch a glimpse of the 
hidden heritage in the Perchov family. It stands to reason that the verb ‘to witness’ points to 
the role of Alex’ grandfather during the genocide in the Ukraine. As shall be explained in the 
following, ‘desire’ and ‘queer’ point to the interpreter’s own psychic topography resulting 
from the phantom of the grandfather’s past.  
As Esther Rashkin points out, the essential problem of patients ‘haunted’ by an 
unknown past consists in the impossibility of an independent individuation. Commenting on 
Abraham and Torok’s thought, she explains that a child’s “unwitting involvement in this mute 
past interferes with the normal processes leading to a successful introjection and inhibits its 
emergence as an autonomous subject” (1988, 40). In the narrative of Everything Is 
Illuminated, this interference is troped as an inhibition of love and sexuality – a suffering 
voiced through the interpreter’s misuse of ‘to desire’. His – and, in a similar way, Jonathan’s 
– difficulty in directing his desire becomes palpable when the protagonists examine the old 
photograph of Jonathan’s grandfather’s alleged savior, Augustine, and seem to both fall in 
love with her. While Jonathan “move[s] his finger along the face of the girl in the photograph 
as he mention[s] her”, Alex looks at her “for many minutes” until uttering: “She was so so 
beautiful.” (59) By turning Augustine’s picture into the projection surface of their desires, 
Foer demonstrates how their own desire is corrupted by the desire to recover their family 
histories. In this context, the chapter title, “What We Saw When We Saw Trachimbrod, or 
Falling in Love” (181), does not come as a surprise. 
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Likewise, desire becomes a dominant theme in Jonathan’s fantastical account of the 
history of Trachimbrod. Instead of composing a history narrative featuring a few enlivening 
love stories, the young author tropes the history of his grandfather’s shtetl as a history of 
falling in love, grotesquely also titling four of his chapters “Falling in Love”. Not only is the 
shtetl notorious for its orgies during the Trachimday festival, which can bizarrely be spotted 
by astronauts two centuries later as “a tiny speck of light” (95). More importantly, Jonathan 
reimagines his grandfather’s escape from the Nazis as owing to his appeal to women. The 
attraction of his limp arm, symbolizing his just awakening sexuality, again establishes a link 
between desire and survival. 
This link resurfaces in the protagonists’ conversation in the key scene analyzed above 
that can be considered a reenactment of a primal scene. Alex’ urgent questions about 
Jonathan’s relationship with his grandmother betray his curiosity about the connection 
between one’s own desire and the life of one’s grandparents. The emotionally charged 
formulation, “I decided to peril everything once again. ‘Tell me about you and her’” (157), 
shows that Alex senses suspicion about his own family history, which, in the meantime, he 
can only try to verify through the analogy with Jonathan’s story. In this fashion, the reader 
learns about Jonathan’s childhood habit of hiding under his grandmother’s dress at family 
dinners (157). Through this habit, he seems to be unwittingly enacting an unborn child and 
thus trying, as Nadine Fresco puts it, to gain access “to the life that existed before their birth” 
(1984, 420). Significantly, Jonathan’s hiding place holds not only the secret of birth, but also 
that of survival, for the grandmother’s varicose veins, which young Jonathan likes touching, 
are an indexical sign of her escape from the Nazis: 
My grandmother got them from the war, because she had to walk across Europe to escape. It was 
too much for her legs. […] I’d run my hands up and down her varicose veins. I don’t know why, or 
how I started doing it. It was just something I did. I was a kid, and kids do things like that, I guess. 
(157) 
A clear intertextual reference to Günter Grass’ The Tin Drum, Jonathan’s story confirms 
Alex’ suspicions. Thus, when Jonathan explains his and his grandmother’s afore-mentioned 
screaming game with the words: “We were both secretly in love with words, I guess”, Alex 
seems to be waiting to diagnose a more painful truth: “And you were both secretly in love 
with each other” (159). The utterances of Jonathan’s grandmother express a double bind, 
imploring the grandson to ask and not to ask about the hidden meaning of the Yiddish words. 
What Alex mistakes for a love relationship is, however, “a pathogenic dual union with the 
[grand]parent, in a silent partnership dedicated to preserving the secret intact” (Rashkin 1988, 
40).  
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 As we learn, Alex has also grown up with the maxim of not inquiring about the 
reasons of his grandfather’s melancholia. This condition emerges after the death of Alex’ 
grandmother, who “died two years yore of a cancer in her brain, and Grandfather became very 
melancholy, and also, he says, blind.” (4-5) As can be seen in this passage, the grandfather 
invents improbable symptoms that are meant to distract the attention from the cause of his 
suffering. Thus, it becomes an imperative in Alex’ family not to ask about his feelings: 
“Father commanded me never to mention Grandmother to Grandfather. […] It will make him 
melancholy, Alex, and it will make him think he is more blind.” (6)  
Ironically enough, the crumbling of the ostensible continuity of this family narrative is 
anticipated through a trifle detail about the grandfather’s dog, whose name, Sammy Davis Jr. 
Jr., satirizes the naming tradition of the Perchovs’ firstborn sons. As we learn from Alex, the 
dog was not purchased, as the boy’s father claims, but picked up from “the home for forgetful 
dogs” (5). Both this whimsical hint and Alex’s lexical mistake, point to a graver form of 
‘forgetfulness’, to wit, the gaping void in one’s family’s history. What is interesting, however, 
is the fact that in consequence the bitch is denied her real sex, which she resists by making 
advances at members of the male sex such as Jonathan (56).  
Similarly, the repression of memory and true identity in Alex’s family is troped as a 
repressed desire, manifesting itself in his closeted homosexuality, a circumstance anticipated 
by the lexical misuse of the adjective ‘queer’. Just like his grandfather, whose real first name 
“Eli” is revealed in a stream-of-consciousness monologue (250) and points to his denied 
Jewish origins, Alex is characterized by the denial of a trait of his, for which he is likely to be 
victimized by his intolerant surroundings: “There is such a thing as love that cannot be, for 
certain”, Alex writes to Jonathan, and continues: “If I were to inform Father, for example, 
about how I comprehended love, and who I desired to love, he would kill me, and this is no 
idiom” (241). And just like his grandfather tries to cover up his origins by excessively 
praising Odessa and behaving in an overtly anti-Semitic way before eventually confessing 
that he converted his Jewish name “Eli” into “Alex” after the genocide (275), Alex boasts 
about his success with girls before admitting to never having “been carnal with a girl” and to 
being afraid to come out as homosexual (144). The reason Alex gives for hiding his true 
identity thus also applies to his grandfather’s self-denial: “I think I manufacture these not-
truths because it makes me feel like a premium person” (144). 
The only possible autonomous future for Alex can be to break with all of his previous 
relationships. As his grandfather says about him and his younger brother before committing 
suicide: “They must begin again. They must cut all of the strings, yes? With you […], with 
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their father (who is not gone forever), with everything they have known. Sasha [Alex] has 
started it, and now I must finish it.” (275)  
It is important to mention that Alex’ ‘cutting of the strings’ – uncannily anticipating 
the Grandfather’s slitting of his wrists – is predicted off all by Jonathan. With their 
complementary perspectives on the “living-dead knowledge” of their grandparents’ past 
(Abraham 1988, 3), Alex and Jonathan are enjoined like two puzzle pieces. This invites a 
reading through Abraham and Torok’s idea of the symbol. As the theorists write, patients 
haunted by a phantomized memory of an other, communicate through symbols that are 
inherently incomplete, since they point to a further symbol that they hide. What they derive 
from this insight, are implications for the work of the psychoanalyst, whose task it is “to 
retrace the broken symbol’s lines of fracture”: 
Psychoanalytic listening consists of a special way of treating language. Whereas normally we are 
given meanings, the analyst is given symbols. Symbols are data that are missing an as yet 
undetermined part, but that can, in principle, be determined. The special aim of psychoanalytic 
listening is to find the symbol’s complement […], in other words, the fragment that “symbolizes 
with” – or, we might say, that “cosymbolizes” (1986, 79-80). 
This understanding of the symbol can account for Foer’s design of his interpreter’s broken 
language. The fact that the “undetermined part […] can, in principle, be determined” once 
again highlights that the discourse of the fictional translator does not invite a purely 
deconstructive reading. The psychoanalytic interpretation, as suggested by Abraham and 
Torok, does greater justice to the skillfully created language of the interpreter, whose 
discourse is dominated by the silenced past of his grandfather.  
An etymological explanation offered by Esther Rashkin casts more light on Abraham 
and Torok’s theory of the symbol: 
For the Greeks, the symbolon, was a piece of pottery or earthenware that was broken in two prior 
to someone’s (usually a warrior’s) voyage. One of the two pieces remained at the site of departure 
while the other was carried by the traveler and “voyaged” with him. Upon his return (often many 
years later), the traveler’s piece of pottery served as a sign of recognition and as proof of his 
identity when it was rejoined with its matching complement. The word “symbol” referred to each 
of the two pieces individually as well as to the act of putting the two pieces together (from the 
Greek symballo = to put together). (1988, 47) 
This story behind the symbol can we be retraced in Everything Is Illuminated. As shown by 
the story of Alex’ grandfather, the Holocaust divided vast parts of Europe into victims and 
perpetrators, who could impossibly compose a common historical account of the catastrophic 
events. Instead, they became the bearers of different fragments of a discourse, which, in its 
unprocessed or secret quality, was passed on to their descendants. It is as such that Alex and 
Jonathan bring along their fragments of a narrative and a language. Their encounter is not 
only one between a traveller and his guide or between the descendant of a Holocaust victim 
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and that of a perpetrator; it is also one between two authors of the same story, between two 
hapless lovers, between two parties of an existential dialogue. Thus, Foer has Alex write in a 
letter to Jonathan: 
We are talking now, Jonathan, together, and not apart. We are with each other, working on the 
same story, and I am certain that you can also feel it. Do you know that I am the Gypsy girl and 
you are Safran, and that I am Kolker and you are Brod, and that I am Alex and you are you, and 
that I am you and you are me? (214) 
 
Indeed, the encounter between the two protagonists symbolizes an absolute dissolution of 
boundaries. In this sense, the narrative strands and the linguistic discourses produced by them, 
in the end, do seem to fit together like the fragments of the broken vessel described by Walter 
Benjamin, even if the dream of a greater language can only appear a mirage in the light of the 
civilization-breaking experience of the Holocaust. 
 
 
Against the appropriation of the Holocaust 
 
If the protagonists fit together like chalk and cheese, this does not imply that they are able to 
piece together all the discourse fragments of the two Holocaust witnesses they get to know. 
This confirms the tenets of trauma theory, which highlights the risk of trivializing traumatic 
discourse: “The danger of speech, of integration into the narration of memory”, Cathy Caruth 
argues, “may lie not in what it cannot understand, but in that it understands too much” (1995, 
154). Seeking to preserve the strangeness and incomprehensibility of traumatically charged 
language, Foer has his fictional translator tread on linguistically foreign ground in his attempt 
to work through the memory of the Holocaust. Since this foreign ground is not easy to 
conquer and constantly evades the translator’s control, Alex’ linguistic slippage undermines 
the possibility of appropriating a language.  
 It is particularly significant that Foer chooses a descendant of a collaborator to be the 
main narrator in a Holocaust narrative. Alex’ and Jonathan’s narrative strands can be said to 
encircle the central traumatic events of the Holocaust. While Jonathan’s magic realist account 
approaches the genocide through a phantasmagoric prehistory of his grandfather’s shtetl, Alex 
is involved in a retrospective search for eye-witnesses and traces. Despite its linguistic 
turbulence, Alex’ account is more strongly rooted in realism, which implies that he is 
assigned the authority of the Holocaust narrative despite the silenced past of his family. This 
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delicate and precarious endeavor, as it is described in an essay by Ulla Haselstein (1991), can 
be said to be cushioned by Alex’ limited language skills. 
 The fact that the interpreter’s language differs from that of Jonathan only in the level 
of proficiency calls up not only Walter Benjamin’s idea of the interrelatedness between 
languages, but also Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of intralinguistic dialogism. In regard to Alex’ 
use of the thesaurus, in particular, Bakhtin’s thoughts on heteroglossia in the novel offer a 
valuable comment. Thus, the critic describes the socio-ideological component of any given 
speech act: 
The word in language is half someone else’s. It becomes “one’s own” only when the speaker 
populates it with his own intention, his own accent […]. Prior to this moment of appropriation, the 
word does not exist in a neutral and impersonal language (it is not, after all, out of a dictionary that 
the speaker gets his words!), but rather it exists in other people’s mouths, in other people’s 
contexts, serving other people’s intentions: it is from there that one must take the word, and make 
it one’s own. (1981, 293-94) 
The appropriation of “someone else’s” word is precisely what Foer’s translator fails in. One 
could argue that dictionaries do not guarantee for absolute neutrality. They can well be 
instrumentalized as pillars of authority, however, only so by someone who knows how to use 
them effectively. This is not the case with Alex, who, out of all synonyms offered in the 
thesaurus, always seems to choose the least appropriate one. The effect of the fictionalized 
use of the thesaurus is an entire de-contextualization of his words – which, metaphorically, 
stands in for the search for a new language. 
 Bakhtin’s description of the dialogic relationship between the speaker and the 
addressee helps uncover another aspect the fictional young translator’s discourse reverberates 
with. Bakhtin writes: “[E]very word is directed toward an answer and cannot escape the 
profound influence of the answering word that it anticipates.” (1981, 280) This idea is clearly 
at work in Everything Is Illuminated, since Alex produces a thoroughly tentative discourse 
that cannot entirely speak for itself, but, in its awkwardness, stumbles towards the addressee. 
In his highly comical, knotted language, he repeatedly asks the recipient of his letters, 
Jonathan, to correct his drafts on their common journey, but also to understand his difficulty 
in writing: “I tried bestly, and did the best I could, which was the best that I could do. It is so 
rigid for me. Please be truthful, but also please be benevolent, please” (26). In entrusting his 
notes to Jonathan, the translator reveals every single one of his words to be “semi-alien” 
(1981, 299). In passing his words on to the grandson of a Holocaust survivor, the translator 
seems to address both his difficulty of creating a Holocaust discourse in general, and his 
particular moral burden of speaking from the position of a descendant of a Holocaust witness 
forced into traumatic complicity with the Nazis. 
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 What is not least important is also the material context of the exchange between the 
protagonists. While, problematically enough, receiving “currency”, that is payment, from 
Jonathan for his writing job, Alex insists on his incorruptibility as far as the truth of his 
account is concerned: 
I have only one remark about your remarks about my writing. With regards for how you ordered 
me to remove the section where you talk about your grandmother, I must tell you that this is not a 
possibility. I accept if because of my decision you choose not to present me any more currency, or 
if you command for me to post back the currency you have given me in the previous months. It 
would be justifying every dollar, I will inform you. (179) 
As this passage demonstrates, accounts of the Holocaust cannot be entirely separated from the 
commercial components of the literary market. Yet, the text argues against their appropriation 
and monopolization by descendants of both the victims and the perpetrators. Thus, Foer sets 
up a dialogue, in which neither of the protagonists can claim the ownership of the historical 
trauma. In doing so, the author confirms trauma theorist Cathy Caruth’s view, according to 
which history, like trauma, is marked by intrinsic dialogism: “[H]istory, like trauma, is never 
simply one’s own, [...] history is precisely the way we are implicated in each other’s 
traumas.” (Caruth 1996, 24) 
 Despite “rigid attempts”, the protagonists do not reach a common language. For while 
Alex’ travelogue and Jonathan’s magic realist account of his own genealogy in Trachimbrod 
approach each other asymptotically, they never merge into one narrative. Most importantly, 
the novel does not display a single letter of response by Jonathan, even though such a 
response is implied in Alex’ own letters. Their “complementarity and difference”, as Ulla 
Haselstein writes, “reflects the general absence of a dialogue between the descendants of 
victims and perpetrators as a burdensome historical legacy” (2006, 210, translation mine).18 
This painful absence can be clearly detected in the translator’s broken discourse.  
At the same time, Foer offers an optimistic corrective insofar as he sends the 
descendants of both parties on a common search for a language for the civilization-breaking 
experience of the Holocaust. The search for a language for the Holocaust is encoded in the 
complex figure of translation. The so-called third generation, shaped not by the experience of 
the Holocaust but precisely by its non-experience, sets out for Babel, if not to restore a 
common language, then at least to recover the “primal scene of linguistic indebtedness”, 
which led to the traumatic split of language in the first place. The recovery of such a scene 
                                                 
18
 In the original: “[I]hre[…] Komplementarität und Differenz […] reflektieren die weitgehende Absenz eines 
Dialogs der Nachfahren von Opfern und Tätern als historische Erblast”. 
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bears the hope of assembling some broken pieces of language, yet not of extinguishing the 
rupture traces, which is why the search for a language of trauma must remain unfinished. 
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Traumatic Passages between Two Nearly Native Tongues: Edwidge Danticat’s The 
Farming of Bones 
 
Seeking to trope a deeply traumatic historical episode, Danticat, like Foer, chooses to disrupt 
the chronological linearity of events so as to inscribe the resistance of traumatic experience 
against its verbalization into the very structure of the narrative. Like Everything Is 
Illuminated, The Farming of Bones is woven together out of separate narrative strands – with 
one of them tracing the chronological progression of events, while the other, visually marked 
by bold face printing, delves entirely into the protagonist’s inner world made up of circularly 
recurring memory images, dreams and thoughts. However, this can be named as the only 
crucial commonality. Writing from a similar geographical and generational distance to the 
genocide she depicts at the center of her narrative, Danticat mostly employs different 
narrative and linguistic strategies. While Foer incorporates his attempt of bridging this 
distance by sending his fictional alter ego on a journey from New York to Ukraine, Danticat 
keeps the historical leap and the journey to the Haitian-Dominican border out of the diegesis. 
Her narrative unfolds partly on Dominican and partly on Haitian ground and her protagonist 
does not need to travel to these settings from somewhere else, but inhabits them as a young 
adult at the time of the 1937 massacre – thus living two generations before the author. The 
metareflexive distance to the narrated events also seems reduced: Danticat does not linger for 
too long on considerations about an impossible recovery of history, about its possibly failing 
translation into another language and another time and space, or about an interminable search 
for a language for the unspeakable. While Foer’s novel, with Linda Hutcheon, could be 
classified as historiographic metafiction (1988, 5), Danticat transports the reader directly into 
the year 1937 and focalizes the narrative through a survivor, who has no generational distance 
to the catastrophic events and therefore cannot metareflect on the post-memory of the 
massacre. Born in Haiti in 1969 and having a good command of both Kreyòl and Spanish in 
addition to English, Danticat, finally, does not share Foer’s linguistic distance to the survivor 
figure and therefore does not need to rely on failing translator figures. However, this does not 
render her depiction of the genocide less powerful. As I would like to show in the following, 
it is precisely through the employment of all three languages that Danticat tropes the 
traumatic historical events of 1937. 
The border as the site of trauma 
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Mapping translation in metaphorical terms presupposes a crossing-over from one side to 
another or a transgression of a border. While Everything Is Illuminated presents translation in 
linguistic, historical and psychological terms, it does not invoke the figure of crossing a 
physical or national border. All of its three narrative strands are geographically situated in 
Ukraine; even in the correspondence between Alex and Jonathan a border-crossing is not 
thematized, since the reader is only presented with Alex’ letters to Jonathan, not with the 
latter’s replies, and the process of transportation of these letters from Odessa to New York is 
never highlighted. What distinguishes Danticat’s from Foer’s novel is the central figure of a 
clearly locatable and transgressible physical border. As I want to argue, the employment of a 
linguistic border-crossing in The Farming of Bones can be explained through this central 
figure of the border, and more specifically that of the border river.  
 Two aspects of the latter invite and necessitate a process of translation: first, the 
troping of the river as a site of repeated traumata, which demand a working-through, and 
second, the contrast between the border river as a natural boundary and the national and 
linguistic border as a symbolic one. Let us begin with the first aspect. Early in the narrative, 
Danticat directs our attention to the fact that the border river bears a marker of trauma in its 
very name, Massacre River. When Señora Valencia recalls why she and her father, Don 
Ignacio, travelled to the river, where they first met, or, as she puts it, “found” eight-year old 
Amabelle: “I wanted to see the Massacre River where the French buccaneers were killed by 
the Spaniards in my history lesson” (91). With the inscription of death in its name, Massacre 
River seems destined to become the site of a traumatic origin in the narrative – the death of 
Amabelle’s parents before the girl’s eyes, after which she is quasi-adopted by Don Ignacio 
and remains in the Dominican Republic instead of returning to Haiti. This disaster in 
Amabelle’s life intertwines from the very beginning with a traumatic episode suffered 
previously by her future foster family, the death of Señora Valencia’s mother in childbirth. 
Don Ignacio’s and his daughter’s trip to Massacre River is directly linked to this death, since 
the child’s interest in pirates is motivated by the fact that, left alone to raise her, her father 
takes to adventuresome methods of upbringing. As Señora Valencia recalls: “He took me 
hunting for birds and taught me to shoot a rifle, as if I were the son who took Mami’s life in 
childbirth” (91). Upon encountering Amabelle, the two can be said to enter a bond of pain 
with the girl, whom they find sitting unmoving by the water, frozen in shock after having 
witnessed her parents drowning in the torrent of the river.  
 As the reader learns already in the first lines of the narrative, Amabelle regularly 
relives the memory of her parents drowning in traumatic nightmares (1). The trauma suffered 
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by the protagonist is so fundamental that she initially presents Sebastien in the role of her 
therapist before introducing him as her lover. The first time she quotes him in direct speech – 
“lie still while I take you back” – we witness him creating the mental image of a “cave across 
the river” meant to direct Amabelle’s attention away from the traumatic site of her parents’ 
death and to a different site, where water appears as soothing and energizing rather than a 
dangerous and uncontrollable force (1). Not only does Sebastien try to offer her comforting 
images; in a manner highly reminiscent of psychoanalytic treatment described by Bessel van 
der Kolk and Onno van der Hart (1995), in which a “therapist of a Holocaust survivor had the 
patient imagine a flower growing in the assignment place in Auschwitz”, Sebastien suggests 
to Amabelle to rewrite her memories: 
‘I don’t want you to dream of that river again,’ he said. ‘Give yourself a pleasant dream. 
Remember not only the end, but the middle, and the beginning, the things they did when 
they were breathing. Let us say that the river was still that day.’ 
‘And my parents?’ 
‘They died natural deaths many years later.’ (55) 
With his remodeling of his lover’s memories, Sebastien seems to acknowledge van der Kolk’s 
and van der Hart’s argument that “[o]nce flexibility is introduced, the traumatic memory starts 
losing its power over current experience. By imagining these alternative scenarios, many 
patients are able to soften the intrusive power of the original, unmitigated horror.” (1995, 178) 
To seal the effect of his rewriting, Sebastien provides it with a teleological element. In 
response to Amabelle’s question why she came to the Dominican Republic if her parents had 
not drowned in the border river, he tells her: “Even though you were a girl when you left and I 
was already a man when I arrived and our families did not know each other, you came here to 
meet me.” (55) Having encountered the young man in the role of both therapist and lover – 
for the “cave across the river” also happens to be the place “where Sebastien and [Amabelle] 
first made love” (100) – it is the more painful to witness how, in the course of the 1937 
massacre, Amabelle is forced to return to the very site of her parents’ death without him and 
master the act that had taken their lives. While she herself survives, the border river becomes 
the site of a traumatic repetition – the death of Wilner and Odette, a Haitian couple, with 
whom Amabelle is fleeing from the Dominican Republic. Against the background of the 
unyielding physical boundary between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, boundaries such as 
the ethnic, national and linguistic are highlighted as purely symbolic, though no less 
calamitous. Danticat emphasizes that the logics of ethnic distinction between Haitians and 
Dominicans has always been undermined. Thus, the protagonist perceives herself as a 
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member of the Dominican family she grows up in and later works for: “The señora and her 
family are the closest to kin I have”, Amabelle states (110). And this perception seems 
mutual, since it appears more than a joke when Señora Valencia tells Amabelle about her 
newborn daughter: “And my daughter favors you […]. She’s taken your color from the mere 
sight of your face” (11). At the same time, however, Amabelle’s mistress knows about the 
dangers of such a misattribution: “My poor love,” she says to the protagonist, “what if she’s 
mistaken for one of your people?” (12). In fact, Danticat demonstrates the consequences of 
such a misattribution when, after the massacre, she gathers survivors in an improvised 
hospital and mentions a Dominican man, who “was black like the nun who came to re-dress 
his wounds. He’s been mistaken for [a Haitian] and had received a machete blow across the 
back of his neck for it. There were many like him in the room” (217). The violence that 
underlies an ethnic classification also becomes palpable in the case of Doctor Javier, who 
seeks to help a group of Haitians escape the massacre and is arrested along with them: “If he 
wanted to be a Haitian, [the soldiers] told Doctor Javier, they would treat him like a Haitian” 
(248). In addition to the absurdity and violent logics of ethnic difference, Danticat stresses the 
fact that mixed marriages between Haitians and Dominicans were no exception. To do so, she 
has Amabelle encounter the sisters Dolores and Doloritas on her flight to Haiti, who seem to 
be “Dominicanas – or a mix of Haitian and Dominican” (171). Once again, we are reminded 
of the absurdity of the distinction when Amabelle adds that “in some cases it was hard to tell” 
(ibid.). 
 
The Shibboleth myth 
 
As to the linguistic border, Danticat initially sets the reader on a misleading trail by quoting 
the myth of Shibboleth in the prologue. The Shibboleth myth, which Jacques Derrida deals 
with in an eponymous work on Paul Celan’s poetry, tells the story of the besiegement of the 
Ephraimites by the Gileadites. Having captured the fords of the Jordan, the Gileadites subject 
everyone willing to cross to a pronunciation test, using the word ‘shibboleth’. The purpose is 
to identify Ephraimites, who would mispronounce the word as ‘sibboleth’, and to kill them 
before they can escape. Derrida emphasizes in his analysis that linguistic difference is 
inscribed into their bodies, which is why they cannot outwit the enemy: “In the word, the 
difference between shi and si has no meaning. But it is the ciphered mark which one must be 
able to partake of with the other, and this differential power must be inscribed in oneself, that 
is, in one’s own body” (1994, 29, emphasis in the original). Derrida specifies that  
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[t]his inscription of difference in the body (for example the phonatory ability to 
pronounce this or that) is nonetheless not natural, is in no way an innate organic faculty. 
Its very origin presupposes participation in a cultural and linguistic community, in a 
milieu of apprenticeship, in short an alliance. (1994, 29) 
In The Farming of Bones, Danticat exposes a view that significantly deviates from Derrida’s 
implication of the inalterability of the bodily mark as well as the cultural and linguistic 
alliance. Rather than using the Shibboleth myth to rationalize absolute borders between 
languages, Danticat presents us with a protagonist who, linguistically and culturally, is 
familiar with both Haitian and Dominican communities. As I would like to show in the 
following, Danticat constructs an image of linguistic borders which are blurry and easily 
transgressible unless guarded by state violence. 
 The permeability of linguistic boundaries is first of all reflected in the use of three 
different languages in her novel – English, Spanish and Kreyòl. It would have been easy to 
model a Shibboleth effect by playing with the reader’s linguistic understanding of the text. 
However, instead of introducing untranslated passages as Atom Egoyan or Yann Martel do in 
their works, Danticat meticulously translates even those passages from Kreyòl and Spanish 
into English which readers are most likely to understand. Thus, “Frè Antoine” is translated as 
“Brother Antoine” and “Man Irelle” as “Mother Irelle” (33); “pobrecita manman mwen” is 
translated as “[m]y poor mother” (25); and an inscription on a coat of arms saying “Dios, 
Patria, Libertad” is translated as “God, Country, Liberty” (43). Only few expressions that add 
local color are not accompanied by English translations, such as “cafecito” (18), “patrón” 
(37), “granmèmès” (69). Even the title of the novel turns out to be a translation from the 
Kreyòl “travay tè pou zo” (55). Relying on multilingualism and translation at the same time, 
this narrative strategy is best described as ‘translingual’. Warranting for absolute linguistic 
clarity, this strategy clearly does not champion a “radical bilingualism” (Torres 2007, 86).  
However, while it may be said to fall into the category that Lourdes Torres describes as 
“easily accessed, transparent, or cushioned” multilingualism (2007, 79), this strategy does not 
only serve the purpose of catering to the monolingual reader. Rather, it can be read as a 
conscious decision to promote transparence and avoid any tensions at the borders between 
languages. 
 This reading is supported by the way in which the author reframes the Shibboleth 
myth on the level of the histoire. While in the biblical narrative, the meaning of the word 
‘shibboleth’ as ‘river, stream, ear of grain, olive-twig’ is not very relevant  – even though the 
latter could be seen as related to the crossing of the Jordan – Danticat does not reduce her 
attention to the signifier ‘perejil’ or its “value of a password” for Kreyòl-speaking Haitians 
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(Derrida 1994, 24). Instead, she focuses on parsley as a signified and introduces it many times 
into the narrative before reaching an actual shibboleth moment. This is first enacted in a scene 
in which Doctor Javier passes through a doorway to the pantry in Señora Valencia’s house 
and has “suspended bundle of dried parsley [brush] his scalp, leaving behind a few tiny stems 
in his hair” (18). At first sight, this mentioning of parsley appears slightly forced, given that 
Danticat explicitly sets the narrative in “the year 1937, the ninety-third year of independence, 
in the seventh year of the Era of Generalissimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina” (17), and 
thus makes no secret of the fact that the narrative will culminate in the so-called Parsley 
Massacre. Nevertheless, the symbolism of the parsley motif is effectively at work in this 
scene: first, clinging to Doctor Javier’s hair, it appears as a harbinger of the fact that he will 
later perish together with the group of Haitians he tries to save. Second, this scene 
demonstrates that the relationship between Haitians and Dominicans, as servants and masters, 
is defined by a sense of untouchability, since Amabelle does not dare to flick the parsley 
stems from the doctor’s hair. Finally, the staging of such a trivial occurrence as parsley 
clinging to a man’s hair clearly demystifies the Shibboleth narrative around ‘perejil’. 
 When parsley recurs as a motif it once again serves to undermine the graveness of the 
Shibboleth myth. Significantly, the motif is evoked as “pèsi, perejil, parsley” in all three 
languages used in the book, as if to demolish the notion of linguistic boundaries in this one 
sentence. In addition, Danticat again focuses not so much on the signifier, as on the practical 
uses of parsley: 
We used pèsi, perejil, parsley, the damp summer morningness of it, the mingled sprigs, 
bristly and coarse, gentle and docile all at once, tasteless and bitter when chewed, a 
sweetened wind inside the mouth, the leaves a different taste than the stalk, all this we 
savored for our food, our teas, our baths, to cleanse our insides as well as our outsides of 
old aches and griefs, to shed a passing year’s dust as a new one dawned, to wash an 
infant’s hair for the first time and – along with boiled orange leaves – a corpse’s remains 
one final time. (62) 
Even in depicting Trujillo’s inhuman strategy of distinguishing Haitians from Dominicans, 
the author refrains from presenting the word ‘perejil’ as a shibboleth. She insists on keeping 
‘parsley’ in the realm of the signified and its practical uses. When Amabelle repeats that 
parsley was used “to cleanse our insides as well as our outsides”, and continues: “Perhaps the 
Generalissimo in some larger order was trying to do the same for his country” (203), we 
witness the employment of the parsley motif in a metaphorical sense, which however, 
dispenses with the signifier as a shibboleth. 
 The focusing of attention on parsley as a signified culminates in a long anticipated 
scene, in which Amabelle and Sebastien’s friend, Yves, find themselves helplessly exposed to 
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the violence of a mob of Dominicans, before escaping across the border river. A shibboleth 
moment is in fact invoked when two “young toughs [wave] parsley sprigs in front of [their] 
faces”, and say: “Tell us what this is […]. Que diga perejil” (193). However, this prompt 
appears less as a test question than as a mere quotation of the latter, and in fact, the theme of 
the shibboleth is only invoked to be subverted a moment later, since the young toughs are 
prepared for violence independently of any preceding pronunciation test. Strikingly enough, 
even the narrator seems deceived in her expectations:  
At that moment that had I wanted to, I could have said the word properly, calmly, slowly, 
the way I often asked ‘Perejil?’ of the old Dominican women and their faithful attending 
granddaughters at the roadside gardens and markets […]. But I didn’t get my chance. Our 
jaws were pried open and parsley stuffed into our mouths. My eyes watering, I chewed 
and swallowed as quickly as I could, but not nearly as fast as they were forcing the 
handfuls into my mouth. (193) 
As the violent feeding turns into a beating, we may discern another comment on the 
Shibboleth myth. Contrary to Derrida’s picture of language as a mark on one’s body – hence, 
the inability to switch to a different pronunciation – in The Farming of Bones, it is physical 
violence connected to the signified of the shibboleth that leaves inerasable marks on the 
victim’s language. As we learn later about Yves, as a traumatic consequence of the slaughter, 
he not only “loathed the taste of parsley […]; the sound of Spanish being spoken – even by 
Haitians – made his eyes widen, his breath quicken, his face cloud with terror, his lips unable 
to part one from the other and speak” (273). As for Amabelle, the violent feeding and the 
beating physically rob her of the ability to speak for a long time. With her “chipped and 
cracked teeth […] snapping against the mush of open flesh inside [her] mouth”, Amabelle 
finds herself unable to communicate with her companions on the flight, and most importantly, 
to voice the question concerning the place where Sebastien and his sister may be still detained 
(197-99). Parsley turns out as the embodiment of everything that makes a person mute; the 
shibboleth is revealed not as a password, but as a silencing device. 
 As critic Marta Caminero-Santangelo points out, the traumatizing effect of this 
violence becomes palpable in its compulsive repetition, which manifests itself as “the 
repetition of violence which silences speech – that is, as Amabelle’s accidental killing of 
Odette”, one of Amabelle’s Haitian companions on her flight from the Dominican Republic 
(2009, 14). Although, during the crossing of the border river, Amabelle decides that she 
would rather “drown alone, with nobody else’s life to be responsible for” (200), she cannot 
help sealing Odette’s mouth when they hear the shot that kills the woman’s husband, Wilner. 
Caminero-Santangelo explains:  
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Amabelle’s recounting of this scene bears traces of the earlier parsley test – the violence 
of the muting, the justification of collective good that presumably vindicates the violence. 
Later, as Odette dies, she utters with her last gasp the Kreyòl word for parsley, further 
linking the two scenes; both are connected by what is not said. […] In some sense, the trauma 
is the silencing itself, which Amabelle compulsively repeats. (2009, 14) 
Taking this point further, I would add that the violent silencing, the compulsive repetition and 
the silent disappearance of Sebastien and his sister, after the death of Amabelle’s parents, 
constitute the protagonist’s second trauma, which, in turn, is aggravated by the fact that 
Amabelle is denied the possibility to give her testimony and is thereby silenced once again. 
Along with the trauma of her parents’ drowning, this second trauma pursues her in her 
dreams. Trying to keep herself busy with work most of her time, the narrator describes her 
time of inoccupation, her “dead season”, as “one never ending night”, in which she finds 
herself haunted by the question about the significance of the shibboleth, or, in her words, 
whether “one simple word could have saved all [their] lives” (264). Eventually, Danticat has 
her protagonist reach the realization that language, in fact, had never constituted a real 
boundary between Dominicans and Haitians. The narrator characterizes herself as being 
familiar with both sides, stating that she “knew as well how to say ‘pèsi’ as to say ‘perejil’” 
(265). Commenting on the primitive test, she highlights that the Haitians’ mastery of Spanish 
was far more accomplished than that, since Trujillo “asked for ‘perejil,’ but there is much 
more we all knew how to say. Perhaps one simple word would not have saved our lives. Many 
more would have to and many more will.” (ibid.) The last words, as I want to argue, can be 
read as programmatic for Danticat’s novel. After demystifying the shibboleth myth, she 
proceeds to trope two crucial aspects of the narrative through the figure of linguistic border-
crossing: Amabelle’s testimony of the slaughter and the author’s bridging of post-memorial 
distance to the 1937 massacre both become translingual projects. 
 
Translingual witnessing 
 
The theme of witnessing is introduced long before the narrative of the massacre breaks loose. 
Initially, it is not linked to the memory of trauma or survival, but denotes the remembrance of 
common cultural ties and the exchanging of life narratives within the Haitian diasporic 
community. When Father Romain emphasizes his being from the “same village of the world” 
as Amabelle, namely Cap Haitien, the protagonist explains the underlying notion of 
witnessing: 
Father Romain always made much of our being from the same place, just as Sebastien 
did. Most people here did. It was a way of being joined to your old life through the 
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presence of another person. At times you could sit for a whole evening with such 
individuals, just listening to their existence unfold, from the house where they were born 
to the hill where they wanted to be buried. It was their way of returning home, with you 
as a witness or as someone to bring them back to the present, either with a yawn, a plea to 
be excused, or the skillful intrusion of your own tale. This was how people left imprints 
of themselves in each other’s memory so that if you left first and went back to the 
common village, you could carry, if not a letter, a piece of treasured clothing, some 
message to their loved ones that their place was still among the living. (73, emphasis 
mine) 
In contrast to a more common notion of witnessing, in which a person “sees an event, 
typically a crime or accident” (Oxford Dictionary, online), the witnessing in question involves 
no particular occurrence. What lies at the heart of this ‘diasporic witnessing’ is a confirmation 
of one person’s memories and ties to their country of origin and a permission to travel back in 
time through the presence of a compatriot. What is practiced here is a deliberate act of 
witnessing that does not presuppose an expected delivery of a report, but appears rather as a 
‘witnessing just in case’ – in case the witness accomplishes the desired return to the homeland 
first and can export a sign of life of the one remaining in the Dominican Republic back home 
across the border. 
 What is also interesting in this example of bearing witness to one’s own heritage in 
regard to the whole narrative of The Farming of Bones as a multilingual testimony is the fact 
that it occurs exclusively within the community of Haitians and, as we have to believe despite 
Danticat’s mainly English discourse on it, within their mother tongue, Kreyòl. This difference 
can be seen, in fact, as owed to a connection between the two instances of witnessing, which 
lies in the long history of discrimination and marginalization of Haitians in the Dominican 
Republic. What sets them apart from Dominicans is not so much their different language as 
their different institutional treatment. To demonstrate this, Danticat, for a moment, guides her 
protagonist away from the cane workers’ misery to the settlement of “stable non-vwayajè 
Haitians […] whose families had been in Alegría for generations” (68). Directing Amabelle 
like a camera eye – or a witness – past their houses and their tiny school building, Danticat 
has her record their complaints about being forever stigmatized as foreigners, refused both 
“birth papers” and a proper school education (69). Indeed, it is among these well-established 
expatriates that Amabelle for the first time hears of rumors about deportations and killings of 
Haitians on Dominican territory. In this context, the “common ties: language, foods, history, 
carnival, songs, tales, and prayers”, of which Father Romain regularly reminds the Haitian 
congregants (73), function as a protective mechanism, which is why this instance of ‘diasporic 
witnessing’ is situated only within the Haitian community.  
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While not propagated by Father Romain, there is also an unspoken assumption that a 
stronger assimilation to the Dominican community and a mode of in-betweenness weaken the 
Haitian expatriates. Thus, from Amabelle’s perspective, we initially gain the impression that 
speaking “a mix of Alegrían Kreyòl and Spanish” constitutes a verbal deficiency, since it is 
described as “the tangled language of those who always stuttered as they spoke, caught as 
they were on the narrow ridge between two nearly native tongues” (69). Particularly the 
expression “nearly native tongues” implies that the speakers of the language mix are not 
considered as natives to either of the two. This assumption is certainly not free from 
implications of the power relations between Haitians and Dominicans. While an in-
betweenness on the part of Haitians is evaluated as a deficiency, the same does not apply to 
Dominicans. Thus, Amabelle ascribes the stuttering only to Haitians, for whom Spanish has 
become almost a mother tongue, but not to the Dominican Doctor Javier, who, “spoke Kreyòl 
like a Haitian, with only a slight Dominican cadence” (79). It therefore appears that a 
unilateral linguistic border control, established by a dominant discourse, is absorbed even by 
Haitians themselves, as in the case of Amabelle. 
After surviving the Parsley Massacre, as Pamela Rader rightly observes, Amabelle is 
precluded from giving her testimony three times (39): first, by Yves’ mother, Man Rapadou, 
who claims to already know her story (227), second, by the justice of the peace (235), and 
finally, by priests, who state that they can offer nothing to those who have lost relations (254). 
Remarkably, these three failing attempts to testify occur on Haitian ground and not in the 
Dominican Republic, where the massacre took place. It appears crucial that Amabelle is thus 
prevented from giving her testimony in her native language, Kreyòl. When Yves brings the 
news of priests who listen to and write down survivors’ testimonies, Danticat has him 
comment on the issue of linguistic authorship: “I know what will happen […]. You tell the 
story, and then it’s retold as they wish, written in words you do not understand, in a language 
that is theirs, and not yours.” (246) While he does not make specific reference to national 
languages, such as Spanish or Kreyòl, Yves does point out the danger of translating a 
testimony into a language that does not remain true to the original account of the witness.  
In his essay, “Poetics and Politics of Witnessing” (2005), Jacques Derrida deals 
precisely with the issue of language engaged in an act of witnessing. Examining Paul Celan’s 
poetry as a case in point, Derrida observes about the original language, in which a testimony 
is formulated: “As always, the idiom remains irreducible. This invincible singularity of the 
verbal body already introduces us into the enigma of testimony […]. This idiom is 
untranslatable, at bottom, even if we translate it.” (2005, 67). What Derrida seeks to discover 
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in the language of witnessing is a singularity that could release it from being affected by 
différance, from the shifting of signifiers, through which meaning remains forever deferred or 
postponed. If a testimony presupposes the “irreplaceability of the singular witness” (ibid.), 
then it must engage words that can warrant for its truth, and therefore must be located almost 
outside of the drifting system of language. From this paradoxical demand, Derrida derives the 
same characteristics of witnessing as those he attributes to translation in “Des Tours de 
Babel” (1985): both acts are as necessary as they are impossible. It is therefore no coincidence 
that these two acts are intertwined in Derrida’s argument on the singular language of 
testimony: 
We see already announcing itself the poignant question of untranslatable testimony. 
Because it must be linked to a singularity and to the experience of an idiomatic mark – for 
example, that of a language – testimony resists the test of translation. It thus risks not 
being able to cross the frontier of singularity, if only to deliver its meaning. But what 
would an untranslatable testimony be worth? Would it be a non-testimony? And what 
would a testimony that was absolutely transparent to translation be? Would it still be a 
testimony? (2005, 68-69) 
It is interesting to observe that Edwidge Danticat’s troping of Amabelle’s testimony is 
intimately connected with the need of translation and its impossibility. Just like Foer, Danticat 
links the trope of the limits of translation to what Derrida has described as the “proper-name 
effect” (1987, 312). The name in question is introduced in the very first sentence of the 
narrative: “His name is Sebastien Onius” (1). Bearing in mind Derrida’s point that a proper 
name is seemingly located outside of language and is therefore untranslatable, we may 
understand how the invocation of the murdered lover’s name signals a rupture in the narrative 
discourse on the slaughter. Remaining, at least partly, outside of language, Sebastien’s name 
cannot be integrated into what is presented as Amabelle’s narrative memory.  
 Opening and closing the first chapter (1, 4), the name functions as a signpost to the 
ontology and temporality of the narrative. As outlined above, the chapters and passages in 
bold print signal a reaching out into an ontological order different from that in which the 
story-line is conveyed – the order of Amabelle’s dreams and memories, in short, of her 
psychological reality. When the protagonist relates to us that “[a]t times Sebastien Onius 
guarded [her] from the shadows. At other times he was one of them” (4), we get a sense of his 
liminal presence both in the narrated fictional past and in Amabelle’s inner world. As to the 
narrative time, the introduction of Sebastien’s name in the present tense – “His name is 
Sebastien Onius” – arouses the expectation of an entire novel written in the present tense. 
When this tense is contrasted by the past tense of the second and most other chapters with 
even numbers and, at the latest, when the fact of his death is established in the novel, it 
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becomes clear that this present tense does not stand in any chronological relation to the past 
tense, in which the story unfolds. Rather, its use marks a memory frozen in time, a bygone 
present that nevertheless cannot become past. 
 
 
 
Translating proper names 
 
Both the traumatic quality of this memory and the denied possibility of giving her testimony 
are presented as reasons of Amabelle’s inability to start a new life after the slaughter. This 
fact displays another curious parallel to Derrida’s concept of witnessing. Examining Paul 
Celan’s poetry as an epitome of witnessing through language, Derrida focuses on the German 
word ‘zeugen’ in the poem “Aschenglorie”, which apart from ‘to witness’ also translates as 
‘to procreate’. He uses the second meaning to establish a link between the passing on of a 
testimony and the continuation of a genealogical line (2005, 74). Precisely this connection is 
negotiated in The Farming of Bones, when Danticat portrays Amabelle’s life as a childless 
witness of the slaughter. A futile inquiry about Sebastien that she tries to send to Doctor 
Javier, who, after his unsuccessful attempt to help a group of Haitians escape across the 
border, seems to have suffered the same fate as her lover, of course remains forever 
unanswered. Sensing that there is no addressee neither for her testimony nor for her inquiry, 
Amabelle is caught in a double-bind between trying to mourn and to forget Sebastien, and  
“wait[s] for Doctor Javier’s reply by growing old” (267). This double-bind is not eased, but 
only reflected in Sebastien’s friend Yves, with whom she comes to live without ever loving 
him. Having forfeited the chance to have a family with him, Amabelle admits:  
I regretted that we hadn’t found more comfort in each other. After I realized that 
Sebastien was not coming back, I wanted to find someone who would both help me forget 
him and mourn him with me. Perhaps this was too great a gift to ask of a man who was in 
search of the same thing for himself. (274) 
Since Amabelle has remained childless, it is highly symbolic that when joining a parade of 
survivors celebrating Trujillo’s death in 1961, she is for the first time addressed as “Man 
Amabelle”, literally meaning ‘Mother Amabelle’, by someone who notices her dancing the 
traditional kalanda (269). Significantly, Amabelle is surprised both by her own dancing, 
which she had not been conscious of, and by the form of address with a “title belonging to an 
elder […] before [her] name” (269). In this moment, it seems, she suddenly officially turns 
into a survivor-witness, without having ever been allowed to testify and into a mother without 
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having ever had a child. The title ‘Man’ transforms her name, translates it into a different, 
more desirable version of her life. However, this sudden transformation hardly marks the end 
of a successful mourning period, but only evokes the vision of what could have been – a 
vision that quickly vanishes in the face of Amabelle’s feeling of guilt: “How dare you dance 
on a day like this? […] It’s like dancing on all the graves.” (270) 
 In contrast, the vision of continuing one’s life after the slaughter is surprisingly 
realized by Father Romain, the Haitian priest from Alegría, who, along with Doctor Javier, 
had been involved in the plan of escape across the border and had in consequence suffered 
torture in a Dominican prison. His opting for life despite having been witness to the massacre 
is, in turn, signaled by a successful transformation, or translation, of his own title. When 
Amabelle addresses him as a priest with “Father”, he informs her about this translation: “I am 
no longer a father, […] I am a father to three young boys. I am no longer with any order.” 
(272) Strictly speaking, the change in his title is a minimal one, since it consists only in the 
loss of a capital letter. However, this minimal difference bespeaks a more salvaging 
translation that Amabelle’s sudden nomination as “Man Amabelle”. His having become a 
witness seems to demand an act of procreation, as he explains: “It took more than prayers to 
heal me after the slaughter […]. It took a love closer to the earth, closer to my own body, to 
stop my tears.” (272) 
 These transformations of proper names lie at the heart of Danticat’s negotiation of a 
possible recovery after the genocide, for as in Walter Benjamin’s “The Task of the 
Translator” (2000), in The Farming of Bones, survival is closely linked up with translation. It 
is interesting to note that even the ‘translations’ of Amabelle’s and Father Romain’s names 
are not merely enacted against the background of Sebastien’s name, but that Danticat probes 
into the translatability of the very name of Amabelle’s killed lover. Throughout most of the 
narrative, Sebastien’s name remains a stumbling block, resisting its own integration into 
narrative memory, and appearing instead as a symptom of a traumatic repetition-compulsion. 
This becomes most palpable toward the end of the narrative, when we are presented with a 
four-time repetition of the sentence: “His name is Sebastien Onius” (281-82), which gives 
Amabelle four attempts to continue it in different ways. The first of these continuations 
clearly bespeaks an impossibility of the narrativization of Sebastien’s story: “His name is 
Sebastien Onius and his story is like a fish with no tail, a dress with no hem, a drop with no 
fall, a body in the sunlight with no shadow.” (281) Since the circumstances of his death 
cannot be fully known, his story lacks the integral part of an ending and thus remains forever 
incomplete. The second continuation expresses how everything crystallizes and fades around 
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this name, opening an abyss of infinite longing: “His name is Sebastien Onius. Sometimes 
this is all I know. My back aches now in all those places that he claimed for himself, arches of 
bare skin that belonged to him, pockets where the flesh remains fragile, seared like unhealed 
burns where each fallen scab uncovers a deeper wound.” (281) 
 However, after these two repetitions a certain reevaluation can be observed. After 
invoking her lover’s name, in a Derridean sense, as a marker of untranslatability, or, in other 
words, of the impossibility of working through his loss, Amabelle turns her attention to the 
fact that it is precisely his name that preserves him from being forgotten. As she declares, 
“[m]en with names never truly die. It is only the nameless and faceless who vanish like smoke 
into the early morning air.” (282) This turn sets a process in motion that can be regarded as a 
process of mourning. Repeating his name for a third time, she suddenly situates his death on a 
timeline – seven years after his father’s death. Finally, the last repetition of his name directs 
her toward the future, since she realizes where she could find a place to say farewell to her 
dead lover: “His name is Sebastien Onius and his spirit must be inside the waterfall cave at 
the source of the stream where the cane workers bathe, the grotto of wet moss and chalk and 
luminous green fresco – the dark green of wet papaya leaves.” (282) 
 To travel back to the cave, the symbol of both love and healing, means to leave Haiti 
and cross over to the Dominican Republic, both in territorial and linguistic terms. The 
crossing is anticipated by Amabelle’s sudden attraction to the Spanish language. It becomes 
palpable in a scene, in which she absentmindedly begins to follow a group of tourists around 
Cap Haitien: “I wasn’t certain why I had picked that particular group of white foreigners and 
Haitian guide to follow until I realized that both the guide’s talk and the things that members 
of the group were whispering to one another were in Spanish.” (278-79) With Derrida, this 
attraction can be explained through the fact that Spanish had become a “privileged witness” to 
the massacre and, thus, “present at everything that was capable of destroying […] existences 
of innumerable number” (2005, 67-68). As such, it seems to offer a key to the 
incomprehensibility of the traumatic events. 
 However, Danticat’s project, unlike that of Foer, goes beyond sending her protagonist 
to an enigmatic site of slaughter and survival to confront her once again with the 
unspeakability of the traumatic events. Significantly, Amabelle does speak the language of the 
country, in which she massacre occurred, and this language is not merely treated in the 
Derridean sense as a witness; instead, Danticat highlights the fact that, having enabled the 
racialized discourse in the first place, the Spanish language had thus become unwittingly 
complicit with the perpetrators. When Amabelle travels back, she therefore pursues a twofold 
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objective: one the one hand, to mourn Sebastien, and on the other, to reclaim her voice in 
Spanish and to deliver her testimony to the system that had engendered the violence. The need 
to talk back to the perpetrators is first formulated long before her journey back to Alegría. It is 
upon Odette’s death, which occurs while the massacre is still continuing on the Dominican 
side of the border, that Amabelle’s thoughts wander to Trujillo as the initiator of the slaughter, 
who, in her view, should be confronted with Odette’s last word, “pèsi”:  
The Generalissimo’s mind was surely as dark as death, but if he had heard Odette’s 
‘pèsi’, it might have startled him, not the tears an supplications he would have expected, 
no shriek from unbound fear, but a provocation, a challenge, a dare. To the devil with 
your world, your grass, your wind, your water, your air, your words. You ask for perejil, I 
give you more. (203) 
As Amabelle’s words make clear, the word ‘pèsi’ is uttered in direct response to the 
humiliation involved in the distinction between Haitians and Dominicans based on their 
pronunciation of a word as banal as ‘parsley’. To insist on one’s own pronunciation is to 
refuse to be subjugated to the ridiculous and inhuman test, to make “no effort to say ‘perejil’ 
as if pleading for [one’s] life” (ibid.). Being a “challenge” and a “provocation”, the word 
needs to be delivered to the site of origin of the hateful myth. 
 Danticat directs our attention to this myth one last time, when, at the close of the 
narrative, she has Sylvie, Señora Valencia’s young new maid, ask the elliptic and yet clearly 
understandable question: “Why parsley?” (303) By presenting the question in English, 
Danticat once again defamiliarizes the word from its shibboleth context and tropes Sylvie’s 
bewilderment as the only adequate reaction. When her question prompts her mistress to 
recount the anecdote of Trujillo’s ‘insight’ owed to the word ‘perejil’, the answer appears as 
an attempt to justify the massacre. For it remains unclear whether she speaks for herself or 
quotes Trujillo, when she says: “On this island, you walk too far and people speak a different 
language. Their own words reveal who belongs on what side.” (304) What does stand out 
clearly, though, is the fact that the discourse that had engendered the violence is still alive and 
uncritically perpetuated by the Dominican high-class society. 
 In reaction to this fact, Danticat has her narrator undertake a linguistic move which 
allows the latter to undermine the Dominican discourse of power. Already before the 
massacre, the provocative question is raised by Sebastien’s sister, Mimi, as to why their 
masters and mistresses had to be addressed as ‘Señor’ and ‘Señora’: “But what would be so 
terrible if we did say only their Christian names?” (63) Even after the massacre, Amabelle’s 
concern that it “would demonstrate a lack of respect” seems to persist (ibid.), for she still 
refers to her former mistress as “the señora” (294). However, Amabelle’s discourse proves 
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subversive when she entirely drops the first name and addresses Señora Valencia exclusively 
by the title denoting her social status, thus robbing her of individuality and personality. This 
address is also presented as a response to the latter’s neutral, unempathetic tone, for the 
protagonist comments:  
I felt as though she were speaking on behalf of someone else. I couldn’t stop thinking that 
perhaps an older member of her family, a doña with a similar face, similar manners, and a 
voice similar to hers, had come to keep me company until Valencia herself could talk to 
me. (297) 
Realizing that Valencia will not emerge, Amabelle addresses her final farewell not so much to 
her former mistress, as to the Dominican class system that had enabled the discrimination of 
Haitians, saying: “Go in peace, Señora” (306).  
 At the same time, this farewell does not imply a farewell to either the country or the 
Spanish language. On the contrary, the last journey across the border allows Amabelle to 
recover a part of her life narrative, marked by the impact of traumatic events at this border. 
Significantly, Danticat’s narrative closes on the very border, which is troped not only as a 
physical, national and linguistic one, but also one between dreams and reality as well as 
between life and death. Even the threat of the torrential river seems mitigated by this 
symbolism, when Amabelle slips into the water: “The water was warm for October, warm and 
shallow, so shallow that I could lie on my back in it with my shoulders only half submerged” 
(310). However, one would wait in vain “for softness, for a gentler embrace”, since, as the 
narrator notes, “nature has no memory” (309-10). This observation takes us back to our point 
of departure, the fact that it is precisely the lack of memory in nature that has inspired 
Danticat’s narrative, which transgresses generational, geographic and linguistic distance.  
 
 
English as the impartial listener 
 
The linguistic transgression finally prompts us to ask how English as the language of the 
narrative voice relates to the story set between Spanish and Kreyòl and what effects this 
choice of language brings about. In a most obvious sense, the language choice signals the 
author’s post-memorial distance to the diegesis of her narrative. What is more, the strategy of 
translingual writing allows Danticat to effectively trope a historical trauma that, as Cathy 
Caruth derives from her readings of Freud, can be fully known only after a period of latency 
(cf. 1995, 7). If the theorist argues that traumatic events become “fully evident only in 
connection with another place, and in another time” (ibid., 8), Danticat seems to add that they 
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reveal themselves in connection with another language. As trauma theorist Ernst van Alphen 
convincingly argues, memory and trauma can be considered as “symptoms of discursivity” 
(1999, 24). Drawing on ideas originally based on the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, he argues that 
“forms of experience do not just depend on the event or history that is being experienced, but 
also on the discourse in which the event is expressed” (ibid.). In other words, trauma causes a 
breach in memory not only because the triggering event is unprecedented but because the 
structures inherent to language resist its representation. In this context, a translingual narrative 
strategy points to a way out of the impasse of unrepresentability. To transgress the boundary 
between Spanish and Kreyòl as the two languages involved in the historical trauma, Danticat 
summons English as an uninvolved third party. This reflects Derrida’s point, derived from 
Paul Celan’s poem “Aschenglorie”, that the language present at a disaster becomes a witness, 
and as such, cannot deliver its testimony to another witness, since the other is as singular and 
as involved (cf. 2005, 89). If in The Farming of Bones, both Spanish and Kreyòl are invoked 
as witnesses to the slaughter, English figures as a more impartial listener.  
 At the same time, the use of English establishes a connection to a political context in 
which Danticat’s novel, as I agree with Marta Caminero-Santangelo, appears highly topical: 
the US American context with its current climate of escalating hostility to illegal immigration 
(cf. 2009, 22). As Caminero-Santangelo convincingly demonstrates, Danticat’s depiction of 
the 1937 atmosphere in the Dominican Republic displays multiple parallels to the current 
situation of illegal immigrants in the United States, starting with the rhetorics on cultural, 
linguistic and economic difference and the alleged threat of the foreign and finishing with the 
inhuman treatment these rhetorics vindicate. This connection between the two violent and 
traumatizing situations leads us back to the idea proposed by Cathy Caruth: 
“In a catastrophic age, […] trauma itself may provide the very link between cultures: not 
as a simple understanding of the pasts of others but rather, within the traumas of 
contemporary history, as our ability to listen through the departures we have all taken 
from ourselves.” (Caruth 1995, 11) 
In The Farming of Bones, trauma is indeed troped as “the very link between cultures”: first, 
between Dominican and Haitian culture, which were violently separated under Trujillo by 
means of state authority; and second, as a link between the marginalization of Haitians in the 
Dominican Republic and that of illegal immigrants in the United States. In retracing the 
protagonist’s relation to the imposed border between her “nearly native tongues” (69), 
Danticat’s novel “listen[s] through the departures we have all taken from ourselves” and 
opens the view to other departures, which are currently being taken in the United States and 
around the world. 
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Conclusion 
 
The two novels analyzed in this chapter, present us with trauma narratives that hinge on the 
figure of linguistic border-crossing. In Everything Is Illuminated, the figure is used to signal 
the historical and linguistic distance that would need to be bridged in order to recover the 
transgenerational memory of the Holocaust. With Walter Benjamin and Jacques Derrida, we 
can say that the task of the translator is forced upon the ‘third generation’, since they grow up 
surrounded by their grandparents’ traumatic or repressed memories of the Holocaust, which, 
metaphorically speaking, demand to be translated, or worked through. To mark the difficulty 
of accessing these memories and retracing historical truth, the novel engages a translator 
figure boasting a comically limited competence of English. His unidiomatic use of 
vocabulary, however, is symptomatic of the “phantomized” memories of his family, to speak 
with Nicolas Abraham. 
 While Foer’s novel allows the protagonists to approach the gaping void in their family 
narratives without ever fully reaching, let alone, filling it, in The Farming of Bones, the 
historical distance to the narrated genocide seems reduced and traumatic memory not as 
inaccessible. Instead, the figure of the language border stands in for the site of trauma, with 
the ‘Parsley Massacre’ relying on the Shibboleth myth of a clear distinction between Haitians 
and Dominicans. Years after the massacre, the transgression of this border seems to neutralize 
its violent imposition, and, therefore, brings along a healing effect for the protagonist. The 
fact that the narrative ends at the very site of the border is highly symbolic: By immersing 
herself into the border river, the protagonist revisits her own site of trauma and seems ready to 
come to terms with her traumatic memories. In terms of language, Amabelle, in addition to 
Kreyòl, reclaims Spanish, thus refusing to remain exiled from her nearly native tongue. Her 
position at the border thus signals her freedom to partake in both of her languages. 
 Troping the possibility of healing through the transgression of language boundaries, 
the novels draw on multilingual aesthetics in different ways. Thus, in Everything Is 
Illuminated, English not only marks the distant point of departure, from where the search for 
traumatic history begins; it also remains, in its standard and its broken version, the sole 
language available to the protagonists in their attempts to articulate Holocaust trauma. This 
highlights the impossibility of fully recovering the trauma buried in the languages of the 
victims of the Holocaust. In The Farming of Bones, the languages that become ‘witness’ to 
the genocide, Kreyòl and Spanish, are separated through state violence, which introduces a 
split into the memory of the genocide. Bringing them together on the level of the discourse 
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signals an overcoming of this traumatic condition. English, in turn, enters the stage as an 
impartial listener, enabling the expression of the traumatic link between Dominican and 
Haitian history. Thus, while diverging in their views on the success of the therapeutic process, 
both narratives engage with multilingualism and translation as key figures to the working- 
through of historical trauma. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Considering the multiple psychological scenarios of linguistic border-crossing in fiction that 
have been discussed in this thesis, we can observe an oscillation between two opposite poles: 
the transgression into another language as the beginning of a nightmare or as the source of a 
possible salvation. I have taken my point of departure through Eva Hoffman’s Lost in 
Translation, a sentimental account of the difficulties of language migration, and the only non-
fictional text dealt with in this thesis. The autobiographic persona’s movement from Polish to 
English, framed by other hardships of migration, is strongly defined by her sense of 
marginalization and destabilization in Canada. This leads her to an inner conflict, in which 
she idealizes her mother tongue as a lost paradise and condemns her own stepping across the 
border into the new language. Visibly influenced by her environment’s skepticism about 
bilingualism and its effects on the human psyche, Hoffman associates her linguistic border-
crossing with a feeling of loss and estrangement.  
However, as we have seen in the depiction of the translator figure in Atom Egoyan’s 
film Calendar, an inner conflict in linguistic borderlands is not the only outcome of 
encountering and learning the foreign language. Instead, linguistic border-crossings can be 
mastered without exerting violence against one’s self by allowing the first and the second 
language to permeate each other. This hybridizing strategy is troped as a way of facilitating a 
better balance between the two languages and of keeping track of one’s personal history by 
means of retracing the marks it leaves in one’s language(s). At the same time, this strategy 
emerges as a form of protest against absolute assimilation, since it renounces the native-
speaker ideal and fosters true bilingualism. 
As suggested in the first chapter, Hoffman’s narrative of language migration displays 
the wish to assign her mother tongue a hegemonic position in the New World and thus never 
to have to feel decentered. A similar tendency and struggle can be observed in two of the 
films I have analyzed. The photographer in Atom Egoyan’s Calendar feels tortured by the 
fact that, on his journey to his diasporic homeland, Armenia, he depends on his wife’s 
translation services and tries to impose an authoritarian rule to contain the power of her 
discourse. In Michel Gondry’s The Science of Sleep, the protagonist finds himself equally 
helpless in a language that had previously been his mother tongue. Due to his conflict-ridden 
relationship both to his mother’s French and to his deceased father’s traumatically charged 
Spanish, he seeks to banish the influence of both languages and replace them, even in his 
unconscious life, by English. An imaginary studio, in which he seemingly prepares his own 
231 
 
dreams, is presented as a monument to his narcissistic dictatorship in English. To speak with 
Julia Kristeva, this characterizes the protagonists as strangers to themselves (1991), and 
reveals their resistance against multilingualism as a neurotic reaction. 
Significantly, the totalizing tendencies fail in all three works: Eva Hoffman’s 
autobiographic self finally adapts to her English-speaking surroundings, Egoyan’s 
photographer loses his translator-wife to his Armenian rival, and Gondry’s Stéphane gets lost 
between dreams and reality. This can be explained through the fact that all of these works are 
united by the theme of repression. Be it the half-knowledge of the parents’ Holocaust trauma, 
as in Lost in Translation, the memory and feeling of guilt about the parents’ separation, as in 
The Science of Sleep, or the knowledge of one’s own mother tongue as in Calendar, all of the 
protagonists seek to repress central issues of their lives. Their journeys into ‘foreign’ language 
territory, in turn, confront them with what they have tried to forget. In this context, their 
militant monolingualism appears as an attempt to resist the return of the repressed. Thus, the 
‘foreign’ language exerts a subversive power, but is also configured as a releasing force, since 
it eventually makes the protagonists give up their neurotic resistance and begin to come to 
terms with their memories. 
The figure of linguistic border-crossings also lends itself to troping collectively 
repressed memories, as shown in the case in Lars von Trier’s Europa. Taking the delusive 
dream of a totalizing discourse still to a different level, the director casts his naïve American 
protagonist into a lethal nightmare, in which he becomes a victim of the linguistic tyranny of 
others. Seduced by the intrigues of German-speaking supporters of the Nazis, the protagonist 
recovers his own voice in English too late and perishes in a hypnotic Babelian nightmare 
while trying to follow the orders of the Werewolves. To put it differently, the protagonist is 
sent into the realm of nationalist myth-making, where independent cinema’s enfant terrible, 
Lars von Trier, takes on the task of confusing human language, as done by God in the myth of 
Babel, so as to stop the creation of totalizing discourses. The death of the protagonist, 
carefully established as an identification figure for the viewer, can be read as political 
criticism of redemptive fantasies about European unity at the end of the Cold War. Thus, 
linguistic border-crossing emerges as powerful figure for putting the audience on the 
psychoanalytic couch and exploring the collective unconscious. 
In other configurations, the transgression of language boundaries is troped as a 
possibility for the protagonist to undermine a hegemonic discourse exerted in one language. 
The character does not necessarily need to succeed in subverting an entire regime in order to 
prove the force of linguistic border-crossings. Thus, Junot Diaz’ The Brief Wondrous Life of 
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Oscar Wao makes the case that a multilingual subject’s notion of love and desire can 
considerably deviate from the discourse on sexuality as dictated in his first language. Upon 
arrival to the diasporic homeland, the Dominican Republic, Oscar Wao’s difference from the 
norm in terms of gender and language is figured as a provocation to the machista discourse 
inherited from the times of the Trujillo regime. The protagonist’s easy crossing of language 
boundaries is presented as a dangerous power, which, in consequence, is brutally 
extinguished. 
Other protests against and escapes from hegemonic discourses analyzed in this thesis 
prove more successful. This has been demonstrated in Yann Martel’s Self, where the 
protagonist’s bilingualism fosters his/her questioning of gender difference and 
heteronormativity, and eventually enables him/her to transcend the limits of the discourse 
imposed by his/her mother tongue. A similar liberation can be observed in the case of Atom 
Egoyan’s translator figure, whose character is diametrically opposed to her husband’s 
‘translation neurosis’. As shown in the analysis of Calendar, the female character role as 
translator allows her to resist the photographer’s militant monolingualism and empowers her 
to freely cross the lines between her Canadian and her Armenian world. As both Egoyan and 
Martel lead us to believe, the foreign language, if not perceived a source of anxiety, can exude 
a strong sense of attraction. It is not accidental that both characters fall in love in the process 
of translation or, as in Self, when faced with the enchanting strangeness of a foreign language. 
Therefore, in both works, we encounter the language boundary as a magnetic line, promoting 
the two sides’ desire for each other. 
 If love relations with speakers of the ‘foreign’ language are viewed rather skeptically 
in Eva Hoffman’s Lost in Translation, this has to do with the author’s troping of the migrant 
as divided or split between the first and the second language. What makes the language 
memoir particularly interesting for my exploration are the gaps, tensions and contradiction 
present in Hoffman’s text. Thus, as I have suggested, her own text allows to trace her feeling 
of an inner split back to her childhood. Her idealization of Poland appears in an awkward 
light, since it is also the country where most of her Jewish family died in the Holocaust. With 
Marianne Hirsch, I have argued that a feeling of split between herself and her surroundings 
can be assumed to have been present already in her childhood and that the moving to Canada 
offered a welcome possibility to transfer this feeling from an earlier, more painful context to 
the difficult, but not inherently traumatic context of her language migration. 
 In fact, the postmemory of her parents’ Holocaust trauma resurfaces in the language 
memoir, and this is where the process of translation, in metaphorical terms, suddenly acquires 
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therapeutic value. Reading Hoffman’s psychological translation process as a means of 
searching for a “blindspot of some primal scene” (Fresco 1984, 420) clearly connects her 
narrative to Jonathan Safran Foer’s Everything Is Illuminated. As we have seen in the fourth 
chapter, his novel tropes translation as a means of finding access to the linguistically and 
historically almost unreachable story of his grandparents’ survival in the Holocaust. Here, as 
well, translation is configured in its therapeutic potential – which does not mean that the 
healing process is successful. Well-aware of the pitfalls of redemptive narratives, Foer turns 
the process of translation into tragicomical adventure, reflecting, in a Derridean sense, the 
necessity and impossibility of translation. Ironically, it is from the translator’s failing 
language that the author salvages a “phantomized” memory of the latter’s family own 
involvement in the Holocaust (Abraham 1988, 4). The highly revealing slips of the tongue 
that occur in the process of translation once again confirm the transformatory potential of the 
transgression of language borders. 
 Translation is presented as necessary not only for the descendants of Holocaust 
survivors, but, even more so, for the traumatized witnesses, whose experience has taken them 
to the limits of language and understanding. At this point, the figure of linguistic border-
crossing looms large in its metaphorical potential to trope and possibly even extend precisely 
these limits. The crossing of language boundaries is also presented as the key to a possible 
working through historical trauma in Edwidge Danticat’s The Farming of Bones. In this 
narrative, trauma is most closely related to language, since it deals with the thin and unstable 
boundary drawn between Dominicans and Haitians as well as their languages – a boundary 
that quickly justifies the eruption of genocidal violence. What is staged as a traumatic 
Shibboleth moment is unmasked as a pure act of violence that robs the Haitian protagonist of 
the right to feel native in the Spanish of the Dominican Republic. Barely surviving the 
genocide, Amabelle finds herself expelled from Spanish and robbed of the ability to give her 
testimony. In this context, the recovery of both of her languages is troped as the only way of 
healing. Therefore, the act of returning to the traumatically charged language border is troped 
as the only way to protest against the violently imposed monolingualism, to mourn her lost 
love, and to regain some sense of dignity. 
All in all, it is safe to say that while some of the works discussed in the thesis trope 
linguistic border-crossings as a source of anxiety and melancholia, all of them seem to agree 
that translation is a process rather to be found in than to be lost. The films and books, in which 
multilingualism or translation, at a first glance, appear as potentially traumatizing, suggest – 
explicitly or implicitly – that these evaluations are derived, to a great extent, from different 
234 
 
traumatizing contexts, which reveals them as results of transference. Ventures into foreign-
language territory are thus troped as helping characters to recover traumatic and repressed 
memories, to confront their own fears, to undergo transformations, to become familiar with 
themselves.  
As I have shown, multilingual aesthetics not only evaluate fictional scenarios of 
linguistic border-crossings; they also provide a powerful strategy for transmitting the 
emotions involved in them to the audience. In analogy to the notion of “traumatic realism” 
(Foster 1996, Rothberg 2000, LaCapra 2001), it can be said that the works examined in this 
thesis make a strong case for “multilingual realism”, a style that mimics multilingual modes 
of signification and, thus, stays true to multilingual fictional settings and the characters’ 
multilingual inner lives in order to make the psychological experience of linguistic border-
crossings accessible to readers and viewers alike. While more extensively practiced in film 
due to its multiple channels through which meaning is conveyed, multilingual realism also 
prominently surfaces in literary works: In literary fiction, as we have seen, it opens a wide 
space for experimentation – be it through hybridizing techniques, the readers’ exposure to 
long untranslated passages in languages that the target audience is not likely to understand, or 
pseudo-multilingualism. 
 
 
Lost and found in translation 
 
Taking into account the impact of the title of Eva Hoffman’s language memoir, it is 
illuminating to take a look at the eponymous narrative poem by James Merrill, which was 
published in 1974 in the New York Times and first coined the now familiar title. Significantly 
for our context, the poem is both multilingual – drawing on English, French, German and 
even Arabic – and concerned with memory, trauma and translation. In the poem, the speaker 
recounts a traumatic summer in his boyhood, in which he is confronted with the long absence 
and impending divorce of his parents. Left in the care of his governess, “His French 
Mademoiselle” (l. 14), he impatiently awaits the arrival of a jigsaw puzzle from a New York 
puzzle-rental shop. The metaphorical character of the puzzle is hinted at when the lyrical 
persona notes: “A summer without parents is the puzzle / Or should be.” (ll. 11-12) As the 
puzzle arrives and he and Mademoiselle begin to assemble it, they do not fail to notice, each 
in their different way, some parallels between the emerging image and the troubled domestic 
situation. In two completed parts of the puzzle, “two ragged wooden clouds”, the boy discerns 
235 
 
the figures of a “Sheik with beard” and “a dark-eyed woman veiled in mauve”, who “gaze 
from cloud to cloud / With marked if undecipherable feeling” (ll. 92-99). The figures 
represent the parental couple, which is confirmed by the fact that a “slave or page-boy” 
appears between them, whom Mademoiselle quickly recognizes as the woman’s son. In the 
child’s perception, she does so “mistakenly”, which gives a clue of his denial and repression 
of the situation (ll.101-102). However, the poem speaks a different language since a missing 
puzzle piece, that of the page-boy’s feet, is finally found at the child’s feet, betraying their 
relation. 
 With Donald Winnicott, the puzzle can be considered a “transitional object” (1953), 
helping the child symbolically deal with his parents’ absence and separation. The traumatic 
quality of the experience is highlighted in the retrospective narrative, since the narrator 
initially withdraws from the scene by speaking of “the boy” (l. 12) in the third person, before 
beginning to speak of Mademoiselle and himself as “us” (l. 95) and getting through to the 
first-person “I” only in line 110. Assuming the identity of the boy only belatedly, the narrator 
shows signs of a dissociative memory. The puzzle with its “thousand hand-sawn / Sandal-
scented pieces” (l. 40-41) stands in for his fragmented perception and memory of the domestic 
situation as well as for the broken home itself. As soon as the puzzle is finished, it begins to 
crumble, undermining the unity of the family in the picture, and needs to be dismantled and 
returned to the rental shop, which robs the child of his transitional object. 
 The fact that the boy secretly keeps one puzzle piece, to retain at least a small part of 
the family picture, brings up the theme of translation, since it seems to show an “innocently 
branching palm” (l. 46) – an association that is later linked to a poem by Valéry titled 
“Palme”, to which the adult narrator struggles to find a German translation by Rilke. 
Ransacking libraries in different countries, he obsesses over the question of where he might 
have encountered this translation before. The Proustian search for the translation, like a search 
for memory, in turn leads him back to Mademoiselle, who has taught him French and German 
and has undergone, as the narrator learns only as an adult, a ‘self-translation’. For the 
governess, “a widow since Verdun” (l. 15), is “only French by marriage” (l. 108), while being 
the daughter of a German father and having grown up in Alsace ‒ a heritage she is ashamed of 
and seeks to repress and hide after the war. Coming from the border area between Germany 
and France, it is no wonder that she “does borders” (ll. 57, 83) in the puzzle, as the narrator 
insists twice in the poem. With her family history, or her “pitiful bit of truth”, hidden away (l. 
176), her inner life seems split in two, into her “French hopes” and “German fears” (l. 23). 
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Growing up in her care, the narrator unwittingly inherits a linguistic symptom of her 
repression, and is told as an adult that he speaks French with a German accent. 
 Mademoiselle’s self-translation from German to French and Rilke’s translation of 
Valéry’s poem from French to German complement each other and are intertwined in the 
narrator’s mind. Significantly, these translations are inscribed not only in his memory, but 
also literally into the body of the poem. Mademoiselle mixes the two languages ‒ “Schlaf 
wohl, chéri” (l. 119) ‒ and the narrator tries to render the translation of Valéry’s poem by 
tentatively translating one line himself: “Patience dans l'azur. / Geduld im… Himmelblau?” (l. 
36-37) The search for memory is thus intimately bound up with the act of translation; to 
recover the past is to translate it. 
 Just as he learns about Mademoiselle’s repressed past, he succeeds in finding the 
translation of “Palme”, which turns out to be the German motto preceding the poem. 
Celebrating the recovery of lost memories and words, the poem, ends on a positive note: 
But nothing’s lost. Or else: all is translation 
And every bit of us is lost in it 
(Or found – I wander through the ruin of S 
Now and then, wondering at the peacefulness)  
And in that loss a self-effacing tree, 
Color of context, imperceptibly 
Rustling with its angel, turns the waste 
To shade and fiber, milk and memory. (ll. 198-205) 
It is surprising to discover how much of the discourse on multilingualism and translation later 
developed in the works that are analyzed in this thesis is anticipated in this last stanza of 
Merrill’s poem. Drawing on the translational metaphor that has been, from Freud’s time and 
until today, popular in psychological discourse, the phrase that “all is translation” not only 
confirms George Steiner’s comparison of understanding and translation (1975) and Jurij 
Lotman’s claim that “the elementary act of thinking is translation” (1990, 143); it also 
highlights the centrality of the literary figure of linguistic border-crossing that I have analyzed 
in many of its facets in this thesis. What is more, Merrill’s formulation that “every bit of us is 
lost in [translation] / (Or found […]” prefigures the entire spectrum of the negotiations of 
linguistic border-crossings as discussed in the previous chapters. According to Merrill’s own 
evaluation, translation pervades all spheres of human life and shows the way to working 
through painful memories and understanding one’s personal history. His optimistic troping of 
translating is reflected in the multilingual texture of the poem, which shows but another 
parallel to the works I have examined. 
 As I would like to point out, Merrill’s poem suggests several directions for future 
research. First, it places the figure of linguistic border-crossings in the context of another 
237 
 
theme which is present in most of the works I have discussed, but which has not been 
addressed in its own right: the theme of coming of age. Clearly, the question of where and 
how one learns another language is bound up with that of where and how one grows up in 
general. Further, in its metaphorical dimension, the motif of translation implies a retracing of 
one’s personal life narrative – a project that necessarily points back to childhood and 
adolescence. It is not coincidental, therefore, that the theme of growing up and coming of age 
figures in many multilingual works. Thus, Self and The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao 
both qualify for the label of the ‘Bildungsroman’; Lost in Translation does so, albeit in the 
genre of non-fiction; Everything Is Illuminated, The Farming of Bones, Calendar and The 
Science of Sleep are centrally concerned with stories from the protagonists’ childhood or 
youth; and Europa seems obsessed with the theme of initiation. 
 Since the theme of coming-of-age stands out so prominently in the works discussed, it 
would be worthwhile to devote more attention to its interconnections with the issue of 
multilingualism and translation. More specifically, it would be relevant to explore the 
multilingual ‘Bildungsroman’ in a diachronic perspective in order to understand whether the 
figure of linguistic border-crossing or the aesthetics of literary multilingualism in any way 
appear constitutive of the genre. Also, research could focus on multilingual stories of 
initiation in the context of nation-building narratives or, to speak with Benedict Anderson, the 
making of “imagined communities” (1983). Independently of the issue of multilingualism, 
such research has been carried out in the fields of literature and film in different national, 
post-colonial, ethnic, and diasporic contexts (cf. Müller 1987, Millard 2007, Bolton 2010, 
Dodgson-Katiyo and Wisker 2010, Bennett and Beirne 2011, Bolaki 2011). An essay such as 
by Josephine May, who argues that adolescence is used in Australian cinema as a metaphor 
for a young nation’s coming of age and its transition from colonial to post-colonial conditions, 
is representative of this line of research (2011). Taking Adams’ and Carfagna’s sociological 
study, Coming of Age in a Globalized World (2006) as an impulse, it would be also interesting 
to examine whether multilingual stories of initiation can be seen as part of the myth-making 
of globalization and cosmopolitanism. 
 Furthermore, Merrill’s “Lost in Translation” proposes still another project for future 
research. While a French Mademoiselle has traditionally been a character announcing an 
elitist multilingual upbringing, the governess in the poem seems to be the closest caregiver the 
young boy has, while his family is breaking apart. What is more, she is endowed with an own 
story. By placing her repressed past at the center of the narrative poem, Merrill undermines 
the image of the elite multilingualism, and focuses on the Mademoiselle’s personal 
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multilingual trajectory as a language migrant, which is partly associated for her with the 
feeling of shame. Significantly, the boy’s inherited German accent in French also displaces 
the idea of flawless elite multilingualism and stands out as a marker of a not so flawless, and 
simply human past. 
As has become clear from the opposition between works such as Lost in Translation 
and Self, within the frame of multilingual fiction, it still makes a big difference whether 
linguistic border-crossings take place in the context of political migration or youthful 
experimentation. However, as the majority of the works analyzed in the thesis demonstrate, 
literary multilingualism has been lifted out of the elite position that it used to occupy, as 
mentioned in the introduction, in literary history. This raises the question of the position of 
contemporary multilingual fiction in the literary and cinematic market. While the films 
discussed in the thesis derive their freedom of multilingual experimentation from being art-
house productions, other, less experimental, productions such as Alejandro González 
Iñárritu’s Babel or Sofia Coppola’s Lost in Translation have helped multilingualism reach the 
cinematic mainstream. The multilingual literary fiction explored in the thesis cannot yet be 
said to represent a literary mainstream. However, particularly Lost in Translation, Calendar 
and The Farming of Bones present us with multilingualism as a topic and a technique clearly 
not exclusively reserved for an elite market niche. It remains to be seen whether a wider trend 
of writing multilingual fiction without the air of elitism can be observed in the future. 
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